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THE    MEMOIRS   OF 
COLONEL    JOHN    S.    MOSBY 


. 


COLONEL  MOSBY   AT  THE  AGE  OF  FIFTY-FIVE  YEARS 

His  sister  considers  this  a  perfect  likeness  of  him 


THE  MEMOIRS  OF 


COLONEL  JOHN  S.  MOSBY 


EDITED    BY 

CHARLES   WELLS   RUSSELL 


L  - 

Lf3J 


WITH  ILLUSTRATIONS 


NGN-REFER? 


oaWVAO-Q3S 


■^w 


BOSTON 

LITTLE,   BROWN,   AND   COMPANY 

1917 


THE  LIBRARY 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  MORTH  CAROLINA 

AT  CHAPEL  H<LL 


Copyright,  /Qf?, 
By  Little,  Brown,  and  Company. 


All  rights  reserved 
Published,  September,  191 7 


Norfaoolj  $«ss 
Set  ud  and  electrotvDed  bv  J.  S.  Cushing  Co.,  Norwood.  Mass..  U.S.A. 


ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

Acknowledgment  is  made  to  the  publishers 
of  Munsey's  Magazine,  Leslie's  Weekly,  and  the 
New  York  Herald  for  permission  to  use  material 
which  has  previously  appeared  in  their  pages. 


INTRODUCTION 

The  chronicles  of  history  record  that  in  most 
wars  some  figure,  through  intrepidity,  originality, 
and  brilliancy  of  action,  has  raised  himself  above 
his  fellows  and  achieved  a  picturesqueness  which 
is  commonly  associated  only  with  characters  of 
fiction.  In  the  American  Civil  War,  or  the  War 
Between  the  States,  three  dashing  cavalry  leaders 
—  Stuart,  Forrest,  and  Mosby  —  so  captured  the 
public  imagination  that  their  exploits  took  on  a 
glamour,  which  we  associate  —  as  did  the  writers 
of  the  time  —  with  the  deeds  of  the  Waverley 
characters  and  the  heroes  of  Chivalry.  Of  the 
three  leaders  Colonel  John  S.  Mosby  (1833-1916) 
was,  perhaps,  the  most  romantic  figure.  In  the 
South  his  dashing  exploits  made  him  one  of  the 
great  heroes  of  the  "Lost  Cause."  In  the  North 
he  was  painted  as  the  blackest  of  redoubtable 
scoundrels,  a  fact  only  to  be  explained  as  due  to 
the  exasperation  caused  by  a  successful  enemy 
against  whom  all  measures  were  worthless  and  in- 


viii  INTRODUCTION 

effective.  So  great  became  the  fame  of  Mosby's 
partisan  exploits  that  soldiers  of  fortune  came  even 
from  Europe  to  share  his  adventures. 

Colonel  Mosby  was  a  "Virginian  of  the  Vir- 
ginians", educated  at  the  State's  University,  and 
seemed  destined  to  pass  his  life  as  an  obscure 
Virginia  attorney,  when  war  brought  him  his 
opportunity  for  fame.  The  following  pages  con- 
tain the  story  of  his  life  as  private  in  the  cavalry, 
as  a  scout,  and  as  a  leader  of  partisans. 

But  Mosby  was  the  type  of  man  who  is  not 
content  with  the  routine  performance  of  duties, 
and  this  was  illustrated  early  in  his  career  as  a 
soldier.  He  was  ever  on  the  watch  to  aid  the  cause 
in  which  he  was  engaged.  Stuart's  famous  ride 
around  McClellan  and  Lee's  attack  on  Pope,  be- 
fore he  could  be  reinforced,  were  deeds  for  which 
Mosby  fairly  earned  some  share  of  credit.  These 
enterprises,  together  with  his  prevention  of  Sheri- 
dan's use  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  had  a  dis- 
tinct bearing  upon  the  successful  maintenance  of 
the  Southern  Confederacy  for  four  long  years.  But 
his  great  work  was  his  distinctive  warfare  near 
Washington  against  the  troops  guarding  the  Poto- 
mac. Behind  the  Northern  forces  aiming  at  Rich- 
mond, for  two  years  of  almost  incredible  activity  — 
Mosby  himself  said,  "I  rarely  rested  more  than  a 


INTRODUCTION  ix 

day  at  a  time"  —  he  maintained  his  warfare, 
neutralizing  at  times  some  fifty  thousand  troops 
by  compelling  them  to  guard  the  rear  of  the  enemy 
and  his  capital.  The  four  counties  of  Virginia 
nearest  Washington  became  known  as  "Mosby's 
Confederacy."  Here  his  blows  were  almost  in- 
cessant, followed  always  by  the  dispersing  of  his 
band  or  bands  among  the  farmhouses  of  the  sym- 
pathetic inhabitants.  Seldom  or  never  was  an 
attack  made  with  more  than  two  hundred  and  fifty 
men.  Usually  from  thirty  to  sixty  would  be  col- 
lected at  a  rendezvous,  such  as  Rectortown,  Aldie, 
or  Upperville,  and  after  discharging,  as  it  were, 
a  lightning  flash,  be  swallowed  up  in  impenetrable 
darkness,  leaving  behind  only  a  threat  of  some 
future  raid,  to  fall  no  one  could  foresee  where. 
The  execution  of  this  bold  plan  was  successful  — 
long  successful ;  its  damage  to  the  enemy  enormous, 
and  it  exhibited  a  military  genius  of  the  highest 
order.  By  reason  of  his  originality  and  intellec- 
tual boldness,  as  well  as  his  intrepidity  and  success 
of  execution,  Mosby  is  clearly  entitled  to  occupy  a 
preeminence  among  the  partisan  leaders  of  history. 
And  this  is  to  be  said  for  him,  that  he  created 
and  kept  up  to  the  end  of  the  great  war  "  Mosby's 
Confederacy",  while  preserving  the  full  confidence 
and  regard  of  the  knightly  Lee. 


x  INTRODUCTION 

Confederate  General  Marcus  Wright,  who  as- 
sisted in  editing  the  records  of  the  war,  wrote  to 
Colonel  Mosby  as  follows : 

Dear  Colonel  Mosby : 

It  may  and  I  know  will  be  interesting  to  you  that  I 
have  carefully  read  all  of  General  R.  E.  Lee's  dispatches, 
correspondence,  etc.,  during  the  war  of  1861-1865 ; 
and  while  he  was  not  in  the  habit  of  paying  compli- 
ments, yet  these  papers  of  his  will  show  that  you  re- 
ceived from  him  more  compliments  and  commendations 
than  any  other  officer  in  the  Confederate  army. 

But  an  even  more  effective  testimonial  of 
Mosby's  success  comes  from  the  records  of  his 
enemy.  For  a  time  the  Northern  belief  was  that 
"Mosby"  was  a  myth,  the  "Wandering  Jew"  of 
the  struggle.  Later,  he  was  termed  the  "Modern 
Rob  Roy."  Such  epithets  as  "land  pirate", 
"horse  thief",  "murderer",  and  "guerrilla"  bear 
witness  of  the  feeling  of  exasperation  against 
the  man.  "Guerrilla",  however,  was  the  favorite 
epithet,  and  Mosby  did  not  resent  its  use,  for  he 
believed  that  his  success  had  made  the  term  an 
honorable  one. 

The  effectiveness  of  Mosby's  work  is  illustrated 
by  the  following  comment  of  the  Comte  de  Paris 
in  his  "History  of  the  Civil  War  in  America"  : 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

In  Washington  itself,  General  Heintzelman  was  in 
command,  who,  besides  the  depots  .  .  .  had  under  his 
control  several  thousand  infantry  ready  to  take  the 
field,  and  Stahel's  division  of  cavalry  numbering  6,000 
horses,  whose  only  task  was  to  pursue  Mosby  and  the 
few  hundred  partisans  led  by  this  daring  chief. 

General  Joseph  E.  Hooker,  in  his  testimony 
on  the  conduct  of  the  war,  said  : 

I  may  here  state  that  while  at  Fairfax  Court  House 
my  cavalry  was  reinforced  by  that  of  Major-General 
Stahel.  The  latter  numbered  6,100  sabres.  .  .  .  The 
force  opposed  to  them  was  Mosby's  guerrillas,  number- 
ing about  200,  and,  if  the  reports  of  the  newspapers 
were  to  be  believed,  this  whole  party  was  killed  two 
or  three  times  during  the  winter.  From  the  time 
I  took  command  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  there 
was  no  evidence  that  any  force  of  the  enemy,  other 
than  the  above-named,  was  within  100  miles  of  Wash- 
ington City ;  and  yet  the  planks  on  the  chain  bridge 
were  taken  up  at  night  the  greater  part  of  the  winter 
and  spring.  It  was  this  cavalry  force,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, I  had  occasion  to  ask  for,  that  my  cavalry  might 
be  strengthened  when  it  was  numerically  too  weak  to 
cope  with  the  superior  numbers  of  the  enemy. 

How  redoubtable  Mosby  was  considered  by  the 
Northern  authorities  may  be  seen  from  the  fol- 
lowing : 


xii  INTRODUCTION 

War  Department, 
Washington,  April  16,  1865. 
Major-General  Hancock, 

Winchester,  Va. 
In  holding  an  interview  with  Mosby,  it  may  be  need- 
less to  caution  an  old  soldier  like  you  to  guard  against 
surprise  or  danger  to  yourself ;  but  the  recent  mur- 
ders show  such  astounding  wickedness  that  too  much 
precaution  cannot  be  taken.  If  Mosby  is  sincere,  he 
might  do  much  toward  detecting  and  apprehending  the 

murderers  of  the  President. 

Edwin  M.  Stanton, 

Secretary  of  War. 

Secretary  Stanton  had  previously  telegraphed 
to  Hancock,  "There  is  evidence  that  Mosby  knew 
of  Booth's  plan"  — concerning  the  assassination 
of  Lincoln  —  "and  was  here  in  the  city  with  him." 

No  one  knew  better  than  Hancock  that  Mosby, 
at  the  time  of  the  assassination,  was  in  Virginia. 
The  notion  that  he  had  anything  to  do  with 
this  crime  was  a  part  of  the  reputation  he  had 
acquired  in  the  North  and  which  he  was  doubtless 
quite  willing  to  acquire  in  order  to  give  worse 
dreams  to  those  of  the  enemy  who  were  in  the 
neighborhood  of  his  operations.  This  reputation 
was  fostered  by  soldiers,  who,  during  the  war  and 
long  afterwards,  entertained  their  firesides  with 
tales   of   hairbreadth    escapes   from    the   dreadful 


INTRODUCTION  xiii 

guerrillas.  But  some  of  Mosby's  best  friends  in 
his  later  life  were  men  who  had  been  his  prisoners. 

So  far  did  the  hostility  and  feeling  against 
Mosby  carry  that  as  late  as  May  4,  1865,  almost 
a  month  after  Lee's  surrender,  General  Grant  tele- 
graphed to  General  Halleck,  "  I  would  advise  offer- 
ing a  reward  of  $5,000  for  Mosby."  This  was 
done,  but  nobody  captured  him. 

The  turning  point  in  his  career  after  the  war 
was  his  endorsement  of  and  voting  for  Grant  in 
1872.  The  Civil  War  was  then  but  seven  years 
past,  and  the  Southern  people  were  not  prepared 
to  follow  his  lead.  They  turned  against  him  bit- 
terly —  against  one  of  their  chief  heroes,  whom 
they  had  delighted  to  honor  —  who  had  struggled 
so  manfully  and  for  so  long  against  the  storm 
raging  against  them.  Young  and  of  little  experi- 
ence in  politics  he  may  have  thought  it  incon- 
ceivable that  they  would  treat  his  voting  for 
the  magnanimous  soldier  as  the  unforgivable  sin. 
His  motive  was  rather  gratitude  than  political,  — 
rather  a  response  to  Grant's  behavior  toward  the 
Southern  army,  General  Lee,  and  himself,  than  any 
design  to  change  the  attitude  of  the  South  toward 
the  Federal  Government.  Certainly  the  Colonel, 
in  spite  of  abuse  and  recrimination  heaped  upon 
him,  never  repented  of  this  act. 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

During  his  last  illness  Colonel  Mosby  did  say, 
no  doubt  to  hear  himself  contradicted,  "I  pitched 
my  politics  in  too  high  a  key  when  I  voted  for 
Grant.  I  ought  to  have  accepted  office  under 
him.  My  family  would  now  be  comfortably 
supplied  with  money."  But  this  was  far  from 
being  his  serious  opinion,  as  his  own  statements 
show. 

Intellectually  the  Colonel  showed  as  great  a 
constitutional  impatience  of  restraint  and  as 
great  individuality  as  he  exhibited  in  his  opera- 
tions during  the  war.  Perhaps  his  lifelong  fond- 
ness for  Byron's  poetry  resulted  from  a  feeling 
that  there  was  a  resemblance  between  the  experi- 
ences of  Byron,  as  represented  in  his  poems,  and 
his  own  —  the  "war  of  the  many  with  one."  But 
the  resemblance  was  a  superficial  one.  Mosby's 
impatience  of  restraint  was  a  so  strongly  marked 
characteristic  that  he  always  seemed  unwilling 
to  follow  a  plan  of  his  own,  after  having  disclosed 
it  to  another.  Probably  the  reason  the  "  Yankees  " 
trying  to  trap  him  could  never  find  out  where  he 
was  going  to  be  next  was  because  he  never  knew 
himself. 

The  following  from  an  interview  with  him,  which 
appeared  in  the  Philadelphia  Post  in  1867  or  1868, 
illustrates  his  tendency  to  think  independently : 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

"Whom  do  you  consider  the  ablest  General  on  the 
Federal  side?" 

"McClellan,  by  all  odds.  I  think  he  is  the  only 
man  on  the  Federal  side  who  could  have  organized  the 
army  as  it  was.  Grant  had,  of  course,  more  successes 
in  the  field  in  the  latter  part  of  the  war,  but  Grant  only 
came  in  to  reap  the  benefits  of  McClellan's  previous 
efforts.  At  the  same  time,  I  do  not  wish  to  disparage 
General  Grant,  for  he  has  many  abilities,  but  if  Grant 
had  commanded  during  the  first  years  of  the  war,  we 
would  have  gained  our  independence.  Grant's-  policy 
of  attacking  would  have  been  a  blessing  to  us,  for  we 
lost  more  by  inaction  than  we  would  have  lost  in  battle. 
After  the  first  Manassas  the  army  took  a  sort  of  'dry 
rot',  and  we  lost  more  men  by  camp  diseases  than  we 
would  have  by  fighting." 

"What  is  your  individual  opinion  of  Jeff  Davis?" 
"  I  think  history  will  record  him  as  one  of  the  greatest 
men  of  the  time.  Every  lost  cause,  you  know,  must 
have  a  scapegoat,  and  Mr.  Davis  has  been  chosen  as 
such ;  he  must  take  all  the  blame  without  any  of  the 
credit.  I  do  not  know  any  man  in  the  Confederate 
States  that  could  have  conducted  the  war  with  the 
same  success  that  he  did." 

"Are  there  any  bitter  feelings  cherished?" 
"No,  not  now,  except  those  engendered  since  the  war 
by  the  manner  in  which  we  have  been  treated.  .  .  . 
The  whole  administration  of  affairs  in  Virginia  is  in 
the  hands  of  a  lot  of  bounty  jumpers  and  jailbirds, 
and  their  only  qualification  is  that  they  can  take  the 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

iron-clad  oath!"     "But,"  he  added,   "they  generally 
take  anything  else  they  can  lay  their  hands  on." 


General  Grant  and  Colonel  Mosby  came  to  be 
far  more  than  political  friends.  In  fact  it  was 
through  General  Grant  that  Mosby  secured  his 
position  with  the  Southern  Pacific  Railroad  which 
he  held  from  1885  to  1901.  The  two  men  were 
well  suited  to  each  other.  Grant  was  a  silent 
man  —  a  good  listener.  Mosby,  abrupt  and  even 
rude  toward  those  who  wished  to  speak  to  him 
irrelevantly,  dearly  loved  to  talk  to  an  intelligent 
person.  The  silent  and  slow  commander  of  "all 
the  armies",  guided  by  luminous  common  sense, 
and  the  nervous,  impetuous  raider  —  a  raider 
by  temperament,  a  raider  in  every  way  —  in  prac- 
tice of  law,  taking  part  in  politics,  writing  "Me- 
moirs", had  much  in  common  that  was  fundamen- 
tal. They  were  but  children  in  taking  care  of  their 
business  affairs  ;  they  were  shy,  and  full  of  feeling, 
sentiment,  and  romance. 

The  Colonel  was  an  assistant  attorney  in  the 
Department  of  Justice  at  Washington  from  1904 
to  1910  and  continued  to  reside  in  the  Capital 
until  his  death,  May  30,  1916.  He  was  not  often 
inclined  to  talk  about  his  own  exploits  in  the  Civil 
War,  though  going  at  some  length  into  explanations 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

of  the  movements  of  the  great  armies  and  engaging 
in  various  controversies  about  them,  as  well  as 
about  other  matters  of  public  interest,  past  and 
present.  Colonel  Mosby  realized  that  the  ac- 
count of  the  military  operations  at  the  Battle  of 
Manassas  included  in  the  present  volume  is  mark- 
edly at  variance  with  the  usual  version.  His 
efforts  to  unravel  the  story  of  Stuart's  cavalry 
in  the  Gettysburg  campaign  extended  over  many 
years  and  resulted  in  a  book  *  and  numerous 
articles.  The  account  which  he  prepared  for 
these  "Memoirs"  he  considered  the  best  answer 
to  Stuart's  critics,  and  spoke  of  it  as  "  the  final 
word." 

The  Colonel  was  little  interested  in  anything 
which  did  not  concern  man  in  his  social  rela- 
tions except,  perhaps,  logic  and  polemics.  What 
could  not  be  affirmed  positively  with  a  geometric 
Q.  E.  D.  appealed  to  him  only  as  it  concerned  war, 
politics,  sentiment,  or  the  like.  New  inventions 
left  him  cold,  if  not  a  little  resentful,  at  their  dis- 
turbing or  rendering  out  of  date  the  historical 
setting  of  the  Civil  War.  But  in  political  and 
social  matters  he  was  an  advanced  thinker,  al- 
though this  was  rather  a  liberal  attitude  of  mind  — ■ 
in  which  he  took  pride  —  than  any  interest  in  the 

1  Now  used  as  a  textbook  in  the  War  College. 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

views  themselves.  His  horizon  in  general  was 
limited  by  American  history  and  politics.  He 
was  full  of  the  anecdotal  history  of  Virginia  and 
conspicuous  Virginians  of  past  generations,  as 
well  as  information  about  family  relationships  — 
information  such  as  is  printed  in  books  in  New 
England,  but  in  Virginia  has  been  commonly  left 
to  oral  tradition. 

But  the  events  described  in  these  "Memoirs" 
were  his  greatest  interest  and  the  days  when  he  was 
a  commander  of  partisans  were  the  golden  days 
of  his  over  fourscore  years.  As  he  said  at  the 
reunion  of  his  battalion  in  1895  : 

"Life  cannot  afford  a  more  bitter  cup  than  the  one 
I  drained  at  Salem,  nor  any  higher  reward  of  ambition 
than  that  I  received  as  Commander  of  the  Forty- third 
Virginia  Battalion  of  Cavalry." 

CHARLES   W.   RUSSELL. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

Introduction vii 

I    Early  Life i 

II    The  War  Begins n 

III  A  Private  in  the  Cavalry      .        .        .        .22 

IV  Johnston's  Retreat  from  Harper's  Ferry  .      33 
V  Recollections  of  Battle  of  Manassas         .      47 

VI  The  Strategy  of  the  Battle  of  Manassas  .      55 

VII  About  Fairfax  Court  House          ...      86 

VIII  Campaigning  with  Stuart        ....      99 

IX  The  Campaign  against  Pope   .        .        .        .122 

X  First  Exploits  as  a  Partisan         .        .        .146 

XI    The  Raid  on  Fairfax 168 

XII  Stuart  and  the  Gettysburg  Campaign          .     201 

XIII  The  Year  after  Gettysburg  .        .        .258 

XIV  The  Campaign  against  Sheridan    .        .        .     283 
XV    The  Greenback  Raid 312 

XVI  Last  Days  in  the  Valley        .        .        .        .327 

XVII    Final  Scenes 353 

XVIII    In  Retrospect 365 

XLX  My  Recollections  of  General  Lee       .        .374 

XX  My  Recollections  of  General  Grant          .    383 

Index 401 


LIST   OF   ILLUSTRATIONS 

Colonel  Mosby  at  the  Age  of  Fifty-five  Years       .         .         Frontispiece 

FACING    PAGE 

Colonel  Mosby's  Father  and  Brother 8 

Virginia  Jackson  (McLaurine)  Mosby,  Colonel  Mosby's  Mother  16 
Aaron  Burton  (Colored),  Aged  84  Years        .....       30 

Captain  Mosby  in  January,  1863 .150 

Mosby  Returning  from  a  Raid      .         .         .         .         .         .         .154 

Major  Mosby  in  1863.  From  the  Painting  by  Guillaume  .  .  200 
William  H.  Chapman,  Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Next  in  Rank  to 

Colonel  Mosby  when  the  War  Closed  .....  270 
Lieutenant  Fountain  Beatty,  Lieutenant  Frank  H.  Rahm,  and 

Scout  John  Russell  ........     290 

Dr.  J.  Wiltshire  and  Major  A.  E.  Richards 312 

Charles  E.  Grogan,  Colonel  Mosby,  and  Dr.  W.  L.  Dunn     .         .318 
Major  A.  E.  Richards   .........     334 

Colonel  John  S.  Mosby.     Photographed  in  Richmond  in  March, 

1865 356 

William  H.  Mosby,  Colonel  Mosby's  Adjutant  and  Only  Brother     360 

Mosby  in  1866 362 

Colonel  Mosby  at  Fourscore  Years  of  Age  (1915)         .        .        •     398 


... 


THE  SHENANDOAH  VALLEY 

showing  Ihe  positions  of  the  armies  on 


THE   MEMOIRS  OF 
COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

CHAPTER   I 

Early  Life 

I  WAS  born  December  6,  1833,  at  the  home  of 
my  grandfather,  James  McLaurine,  in  Powhatan 
County,  Virginia.  He  was  a  son  of  Robert 
McLaurine,  an  Episcopal  minister,  who  came  from 
Scotland  before  the  Revolution.  Great-grand- 
father McLaurine  lived  at  the  glebe  and  is  buried 
at  Peterville  Church  in  Powhatan.  After  the 
church  was  disestablished,  the  State  appropriated 
the  glebe,  and  Peterville  was  sold  to  the  Baptists. 
My  grandfather  McLaurine  lived  to  be  very  old. 
He  was  a  soldier  of  the  Revolution,  and  I  well 
remember  his  cough,  which  it  was  said  he  con- 
tracted from  exposure  in  the  war  when  he  had 
smallpox.  My  grandfather  Mosby  was  also  a 
native  of  Powhatan.  He  lived  at  Gibraltar,  but 
moved  to  Nelson  County,  where  my  father,  Alfred 
D.  Mosby,  was  born.  When  I  was  a  child  my 
father  bought  a  farm  near  Charlottesville,  in  Albe- 


2  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

marie,  on  which  I  was  raised.  I  recollect  that  one 
day  I  went  with  my  father  to  our  peach  orchard 
on  a  high  ridge,  and  he  pointed  out  Monticello, 
the  home  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  on  a  mountain  a 
few  miles  away,  and  told  me  some  of  the  history  of 
the  great  man  who  wrote  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence. 

At  that  time  there  were  no  public  and  few  private 
schools  in  Virginia,  but  a  widow  opened  a  school  in 
Fry's  Woods,  adjoining  my  father's  farm.  My 
sister  Victoria  and  I  went  as  her  pupils.  I  was 
seven  years  old  when  I  learned  to  read,  although 
I  had  gone  a  month  or  so  to  a  country  school  in 
Nelson,  near  a  post  office  called  Murrell's  Shop, 
where  I  had  learned  to  spell.  As  I  was  so  young 
my  mother  always  sent  a  negro  boy  with  me  to  the 
schoolhouse,  and  he  came  for  me  in  the  evening. 
But  once  I  begged  him  to  stay  all  day  with  me,  and 
I  shared  my  dinner  with  him.  When  playtime 
came,  some  of  the  larger  boys  put  him  up  on  a 
block  for  sale  and  he  was  knocked  down  to  the 
highest  bidder.  I  thought  it  was  a  bona  fide  sale 
and  was  greatly  distressed  at  losing  such  a  dutiful 
playmate.  We  went  home  together,  but  he  never 
spent  another  day  with  me  at  the  schoolhouse. 

The  first  drunken  man  I  ever  saw  was  my  school- 
master.    He  went  home  at  playtime  to  get  his 


EARLY   LIFE  3 

dinner,  but  took  an  overdose  of  whiskey.  On  the 
way  back  he  fell  on  the  roadside  and  went  to  sleep. 
The  big  boys  picked  him  up  and  carried  him  into 
the  schoolhouse,  and  he  heard  our  lessons.  The 
school  closed  soon  after ;   I  don't  know  why. 

It  was  a  common  thing  in  the  old  days  of  negro 
slavery  for  a  Virginia  gentleman,  who  had  in- 
herited a  fortune,  to  live  in  luxury  with  plenty  of 
the  comforts  of  life  and  die  insolvent,*  while  his 
overseer  retired  to  live  on  what  he  had  saved. 
Mr.  Jefferson  was  one  example  of  this.  I  often 
heard  that  Jefferson  had  held  in  his  arms  Betsy 
Wheat,  a  pupil  at  the  school  where  I  learned  to 
read.  She  was  the  daughter  of  the  overseer  and, 
being  the  senior  of  all  the  other  scholars,  was  the 
second  in  command.  She  exercised  as  much  au- 
thority as  the  schoolmistress. 

As  I  have  said,  the  log  schoolhouse  was  in 
Fry's  Woods,  which  adjoined  my  father's  farm. 
To  this  rude  hut  I  walked  daily  for  three  sessions, 
with  my  eldest  sister  —  later  with  two  —  often 
through  a  deep  snow,  to  get  the  rudiments  of  an 
education.  I  remember  that  the  schoolmistress, 
a  most  excellent  woman,  whipped  her  son  and 
me  for  fighting.  That  was  the  only  blow  I  ever 
received  during  the  time  I  went  to  school. 

A  few  years  ago  I  visited  the  spot  in  company 


4  COLONEL  JOHN  S.  MOSBY 

with  Bartlett  Boiling,  who  was  with  me  in  the  war. 
There  was  nothing  left  but  a  pile  of  rocks  —  the 
remains  of  the  chimney.  The  associations  of 
the  place  raised  up  phantoms  of  the  past.  I  am 
the  only  survivor  of  the  children  who  went  to 
school  there.  I  went  to  the  spring  along  the 
same  path  where  I  had  often  walked  when  a 
barefooted  schoolboy  and  got  a  drink  of  cool 
water  from  a  gourd.  There  I  first  realized  the 
pathos  of  the  once  popular  air,  "Ben  Bolt"  ;  the 
spring  was  still  there  and  the  running  brook, 
but  all  of  my  schoolmates  had  gone. 

The  "Peter  Parley"  were  the  standard  school- 
books  of  my  day.  In  my  books  were  two  pic- 
tures that  made  a  lasting  impression  on  me.  One 
was  of  Wolfe  dying  on  the  field  in  the  arms  of  a 
soldier ;  the  other  was  of  Putnam  riding  down 
the  stone  steps  with  the  British  close  behind  him. 
About  that  time  I  borrowed  a  copy  of  the  "Life 
of  Marion",  which  was  the  first  book  I  read, 
except  as  a  task  at  school.  I  remember  how  I 
shouted  when  I  read  aloud  in  the  nursery  of  the 
way  the  great  partisan  hid  in  the  swamp  and  out- 
witted the  British.  I  did  not  then  expect  that  the 
time  would  ever  come  when  I  would  have  escapes 
as  narrow  as  that  of  Putnam  and  take  part  in  ad- 
ventures that  have  been  compared  with  Marion's. 


EARLY   LIFE  5 

When  I  was  ten  years  old  I  began  going  to  school 
in  Charlottesville  ;  sometimes  I  went  on  horseback, 
and  sometimes  I  walked.  Two  of  my  teachers,  — 
James  White,  who  taught  Latin  and  Greek,  and 
Aleck  Nelson,  who  taught  mathematics  —  were 
afterwards  professors  at  Washington  and  Lee, 
while  General  Robert  E.  Lee  was  its  president. 
When  I  was  sixteen  years  old  I  went  as  a  student 
to  the  University  of  Virginia  —  some  evidence  of 
the  progress  I  had  made  in  getting  an  education. 

In  my  youth  I  was  very  delicate  and  often  heard 
that  I  would  never  live  to  be  a  grown  man.  But 
the  prophets  were  wrong,  for  I  have  outlived  nearly 
all  the  contemporaries  of  my  youth.  I  was  de- 
voted to  hunting,  and  a  servant  always  had  coffee 
ready  for  me  at  daylight  on  a  Saturday  morning, 
so  that  I  was  out  shooting  when  nearly  all  were 
sleeping.  My  father  was  a  slaveholder,  and  I  still 
cherish  a  strong  affection  for  the  slaves  who  nursed 
me  and  played  with  me  in  my  childhood.  That 
was  the  prevailing  sentiment  in  the  South  —  not 
one  peculiar  to  myself  —  but  one  prevailing  in  all 
the  South  toward  an  institution  *  which  we  now 


1  Colonel  Mosby  never  had  a  word  to  say  favorable  to  slavery  —  a 
fact  which  may  be  attributed  to  the  influence  of  Miss  Abby  Southwick, 
afterwards  Mrs.  Stevenson,  of  Manchester,  Massachusetts,  who  was 
employed  to  teach  his  sisters.  She  was  a  strong  and  outspoken  aboli- 
tionist and  a  friend  of  Garrison  and  Wendell  Phillips.      All  the  Mosby 


6  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

thank  Abraham  Lincoln  for  abolishing.  I  had 
no  taste  for  athletics  and  have  never  seen  a  ball 
game.  My  habits  of  study  were  never  regular, 
but  I  always  had  a  literary  taste.  While  I  fairly 
recited  Tacitus  and  Thucydides  as  a  task,  I  read 
with  delight  Irving's  stories  of  the  Moors  in 
Granada. 

[Colonel  Mosby's  career  at  the  University  of 
Virginia,  where  he  graduated  in  Greek  and  mathe- 
matics, was  not  so  serene  throughout  as  that  of 
the  ordinary  student.  One  incident  made  a  last- 
ing impression  upon  his  mind  and  affected  his 
future  course.  He  was  convicted  of  unlawfully 
shooting  a  fellow  student  and  was  sentenced  to  a 
fine  and  imprisonment  in  the  jail  at  Charlottesville. 
It  was  the  case  of  defending  the  good  name  of  a 
young  lady  and,  while  the  law  was  doubtless  vio- 
lated, public  sentiment  was  indicated  by  the  legis- 
lature's remitting  the  fine  and  the  governor's 
granting  a  pardon. 

The  Baltimore  Sun  published  an  account  of 
this  incident,  by  Mr.  John  S.  Patton,  who  said 

family  were,  and  remained,  devoted  to  Miss  Southwick.  She  and  young 
Mosby  had  numerous  talks  on  the  subject  of  slavery  and  other  political 
topics.  At  the  close  of  the  war  she  immediately  sent  money  and  sup- 
plies to  the  family  and  told  how  anxiously  she  had  read  the  papers, 
fearing  to  find  the  news  that  he  had  been  killed. 


EARLY  LIFE  7 

that  Mosby  had  been  fined  ten  dollars  for  as- 
saulting the  town  sergeant.  The  young  Mosby 
had  been  known  as  one  not  given  to  lawless  hilar- 
ity, but  as  a  " fighter."  "And  the  Colonel  him- 
self admits,"  continues  Patton,  "that  he  got  the 
worst  of  these  boyish  engagements,  except  once, 
when  the  fight  was  on  between  him  and  Charles 
Price,  of  Meachem's,  —  and  in  that  case  they 
were  separated  before  victory  could  perch.  They 
also  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  he  was  a  spirited  lad, 
although  far  from  'talkative'  and  not  far  from 
quiet,  introspective  moods.  .  .  .  His  antagonist 
this  time  was  George  Turpin,  a  student  of  medi- 
cine in  the  University.  .  .  .  Turpin  had  carved 
Frank  Morrison  to  his  taste  with  a  pocket  knife 
and  added  to  his  reputation  by  nearly  killing 
Fred  M.  Wills  with  a  rock.  .  .  . 

"When  Jack  Mosby,  spare  and  delicate  —  Turpin 
was  large  and  athletic — received  the  latter 's  threat  that 
he  would  eat  him  '  blood  raw '  on  sight,  he  proceeded 
to  get  ready.  The  cause  of  the  impending  hostilities 
was  an  incident  at  a  party  at  the  Spooner  residence  in 
Montebello,  which  Turpin  construed  as  humiliating  to 
him,  and  with  the  aid  of  some  friends  who  dearly  loved 
a  fisticuff,  he  reached  the  conclusion  that  John  Mosby 
was  to  blame  and  that  it  was  his  duty  to  chastise  him. 
Mosby  was  due  at  Mathematics  lecture  room  and 
thither  he  went  and  met  Professor  Courtnay  and  did 


8  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

his  problems  first  of  all.  That  over,  he  thrust  a  pepper- 
box pistol  into  his  jacket  and  went  forth  to  find  his 
enemy.  He  had  not  far  to  go;  for  by  this  time  the 
Turpins  were  keeping  a  boarding  house  in  the  building 
then,  as  now,  known  as  the  Cabell  House,  about  the 
distance  of  four  Baltimore  blocks  from  the  University. 
Thither  went  the  future  partisan  leader,  and,  with  a 
friend,  was  standing  on  the  back  porch  when  Turpin 
approached.  He  advanced  on  Mosby  at  once  —  but 
not  far;  the  latter  brought  his  pepper-box  into  action 
with  instant  effect.  Turpin  went  down  with  a  bullet 
in  his  throat,  and  was  taken  up  as  good  as  dead.  .  .  . 
The  trial  is  still  referred  to  as  the  cause  celebre  in  our 
local  court.  Four  great  lawyers  were  engaged  in  it: 
the  names  of  Robertson,  Rives,  Watson,  and  Leach 
adorn  the  legal  annals  of  Virginia." 

The  prosecutor  in  this  case  was  Judge  William 
J.  Robertson,  of  Charlottesville,  who  made  a 
vigorous  arraignment  of  the  young  student.  On 
visiting  the  jail  one  day  after  the  conviction, 
much  to  his  surprise  Robertson  was  greeted  by 
Mosby  in  a  friendly  manner.  This  was  followed 
by  the  loan  of  a  copy  of  Blackstone's  "Com- 
mentaries" to  the  prisoner  and  a  lifelong  friend- 
ship between  the  two.  Thus  it  was  that  young 
Mosby  entered  upon  the  study  of  law,  which  he 
made  his  profession. 

Colonel  Mosby  wrote  on  a  newspaper  clipping 


COLONEL  MOSBY'S   FATHER  AXD   BROTHER 

Taken  shortly  before  the  War.     The  brother,  William  H.  Mosby,  joined  the 

command  in  1863  at  the  age  of  18,  and  was  later  Mosby's  Adjutant. 

He  is  shown  in  the  uniform  of  a  Military  School 


EARLY  LIFE  9 

giving  an  account  of  the  shooting  incident:  "I 
did  not  go  to  Turpin's  house,  but  he  came  to  my 
boarding  house,  and  he  had  sent  me  a  message 
that  he  was  coming  there  to  'eat  me  up.'  " 

Mosby's  conviction  affected  him  greatly,  and 
he  did  not  include  an  account  of  it  in  his  story 
because  —  or  at  least  it  would  seem  probable  — 
he  feared  that  the  conclusion  would  be  drawn 
that  he  was  more  like  the  picture  painted  by  the 
enemy  during  the  war,  instead  of  the  kindly  man 
he  really  was.  However  this  may  be,  nothing 
pleased  him  more  than  the  honors  paid  to  him  by 
the  people  of  Charlottesville  and  by  the  Univer- 
sity of  Virginia.  He  spoke  of  these  things  as 
"one  of  Time's  revenges." 

In  January,  191 5,  a  delegation  from  Virginia 
presented  Colonel  Mosby  with  a  bronze  medal 
and  an  embossed  address  which  read  as  follows : 

To  Colonel  John  S.  Mosby,  Warrenton,  Virginia. 

Your  friends  and  admirers  in  the  University  of  Vir- 
ginia welcome  this  opportunity  of  expressing  for  you 
their  affection  and  esteem  and  of  congratulating  you 
upon  the  vigor  and  alertness  of  body  and  mind  with 
which  you  have  rounded  out  your  fourscore  years. 

Your  Alma  Mater  has  pride  in  your  scholarly  applica- 
tion in  the  days  of  your  prepossessing  youth;  in  your 
martial  genius,  manifested  in  a  career  singularly  orig- 
inal and  romantic;    in  the  forceful  fluency  of  your 


io  COLONEL  JOHN  S.    MOSBY 

record  of  the  history  made  by  yourself  and  your  com- 
rades in  the  army  of  Northern  Virginia;  and  in  the 
dignity,  diligence,  and  sagacity  with  which  you  have 
served  your  united  country  at  home  and  abroad. 

Endowed  with  the  gift  of  friendship,  which  won  for 
you  the  confidence  of  both  Lee  and  Grant,  you  have 
proven  yourself  a  man  of  war,  a  man  of  letters,  and  a 
man  of  affairs  worthy  the  best  traditions  of  your  Uni- 
versity and  your  State,  to  both  of  which  you  have  been 
a  loyal  son.] 


CHAPTER   II 
The  War  Begins 

I  went  to  Bristol,  Virginia,  in  October,  1855, 
and  opened  a  law  office.  I  was  a  stranger  and 
the  first  lawyer  that  located  there. 

When  attending  court  at  Abingdon  in  the  sum- 
mer of  i860  I  met  William  Blackford,  who  had 
been  in  class  with  me  at  the  University  and  who 
was  afterwards  a  colonel  of  engineers  on  General 
Stuart's  staff.  Blackford  asked  me  to  join  a 
cavalry  company  which  he  was  assisting  to  raise 
and  in  which  he  expected  to  be  a  lieutenant.  To 
oblige  him  I  allowed  my  name  to  be  put  on  the 
muster  roll ;  but  was  so  indifferent  about  the 
matter  that  I  was  not  present  when  the  company 
organized.  William  E.  Jones  was  made  captain. 
He  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point  and  had  resigned 
from  the  United  States  army  a  few  years  before. 
Jones  was  a  fine  soldier,  but  his  temper  produced 
friction  with  his  superiors  and  greatly  impaired 
his  capacity  as  a  commander. 

There  were  omens  of  war  at  this  time,  but  no- 

11 


12  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

body  realized  the  impending  danger.  Our  first 
drill  was  on  January  Court  Day,  1861.  I  bor- 
rowed a  horse  and  rode  up  to  Abingdon  to  take 
my  first  lesson.  After  the  drill  was  over  and 
the  company  had  broken  ranks,  I  went  to  hear 
John  B.  Floyd  make  a  speech  on  the  condition  of 
the  times.  He  had  been  Secretary  of  War  and 
had  lately  resigned.  Buchanan,  in  a  history  of 
his  administration,  said  that  Floyd's  resignation 
had  nothing  to  do  with  secession,  but  he  requested 
it  on  account  of  financial  irregularities  he  had 
discovered  in  the  War  Department. 

But  to  return  to  the  campaign  of  i860.  I 
never  had  any  talent  or  taste  for  stump  speaking 
or  handling  party  machines,  but  with  my  strong 
convictions  I  was  a  supporter  of  Douglas  l  and 
the  Union. 

Whenever  a  Whig  became  extreme  on  the 
slave  question,  he  went  over  to  the  opposition 
party.  No  doubt  the  majority  of  the  Virginia 
Democrats  agreed  with  the  Union  sentiments  of 
Andrew   Jackson,    but   the   party   was   controlled 

1  Colonel  Mosby  was  almost  the  only  Douglas  Democrat  in  Bristol ; 
that  is  to  say  he  was  in  favor  of  recognizing  the  right  of  a  territory 
belonging  to  the  United  States  to  vote  against  slavery  within  its  bor- 
ders. The  Breckinridge  Democrats  believed,  especially  after  the 
decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Dred  Scott  case,  in  the  right  of 
the  slaveholders  to  take  their  slaves  into  the  territories  and  hold  them 
there  in  slavery  against  the  wishes  of  the  inhabitants. 


THE  WAR  BEGINS  13 

by  a  section  known  as  "the  chivalry",  who  were 
disciples  of  Calhoun,  and  got  most  of  the  honors. 
It  was  for  this  reason  that  a  Virginia  Senator 
(Mason),  who  belonged  to  that  school,  was  se- 
lected to  read  to  the  Senate  the  dying  speech  of 
the  great  apostle  of  secession  and  slavery  (Cal- 
houn). It  proved  to  be  a  legacy  of  woe  to  the 
South. 

I  met  Mr.  Mason  at  an  entertainment  given 
him  on  his  return  from  London  after  the  close  of 
the  war.  He  still  bore  himself  with  pride  and 
dignity,  but  without  that  hauteur  which  is  said 
to  have  characterized  him  when  he  declared  in 
the  Senate  that  he  was  an  ambassador  from  Vir- 
ginia. He  found  his  home  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  desolate.  It  will  be  remembered  that, 
with  John  Slidell,  Mason  was  captured  when  a 
passenger  on  board  an  English  steamer  and  sent 
a  prisoner  to  Fort  Warren  (in  Boston  Harbor), 
but  he  was  released  on  demand  of  the  English 
government.  Mason  told  us  many  interesting 
things  about  his  trip  to  London  —  of  a  conversa- 
tion with  Lord  Brougham  at  a  dinner,  and  the 
mistake  the  London  post  office  had  made  in  send- 
ing his  mail  to  the  American  minister,  Charles 
Francis  Adams,  and  Mr.  Adams's  mail  to  Mason. 
Seeing  him  thus  in  the  wreck  of  his  hopes  and  with 


14  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

no  future  to  cheer  him,  I  was  reminded  of  Caius 
Marius  brooding  among  the  ruins  of  Carthage. 

William  L.  Yancey,  of  Alabama,  did  more  than 
any  other  man  in  the  South  to  precipitate  the 
sectional  conflict.  In  a  commercial  convention, 
shortly  before  the  campaign  of  i860,  he  had 
offered  resolutions  in  favor  of  repealing  the  laws 
against  the  African  slave  trade.  Yancey  at- 
tacked Thomas  Jefferson  as  an  abolitionist,  as 
Calhoun  had  done  in  the  Senate,  and  called 
Virginia  a  breeding  ground  for  slaves  to  sell  to 
the  Cotton  States.  He  also  charged  her  people 
with  using  the  laws  against  the  importation  of 
Africans  to  create  for  themselves  a  monopoly 
in  the  slave  market.  Roger  A.  Pryor  replied  to 
him  in  a  powerful  speech. 

Yancey  was  more  responsible  than  any  other 
man  for  the  disruption  of  the  Democratic  Party 
and,  consequently,  of  the  Union.  He  came  to 
Virginia  to  speak  in  the  Presidential  canvass.  I 
was  attending  court  at  Abingdon,  where  Yancey 
was  advertised  to  speak.  A  few  Douglas  men 
in  the  county  had  invited  Tim  Rives,  a  famous 
stump  orator,  to  meet  Yancey,  and  I  was 
delegated  to  call  on  the  latter  and  prepare  a 
joint  debate.  Yancey  was  stopping  at  the  house 
of    Governor    Floyd  —  then    Secretary    of    War. 


THE  WAR  BEGINS  15 

I  went  to  Floyd's  home,  was  introduced  to  Yancey, 
and  stated  my  business.  He  refused  the  joint 
debate,  and  I  shall  never  forget  the  arrogance 
and  contempt  with  which  he  treated  me.  I  heard 
his  speech  that  day ;  it  was  a  strong  one  for  his 
side.  As  the  Virginia  people  had  not  yet  been 
educated  up  to  the  secession  point,  Yancey  thinly 
veiled  his  disunion  purposes.  That  night  we 
put  up  Tim  Rives,  who  made  a  great  speech  in 
reply  to  Yancey  and  pictured  the  horrors  of  dis- 
union and  war.  Rives  was  elected  a  member  of 
the  Convention  that  met  the  next  winter,  and 
there  voted  against  disunion. 

Early  in  the  war,  the  company  in  which  I  was 
a  private  was  in  camp  near  Richmond,  and  one 
day  I  met  Rives  on  the  street.  It  was  the  first 
time  I  had  seen  him  since  the  speech  at  Abingdon. 
I  had  written  an  account  of  his  speech  for  a  Rich- 
mond paper,  which  pleased  him  very  much,  and 
he  was  very  cordial.  He  wanted  me  to  go  with 
him  to  the  governor's  house  and  get  Governor 
Letcher,  who  had  also  been  a  Douglas  man  the 
year  before,  to  give  me  a  commission.  I  declined 
and  told  him  that  as  I  had  no  military  training, 
I  preferred  serving  as  a  private  under  a  good 
officer.  I  had  no  idea  then  that  I  should  ever 
rise  above  the  ranks. 


16  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

A  few  days  before  the  presidential  election,  I 
was  walking  on  the  street  in  Bristol  when  I  was 
attracted  by  a  crowd  that  was  holding  a  Bell 
and  Everett  meeting.  Some  one  called  on  me  to 
make  a  Union  speech.  I  rose  and  told  the  meeting 
that  I  saw  no  reason  for  making  a  Union  speech 
at  a  Bell  and  Everett  meeting ;  that  it  was  my 
mission  to  call  not  the  righteous,  but  sinners,  to 
repentance.  This  "brought  down  the  house."  I 
little  thought  that  in  a  few  months  I  should  be 
regarded  as  one  of  the  sinners. 

I  was  very  friendly  with  the  editor  of  the  se- 
cession paper  in  my  town.  One  day  he  asked  me 
what  I  intended  to  do  in  the  case  of  a  collision 
between  the  Government  and  South  Carolina. 
I  told  him  I  would  be  on  the  side  of  the  Union. 
He  said  that  I  should  find  him  on  the  other  side. 
"Very  well,"  I  replied,  "I  shall  meet  you  at  Phil- 
ippi."  Some  years  after  the  war  he  called  upon 
me  in  Washington  and  jokingly  reminded  me  of 
what  I  had  said  to  him.  As  he  was  about  my 
age  and  did  not  go  into  the  army,  I  was  tempted 
to  tell  him  that  I  did  go  to  Philippi,  but  did  not 
meet  him  there.1 

1  The  editor  in  question,  Mr.  J.  A.  Sperry,  of  the  Bristol  Courier, 
has  told  the  story  in  a  somewhat  different  way.  In  writing  his  remi- 
niscences of  Mosby  he  said : 

"Mosby  pursued  the  even  tenor  of  his  way  until  the  memorable 


VIRGINIA  JACKSON  (McLAURINE)  MOSBY 

Colonel  Mosby's  Mother 


THE  WAR   BEGINS  17 

In  April,  1861,  came  the  call  to  arms.  On  the 
day  after  the  bombardment  by  South  Carolina 
and  the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter  that  aroused 
all  the  slumbering  passions  of  the  country,  I  was 

Presidential  Campaign  of  i860.  So  guarded  had  been  his  political 
utterances  that  but  few  of  the  villagers  knew  with  which  of  the  parties 
to  class  him,  when  he  suddenly  bloomed  out  as  an  elector  on  the  Doug- 
las ticket.  This  seemed  to  fix  his  status  as  a  Union  Democrat.  I 
say  seemed,  for  I  am  now  inclined  to  think  his  politics  was  like  his 
subsequent  fighting,  —  independent  and  irregular. 

"We  saw  little  of  him  in  the  stirring  times  immediately  succeeding 
the  election.  One  morning  about  the  middle  of  January,  1861,  I  met 
him  in  the  street,  when  he  abruptly  accosted  me,  'I  believe  you  are  a 
secessionist  per  se.' 

"'What  has  led  you  to  that  conclusion?' 

"'The  editorial  in  your  paper  to-day.' 

"'You  have  not  read  it  carefully,'  said  I.  'There  is  nothing  in  it 
to  justify  your  inference.  In  summing  up  the  events  of  the  week,  I 
find  that  several  sovereign  States  have  formally  severed  their  connection 
with  the  Union.  We  are  confronted  with  the  accomplished  fact  of 
secession.  I  have  expressed  no  opinion  either  of  the  right  or  the  expe- 
diency of  the  movement.  I  am  not  a  secessionist  per  se,  if  I  under- 
stand the  term ;  but  a  secessionist  by  the  logic  of  events.' 

"'I  am  glad  to  hear  it,'  he  rejoined.  'I  have  never  coveted  the 
office  of  Jack  Ketch,  but  I  would  cheerfully  fill  it  for  one  day  for  the 
pleasure  of  hanging  a  disunionist  per  se.  Do  you  know  what  secession 
means  ?  It  means  bloody  war,  followed  by  feuds  between  the  border 
States,  which  a  century  may  not  see  the  end  of.' 

'"I  do  not  agree  with  you,'  I  said.  'I  see  no  reason  why  secession 
should  not  be  peaceable.  But  in  the  event  of  the  dreadful  war  you 
predict,  which  side  will  you  take?' 

"'I  shall  fight  for  the  Union,  Sir,  —  for  the  Union,  of  course,  and  you  ? ' 

"'Oh,  I  don't  apprehend  any  such  extremity,  but  if  I  am  forced 
into  the  struggle,  I  shall  fight  for  my  mother  section.  Should  we  meet 
upon  the  field  of  battle,  as  Yancey  said  to  Brownlow  the  other  day,  I 
would  run  a  bayonet  through  you.' 

"'Very  well,  —  we'll  meet  at  Philippi,'  retorted  Mosby  and  stalked 
away. 

"'Several  months  elapsed  before  I  saw  him  again,  but  the  rapid  and 
startling  events  of  those  months  made  them  seem  like  years.     I  was 


18  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

again  attending  court  at  Abingdon,  when  the 
telegraph  operator  told  me  of  the  great  news  that 
had  just  gone  over  the  wire.  Mr.  Lincoln  had 
called  on  the  States  for  troops  to  suppress  the 
rebellion. 

In  the  preceding  December,  Floyd  had  ordered 
Major  Anderson  to  hold  Sumter  against  the  seces- 
sionists to  the  last  extremity.  Anderson  simply 
obeyed  Floyd's  orders.  When  the  news  came, 
Governor  Floyd  was  at  home,  and  I  went  to  his 
house  to  tell  him.  I  remember  he  said  it  would 
be  the  bloodiest  war  the  world  had  ever  seen. 
Floyd's  was  a  sad  fate.  He  had,  as  Secretary  of 
War,  given  great  offense  to  the  North  by  the 
shipping  of  arms  from  the  northern  arsenals  to 
the  South,  some  months  before  secession.  He 
was  charged  with  having  been  in  collusion  with 
the  enemies  of  the  Government  under  which  he 
held  office,  and  with  treachery.  At  Donelson  he 
was  the  senior  officer   in  command.     When   the 

sitting  in  my  office  writing,  one  day  in  the  latter  part  of  April,  when 
my  attention  was  attracted  by  the  quick  step  of  some  one  entering  and 
the  exclamation, '  How  do  you  like  my  uniform  ? ' 

"It  was  a  moment  before  I  could  recognize  the  figure  pirouetting 
before  me  in  the  bob-tail  coat  of  a  cavalry  private. 

"'Why,  Mosby!'  I  exclaimed,  'This  isn't  Philippi,  nor  is  that  a 
Federal  uniform.' 

"'No  more  of  that,'  said  he,  with  a  twinkle  of  the  eye.  'When  I 
talked  that  way,  Virginia  had  not  passed  the  ordinance  of  secession. 
She  is  out  of  the  Union  now.  Virginia  is  my  mother,  God  bless  her ! 
I  can't  fight  against  my  mother,  can  I ? '" 


THE  WAR   BEGINS  19 

other  brigadiers  refused  to  fight  any  longer,  he 
brought  off  his  own  men  and  left  the  others  to 
surrender  to  Grant.  This  was  regarded  as  a 
breach  of  discipline,  and  Jefferson  Davis  relieved 
him  of  his  command. 

When  Lincoln's  proclamation  was  issued,  the 
Virginia  Convention  was  still  in  session  and  had 
not  passed  a  secession  ordinance,  so  she  was  not 
included  with  States  against  which  the  proclama- 
tion was  first  directed.  With  the  exception  of 
the  northwestern  section  of  the  State,  where  there 
were  few  slaves  and  the  Union  sentiment  pre- 
dominated, the  people  of  Virginia,  in  response  to 
the  President's  call  for  troops  to  enforce  the 
laws,  sprang  to  arms  to  resist  the  Government. 
The  war  cry  "To  arms!"  resounded  throughout 
the  land  and,  in  the  delirium  of  the  hour,  we  all 
forgot  our  Union  principles  in  our  sympathy 
with  the  pro-slavery  cause,  and  rushed  to  the 
field  of  Mars. 

In  issuing  his  proclamation,  Lincoln  referred 
for  authority  to  a  statute  in  pursuance  of  which 
George  Washington  sent  an  army  into  Penn- 
sylvania to  suppress  the  Whiskey  Insurrection. 
But  the  people  were  persuaded  that  Lincoln's 
real  object  was  to  abolish  slavery,  although  at  his 
inaugural  he  had  said  : 


20  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

There  has  never  been  any  reasonable  cause  for  such 
apprehension  that  by  the  accession  of  the  Republican 
administration  their  property  and  their  peace  and 
personal  security  were  endangered.  Indeed,  the  most 
ample  evidence  to  the  contrary  has  all  the  while  existed 
and  been  open  to  their  inspection.  It  is  found  in 
nearly  all  the  published  speeches  of  him  who  now  ad- 
dresses you.  I  do  but  quote  from  one  of  those  speeches 
when  I  declare  that  "I  have  no  purpose,  directly  or 
indirectly,  to  interfere  with  the  institution  of  slavery 
in  the  States  where  it  exists."  I  believe  I  have  no 
lawful  right  to  do  so,  and  I  have  no  inclination  to  do 
so. 

The  South  had  always  been  solid  for  slavery 
and  when  the  quarrel  about  it  resulted  in  a  con- 
flict of  arms,  those  who  had  approved  the  policy 
of  disunion  took  the  pro-slavery  side.  It  was 
perfectly  logical  to  fight  for  slavery,  if  it  was  right 
to  own  slaves.  Enforcing  the  laws  was  not 
coercing  a  State  unless  the  State  resisted  the  ex- 
ecution of  the  laws.  When  such  a  collision 
came,  coercion  depended  on  which  was  the  stronger 
side. 

The  Virginia  Convention  had  been  in  session 
about  two  months,  but  a  majority  had  opposed 
secession  up  to  the  time  of  the  proclamation, 
and  even  then  a  large  minority,  including  many 
of  the  ablest  men  in  Virginia,  voted  against  it. 


THE  WAR   BEGINS  21 

Among  that  number  was  Jubal  Early,  who  was 
prominent  in  the  war.  Nobody  cared  whether  it 
was  a  constitutional  right  they  were  exercising, 
or  an  act  of  revolution.  At  such  times  reason  is 
silent  and  passion  prevails. 

The  ordinance  of  secession  was  adopted  in 
April  and  provided  that  it  be  submitted  to  a 
popular  vote  on  the  fourth  Thursday  in  May. 
According  to  the  States'  Rights  theory,  Virginia 
was  still  in  the  Union  until  the  ordinance  was 
ratified ;  but  the  State  immediately  became  an 
armed  camp,  and  her  troops  seized  the  United 
States  Armory  at  Harper's  Ferry  and  the  Nor- 
folk Navy  Yard.  Virginia  went  out  of  the  Union 
by  force  of  arms,  and  I  went  with  her. 


CHAPTER   III 
A  Private  in  the  Cavalry 

In  that  fateful  April,  1861,  our  local  company, 
with  other  companies  of  infantry  and  cavalry, 
went  into  camp  in  a  half-finished  building  of  the 
Martha  Washington  College  in  the  suburbs  of 
Abingdon.  Captain  Jones  allowed  me  to  remain 
in  Bristol  for  some  time  to  close  up  the  business 
I  had  in  hand  for  clients  and  to  provide  for  my 
family.  A  good  many  owed  me  fees  when  I  left 
home,  and  they  still  owe  me.  My  last  appear- 
ance in  court  was  at  Blountville,  Tennessee,  be- 
fore the  Chancellor. 

My  first  night  in  camp  I  was  detailed  as  one  of 
the  camp  guards.  Sergeant  Tom  Edmonson  —  a 
gallant  soldier  who  was  killed  in  June,  1864 — gave 
me  the  countersign  and  instructed  me  as  to  the 
duties  of  a  sentinel.  For  two  hours,  in  a  cold 
wind,  I  walked  my  round  and  was  very  glad  when 
my  relief  came  and  I  could  go  to  rest  on  my  pal- 
let of  straw.  The  experience  of  my  first  night  in 
camp  rather  tended  to  chill  my  military  ardor 

22 


A   PRIVATE   IN  THE   CAVALRY  23 

and  was  far  more  distasteful  than  picketing  near 
the  enemy's  lines  on  the  Potomac,  which  I  after- 
wards did  in  hot  and  cold  weather,  very  cheer- 
fully ;  in  fact  I  enjoyed  it.  The  danger  of  being 
shot  by  a  rifleman  in  a  thicket,  if  not  attractive, 
at  least  kept  a  vidette  awake  and  watching.  At 
this  time  I  was  the  frailest  and  most  delicate  man 
in  the  company,  but  camp  duty  was  always  irk- 
some to  me,  and  I  preferred  being  on  the  out- 
posts. During  the  whole  time  that  I  served  as 
a  private  —  nearly  a  year  —  I  only  once  missed 
going  on  picket  three  times  a  week.  The  single 
exception  was  when  I  was  disabled  one  night  by 
my  horse  falling  over  a  cow  lying  in  the  road. 

Captain  Jones  had  strict  ideas  of  discipline, 
which  he  enforced,  but  he  took  good  care  of  his 
horses  as  well  as  his  men.  There  was  a  horse 
inspection  every  morning,  and  the  man  whose 
horse  was  not  well  groomed  got  a  scolding  mixed 
with  some  cursing  by  Captain  Jones.  Jones  was 
always  very  kind  to  me.  He  drilled  his  own 
company  and  also  a  company  of  cavalry  from 
Marion,  which  had  come  to  our  camp  to  get  the 
benefit  of  his  instruction  in  cavalry  tactics. 
'  In  the  Marion  company  was  William  E.  Peters, 
Professor  at  Emory  and  Henry  College,  who 
had  graduated  in  the  same  class  in  Greek  with 


24  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

me  at  the  University.  When  he  and  I  were 
students  reading  Thucydides,  we  did  not  expect 
ever  to  take  part  in  a  greater  war  than  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian.  Peters  had  left  his  literary  work  to 
be  a  lieutenant  of  cavalry.  He  was  made  a  staff 
officer  by  General  Floyd  in  his  campaign  that 
year  in  West  Virginia.  For  some  reason  Peters 
was  not  with  Floyd  when  the  latter  escaped  from 
Fort  Donelson  in  February,  1862.  Peters  was 
a  strict  churchman,  but  considered  it  his  duty 
to  fight  a  duel  with  a  Confederate  officer.  He 
became  a  colonel  of  cavalry.  Peters's  regiment 
was  with  McCausland  when  he  was  sent  by 
General  Early  in  August,  1864,  to  Chambersburg, 
and  his  regiment  was  selected  as  the  one  to  set 
fire  to  the  town.  Peters  refused  to  obey  the  order, 
for  which  he  is  entitled  to  a  monument  to  his 
memory.  Reprisals  in  war  can  only  be  justified 
as  a  deterrent.  As  the  Confederates  were  hold- 
ing the  place  for  only  a  few  hours,  while  the 
Northern  armies  were  occupying  a  large  part  of 
the  South,  no  doubt,  aside  from  any  question  of 
humanity,  Peters  thought  it  was  bad  policy  to 
provoke  retaliation.  General  Early  ordered  a 
reprisal  in  kind  on  account  of  the  houses  burned 
in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  a  few  months  before 
by    General    Hunter.     As    General    Early    made 


A   PRIVATE   IN  THE   CAVALRY  25 

no  mention  of  Peters  in  his  book,  I  imagine  it  was 
because  of  his  refusal  to  apply  the  torch  to  Cham- 
bersburg.  On  his  return  from  this  expedition, 
McCausland  was  surprised  by  Averill  at  Moore- 
field,  and  Peters  was  wounded  and  captured. 
He  told  me  that  he  had  expected  to  be  put  under 
arrest  for  disobedience  as  soon  as  he  got  back  to 
Virginia. 

Hunter  was  a  member  of  an  old  Virginia  family, 
but  he  showed  no  favor  to  Virginians.  At  Bull 
Run  he  commanded  the  leading  division  that 
crossed  at  Sudley  and  was  badly  wounded,  but 
there  was  no  sympathy  for  .him  in  Virginia.  A 
relative  of  his  told  me  that  when  Hunter  met  a 
lady  who  was  a  near  relative,  he  offered  to  em- 
brace her,  but  was  repelled.  She  thought  that 
in  fighting  against  Virginia  he  was  committing 
an  unnatural  act  and  that  he  had  the  feelings, 
described  by  Hamlet,  of  one  who  "would  kill 
a  king  and  marry  with  his  brother."  On  Hun- 
ter's staff  was  his  relative,  Colonel  Strother,  who 
had  won  literary  distinction  over  the  pen  name  of 
"Porte  Crayon."  Both  men  seemed  to  be  an- 
imated by  the  same  sentiments  towards  their  kin. 
Hunter  presided  over  the  court  that  condemned 
Mrs.  Surratt  as  an  accessory  to  the  assassination 
of  President  Lincoln.     He  closed  his  life  by  suicide. 


26  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

But  to  return  to  our  company  of  cavalry  and 
my  first  days  as  a  soldier.  We  were  sent,  within 
a  few  days,  to  another  camping  ground,  where 
we  had  plank  sheds  for  shelter  and  where  we 
drilled  regularly.  Several  companies  of  infantry 
shared  the  camp  with  us.  Once  I  had  been  de- 
tailed for  camp  guard  and,  having  been  relieved 
just  as  the  company  went  out  to  drill,  I  saddled 
my  horse  and  went  along.  I  had  no  ideat  that  it 
was  a  breach  of  discipline  to  be  doing  double 
duty,  until  two  men  with  muskets  came  up  and 
told  me  that  I  was  under  arrest  for  it.  I  was  too 
proud  to  say  a  word  and,  as  my  time  had  come, 
I  went  again  to  walking  my  rounds.  Once  after 
that,  when  we  were  in  camp  on  Bull  Run,  I  was 
talking  at  night  with  the  Colonel  in  his  tent  and 
did  not  hear  the  bugle  sounded  for  roll  call.  So 
a  lieutenant,  who  happened  to  be  in  command, 
ordered  me,  as  a  penalty,  to  do  duty  the  rest  of 
the  morning  as  a  camp  guard.  He  knew  that 
my  absence  from  roll  call  was  not  wilful  but 
a  mistake.  I  would  not  make  any  explanation 
but  served  my  tour  of  duty.  These  were  the 
only  instances  in  which  I  was  punished  when  a 
private. 

Our  Circuit  Judge,  Fulkerson,  who  had  served 
in  the  Mexican  War,  was  appointed  a  colonel  by 


A   PRIVATE   IN  THE   CAVALRY  27 

Governor  Letcher,  and  took  command  of  the 
camp  at  Abingdon.  But  in  a  few  days  we  were 
ordered  to  Richmond.  Fulkerson,  with  the  in- 
fantry, went  by  rail,  but  Jones  preferred  to  march 
his  company  all  the  way.  As  he  had  been  an 
officer  in  the  army  on  the  plains,  we  learned  a 
good  deal  from  him  in  the  two  weeks  on  the  road, 
and  it  was  a  good  course  of  discipline  for  us.  I 
was  almost  a  perfect  stranger  in  the  company  to 
which  I  belonged,  and  I  felt  so  lonely  in  camp  that 
I  applied  to  Captain  Jones  for  a  transfer  to  an 
infantry  company  from  Bristol.  He  said  that 
I  would  have  to  get  the  approval  of  the  Governor 
and  forwarded  my  application  to  him  at  Richmond. 
Fortunately  the  next  day  we  were  ordered  away, 
and  I  heard  nothing  more  about  the  transfer. 

On  May  30,  in  the  afternoon,  our  company  — 
one  hundred  strong  —  left  Abingdon  to  join  the 
army.  In  spite  of  a  drizzling  rain  the  whole 
population  was  out  to  say  farewell ;  in  fact  a 
good  many  old  men  rode  several  miles  with  us. 
We  marched  ten  miles  and  then  disbanded  to 
disperse  in  squads,  under  the  command  of  an 
officer  or  of  a  non-commissioned  officer,  to  spend 
the  night  at  the  country  homes.  I  went  under 
Jim  King,  the  orderly  sergeant,  and  spent  the 
night  at  the  house  of  Major  Ab.   Beattie,  who 


28  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

gave  us  the  best  of  everything,  but  I  was  so  de- 
pressed at  parting  with  my  wife  and  children 
that  I  scarcely  spoke  a  word.  King  had  been 
a  cadet  at  West  Point  for  a  short  time  and  had 
learned  something  of  tactics.  He  was  afterwards 
transferred  to  the  37th  Virginia  Infantry  and 
was  killed  in  Jackson's  battle  at  Kernstown. 

When  the  roll  was  called  the  next  morning  at 
the  rendezvous  at  old  Glade  Spring  Church,  I 
don't  think  a  man  was  missing.  The  men  were 
boiling  with  enthusiasm  and  afraid  that  the  war 
would  be  over  before  they  got  to  the  firing  line. 
I  remember  one  man  who  was  conspicuous  on 
the  march  ;  he  rode  at  the  head  of  the  column 
and  got  the  bouquets  the  ladies  threw  at  us ;  but 
in  our  first  battle  he  was  conspicuous  for  his 
absence  and  stayed  with  the  wagons.  "Our  march 
to  the  army  was  an  ovation.  Nobody  dreamed 
of  the  possibility  of  our  failure  and  the  last  scene 
of  the  great  drama  at  Appomattox.  We  made 
easy  marches,  and  by  the  time  we  got  to  Wythe- 
ville,  all  of  my  depression  of  spirits  had  gone, 
and  I  was  as  lively  as  anybody.  It  took  us  two 
weeks  to  get  to  Richmond,  where  we  spent  a  few 
days  on  the  Fair  Grounds.  We  were  then  sent 
to  a  camp  of  instruction  at  Ashland,  where  we 
remained  a  short  time  or  until  we,  with  a  cavalry 


A   PRIVATE   IN   THE   CAVALRY  29 

company  from  Amelia  County,  were  ordered  to 
join  Joe  Johnston's  army  in  the  Shenandoah. 

I  well  remember  that  we  were  in  Ashland  when 
news  came  to  us  that  Joe  Johnston,  on  June  15, 
had  retreated  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  Winchester. 
To  begin  the  war  by  abandoning  such  an  outpost, 
when  there  was  no  enemy  near  and  no  necessity 
for  it,  was  a  shock  for  which  we  were  not  pre- 
pared, and  it  chilled  our  enthusiasm.  I  couldn't 
understand  it  —  that  was  all  —  but  my  instinct 
told  me  at  the  time  what  was  afterwards  con- 
firmed by  reason  and  experience  —  that  a  great 
blunder  had  been  committed. 

At  Wytheville,  on  our  third  day's  march  to 
Richmond,  we  got  the  papers  which  informed  us 
that  the  war  had  actually  begun  in  a  skirmish  at 
Fairfax,  where  Captain  Marr  had  been  killed. 
We  were  greatly  excited  by  the  news  of  the  affair. 
Our  people  had  been  reading  about  war  and 
descriptions  of  battles  by  historians  and  poets, 
from  the  days  of  Homer  down,  and  were  filled 
with  enthusiasm  for  military  glory.  They  had 
no  experience  in  the  hardships  of  military  ser- 
vice and  knew  nothing,  had  no  conception,  of  the 
suffering  it  brings  to  the  homes  of  those  who 
have  left  them.  In  all  great  wars,  women  and 
children  are  the  chief  sufferers. 


30  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

Our  company  joined  the  First  Virginia  Cav- 
alry, commanded  by  Colonel  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley.  At  Richmond,  Captain 
Jones,  who  stood  high  with  those  in  authority, 
had  procured  Sharp  carbines  for  us.  We  con- 
sidered this  a  great  compliment,  as  arms  were 
scarce  in  the  Confederacy.  We  had  been  fur- 
nished with  sabres  before  we  left  Abingdon,  but 
the  only  real  use  I  ever  heard  of  their  being  put  to 
was  to  hold  a  piece  of  meat  over  a  fire  for  frying. 
I  dragged  one  through  the  first  year  of  the  war, 
but  when  I  became  a  commander,  I  discarded  it. 
The  sabre  and  lance  may  have  been  very  good 
weapons  in  the  days  of  chivalry,  and  my  suspicion 
is  that  the  combats  of  the  hero  of  Cervantes  were 
more  realistic  and  not  such  burlesques  as  they  are 
supposed  to  be.  But  certainly  the  sabre  is  of 
no  use  against  gunpowder.  Captain  Jones  also 
made  requisition  for  uniforms,  but  when  they 
arrived  there  was  almost  a  mutiny.  They  were 
a  sort  of  dun  color  and  came  from  the  penitentiary. 
The  men  piled  them  up  in  the  camp,  and  all  but 
Fount  Beattie  and  myself  refused  to  wear  them. 

We  joined  Joe  Johnston's  army  in  the  Shen- 
andoah Valley  at  his  headquarters  in  Winchester 
and  rested  there  for  a  day.  Then  we  went  on  to 
join  Colonel  J.  E.  B.  Stuart's  regiment  at  Bunker 


m*&k   <**^ 


AARON  BURTON  (COLORED),   AGED   84  YEARS 

An  old  servant  and  coachman  of  A.   D.  Mosby,  who  went  through  the  entire 

Civil  War  as  body-servant  to  his  son,  Colonel  John  S.  Mosby. 

Taken  in  1  898 


A   PRIVATE   IN   THE  CAVALRY  31 

Hill,  a  village  about  twelve  miles  distant  on  the 
pike  leading  to  Martinsburg,  where  Patterson's 
army  was  camped.  We  were  incorporated  into 
the  First  Virginia  Cavalry,  which  Stuart  had 
just  organized,  now  on  outpost  to  watch  Patter- 
son. I  had  never  seen  Stuart  before,  and  the 
distance  between  us  was  so  great  that  I  never  ex- 
pected to  rise  to  even  an  acquaintance  with  him. 
Stuart  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point  and  as  a 
lieutenant  in  Colonel  Sumner's  regiment,  the 
First  Cavalry,  had  won  distinction  and  had 
been  wounded  in  an  Indian  fight.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  he  was  just  twenty-eight  years 
old.  His  appearance  —  which  included  a  red- 
dish beard  and  a  ruddy  complexion  —  indicated 
a  strong  physique  and  great  energy. 

In  his  work  on  the  outposts  Stuart  soon  showed 
that  he  possessed  the  qualities  of  a  great  leader 
of  cavalry.  He  never  had  an  equal  in  such  ser- 
vice. He  discarded  the  old  maxims  and  soon  dis- 
covered that  in  the  conditions  of  modern  war  the 
chief  functions  of  cavalry  are  to  learn  the  designs 
and  to  watch  and  report  the  movements  of  the 
enemy. 

We  rested  a  day  in  camp,  and  many  of  us  wrote 
letters  to  our  homes,  describing  the  hospitable 
welcome  we  had  met  on  our  long  march  and  our 


32  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

anxiety  to  meet  the  foe  who  was  encamped  <x  few 
miles  away.  On  the  following  day,  to  our  great 
delight,  Captain  Jones  was  ordered  to  take  us  on 
a  scout  towards  Martinsburg.  My  first  expe- 
rience was  near  there  —  at  Snodgrass  Spring  — 
where  we  came  upon  two  soldiers  who  were  out 
foraging.  They  ran  across  the  field,  but  we  over- 
took them.  I  got  a  canteen  from  one  —  the  first 
I  had  ever  seen  —  which  I  f^und  very  useful  in 
the  first  battle  I  was  in.  It  was  a  trophy  which 
I  prized  highly.  We  got  a  good  view  of  Patter- 
son's army,  a  mile  or  so  away,  and  returned  that 
evening  to  our  bivouac,  all  in  the  highest  of  spirits. 
Nearly  every  man  in  the  company  wrote  a  letter 
to  somebody  the  next  day. 


CHAPTER   IV 
Johnston's  Retreat  from  Harper's  Ferry 

The  first  great  military  blunder  of  the  war  was 
committed  by  Johnston  in  evacuating  Harper's 
Ferry.  Both  Jackson  and  General  Lee,  who  was 
then  in  Richmond  organizing  the  army  and 
acting  as  military  adviser,  were  opposed  to  this. 
They  wanted  to  hold  it,  not  as  a  fortress  with  a 
garrison,  but  to  break  communication  with  the 
West,  and  a  salient  for  an  active  force  to  threaten 
the  flank  of  an  invading  army. 

On  April  27,  Stonewall  Jackson  was  ordered 
to  the  command  of  Harper's  Ferry,  which  the 
militia  had  seized  a  few  days  before.  Harper's 
Ferry  is  situated  in  a  gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge 
through  which  flow  the  waters  of  the  Potomac 
and  the  Shenandoah.  John  Brown  had  seized 
the  place  in  his  rebellion.  The  fact  that  he  tried 
to  start  a  slave  insurrection  in  a  region  where 
there  were  few  slaves  is  proof  that  he  was  a  mono- 
maniac. But  Harper's  Ferry  was  a  place  of 
great  strategic  value  for  the  Confederates,  as  the 

33 


34  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

railroad  and  canal  on  the  Potomac  from  Wash- 
ington, fifty  miles  below,  passed  through  the 
gap.  It  was  a  salient  position ;  its  possession 
by  the  Confederates  was  a  menace  to  the  North 
and  broke  direct  communication  between  the 
Capital  and  the  West.  A  strategic  offensive  on 
the  border  was  the  best  policy  to  encourage 
Southern  sentiment  in  Maryland  and  defend  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  from  invasion. 

A  Virginian  lieutenant,  Roger  Jones,  had  been 
stationed  at  Harper's  Ferry  with  a  small  guard  to 
protect  the  property  of  the  Government.  He  re- 
mained until  the  force  coming  to  capture  the 
place  was  in  sight,  then  set  fire  to  the  buildings, 
and  retreated.  His  example  in  holding  the  po- 
sition to  the  last  extremity  was  not  followed  by 
the  Confederates. 

When  Jackson  arrived  at  the  scene  of  his  com- 
mand, without  waiting  for  instructions,  he  pre- 
pared to  hold  it  by  fortifying  Maryland  Heights. 
"I  am  of  the  opinion,"  he  wrote  to  General  Lee, 
"that  this  place  should  be  defended  with  the 
spirit  that  actuated  the  defenders  of  Thermopylae 
and  if  left  to  myself  such  is  my  determination." 
General  Lee  was  in  accord  with  Jackson's  senti- 
ments. Now  Jackson  did  not  mean  that  Har- 
per's Ferry  should  be  held  as  a  fortress  to  stand 


JOHNSTON'S   RETREAT  35 

a  siege ;  nor  that  he  would  stay  there  and  die 
like  the  Spartans  in  the  Pass,  but  that  he  would 
hold  it  until  a  likelihood  of  its  being  surrounded 
by  superior  numbers  was  imminent.  There  was 
no  prospect  of  this  being  the  case,  for  no  invest- 
ing force  was  near.  The  best  way  to  defend  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  was  to  hold  the  line  of  the 
Potomac  as  a  menace  to  Washington. 

Major  Deas,  who  had  been  sent  to  Harper's 
Ferry  as  an  inspector  of  the  Confederate  War 
Department,  thought  that  the  troops  showed 
an  invincible  spirit  of  resistance.  On  May  21 
he  wrote:  "I  have  not  asked  Colonel  Jackson 
his  opinion  on  the  subject,  but  my  own  is  that 
there  is  force  enough  here  to  hold  the  place  against 
any  attack  which,  under  the  existing  state  of 
affairs,  may  be  contemplated."  And  on  May 
23,  the  day  before  McDowell's  army  at  Wash- 
ington crossed  into  Virginia,  he  reported  that 
there  were  ''about  8000  troops  at  Harper's  Ferry 
and  the  outposts,  including  five  companies  of 
artillery  and  a  naval  battery,  and  that  7300  were 
then  able  to  go  into  battle  well-armed.  The 
Naval  Batteries,"  he  said,  "under  Lieutenant 
Fauntleroy,  are  placed  on  the  northern  and 
southern  salients  of  the  village  of  Harper's  Ferry 
and  envelop  by  their  fire  the  whole  of  the  town 


36  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

of  Bolivar  and  the  approaches  of  the  immediate 
banks  of  the  Potomac  and  Shenandoah  rivers. 
The  cavalry  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  E.  B. 
Stuart  is  in  very  good  condition  and  quite  effec- 
tive. All  the  infantry  regiments  are  daily  drilled 
in  the  school  of  the  soldier  and  company,  and 
valuable  assistance  is  received  in  this  respect  from 
the  young  men  who  have  been  instructed  at  the 
Military  School  at  Lexington."  Neither  Jack- 
son nor  Major  Deas  knew  of  any  immediate 
danger  of  Harper's  Ferry  being  invested. 

On  May  24,  in  accordance  with  orders  from  the 
Confederate  Government  at  Montgomery,  Gen- 
eral Joseph  E.  Johnston  assumed  command  at 
the  Ferry,  and  in  a  few  days  Jackson  was  given  a 
brigade  of  five  Virginia  regiments.  The  outposts 
at  the  Ferry  then  extended  from  Williamsport  on 
the  Potomac  to  Point  of  Rocks  on  the  river  be- 
low. Johnston  at  once  submitted  a  memorandum 
to  Richmond  on  the  conditions  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
which  displayed  the  caution  for  which  he  became 
distinguished.  He  seemed  to  have  little  con- 
fidence in  his  troops  and  thought  the  position 
could  be  easily  turned  from  above  or  below,  taking 
no  account  of  the  fact  that  he  might  turn  the 
flank  of  an  enemy  who  was  flanking  him.  John- 
ston asked  instructions  from  General  Lee  in   re- 


JOHNSTON'S   RETREAT  37 

lation  to  the  manner  in  which  the  troops  he 
commanded  should  be  used.  And  on  May  28 
he  again  wrote  in  the  same  tone  of  despair:  "If 
the  Commander-in-Chief  has  precise  instructions 
to  give  I  beg  to  receive  them  early.  I  have 
prepared  means  of  transportation  for  a  march. 
Should  it  be  decided  that  the  troops  should 
constitute  a  garrison  this  expense  can  be  recalled," 
which  shows  he  was  getting  ready  for  a  retreat. 
With  this  letter  Johnston  enclosed  a  memorandum 
from  a  staff  officer,  Major  Whiting,  in  which  the 
latter  spoke  of  troops  that  were  gathering  at 
Carlisle  and  Chambersburg,  intimating  that  in 
the  event  of  the  advance  of  this  force  it  might  be 
necessary  to  move  out  to  prevent  being  shut  up 
in  a  cul-de-sac.  But  such  a  thing  was  too  re- 
mote and  contingent  to  constitute  a  danger  of 
investment  at  that  time.  No  place  is  absolutely 
impregnable  ;  Gibraltar  has  been  captured.  The 
answer  Johnston  should  have  received  to  this 
request  for  orders  was  that  he  did  not  command 
a  garrison  to  defend  a  fortress,  but  an  active  force 
in  the  field ;  and  that  Harper's  Ferry  might  be 
held  as  a  picket  post. 

The  discipline  of  Johnston's  troops  ought  to 
have  been  as  good  as  that  of  the  three  months' 
men  that  Patterson  was  collecting  at  Chambers- 


38  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

burg,  fifty  miles  away.  In  addition  to  the  cadets 
of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  who  were 
drilling  his  regiments,  Johnston  had  in  his  army 
at  least  ten  officers  who  had  lately  resigned  from 
the  U.  S.  Army.  Nearly  all  of  the  field  officers 
of  Jackson's  brigade  had  been  educated  at  the 
Military  Institute,  and  several  had  been  officers 
in  the  Mexican  War.  Their  conduct  in  battle 
a  few  weeks  afterwards  shows  how  much  Johnston 
had  underrated  them.  The  men  were  volunteers 
full  of  enthusiasm  for  a  cause  and  rendered  cheer- 
ful obedience  to  orders ;  it  was  not  necessary  to 
drill  such  material  into  machines  to  make  them 
soldiers. 

Johnston  complained  of  the  want  of  discipline 
of  his  army  and  the  danger  of  being  surrounded 
by  a  superior  force.  The  force  that  was  coming 
to  surround  the  Ferry  was  a  spectre.  McDowell's 
and  Patterson's  armies  were  fifty  miles  away  and 
a  hundred  miles  apart.  At  the  request  of  Gov- 
ernor Pierpont  a  few  regiments  had  crossed  the 
Ohio,  but  McClellan's  headquarters  were  still  at 
Cincinnati.  Any  movement  from  that  direction 
would  naturally  be  through  central  Virginia  — 
towards  Richmond  —  in  cooperation  with  Mc- 
Dowell. Johnston  continued  to  show  great 
anxiety   about   his   position  and  wrote  about  it 


JOHNSTON'S   RETREAT  39 

several  times  to  General  Lee.  But  neither  Lee 
nor  President  Davis  could  see  the  danger  as  he 
saw  it,  and  on  June  7  General  Lee  —  to  calm  his 
fears  —  wrote  him:  "He  (the  President)  does 
not  think  it  probable  that  there  will  be  an  im- 
mediate attack  by  troops  from  Ohio.  General 
N.  J.  Garnett,  C.  S.  Army,  with  a  command  of 
4000  men,  has  been  dispatched  to  Beverly  to  ar- 
rest the  progress  of  troops.  .  .  .  Colonel  Mc- 
Donald has  also  been  sent  to  interrupt  the  pas- 
sage of  troops  over  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail- 
road. It  is  hoped  by  these  means  you  will  be 
relieved  from  an  attack  in  that  direction,  and 
will  have  merely  to  meet  an  attack  in  front  from 
Pennsylvania." 

In  the  meantime  reinforcements  were  going  to 
Beauregard  and  Johnston  almost  daily.  Wise 
and  Floyd  had  been  sent  to  the  Kanawha  Valley 
to  counteract  any  movement  there,  and  Garnett, 
with  four  thousand  troops,  had  been  sent  to 
northwest  Virginia.  Patterson's  was  the  only 
force  from  which  Johnston  could  expect  an  attack, 
and  as  he  would  have  to  make  detachments  from 
it  to  guard  his  communications,  Patterson  could 
not  be  much  superior  in  numbers  when  the  col- 
lision should  come. 

General  Lee,  as  adviser  to  the  War  Department, 


40  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

was  really  the  de  facto  Secretary  of  War  and  di- 
rected all  operations  in  the  field.  He  had  se- 
lected Manassas  Junction  as  a  strategic  point  for 
the  concentration  of  troops,  on  account  of  its 
being  in  connection  with  the  Valley.  On  return 
from  Manassas  Junction,  to  relieve  Johnston  of 
anxiety  about  his  flank  being  turned,  Lee  wrote 
to  him  that  he  had  placed  Colonel  Ewell  in  ad- 
vance at  Fairfax  Court  House  and  Colonel  Eppa 
Hunton  at  Leesburg  on  the  Potomac,  each  with 
a  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry  in  reservation, 
who  would  inform  him  of  any  movement  to  his 
rear.  But  Johnston  continued  uneasy  and,  al- 
though he  was  receiving  reinforcements,  he  again 
wrote  that  he  had  heard  that  Patterson  had  10,000 
troops  at  Chambersburg,  that  some  of  McClellan's 
troops  had  reached  Grafton,  and  he  apprehended 
a  junction  of  all  of  those  forces  against  him.  He 
should  at  least  have  waited  for  the  development 
of  such  a  plan  and  then,  instead  of  retreating, 
have  taken  the  offensive  to  defeat  it.  Johnston's 
suggestion  meant  the  abandonment  of  the  Valley. 
Patterson,  who  was  organizing  the  force  at 
Chambersburg,  was  a  political  general,  only  re- 
membered for  having  allowed  the  force  he  com- 
manded in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  to  render  no 
service  at  a  critical  time.     Patterson  proposed  to 


JOHNSTON'S   RETREAT  41 

capture  Harper's  Ferry,  which,  of  course,  Gen- 
eral Scott  was  very  willing  to  do.  But  the  only 
support  Scott  could  promise  from  Washington  was 
to  make  a  demonstration  towards  Manassas  to 
prevent  reinforcements  going  to  the  Valley  and 
to  send  a  force  of  2500  on  a  secondary  expedition 
up  the  Potomac.  As  the  Ferry  was  of  great 
strategic  value  as  an  outpost,  Scott  warned  Pat- 
terson of  the  desperate  resistance  he  might  expect 
from  the  Confederates.  He  did  not  suspect  that 
the  Confederates  were  then  packing  up  to  leave. 

On  June  14  the  Confederates  began  the  evacu- 
ation of  Harper's  Ferry  and  retreated  ten  or 
twelve  miles  to  Charles  Town.  No  movement 
had  been  made  against  them  from  any  direction. 
Several  regiments  had  just  arrived  —  there  were 
about  3000  militia  at  Winchester,  and  a  force  of 
the  enemy  had  retreated  from  Romney. 

On  June  13,  after  repeated  requests  for  instruc- 
tions about  holding  Harper's  Ferry,  which  showed 
clearly  a  desire  to  shift  the  responsibility  for  it, 
the  War  Department  wrote  him  the  conditions  on 
which  the  place  should  be  evacuated  :  "You  have 
been  heretofore  instructed  to  use  your  own  dis- 
cretion as  to  retiring  from  your  position  at  Har- 
per's Ferry  and  taking  the  field  to  check  the  ad- 
vance of  the  enemy.  ...     As  you  seem  to  desire, 


42  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

however,  that  the  responsibility  of  your  retire- 
ment should  be  assumed  here,  and  as  no  reluctance 
is  felt  to  bear  any  burden  which  the  public  in- 
terest may  require,  you  can  consider  yourself 
authorized,  whenever  the  position  of  the  enemy 
shall  convince  you  that  he  is  about  to  turn  your 
position  and  thus  deprive  the  country  of  the  ser- 
vices of  yourself  and  the  troops  under  your  com- 
mand, to  destroy  everything  at  Harper's  Ferry." 

Johnston  seems  to  have  met  this  letter  at 
Charles  Town  while  it  was  on  the  way,  and  did 
not  wait  for  it  at  the  Ferry.  Johnston's  report 
says  he  met  a  courier  from  Richmond  with  a 
despatch  authorizing  him  to  evacuate  Harper's 
Ferry  at  his  discretion.  The  dispatch  he  received 
had  no  such  instructions  ;  the  conditions  on  which 
he  was  authorized  to  abandon  the  place  had  not 
arisen ;  no  enemy  was  threatening  to  turn  his 
position. 

On  June  15  Patterson  crossed  the  Maryland 
line.  His  leading  brigade  was  commanded  by 
Colonel  George  H.  Thomas,  a  Virginian,  who 
was  an  officer  in  the  Second  Cavalry  under  Lee. 
It  had  been  expected  that  he  would  go  with  the 
people  of  his  native  State.  On  the  sixteenth  his 
brigade  waded  the  Potomac.  When  Patterson 
heard  that  Harper's  Ferry  had  been  abandoned, 


JOHNSTON'S   RETREAT  43 

he  was  incredulous  and  thought  it  was  a  ruse, 
giving  Joe  Johnston  a  credit  he  himself  never 
claimed. 

The  evacuation  of  Harper's  Ferry  before  it 
was  compelled  by  the  presence  of  an  enemy  was 
not  approved  at  Richmond,  nor  was  it  done  to 
act  in  concert  with  any  other  force,  as  was  then 
supposed.  The  victory  at  Bull  Run  a  few  weeks 
afterwards  confirmed  the  impression  that  the 
movement  had  been  made  in  cooperation  with 
Beauregard.  The  latter  knew  nothing  of  such  a 
purpose  until  he  heard  that  the  Confederates  had 
lost  their  advantage,  and  that  the  enemy  held  the 
key  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  In  plain  words 
it  was  a  retreat. 

The  evacuation  of  the  post  before  there  was 
any  pressure  to  compel  it  made  Johnston  the 
innocent  cause  of  a  comedy  at  Washington. 
General  Scott  could  not  comprehend  what  could 
be  the  motive  for  it,  except  on  the  theory  of  its 
being  a  feigned  retreat  to  capture  Washington  by 
a  stratagem.  No  other  reason  could  be  con- 
ceived why  the  Confederates  should  surrender, 
without  making  a  defense,  the  advantage  of 
Harper's  Ferry  as  a  base. 

After  a  part  of  his  force  had  crossed  the  Potomac, 
to  his  surprise,  Patterson  received  a  telegram  from 


44  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

General  Scott,  on  June  16,  ordering  him  to  send 
at  once  to  Washington  all  the  regular  troops, 
horse  and  foot,  and  Burnside's  Rhode  Island 
regiment.  And  on  the  17th  of  June,  Scott  repeated 
the  order  and  said  :  "We  are  pressed  here.  Send 
the  troops  I  have  twice  called  for  without  delay." 
Where  the  pressure  could  come  from  was  a  mystery 
to  Patterson,  as  he  knew  that  Johnston  was  still 
in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  but  the  order  was  im- 
perative, and  he  obeyed.  "The  troops  were  sent," 
he  said,  "leaving  me  without  a  single  piece  of 
artillery,  and  for  the  time  with  but  one  troop  of 
cavalry,  which  had  not  been  in  service  over  a 
month."  So  the  hostile  armies  retreated  in  op- 
posite directions.  Patterson  recrossed  the  Po- 
tomac, and  Johnston,  unconscious  of  the  alarm 
which  his  retreat  had  given  in  Washington,  went 
on  to  Winchester. 

There  was  another  amusing  episode  on  June  16 
as  a  result  of  the  Harper's  Ferry  operations.  In 
anticipation  of  the  demonstration  he  was  to  make 
in  favor  of  Patterson's  predicted  attack  on  Har- 
per's Ferry,  McDowell  had  sent  General  Schenck 
on  the  Loudoun  railroad  as  an  advance  guard. 
When  turning  a  curve  near  Vienna,  a  fire  was 
opened  on  the  train  by  what  Schenck  called  a 
"masked  battery."     The  engine  was  in  the  rear, 


JOHNSTON'S   RETREAT  45 

and  as  the  engineer  could  not  draw  the  train  out 
of  the  range  of  fire,  he  detached  the  engine  and 
disappeared  under  a  full  head  of  steam.  So 
Schenck  and  his  men  had  to  walk  back.  Under 
a  flag  of  truce  he  asked  permission  to  bury  the  dead 
and  take  care  of  the  wounded.  Schenck  after- 
wards gained  notoriety  as  U.  S.  Minister  at  Lon- 
don and  was  recalled.  The  only  distinction  he 
won  in  the  war  was  as  the  inventor  of  the  term 
"masked  battery."  The  battery  that  did  so  much 
damage  was  commanded  by  my  schoolmate,  Del 
Kemper. 

The  whole  country  was  greatly  surprised  by 
the  news  of  the  evacuation  of  Harper's  Ferry.  If 
Johnston  had  waited  a  day  longer  for  the  answer 
to  his  request  for  instructions,  his  retreat  would 
have  been  a  disobedience  of  orders.  The  con- 
ditions did  not  exist,  in  the  opinion  of  the  War 
Department,  which  would  justify  the  evacuation. 
Johnston  sent  a  reply  in  which  he  disclaimed  a 
desire  to  shift  responsibility  —  which  was  clearly 
inconsistent  with  his  request  for  instructions. 

Harper's  Ferry  should  have  been  held  until 
danger  was  imminent.  It  must  have  been  a  po- 
sition of  strategic  value  as  well  as  of  tactical 
strength  since  it  was  held  by  11,000  men  against 
the  Confederates    and    used    as    a    base    in    the 


46  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

Gettysburg  campaign  and  also  when  Early  in- 
vaded Maryland.  When  the  Ferry  was  evacu- 
ated, McDowell's  army  was  fifty  miles  below, 
defending  Washington,  and  Beauregard,  in  his 
front,  fully  occupied  his  attention.  Patterson 
was  at  Hagerstown,  had  not  crossed  the  Potomac, 
and  had  given  no  sign  of  doing  so. 


CHAPTER  V 
Recollections  of  Battle  of  Manassas1 

The  First  Virginia  Cavalry  remained  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  until  the  eighteenth  of  July 
when,  by  forced  marches,  it  was  sent  to  join  the 
army  and  take  its  part  in  the  Battle  of  Manassas. 
When  we  left  the  Valley,  Stuart  sent  Captain 
Patrick's  company  to  watch  Patterson,  whose 
army  was  in  camp  at  Charles  Town,  and  to  screen 
the  transfer  of  the  army  to  the  east  of  the  Blue 
Ridge.  It  was  well  known  that  in  a  few, days 
the  most  of  Patterson's  regiments  would  be  mus- 
tered out  of  service  and  would  go  home.  It  was 
evident  that  his  prime  object  had  been  not  to 
divert  Johnston's  army  but  to  avoid  a  collision. 
Patterson  no  doubt  thought  that  he  had  effected 
his  purpose  and  was  content  to  rest  where  he  was. 

Stuart's  regiment  arrived  at  the  scene  of  the 
approaching  battle  on  the  evening  of  July  20  and 
went  into  bivouac  near  Ball's  Ford.     The  armies 

1  This,  the  first  battle  of  the  war,  was  known  in  the  North  as  the 
Battle  of  Bull  Run,  and  in  the  South  as  the  Battle  of  Manassas. 

47 


48  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

were  so  close  together  that  there  was  a  great  deal 
of  picket  firing,  and  I  remember  very  well  the 
foreboding  I  felt  when  I  lay  down  under  a  pine 
tree  to  rest  beside  Fount  Beattie.  When  the 
bugle  sounded  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-first, 
in  counting  off,  I  was  Number  I  in  the  first  set  of 
fours  and  rode  at  the  head  of  the  squadron  that 
day.  Nothing  afterwards  occurred  in  my  mili- 
tary career  that  gives  me  more  satisfaction  to 
remember.  A  few  days  before  six  Colt  pistols 
had  been  sent  to  our  company,  and  Captain 
Jones  had  selected  the  men  who  were  to  have 
them.  I  was  one  of  the  six  —  I  don't  know  why. 
But  to  reconcile  those  who  got  no  pistols,  Jones 
told  them  that  the  six  should  be  selected  for  the 
most  dangerous  work.  Shortly  after  breakfast 
on  the  morning  of  the  battle,  Stuart  sent  Jones  to 
make  a  reconnaissance  over  Bull  Run.  When  we 
reached  the  woods  where  he  thought  the  enemy 
might  be,  Jones  called  for  the  six  men.  We  all 
responded  and  rode  off  into  the  woods  to  recon- 
noitre, but  we  didn't  find  an  enemy.  So  the 
company  recrossed  the  Run. 

Our  regiment  was  divided  during  the  battle, 
and  the  squadron  to  which  I  belonged  was  placed 
under  a  Major  Swan,  a  Marylander.  Late  in 
the  day  when  the  enemy  was  in  retreat,  Swan 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  MANASSAS         49 

halted  us  in  a  field  within  fifty  yards  of  Kemper's 
guns,  which  were  firing  on  the  retreating  troops. 
That  was  the  very  time  for  us  to  have  been  on  the 
enemy's  flank.  I  was  near  Captain  Jones.  He 
rose  in  his  stirrups  and  said  indignantly,  "Major 
Swan  !  You  can't  be  too  bold  in  pursuing  a  flying 
enemy."  But  he  made  no  impression  on  Swan. 
After  dark  Swan  marched  us  back  over  Bull 
Run,  and  I  slept  in  a  drenching  rain  in  a  fence 
corner.  Swan  did  not  get  a  man  or  a  horse 
scratched.  He  did  a  life  insurance  business  that 
day.  Instead  of  Swan  supporting  the  battery, 
the  battery  supported  Swan.  Afterwards  my  last 
official  act  as  adjutant  of  the  company  was  to 
carry  an  order  from  Jones  who  had  become  colo- 
nel, for  Swan's  arrest.  We  lay  all  the  next  day 
near  the  battlefield,  and  I  rode  over  it,  carrying  a 
despatch  to  Stuart  at  Sudley.  But  the  first  thing 
I  did  in  the  morning  was  to  make  a  temporary 
shelter  from  the  rain  in  a  fence  corner  and  write  a 
letter  to  my  wife. 

Monday,  July  22d,  Battlefield  of  Manassas. 

My  dearest  Pauline : 

There  was  a  great  battle  yesterday.  The  Yankees 
are  overwhelmingly  routed.  Thousands  of  them  killed. 
I  was  in  the  fight.    We  at  one  time  stood  for  two  hours 


50  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

under  a  perfect  storm  of  shot  and  shell  —  it  was  a 
miracle  that  none  of  our  company  was  killed.  We 
took  all  of  their  cannon  from  them ;  among  the  bat- 
teries captured  was  Sherman's  —  battle  lasted  about 
7  hours  —  about  90,000  Yankees,  45,000  of  our  men. 
The  cavalry  pursued  them  till  dark  —  followed  6  or 
7  miles.  Genl.  Scott  commanded  them.  I  just  snatch 
this  moment  to  write  —  am  out  doors  in  a  rain  —  will 
write  you  all  particulars  when  I  get  a  chance.  We 
start  just  as  soon  as  we  can  get  our  breakfast  to  fol- 
low them  to  Alexandria.  We  made  a  forced  march 
to  get  here  to  the  battle  —  travelled  about  65  miles 
without  stopping.     My  love  to  all  of  you.     In  haste. 

Yours  devotedly, 

Early  on  Tuesday  morning  (July  23)  Stuart's  regi- 
ment and  Eley's  brigade  moved  to  Fairfax  Court 
House  and  camped  near  there  on  opposite  sides  of 
the  Alexandria  pike.  t  Stuart's  dispatch  to  General 
Johnston,  who  was  still  at  Manassas,  says  we  got 
there  at  9.30  a.m.  The  country  looked  very  much 
like  Egypt  after  a  flood  of  the  Nile  — it  was  strewn 
with  the  debris  of  McDowell's  army.  I  again  wrote 
to  my  wife  and  used  paper  and  an  envelope  which 
the  Zouaves  had  left  behind.  On  it  was  a  picture 
of  a  Zouave  charging  with  a  fixed  bayonet  and  an 
inscription  —  "Up  guards  and  at  them" — which 
is  said  to  have  been  Wellington's  order  at  Waterloo. 
The  Zouaves  were  then  charging  on  New  York. 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF   MANASSAS  51 

Fairfax  Court  House,  July  24th,  1861. 

My  dearest  Pauline : 

I  telegraphed  and  wrote  you  from  Manassas  early 
the  next  morning  after  the  battle.  We  made  a  forced 
march  from  Winchester  to  get  to  Manassas  in  time 
for  the  fight,  —  travelled  two  whole  days  and  one 
night  without  stopping  (in  the  rain)  and  getting  only 
one  meal.  We  arrived  the  morning  before  the  fight. 
It  lasted  about  ten  hours  and  was  terrific.  When  we 
were  first  brought  upon  the  field  we  were  posted  as  a 
reserve  just  in  rear  of  our  artillery  and  directly  within 
range  of  the  hottest  fire  of  the  enemy.  For  two  hours 
we  sat  there  on  our  horses,  exposed  to  a  perfect  storm 
of  grapeshot,  balls,  bombs,  etc.  They  burst  over  our 
heads,  passed  under  our  horses,  yet  nobody  was  hurt. 
I  rode  my  horse  nearly  to  death  on  the  battlefield, 
going  backward  and  forward,  watching  the  enemy's 
movements  to  prevent  their  flanking  our  command. 
When  I  first  got  on  the  ground  my  heart  sickened. 
We  met  Hampton's  South  Carolina  legion  retreating. 
I  thought  the  day  was  lost  and  with  it  the  Southern 
cause.  We  begged  them,  for  the  honor  of  their  State, 
to  return.  But  just  then  a  shout  goes  up  along  our  lines. 
Beauregard  arrives  and  assures  us  that  the  day  will  be 
ours.  This  reanimated  the  troops  to  redouble  their 
efforts.  Our  regiment  had  been  divided  in  the  morning  ; 
half  was  taken  to  charge  the  enemy  early  in  the  action 
and  the  remaining  part  (ours  and  Amelia  Co.)  were  held 
as  a  reserve,  to  cover  the  retreat  of  our  forces,  if  unsuc- 
cessful, and  to  take  advantage  of  any  favorable  moment. 


52  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

When,  late  in  the  evening,  the  Yankees  gave  way, 
they  seemed  overwhelmed  with  confusion  and  despair. 
They  abandoned  everything  —  arms,  wagons,  horses, 
ammunition,  clothing,  all  sorts  of  munitions  of  war. 
They  fled  like  a  flock  of  panic-stricken  sheep.  We 
took  enough  arms,  accoutrements,  etc.  to  equip  the 
whole  army.  They  were  splendidly  equipped,  had 
every  imaginable  comfort  and  convenience  which 
Yankee  ingenuity  could  devise. 

The  fight  would  not  have  been  half  so  long  had  it 
been  an  open-field  one,  but  the  Yankees  were  pro- 
tected by  a  thick  pine  woods,  so  that  it  was  almost 
impossible  to  get  at  them  with  the  cavalry.  They 
never  once  stood  to  a  clash  of  the  bayonet  —  always 
broke  and  ran.  In  the  evening,  when  they  gave  way, 
the  order  was  given  to  charge  them.  We  were  then 
in  the  distant  part  of_the  field.  In  a  moment  we  were 
in  full  pursuit,  and  as  we  swept  on  by  the  lines  of  our 
infantry,  at  full  speed,  the  shouts  of  our  victorious 
soldiers  rent  the  air.  We  pursued  them  for  six  or 
eight  miles,  until  darkness  covered  their  retreat.  The 
whole  road  was  blocked  up  with  what  they  abandoned 
in  their  flight.  All  our  regiment  (in  fact,  nearly 
all  the  soldiers)  now  have  splendid  military  overcoats 
which  they  took.  I  have  provided  myself  very  well. 
We  took  every  piece  of  their  artillery  from  them  —  62 
pieces  —  among  them,  one  of  the  finest  batteries  in  the 
world.  Their  total  loss  cannot  be  less  than  5000.  Our 
company  is  now  equipped  with  Yankee  tents,  (I  am 
writing  under  one).  We  are  also  eating  Yankee  pro- 
visions, as  they  left  enough  to  feed  the  army  a  long 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  MANASSAS         53 

time.  .  .  .  All  of  the  Northern  Congress  came  out 
as  spectators  of  the  fight.  A  Senator  was  killed  by  a 
cannon  ball  —  Foster.  All  of  our  troops  fought  well, 
but  the  Virginia  troops  bore  the  brunt  of  the  battle, 
especially  Jackson's  brigade.  A  Washington  paper 
says  they  were  scarce  of  ammunition  —  a  lie,  for  we 
took  enough  from  them  to  whip  them  over  again. 
Our  Captain  (who  you  know  is  an  old  army  officer) 
complimented  our  company  very  much  for  their  cool- 
ness and  bravery  in  standing  fire,  —  said  that  we  stood 
like  old  veterans.  We  were  placed  in  the  most  trying 
position  in  which  troops  can  be  placed,  to  be  exposed 
to  a  fire  which  you  cannot  return.  .  .  .  There  was 
scarcely  a  minute  during  the  battle  that  I  did  not  think 
of  you  and  my  sweet  babes.  I  had  a  picture  of  May 
[his  daughter]  which  I  took  out  once  and  looked  at. 
For  a  moment  the  remembrance  of  her  prattling  inno- 
cence almost  unfitted  me  for  the  stern  duties  of  a  sol- 
dier, —  but  a  truce  to  such  thoughts.  We  are  now 
marching  on  to  bombard  Washington  Citya 

Fairfax  Court  House,  July  27,  1861. 

Dearest  Pauline : 

We  are  here  awaiting  for  the  whole  army  to  come 
up.  .  .  .     Several  of  our  men  got  scared  into  fits  at 

the  battle.     A  Dr. put  a  blister  on  his  heart  as  an 

excuse  not  to  go  into  battle ;   one  named  was  so 

much  frightened  when  the  shells  commenced  bursting 
around  us  that  he  fell  off  his  horse  —  commenced 
praying  ;   the  surgeon  ran  up,  —  thought  he  was  shot ; 


54  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

examined  him,  told  him  he  was  only  scared  to 
death.  He  got  up  and  left  the  field  in  double-quick 
time.  I  could  tell  you!of  a  good  many  such  ludicrous 
incidents. 


CHAPTER   VI 

The  Strategy  of  the  Battle  of  Manassas 

On  May  24,  1861,  the  day  after  Virginia  rati- 
fied the  Secession  Ordinance,  McDowell's  army 
crossed  the  Potomac  on  three  bridges.  McDowell 
made  his  headquarters  at  Arlington,  General 
Lee's  home,  and  it  should  be  recorded  to  his 
credit  that  he  showed  the  highest  respect  for 
persons  and  property. 

One  regiment  of  the  New  York  Zouaves,  com- 
manded by  Colonel  Ellsworth,  went  on  a  steamer 
to  Alexandria  and  landed  under  the  guns  of  the 
Pawnee.  A  Confederate  flag  was  flying  from  the 
top  of  a  house  which  was  owned  by  a  citizen  named 
Jackson.  Ellsworth  went  up  and  pulled  down 
the  flag.  As  he  descended  the  stairs,  Jackson 
shot  him  and  was  himself  shot  by  a  Union  soldier. 

On  June  26,  McDowell's  total  strength  present 
for  duty  was  153,682  men  and  twelve  guns; 
Patterson's  was  14,344  men.  Of  McDowell's 
twenty  regiments,  seventeen  were  three  months' 
men.     With   the  exception  of  one   infantry  regi- 

55 


56  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

ment,  four  companies  of  cavalry,  and  three  artil- 
lery companies,  Patterson's  force  was  composed 
of  three  months'  men.  Johnston's  force  at  the 
same  time  was  10,654  men  and  five  or  six  bat- 
teries. 

General  Lee  had  selected  Manassas  Junction 
as  the  point  for  the  concentration  of  the  Confed- 
erate troops  on  account  of  its  being  in  connection 
with  the  Valley.  Beauregard  was  in  command 
here,  while  Jackson  and  Johnston  with  their 
forces  were  across  the  Blue  Ridge  in  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley.  On  June  15,  Johnston  retired 
towards  Winchester,  because,  as  he  said,  Patter- 
son's army  had  reached  the  Potomac  twenty 
miles  above,  and  he  wanted  to  be  in  a  position 
to  repel  an  invasion  of  the  Valley,  or  quickly 
to  reinforce  Beauregard  at  Manassas.  Johnston 
thought,  so  he  said,  that  Patterson  was  making 
a  combined  movement  with  McDowell,  who  was 
expected  to  move  from  Washington  on  Richmond. 
If  so,  Johnston  at  Harper's  Ferry  had  the  interior 
line  and  the  choice  of  reinforcing  Beauregard  or 
striking  Patterson.  As  Patterson  hesitated,  it 
showed  that  he  was  afraid  to  cross  the  Potomac 
with  Johnston  on  his  flank. 

Johnston's  movement  to  Winchester,  which,  as 
I  have  said,  was  really  a  retreat,  about  doubled 


THE  STRATEGY  OF   MANASSAS  57 

the  distance  between  him  and  Beauregard.  If 
he  had  really  wanted  to  join  Beauregard,  his 
quickest  way  to  do  it  would  have  been  to  march 
directly  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  Bull  Run.  The 
distance  would  have  been  shorter  than  his  march 
from  Winchester  to  the  railroad  station,  on  his 
way  to  Manassas.  There  he  left  nearly  half  of 
his  army  for  want  of  transportation.  It  is  re- 
markable, however,  that  Jackson's  biographers, 
Dabney,  Cook,  and  Henderson,  regarded  the 
retreat  to  Winchester  as  only  a  strategic  move. 
Jackson  did  not  think  so. 

Jackson's  brigade  and  Stuart's  regiment  of 
cavalry  were  sent  to  observe  Patterson  on  the 
upper  Potomac.  Patterson  had  no  cavalry  for 
outpost  duty,  while  Johnston  had  the  regiments  of 
Stuart  and  Ashby.  Jackson's  orders  were  to 
feel  out  the  enemy,  but  to  avoid  an  engagement. 
On  July  2  Patterson  crossed  the  Potomac,  and 
Jackson  showed  sufficient  resistance  to  compel 
him  to  display  his  force  and  retired  as  his  orders 
required.  He  was  sure  that  Patterson  had  no 
aggressive  purpose,  but  was  only  making  a  feint 
to  create  a  diversion  and  retain  Johnston  in  the 
Valley,  when  McDowell  moved  against  Beauregard 
at  Manassas.  Jackson  thought  that  a  blow  at 
Patterson  would  have  been  the  best  way  to  co- 


58  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

operate  with  Beauregard.  As  Jackson  had  strict 
ideas  of  military  discipline,  he  would  not  criticise 
his  superiors,  and,  although  the  order  to  fall 
back  was  a  disappointment,  he  did  not,  like 
Achilles,  sulk  in  his  tent.  But  a  letter  he  wrote 
at  the  time  to  his  wife,  read  between  the  lines, 
shows  the  chagrin  he  felt. 

Colonel  Henderson,  in  his  "Life  of  Jackson", 
said : 

The  Federal  army  crawled  on  to  Martinsburg. 
Halting  seven  miles  southwest,  Jackson  was  reinforced 
by  Johnston's  whole  command  and  here  for  four  days 
the  Confederates  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  awaited 
attack.  But  the  Federals  stood  fast  in  Martinsburg 
and  on  the  fourth  day  Johnston  withdrew  to  Win- 
chester. The  Virginia  soldiers  were  bitterly  dissatis- 
fied. 

At  first  even  Jackson  chafed.  He  was  eager  for 
action.  His  experience  at  Falling  Waters  had  given 
him  no  exalted  notion  of  the  enemy's  prowess  and  he 
was  ready  to  engage  them  singlehanded.  "I  want 
my  brigade,"  he  said,  "to  feel  that  it  can  itself  whip 
Patterson's  whole  army  and  I  believe  that  we  can 
do  it." 

The  truth  is  that  the  numerical  difference  in 
the  strength  of  the  two  armies  was  inconsider- 
able, but  Johnston's  had  a  great  advantage  in 
morale  and  a  superior  force  of  cavalry. 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  MANASSAS  59 

On  July  15,  in  obedience  to  General  Scott's 
orders,  Patterson  moved  up  the  Valley,  threw 
some  shells  at  Stuart's  regiment,  and  then  turned 
squarely  around  and  retreated  towards  Harper's 
Ferry.  The  movement  was  so  timid  that  it  was 
more  a  farce  than  a  feint.  Patterson  was  not 
seeking  a  fight ;  his  movement  was  only  a  blind. 
If  the  Confederates  had  then  taken  the  offensive, 
there  would  have  been  a  footrace  towards  the 
Potomac,  and  McDowell  would  not  have  moved 
against  the  troops  at  Manassas. 

The  most  effective  way  to  aid  Beauregard  was 
to  strike  Patterson.  The  next  year  Jackson  did 
what  should  have  been  done  in  1861.  He  turned 
on  Banks  and  swept  him  out  of  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  creating  such  alarm  in  Washington  that 
McDowell,  who  was  moving  from  Fredericksburg 
to  join  McClellan  at  Richmond,  was  recalled  to 
save  the  Capital. 

The  following  dispatch  to  McClellan  from 
Mr.  Lincoln  shows  what  Jackson  did  in  1862 
and  what  he  would  have  done  in  1861,  if  he  had 
been    in    command : 

May  24th,  1862. 

In  consequence  of  General  Banks's  critical  position 
I  have  been  compelled  to  suspend  General  McDowell's 
movements  to  join  you.     The  enemy  are  making  a 


\ 


60  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

desperate  push  on  Harper's  Ferry  and  we  are  trying 
to  throw  General  Fremont's  force  and  a  part  of  Mc- 
Dowell's in  their  rear. 

The  next  that  was  heard  of  Jackson,  he  had 
defeated  Fremont  and  Shields  in  the  Valley  and 
then  turned  off  on  McClellan's  flank  at  Cold 
Harbor. 

In  July  1861,  the  larger  part  of  the  troops 
at  Manassas  should  have  gone  to  Johnston, 
instead  of  his  reinforcing  Beauregard.  That  is, 
if  Johnston  was  willing  to  take  the  offensive  and 
cross  the  Potomac.  That  was  the  best  way  to 
defend  Richmond. 

On  July  17,  McDowell  began  his  movement 
towards  the  Confederate  Capital.  Mr.  Davis 
telegraphed  to  Johnston  at  Winchester  to  join 
Beauregard,  if  practicable.     He  said  : 

General  Beauregard  is  attacked.  To  strike  the 
enemy  a  decisive  blow  a  junction  of  all  your  effective 
force  will  be  needed.  If  practicable  make  the  move- 
ment, sending  your  sick  and  baggage  to  Culpeper  Court 
House  either  by  railroad  or  by  Warrenton.  In  all 
arrangements  exercise  your  discretion. 

President  Davis  endorsed  on  Johnston's  report 
of  the  battle  that  his  order,  or  rather  request 
to  Johnston  to  join  Beauregard  gave  him  discre- 
tion because  Johnston's  letters  of  July  12  and  13 


THE  STRATEGY  OF   MANASSAS  61 

"made  it  doubtful  whether  General  Johnston 
had  the  power  to  effect  the  movement." 

In  the  letters  Johnston  said  that  he  had  to 
"defeat  Patterson  or  elude  him."  It  would 
have  been  impossible  for  him  to  defeat  Patterson 
as  the  latter  was  running ;  as  Patterson  was 
trying  to  elude  Johnston,  the  latter  had  no  trouble 
in  eluding  Patterson. 

On  July  13  General  Johnston  telegraphed  to 
President  Davis:  "Unless  he  (Patterson)  pre- 
vents it,  we  shall  move  toward  Beauregard  to-day." 
Up  to  that  time  Johnston  does  not  seem  to  have 
contemplated,  nor  was  there  any  plan  for,  any 
concerted  action  between  Johnston  and  Beaure- 
gard. 

The  march  to  Manassas  did  not  begin  until 
noon  of  the  eighteenth.  Jackson's  brigade  was 
in  the  advance.  It  waded  the  Shenandoah, 
climbed  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  arrived  at  Manassas 
by  rail  on  the  next  day.  When  the  troops  left 
Winchester,  they  could  not  have  been  expected 
to  join  Beauregard  at  Manassas  before  a  battle, 
because  McDowell's  delay  of  three  days  at  Centre- 
ville  could  not  have  been  anticipated.  On  the 
seventeenth  General  Scott  telegraphed  Patterson 
that  McDowell  would  take  Manassas  the  next 
day,   which   probably  would   have  been  done  if 


62  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

Scott's  program  to  cross  the  Occoquan  and  turn 
the  Confederate  right  had  been  carried  out.  But 
McDowell  changed  the  plan,  waited  to  make 
a  reconnaissance  on  the  Confederate  left,  and 
decided  to  cross  Bull  Run  at  Sudley.  Beauregard 
was  not  expecting  aid  from  Johnston,  for  in  a 
telegram  to  the  War  Department  he  said,  "I 
believe  this  proposed  movement  of  General  John- 
ston is  too  late.  Enemy  will  attack  me  in  force 
to-morrow    morning." 

When  Johnston  left  the  Valley,  Patterson  was 
in  camp  at  Charles  Town.  As  late  as  the  nine- 
teenth Patterson  insisted  that  Johnston  was  at 
Winchester  receiving  reinforcements ;  but  on  the 
twentieth  he  acknowledged  that  Johnston  had 
gone.  It  was  then  too  late  for  him  to  give  assist- 
ance to  McDowell  in  the  battle  the  next  day. 
When  Patterson  was  reproached  for  what  he  had 
not  done,  he  consoled  Scott  by  telling  him  that  if 
he  had  attacked  Joe  Johnston,  he  (Scott)  would 
have  had  to  mourn  the  loss  of  two  battles  instead 
of  one. 

Johnston  arrived  at  Beauregard's  headquarters 
at  Manassas  at  noon  on  July  20,  but  nearly  half 
of  his  army  was  left  behind  him.  Beauregard's 
army  was  posted  on  Bull  Run  at  five  or  six  fords 
stretching    from    Stone    Bridge    to    Union    Mills, 


THE  STRATEGY  OF   MANASSAS  63 

a  distance  of  eight  miles.  Bull  Run  is  a  creek 
running  through  a  largely  wooded  country,  and 
is  passable  anywhere  but  for  its  steep  banks. 
Johnston's  troops  were  posted  behind  Beaure- 
gard's at  the  fords,  and  Jackson  was  placed  in 
the  rear  of  Bonham.  McDowell's  headquarters 
were  in  plain  view  six  miles  distant  at  Centre- 
ville  and  also  in  view  of  the  signal  station  Captain 
Alexander  had  established  on  the  Manassas  plain. 

Beauregard  proposed  an  offensive  plan  which 
Johnston  approved,  but  no  attempt  was  made 
to  execute  it.  The  battle  was  defensive  on  the 
Confederate  side.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the 
twenty-first  the  signal  officers  discovered  McDow- 
ell's column  marching  towards  Sudley  to  turn 
our  left  at  Stone  Bridge.  They  reported  the 
movement  to  General  Evans,  who  commanded 
there,  and  to  headquarters.  Johnston's  brigades 
were  in  the  rear  of  the  fords  as  reserves  ready  to 
be  moved  to  any  point  on  the  line.  As  Bull  Run 
presented  no  defensive  advantages,  it  is  hard 
to  discover  why  that  line  was  selected.  No 
matter  whether  Beauregard  intended  to  act  on 
the  offensive  or  defensive,  his  army  should  have 
been  concentrated  at  one  or  two  fords,  instead 
of  being  distributed  at  several. 

Long  afterwards  Beauregard  claimed  that  John- 


64  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

ston  accepted  his  plan  of  battle,  waived  his  rank, 
and  consented  to  act  as  his  chief  of  staff.  As 
there  was  no  emergency  that  required  such  an 
abdication  of  authority,  and  as  there  was  ample 
time  for  Johnston  to  learn  the  conditions  and  get 
all  the  topographical  knowledge  necessary,  it 
would  have  been  shirking  responsibility  for  him 
to  have  done  so.  His  objective,  McDowell's 
army,  was  in  sight ;  he  was  near  Bull  Run,  and 
he  could  easily  learn  from  maps  where  the  fords 
were  and  the  roads  that  led  to  them.  Beaure- 
gard and  his  staff  officers  could  have  easily  told 
him  how  the  troops  were  disposed.  With  such 
explanation  Johnston  might,  in  an  hour  or  so, 
have  taken  in  the  whole  situation.  Very  few 
commanders  were  ever  on  the  ground  more  than 
a  few  hours  before  a  battle ;  it  is  not  their  busi- 
ness to  act  as  guides  —  the  country  furnishes 
plenty  of  them.  Of  course,  generals  must  utilize 
other  men's  knowledge. 

But  the  inconsistency  is  that  Beauregard  claims 
the  credit  as  commander-in-chief  for  winning 
the  victory,  but  makes  Johnston  responsible  for 
the  failure  to  reap  the  fruit  of  it.  He  contradicts 
his  own  report,  written  a  few  days  after  the 
battle,  which  says  that  the  army,  after  the  hard 
day's   righting,   was   in   no   condition   to   pursue. 


THE  STRATEGY  OF   MANASSAS  65 

He  did  not  seem  to  know  that  he  had  15,000  fresh 
men  on  the  field  and  that  the  remainder  of  John- 
ston's men  arrived  next  morning.  In  his  "Mili- 
tary Memoirs",  General  Alexander,  who  was 
chief  signal  officer  and  also  in  the  evening  carried 
orders  on  the  field,  said  : 

Not  far  off  Stonewall  Jackson,  who  had  been  shot 
through  the  hand  but  had  disregarded  it  until  victory 
was  assured,  was  now  having  his  hand  dressed  by 
Doctor  Hunter  McGuire.  Jackson  did  not  catch  the 
President's  (Davis)  words  and  Doctor  McGuire  re- 
peated them  to  him.  Jackson  quickly  shouted,  "We 
have  whipped  them !  They  ran  like  sheep !  Give 
me  5000  men  and  I  will  be  in  Washington  City  to- 
morrow morning." 

Doctor  Edward  Campbell,  a  surgeon  in  Jack- 
son's brigade,  told  me  soon  after  the  war  that 
he  heard  Jackson  make  that  speech. 

But  Johnston's  endorsement  on  Beauregard's 
order  of  battle  shows  that  so  far  from  waiving 
he  asserted  his  rank  as  commander.     Here  it  is : 

4.30  a.m.,  July  21st. 

The  plan  of  battle  given  by  General  Beauregard 
in  the  above  order  is  approved  and  will  be  executed 
accordingly. 

(Signed)  J.  E.  Johnston, 
General,  C.  S.  Army. 


66  COLONEL  JOHN  S.    MOSBY 

As  Beauregard  submitted  his  program  to  John- 
ston's approval,  he  recognized  Johnston  as  his 
superior  officer.  Orders  are  not  submitted  to 
the  approval  of  subordinates.  As  a  worse  plan 
of  operations  could  hardly  have  been  devised, 
Johnston  might  have  given  Beauregard  credit 
for  it  if  he  had  adopted  it.  As  there  was  no 
attempt  to  execute  it,  however,  it  is  immaterial 
who  was  the  author.  The  battle  was  fought 
on  McDowell's  plan.  What  was  most  remark- 
able was  that  instead  of  directing  its  immedi- 
ate execution  by  an  advance  of  his  columns  on 
Centreville,  it  instructed  brigade  commanders 
to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  advance  but 
to  wait  orders.  None  but  D.  R.  Jones  received 
such  an  order  to  cross  the  Run  that  morning,  and 
his  was  soon  revoked.  As  the  enemy  was  in 
their  front,  old  soldiers  like  Jackson,  Longstreet, 
and  Ewell,  ought  to  have  been  presumed  to  be 
ready  for  combat  without  instructions.  If  the 
Confederates  were  to  assume  the  offensive  to 
turn  McDowell,  their  movement  should  have 
been  begun,  as  McDowell's  was,  before  daybreak ; 
and  as  they  would  have  had  to  move  through  a 
wooded  country,  their  columns  should  have  been 
as  much  as  possible  in  sight  of  and  in  supporting 
distance   of   each   other.     But   what   is   stranger 


THE  STRATEGY  OF   MANASSAS  67 

still  is  that  Beauregard's  order  of  battle,  although 
it  contemplated  the  offensive,  is  dated  at  4.30 
A.M.,  July  21,  long  after  McDowell's  army  was 
in  motion.  McDowell  issued  his  order  of  battle 
on  the  twentieth. 

McDowell  saw  the  danger  of  keeping  the  wings 
of  his  army  so  far  apart  and  said  : 

I  had  felt  anxious  about  the  road  from  Manassas 
by  Blackburn's  Ford  to  Centreville  along  this  ridge, 
fearing  that  while  we  should  be  in  force  to  the  front 
and  endeavoring  to  turn  the  enemy's  position,  we  our- 
selves should  be  turned  by  him  by  this  road.  For  if 
he  should  once  obtain  possession  of  this  ridge,  which 
overlooks  all  the  country  to  the  west  to  the  foot  of  the 
spurs  to  the  Blue  Ridge,  we  should  have  been  irretriev- 
ably cut  off  and  destroyed.  I  had,  therefore,  directed 
this  point  to  be  held  in  force,  and  sent  an  engineer  to 
extemporize  some  field  works  to  strengthen  the  posi- 
tion. .  .  .  The  divisions  were  ordered  to  march  at 
2.30  o'clock  A.M.,  so  as  to  arrive  on  the  ground  early 
in  the  day  and  thus  avoid  the  heat  which  is  to  be  ex- 
pected at  this  season. 

If  the  Confederates  had  moved  in  two  columns 
from  the  lower  fords,  while  Evans  and  Cocke 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  enemy  above, 
they  would  have  reached  Centreville  before  Mc- 
EJowell  reached  Sudley,  and  they  would  have 
been    between    McDowell    and    Washington.     In 


68  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

that  event  McDowell  said  his  army  would  have 
been  destroyed.  McDowell  saw  more  clearly 
than  the  Confederate  generals  what  they  ought 
to  do,  but  he  trusted  to  their  not  doing  it.  Beaure- 
gard's first  plan  for  a  simultaneous  advance  from 
all  the  Bull  Run  fords  to  Centreville  was  impracti- 
cable in  the  wooded  country,  and  it  was  well 
that  no  attempt  was  made  to  execute  it.  His 
line  of  battle  would  have  been  several  miles 
long. 

Beauregard  commanded  that  day  under  John- 
ston as  Meade  commanded  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac under   Grant.     Beauregard's  "report   said  : 

General  Johnston  arrived  here  about  noon  of  the 
20th  of  July,  and  being  my  senior  in  rank  he  neces- 
sarily assumed  command  of  the  forces  of  the  Confed- 
erate States  then  concentrating  at  this  point.  Made 
acquainted  with  my  plan  of  operations  and  disposi- 
tions to  meet  the  enemy,  he  gave  them  his  entire 
approval  and  generously  directed  their  execution  under 
my  command. 

Beauregard  must  have  forgotten,  when  he 
wrote  afterwards  and  claimed  that  he  was  com- 
mander-in-chief at  Bull  Run,  that  he  had  ever 
written  that  Johnston  was. 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  MANASSAS  69 

Beauregard  said  that,  being  informed  at  5.30 
A.M.  that  a  strong  force  was  deployed  in  front  of 
Stone  Bridge,  he  ordered  Evans  and  Cocke  to 
maintain  their  positions  to  the  last  extremity, 
and  that  he  thought  the  most  effective  method 
of  relieving  his  left  was  by  making  a  determined 
attack  by  his  right.  No  doubt  that  was  so.  He 
knew,  long  before  McDowell  reached  Sudley, 
that  Ewell,  Holmes,  Jones,  and  Early  had  not 
advanced  on  Centreville,  and  there  was  then 
abundance  of  time  for  them  to  have  reached 
Centreville   before   McDowell   reached   Sudley. 

But  he  said  that  the  news  from  the  left  after- 
wards changed  his  plan.  As  it  was  clear  that 
McDowell  was  making  only  a  feeble  demonstra- 
tion in  our  front  and  none  on  our  right,  he  must 
have  known  early  in  the  morning  that  the  main 
portion  of  his  army  was  moving  against  our  left. 
He  could  not  have  expected  McDowell  to  stand 
still ;  nor  does  he  give  a  satisfactory  reason  for 
a  change  of  plan,  but  the  reverse.  McDowell 
was  doing  what  he  ought  to  have  wanted  him  to 
do. 

At  7.10  a.m.,  D.  R.  Jones,  whose  brigade  was 
at  McLean's  Ford  near  headquarters,  said  he 
received  the  following  order : 


70  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

Brigadier-General  D.  R.  Jones,5* 

General : 

General  Ewell  has  been  ordered  to  take  the  offensive 
upon  Centreville.  You  will  follow  the  movement  at 
once  by  attacking  him  in  your  front. 

July  21st,  1861. 
[Signed]  G.  T.  Beauregard, 
Brigadier. 

Ewell  was  at  the  next  ford  below,  with  Holmes's 
brigade  in  support.  It  was  not  pretended  that 
any  such  orders  were  sent  to  the  brigades  at  the 
fords  above.  Longstreet,  who  was  at  Black- 
burn's Ford,  with  Early  in  support,  said  that  in 
obedience  to  orders  of  the  twentieth  to  assume 
the  offensive,  he  crossed  Bull  Run  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  twenty-first,  but  as  he  immedi- 
ately came  in  contact  with  the  enemy  and  ordered 
his  men  to  lie  down  under  cover  from  the  artillery 
fire,  he  does  not  seem  to  have  been  ordered  to 
move  on  Centreville,  and  does  not  refer  to  any 
such  order.  He  must  have  been  waiting  for 
further  orders. 

It  is  clear  that  Bonham  received  no  orders  to 
cross  the  Run,  as  he  did  not  attempt  it,  although 
the  enemy  opened  fire  on  him  early  in  the  morn- 
ing. He  said  that  before  daylight  one  of  his 
aides,    General    McGowan,    brought    intelligence 


THE  STRATEGY  OF   MANASSAS  71 

that  the  enemy  was  moving  on  his  left,  and  that 
he  arose  and  with  a  field  glass  discovered  the 
enemy  moving  on  the  pike  to  Stone  Bridge. 
He  said  that  he  immediately  communicated  the 
news  to  headquarters  and  directed  his  command 
to  prepare  for  action,  as  he  supposed  "an  assault 
would  be  made  early  along  our  whole  line." 
But  no  such  assault  was  ordered. 

Early,  who  was  near  McLean's  farm  in  support 
of  Longstreet,  did  not  mention  receiving  any 
order  to  move  on  Centreville ;  neither  did  Jack- 
son, who  was  supporting  Bonham  at  Mitchell's 
Ford.  He  simply  got  an  order  to  place  himself 
in  position  where  he  could  reinforce  either  Cocke 
or  Bonham.  In  the  meantime  Jackson  ascer- 
tained that  Bee,  who  had  been  sent  with  his 
own  and  Bartow's  brigades  to  reinforce  Evans, 
was  hard  pressed.  He  seems  to  have  moved, 
in  the  exercise  of  his  own  discretion,  where  the 
sound  of  the  cannon  indicated  that  the  real  con- 
flict was.  When  he  reached  the  plateau  where 
the  Henry  house  stood,  he  met  the  shattered 
brigades  of  Bee  and  Bartow  retreating.  Jack- 
son formed  his  brigade  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge, 
which  will  forever  be  associated  with  his  name. 

General  Alexander  described  the  scene  as 
follows : 


72  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

A  fresh  brigade  was  drawn  up  in  line  on  the  ele- 
vated ground  known  as  Henry  House  Hill  and  its 
commander,  till  then  unknown,  was  henceforth  to  be 
called  Stonewall.  Bee  rode  up  to  him  and  said : 
"General,  they  are  driving  us!"  "Then,  Sir,"  said 
Jackson,  "we  must  give  them  the  bayonet."  Bee 
galloped  among  his  retreating  men  and  called  out 
to  them:  "See  Jackson  standing  like  a  stone  wall  — 
rally  behind  the  Virginians."  It  was  at  this  moment 
when  Jackson's  and  Hampton's  were  the  only  organ- 
ized troops  opposing  the  Federal  advance  and  Bee 
and  Bartow  were  attempting  to  rally  their  broken 
forces,  that  Johnston  and  Beauregard  reached  the 
field. 

This  was  the  crisis  of  the  battle,  as  Jackson's 
heroic  bearing  electrified  the  troops  and  saved 
the  day.  Jackson  selected  this  place  as  a  battle- 
ground, and  the  great  struggle  was  for  the  posses- 
sion of  the  plateau.  This  was  crescent  shaped, 
the  ridge  forming  a  cover  which  protected  his 
men  from  artillery  fire. 

Jones  said  that  after  getting  the  order  from 
Beauregard  to  cross  the  Run  and  follow  Ewell, 
he  sent  a  message  to  Ewell  but  crossed  and  took 
a  position  on  the  road  from  Union  Mills  to  Centre- 
ville  and  waited  for  Ewell.  In  the  meantime  he 
received  the  following  order  directing  him  to 
return : 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  MANASSAS  73 

IO.3O  A.M. 

General  Jones : 

On  account  of  the  difficulties  in  our  front  it  is 
thought  preferable  to  countermand  the  advance  of  the 
right  wing.     Resume  your  position. 

Beauregard  said  that  as  early  as  5.30  A.M. 
the  enemy  opened  fire  on  Evans  at  Stone  Bridge, 
and  that  by  8.30  a.m.  he  discovered  that  it  was 
a  mask  to  cover  a  movement  around  his  flank, 
and  Evans  promptly  moved  to  meet  it.  So  it 
was  then  clear  that  the  enemy  would  be  on  the 
left.  Instead  of  a  change  of  plans  and  a  retro- 
grade movement,  when  this  was  discovered,  it 
was  the  opportune  moment  to  order  our  right 
to  advance.  Only  four  companies  were  left  to 
hold  Stone  Bridge  against  Tyler's  division ;  they 
held  it  all  day. 

The  sound  of  the  battle  now  informed  our 
generals  where  the  main  effort  of  the  enemy 
would  be  made.  The  "difficulties"  in  his  front, 
of  which  Beauregard  spoke  in  his  note  to  Jones 
as  the  cause  for  revoking  the  order  to  advance, 
instead  of  deterring  should  have  encouraged  him 
to  take  the  offensive.  It  was  now  clear  that 
there  was  only  a  small  force  between  him  and  the 
enemy's  rear  at  Centreville.  Hunter's  and  Heint- 
zelman's  divisions  reached  Sudley  Ford,   at  least 


74  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

eight  miles  away,  about  9.30  a.m.  They  halted 
for  rest  and  for  the  men  to  fill  their  canteens  from 
the  stream.  The  main  body  of  the  Confederate 
army  was  then  about  half  the  distance  from  Centre- 
ville  that  Sudley  is.  The  three  brigades  of  Miles 
that  were  in  reserve  on  the  road  to  Blackburn's 
and  McLean's  fords  could  easily  have  been 
brushed  aside  before  any  reinforcements  could 
have  reached  them.  Then  one  of  his  brigade 
commanders,  Richardson,  reported  that  Colonel 
Stevens,  who  commanded  a  regiment  there,  said, 
"We  have  no  confidence  in  Colonel  Miles,  be- 
cause Colonel  Miles  is  drunk;  "  all  of  which  was 
in  our  favor.  It  was  much  better  for  the  Con- 
federates if  Ewell's  and  Jones's  forward  move- 
ments were  delayed  until  nine  o'clock  by  a  mis- 
carriage of  orders,  for  by  that  time  McDowell 
had  progressed  too  far  to  turn  back  when  he 
heard  of  it. 

When  at  Austerlitz  Napoleon  saw  the  allies 
marching  towards  his  rear,  he  told  his  marshals 
to  be  quiet,  not  to  interrupt  them.  After  their 
movement  had  developed  sufficiently,  he  struck 
such  a  blow  as  Johnston  and  Beauregard  might 
have  repeated  at  Centreville.  McDowell  dreaded 
such  a  counterstroke,  and  in  the  morning  on  the 
road  to  Sudley  he  halted  Howard  and  kept  his 


THE   STRATEGY  OF  MANASSAS  75 

brigade  in  reserve  near  the  pike  until  noon  to 
meet  such  a  contingency.  On  the  field  McDowell 
saw  what  he  might  do  ;  and  reports  from  the  signal 
stations  and  heavy  firing  told  Johnston  and 
Beauregard  what  they  could  do  —  that  the  enemy 
had  exposed  his  rear.  But  "in  my  judgment," 
said  Beauregard,  "it  was  now  (10.30  a.m.)  too 
late  for  the  contemplated  movement."  Napo- 
leon would  have  thought  it  was  the  hour  for  it 
to  begin.  It  is  a  mystery  why  the  Confederate 
generals  abandoned  their  plan  —  if  they  ever 
had  such  a  plan. 

Alexander  said,  "About  8  A.M.  Johnston  and 
Beauregard,  accompanied  by  their  staffs  and 
couriers,  rode  to  the  vicinity  of  Mitchell's  Ford, 
where  they  left  their  party  under  cover  and  took 
position  on  an  open  hill  some  200  yards  to  the 
left  of  the  road." 

Richardson  was  in  their  front,  making  a  feint 
by  shelling  the  woods.  If  he  had  intended  a  real 
attack,  he  would  not  have  halted.  The  resist- 
ance made  by  Evans's  small  force  on  the  Sudley 
road  showed  that,  with  reinforcement  of  Cocke's 
brigade  at  the  ford  below,  McDowell's  turning 
column  could  have  been  held  in  check  until  ours 
took  Centreville.  The  fact  is  that  the  roaring 
guns  and  the  despairing  cry  for  help  from  Centre- 


76  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

ville  would  have  stampeded  McDowell.  General 
Johnston  said  the  news  from  our  left  made  their 
plan  impracticable.  I  think  it  showed  not  only 
that  it  was  practicable,  but  a  dead  sure  thing  if 
they  had  attempted  to  execute  it.  McDowell 
thought  so  too.  I  am  not  judging  the  Confederate 
generals  by  the  lights  that  are  now  before  me, 
but  by  what  their  reports  say  was  before  them 
then. 

Again  quoting  Alexander : 

As  he  rode  out  in  the  morning,  Beauregard  directed 
me  to  go  with  a  courier  to  the  Wicoxen  signal  station 
and  remain  in  general  observation  of  the  field,  sending 
messages  of  all  I  could  discover.  I  went  reluctantly 
as  the  opportunity  seemed  very  slight  of  rendering 
any  service.  There  were  but  two  signal  stations  on  our 
line  of  battle  —  one  in  rear  of  McLean's  Ford  and  one 
near  Van  Pelt's  house  on  a  bluff  a  few  hundred  yards 
to  the  left  and  rear  of  Stone  Bridge.  Beyond  the 
latter  the  broad,  level  valley  of  Bull  Run  for  some 
miles  with  its  fields  and  pastures  as  seen  through  the 
glass  was  foreshortened  into  a  narrow  band  of  green. 
While  watching  the  flag  of  this  station  with  a  good 
glass,  when  I  had  been  there  about  half  an  hour,  the 
sun  being  in  the  east  behind  me,  my  eye  was  caught 
by  a  glitter  in  this  narrow  band  of  green.  I  recognized 
it  at  once  as  the  reflection  of  the  morning  sun  from  a 
brass  field  piece.  Closer  scrutiny  soon  revealed  the 
glittering  of  bayonets  and  masked  barrels.     It  was 


THE  STRATEGY  OF   MANASSAS  77 

about  8.45  a.m.,  and  I  had  discovered  McDowell's 
turning  column  the  head  of  which  at  this  hour  was  just 
arriving  at  Sudley,  eight  miles  away.  I  appreciated 
how  much  it  might  mean  and  thought  it  best  to  give 
Evans  immediate  notice,  even  before  sending  word 
to  Beauregard.  So  I  signalled  Evans  quickly,  "Look 
out  for  your  left,  you  are  turned."  Evans  afterwards 
told  me  that  a  picket,  which  he  had  at  Sudley,  being 
driven  in  by  the  enemy's  advanced  guard,  had  sent 
a  courier,  and  the  two  couriers,  one  with  my  signal 
message  and  one  with  the  report  of  the  picket,  reached 
him  together.  The  simultaneous  reports  from  dif- 
ferent sources  impressed  him,  and  he  acted  at  once 
with  sound  judgment.  He  left  four  companies  of 
his  command  to  watch  the  bridge  and  the  enemy  in 
his  front  —  Tyler  and  his  three  brigades.  With  the 
remainder  of  his  force  (six  companies  of  the  4th  S.  C. 
and  Wheat's  La.  Battalion)  he  marched  to  oppose 
and  delay  the  turning  column,  at  the  same  time  notify- 
ing Cocke,  next  on  his  right,  of  his  movement.  .  .  . 
Having  sent  Evans  notice  of  his  danger,  I  next  wrote 
to  Beauregard  as  follows:  "I  see  a  body  of  troops 
crossing  Bull  Run  about  two  miles  above  the  Stone 
Bridge.  The  head  of  the  column  is  in  the  woods  on 
this  side.  The  rear  of  the  column  is  in  the  woods  on 
the  other  side.  About  half  a  mile  of  its  length  is 
visible  in  the  open  ground  between.  I  can  see  both 
infantry  and  artillery." 

This    message    reached    Beauregard    in    a    few 
minutes.     Johnston's  report  said  : 


78  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

About  8  o'clock  General  Beauregard  and  I  placed 
ourselves  on  a  commanding  hill  in  rear  of  Gen.  Bon- 
ham's  left  (Mitchell's  Ford).  Near  nine  o'clock  the 
signal  officer,  Captain  Alexander,  reported  that  a 
large  body  of  troops  was  crossing  the  Valley  of  Bull 
Run  some  two  miles  above  the  bridge.  General  Bee, 
who  had  been  placed  near  Col.  Cocke's  position,  Col. 
Hampton  with  his  legion,  and  Colonel  Jackson  from 
a  point  near  Gen.  Bonham's  left  were  ordered  to 
hasten  to  the  left  flank. 

Alexander  continued  his  account : 

For  a  long  time  there  was  little  change  and  the 
battle  seemed  to  stand  still.  When  Evans  and  Bee 
were  broken  by  Sherman's  attack  on  the  flank,  their 
retreat  was  specially  pressed  by  the  Federal  artillery. 
On  reaching  the  Warrenton  pike  they  were  met  by  the 
Hampton  Legion  and  Hampton  made  an  earnest  effort 
to  rally  the  retreating  force  upon  his  command.  The 
ground,  however,  was  unfavorable  and  though  Hamp- 
ton made  a  stubborn  fight  (losing  121  out  of  600  men) 
and  delaying  the  advance  near  two  hours  before  leav- 
ing the  pike,  our  whole  line  then  fell  back  under  the 
enemy's  fire. 

Jackson  now  came  to  the  rescue.  He  had 
261 1  men  and  with  the  remnants  of  Hampton's 
600,  they  were  the  only  organized  troops  opposing 
the  enemy's  advance.  Bee,  Bartow,  and  Evans 
were  engaged  in  rallying  their  troops  as  Johnston 


THE  STRATEGY  OF  MANASSAS         79 

and  Beauregard  appeared.  Johnston  took  up 
his  headquarters  a  short  distance  in  the  rear  to 
direct  reinforcements,  while  the  immediate  con- 
duct of  the  battle  was  left  to  Beauregard.  His 
task  was  to  hold  the  line  until  fresh  troops  could 
be  brought  upon  the  scene.  McDowell's  last 
chance  was  to  crush  Beauregard's  line  at  once 
before  any  reinforcements  arrived.  Some  of  his 
brigades  were  absent  —  Burnside's  had  drawn 
off  for  rest  and  ammunition  —  and  his  partial 
attacks  only  consumed  time. 

About  three  o'clock  Kirby  Smith's  brigade 
arrived,  and  it  was  closely  followed  by  Early's 
brigade  and  Beckham's  battery.  Kirby  Smith 
was  severely  wounded  just  as  he  was  extending 
his  line  on  our  left,  and  Elzey  took  command. 
Kirby  Smith  was  the  first  man  I  ever  saw  carried 
from  the  field  on  a  stretcher.  About  four  o'clock 
Beauregard  advanced  his  whole  line,  and  the 
1 8th  Virginia  under  Colonel  Withers,  the  8th 
Virginia  under  Colonel  Hunton,  and  the  Hampton 
Legion  with  Jackson's  brigade  swept  the  field 
and  turned  the  enemy's  guns  on  them.  Early, 
with  Beckham's  battery  and  Stuart's  cavalry, 
crossed  the  Warrenton  pike  and  opened  on  the 
flank  and  rear  of  a  new  line  which  McDowell 
had  formed.     This  force  had  no  artillery  to  reply 


80  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

to  ours,  and  it  soon  broke.  McDowell  said, 
"The  retreat  soon  became  a  rout  and  this  soon 
degenerated  into  a  panic." 

Heintzelman  said,  "Such  a  rout  I  never  wit- 
nessed before." 

Stuart's  cavalry  had  charged  and  routed  the 
Ellsworth  Zouaves  on  the  Sudley  road  as  they 
were  coming  to  the  support  of  the  Federal  bat- 
teries. Heintzelman  led  the  Zouaves.  His  ac- 
count of  this  was  as  follows. 

In  the  meantime  I  sent  orders  for  the  Zouaves  to  move 
forward  to  support  Ricketts'  battery  on  its  right.  As 
soon  as  they  came  up  I  led  them  forward  against  an 
Alabama  regiment,  partly  concealed  in  a  clump  of  small 
pines  in  an  old  field.  At  the  first  fire  they  broke  and 
the  greater  portion  fled  to  the  rear,  keeping  up  a  desul- 
tory fire  over  the  heads  of  their  comrades  in  front.  At 
the  same  time  they  were  charged  by  a  company  of  Seces- 
sion cavalry  on  their  rear,  who  had  come  by  a  road 
through  two  strips  of  woods  on  our  extreme  right. 

Stuart's  charge  was  not  on  the  rear  of  the 
Zouaves  but  on  their  front,  when  they  were 
advancing  to  the  support  of  the  batteries.  Heint- 
zelman said  the  regiment  dispersed  and  did  not 
appear  on  the  field  again ;  the  greater  portion 
kept  on  to  New  York. 

Porter  said : 


THE  STRATEGY  OF   MANASSAS  81 

The  evanescent  courage  of  the  Zouaves  prompted 
them  to  fire  perhaps  a  hundred  shots,  when  they  broke 
and  fled,  leaving  the  batteries  open  to  a  charge  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  which  took  place  immediately.  .  .  . 
Soon  the  slopes  behind  us  were  swarming  with  our 
retreating  and  disorganized  forces,  whilst  riderless 
horses  and  artillery  teams  ran  furiously  through  the 
flying  crowd. 

As  McDowell,  with  the  larger  part  of  his  army, 
had  moved  in  a  circle  by  Sudley,  and  as  they 
retreated  by  the  same  route,  if  our  troops  on  the 
field  had  moved  on  the  straight  line  on  the  pike 
leading  over  Stone  Bridge  to  Centreville,  they 
would  have  cut  off  their  retreat.  This  is  what 
Jackson  wanted  to  do. 

After  the  battle  had  shifted,  Alexander  joined 
Beauregard.  He  said  that  Jackson  alone  of  the 
Confederate  leaders  on  the  field  gave  any  evidence 
of  his  appreciation  of  the  victory.  After  the  war 
Doctor  Edward  Campbell,  a  surgeon  of  Jack- 
son's brigade,  told  me  that  Jackson  said  to  him, 
"I  wonder  if  General  Johnston  and  General 
Beauregard  know  how  badly  they  (the  enemy) 
are  whipped.  If  they  will  let  me,  I  will  march 
my  brigade  into  Washington  to-night." 

Alexander  said  he  heard  Jackson  tell  President 
Davis  the  same  thing.     His  account  concludes : 


82  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

Jackson's  offer  to  take  Washington  City  the  next 
morning  with  5000  men  had  been  made  to  the  President 
as  he  arrived  upon  the  field ;  probably  about  five 
o'clock.  It  was  not  sunset  until  7.15  and  there  was 
nearly  a  full  moon.  But  the  President  himself  and 
both  Generals  spent  these  precious  hours  in  riding 
over  the  field  where  the  conflict  had  taken  place.  .  .  . 
Johnston  and  Beauregard  both  sent  orders  to  different 
commands  to  make  such  advances,  but  neither  went  in 
person  to  supervise  or  urge  forward  the  execution  of  the 
order,  though  time  was  of  the  essence.  [The  italics  are 
Alexander's.] 

Kershaw  with  two  South  Carolina  regiments, 
Kemper  with  two  guns,  and  some  cavalry  were 
all  the  troops  that  pursued  over  Stone  Bridge, 
although  there  were  several  brigades  near  that 
had  not  been  much  engaged  —  some  not  at  all. 
Alexander  carried  the  first  order  from  Beauregard 
about  6  P.M.  in  checking  pursuit.  It  directed 
Kershaw  to  advance  over  Bull  Run  carefully, 
but  not  to  attack.  Alexander,  surprised  at  his 
ill-timed  caution,  asked  if  he  forbade  any  attack. 
Beauregard  replied  that  Kershaw  must  wait  for 
Kemper  and  pursue  cautiously.  It  would  have 
been  as  easy  to  send  half  a  dozen  batteries  as  one. 
Alexander  overtook  Kershaw  just  as  Kemper's 
two  guns  opened  on  the  retreating  column  and 
upset  a  wagon  on  Cub  Run  bridge  that  created 


THE  STRATEGY  OF   MANASSAS  83 

a  blockade  by  which  a  good  deal  of  artillery  was 
lost.  On  his  way  back  to  Beauregard,  Alexander 
met  a  staff  officer  carrying  an  order  for  all  the 
troops  to  return. 

Alexander  was  at  the  council  of  Mr.  Davis 
and  the  generals  that  night  at  Manassas.  The 
conclusion  was  reached  to  make  a  reconnaissance 
the  next  morning.  Some  cavalry  scouting  parties 
were  sent,  who  saw  nothing  but  the  wreck  of 
McDowell's  army.  It  would  have  been  as  easy 
to  have  found  that  out  before  midnight  as  in  the 
morning,  if  they  had  tried,  as  no  attempt  was 
made  to  rally  the  retreating  army. 

McDowell  sent  a  dispatch  from  Fairfax  Court 
House : 

The  larger  part  of  the  men  are  a  confused  mob, 
entirely  demoralized.  It  was  the  opinion  of  all  the 
commanders  that  no  stand  could  be  made  this  side  of 
the  Potomac.  .  .  .  They  are  now  passing  through 
this  place  in  a  state  of  utter  disorganization. 

Edwin  M.  Stanton,  afterwards  Secretary  of 
War,  on  July  26,  five  days  after  the  battle,  wrote 
to  ex-President  Buchanan : 

The  capture  of  Washington  now  seems  to  be  inevit- 
able ;  during  the  whole  of  Monday  and  Tuesday  it 
might  have  been  taken  without  resistance.  The  rout, 
overthrow,  and  demoralization  of  the  army  is  complete. 


84  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

General  Johnston  afterwards  said  as  an  excuse 
for  not  pursuing  that  his  army  was  as  much  de- 
moralized by  victory  as  the  enemy's  by  defeat. 
Nobody  suspected  it  then.  We  had  about  15,000 
troops  on  the  field  who  had  not  been  engaged,  and 
a  good  many  arrived  the  next  morning. 

On  the  caisson  attached  to  one  of  Kemper's 
guns,  when  it  swept  over  Bull  Run,  was  an  old 
Virginian,  whose  long  white  hair  hung  over  his 
shoulders  and  gave  him  the  look  of  a  patriarch. 
When  Kemper  unlimbered  near  Cub  Run,  he 
claimed  the  privilege  of  firing  the  first  gun.  He 
had  done  the  same  when  Beauregard  opened 
his  batteries  on  Sumter.  When  the  curtain  was 
let  down  on  the  last  scene  at  Appomattox,  he 
blew  out  his  brains  and  ended  life's  fitful  fever. 

In  his  report  General  Johnston  said  that  "our 
victory  was  as  complete  as  one  gained  by  infantry 
and  artillery  can  be."  He  took  no  account  of 
Stuart's  charge  at  a  critical  moment  when  the 
Zouaves  were  coming  upon  Jackson's  flank ;  nor 
of  the  fact  that  his  army  exceeded  McDowell's 
in  numbers,  and  had  three  or  four  times  as  much 
cavalry.  The  returns  show  that  in  Beauregard's 
army  that  day  there  were  1468  cavalry,  and  that 
Stuart,  who  had  come  from  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,   had   twelve  companies.     Besides,   Ashby 


THE   STRATEGY   OF   MANASSAS  85 

arrived  the  day  after  the  battle  with  a  cavalry 
regiment.  Johnston  and  Beauregard  had  a  total 
of  effectives  that  day  of  31,982  men  and  fifty- 
five  guns,  although  they  sent  only  two  guns  over 
the  Run  in  pursuit.  McDowell's  total  was  29,862 
men  and  but  seven  companies  of  cavalry.  Cavalry 
is  needed  as  much  to  cover  a  retreat  as  to  pursue. 

We  had  enough  cavalry  to  have  taken  Wash- 
ington. It  is  true,  as  General  Johnston  said, 
that  the  city  is  situated  on  an  unfordable  river ; 
but  less  than  twenty  miles  above  is  a  ford  at 
Seneca  where  Stuart  crossed  going  to  Gettysburg, 
and  I  often  afterwards  crossed  there.  Our  cav- 
alry were  nearer  Seneca  than  McDowell's  army 
was  to  Washington  when  the  retreat  began,  and 
ought  to  have  crossed  the  Potomac  that  night. 
The  next  day  it  could  have  easily  moved  around 
towards  Baltimore,  broken  communications,  and 
isolated  Washington. 

It  is  paradoxical  but  true  that  the  Confederate 
cause  was  lost  at  Bull  Run.  Yet  the  victory 
reflected  on  those  who  won  it  all  "the  glory  that 
was  Greece  and  the  grandeur  that  was  Rome." 
And  no  matter  now  what  men  may  speculate 
as  to  what  might  have  been,  cold  must  be  the 
heart  that  can  read  that  glorious  record  and  not  — 
"Feel  sympathy  with  suns  that  set." 


CHAPTER  VII 
About  Fairfax  Court  House 

Until  the  spring  of  1862  we  did  picket  duty 
on  the  Potomac,  a  more  agreeable  duty  than  the 
routine  of  a  camp.  There  were  some  skirmishes 
and  many  false  alarms.  A  hog  rooting  or  an  old 
hare  on  its  nocturnal  rounds  would  often  draw 
the  fire  of  a  vidette.  My  company  went  three 
times  a  week  on  picket  and  remained  twenty-four 
hours,  when  we  were  relieved  by  another  company. 

[The  following  letters  from  Colonel  Mosby  to 
his  wife  and  his  sister  give  the  most  interesting 
events  of  the  time  between  the  Battle  of  Manassas 
and  the  campaign  of  1862.] 

Fairfax  Court  House,  July  29,  1861. 

Dearest  Pauline : 

We  have  made  no  further  advance  and  I  know  no 
more  of  contemplated  movements  than  you  do.  .  .  . 
A  few  nights  ago  we  went  down  near  Alexandria  to 
stand  as  a  picket  (advance)  guard.  It  was  after  dark. 
When  riding  along  the  road  a  volley  was  suddenly 
poured  into  us  from  a  thick  clump  of  pines.  The 
balls  whistled  around  us  and  Captain  Jones'  horse 

86 


ABOUT   FAIRFAX   COURT   HOUSE         87 

fell,  shot  through  the  head.  We  were  perfectly  help- 
less, as  it  was  dark  and  they  were  concealed  in  the 
bushes.  The  best  of  it  was  that  the  Yankees  shot 
three  of  their  own  men,  —  thought  they  were  ours. 
.  .  .  Beauregard  has  no  idea  of  attacking  Alexandria. 
When  he  attacks  Washington  he  will  go  about  Alex- 
andria to  attack  Washington.  No  other  news.  For  one 
week  before  the  battle  we  had  an  awful  time,  —  had 
about  two  meals  during  the  whole  time,  —  marched  two 
days  and  one  night  on  one  meal,  in  the  rain,  in  order 
to  arrive  in  time  for  the  fight.  .  .  .  We  captured  a 
great  quantity  of  baggage  left  here  by  the  Yankees ; 
with  orders  for  it  to  be  forwarded  to  Richmond. 

Fairfax  Court  House,  August  18,  1861. 

My  dearest  Pauline : 

...  I  was  in  a  little  brush  with  them  one  day 
last  week.  A  party  of  ten  of  us  came  upon  about 
150.  We  fired  on  them  and  of  course  retreated  before 
such  superior  numbers.  We  jumped  into  the  bushes 
to  reload  and  give  it  to  them  again  when  they  came 
up,  but  instead  of  pursuing  us  they  put  back  to  their 
own  camp.  .  .  .  When  I  was  last  on  picket  I  was 
within  about  four  miles  of  Georgetown  and  could 
distinctly  hear  the  enemy's  morning  drum  beat. 
Some  of  the  Yankees  came  to  my  post  under  a  flag  of 
truce,  —  stayed  all  night,  —  ate  supper  with  me  ;  and 
we  treated  each  other  with  as  much  courtesy  as  did 
Richard  and  Saladin  when  they  met  by  the  Diamond 
of  the  Desert.  .  .  .     Our  blister  plaster  doctor  affords 


88  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

us  a  good  deal  of  fun.  He  is  one  of  the  most  pompous 
fellows  you  ever  saw.  He  went  with  us  on  picket  one 
night,  —  got  scared,  —  ran  to  us  and  swore  he  had 
ridden  through  a  whole  regiment  of  the  enemy's  in- 
fantry. The  whole  truth  was  there  was  not  a  Yankee 
in  three  miles  of  him. 

Fairfax  Court  House,  September  2,  1861. 

My  dearest  Pauline : 

...  I  received  a  fall  from  my  horse  one  day  last 
week,  down  at  Falls  Church,  which  came  near  killing 
me.  I  have  now  entirely  recovered  and  will  return 
to  camp  this  morning.  I  was  out  on  picket  one  dark 
rainy  night ;  there  were  only  three  of  us  at  our  post ;  a 
large  body  of  cavalry  came  dashing  down  towards  us 
from  the  direction  of  the  enemy.  Our  orders  were  to 
fire  on  all.  I  fired  my  gun,  started  back  toward  where 
our  main  body  were,  my  horse  slipped  down,  fell  on 
me,  and  galloped  off,  leaving  me  in  a  senseless  condi- 
tion in  the  road.  Fortunately  the  body  of  cavalry 
turned  out  to  be  a  company  of  our  own  men  who  had 
gone  out  after  night  to  arrest  a  spy.  When  they  started 
they  promised  Captain  Jones  to  go  by  our  post  and 
inform  us  of  the  fact,  in  order  to  prevent  confusion, 

—  this  they  failed  to  do  and  their  own  culpable  neglect 
came  near  getting  some  of  them  killed.  .  .  .  Our 
troops  are  gradually  encroaching  on  the  Federals,  — 
now  occupying  a  position  in  full  view  of  Washington, 

—  a  brush  is  looked  for  there  to-day.  ...  I  rode  out 
one  day  about  a  week  ago  with  our  wagon  after  hay, 


ABOUT   FAIRFAX   COURT   HOUSE         89 

—  came  to  where  our  pickets  were  stationed,  —  they 
were  in  full  view  of  the  Yankees,  a  few  hundred  yards 
off  on  the  opposite  hill.  The  Yankees  were  firing  at 
our  men  with  long  range  guns,  but  ours  could  not 
return  it,  as  they  have  only  old  muskets.  I  have  a 
splendid  Sharp's  carbine,  which  will  kill  at  a  thousand 
yards.  I  dismounted  .  .  .  and  turned  loose  on  them. 
...  I  had  to  fire  at  them  most  of  the  time  in  a  thick 
field  of  corn,  —  of  course,  could  not  tell  the  effect,  —  but 
once,  when  a  fellow  ran  out  into  the  road  (in  which  I 
stood)  to  shoot  at  me,  it  took  several  to  carry  him  back. 

Camp  near  Fairfax  Court  House, 

September  17,  1861. 
Dear  Liz  :   [Mosby's  sister] 

.  .  .  Beauregard  and  Johnston  are  expected  to 
move  their  headquarters  up  to  Fairfax  to-day.  .  .  . 
Although  Captain  Jones  is  a  strict  officer  he  is  very 
indulgent  to  me  and  never  refuses  me  any  favor  I  ask 
him.  I  think  he  will  be  made  a  Colonel  very  soon. 
Aaron  [Mosby's  negro  servant]  considers  himself 
next  in  command  to  Captain  Jones.  .  .  .  Nobody 
thinks  the  war  will  continue  longer  than  a  few  months. 
We  will  clean  them  out  in  two  more  battles. 

Camp  near  Fairfax  Court  House, 

September  14,  186 1. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

.  .  .  To-day  we  go  on  picket  at  the  Big  Falls 
on  the  Potomac.     One  hill  we  occupy  commands  a 


90  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

full  view  of  the  Capitol.  I  went  to  take  a  view  of  it 
with  Lloyd.  We  could  see  it  distinctly,  with  all  their 
fortifications  and  the  stars  and  stripes  floating  over  it. 
I  thought  of  the  last  time  I  had  seen  it,  for  you  were 
there  with  me,  and  I  could  not  but  feel  some  regrets 
that  it  was  no  longer  the  Capitol  of  my  Country,  but 
that  of  a  foreign  foe. 

Camp  near  Fairfax, 

September  — ,  1861. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

.  .  .  The  Enemy  had  come  up  with  three  thou- 
sand men,  artillery,  etc.  to  Lewisville,  one  of  our  picket 
stations ;  when  we  got  there  they  were  still  there. 
Three  men  of  our  Company  (including  myself)  were 
detached  to  go  forward  to  reconnoitre.  Col.  Stewart 
[sic]  was  with  us.  While  standing  near  the  opening  of 
a  wood  a  whole  regiment  of  Yankees  came  up  in 
full  view,  within  a  hundred  yards  of  me.  Their 
Colonel  was  mounted  on  a  splendid  horse  and  was 
very  gaily  dressed.  I  was  in  the  act  of  shooting  him, 
which  I  could  have  done  with  ease  with  my  carbine, 
when  Col.  Stewart  told  me  not  to  shoot,  —  fearing 
they  were  our  men.  ...  I  never  regretted  anything 
so  much  in  my  life  as  the  glorious  opportunity  I  missed 
of  winging  their  Colonel.  We  went  back  and  brought 
up  our  artillery,  which  scattered  them  at  the  first 
shot.  I  never  enjoyed  anything  so  much  in  my  life 
as  standing  by  the  cannon  and  watching  our  shells 
when  they  burst  over  them. 


ABOUT   FAIRFAX   COURT   HOUSE         91 
Camp  Cooper,  November  21,  1861. 

My  dearest  Pauline : 

On  Monday  I  participated  in  what  is  admitted  to 
have  been  the  most  dashing  feat  of  the  war.  Col. 
Lee  took  about  80  men  out  on  a  scout,  —  hearing 
where  a  company  of  about  the  same  number  of  Yankees 
were  on  picket,  we  went  down  and  attacked.  They 
were  concealed  in  a  pine  thicket,  where  one  man  ought 
to  have  been  equal  to  ten  outside.  We  charged  right 
into  them  and  they  poured  a  raking  fire  into  our  ranks. 
Fount  Beattie  and  myself,  in  the  ardor  of  pursuit,  had 
gotten  separated  some  distance  from  our  main  body, 
when  we  came  upon  two  Yankees  in  the  woods.  We 
ordered  them  to  surrender,  but  they  replied  by  firing 
on  us.  One  of  the  Yankees  jumped  behind  a  tree  and 
was  taking  aim  at  Fount  when  I  leveled  my  pistol  at 
him,  but  missed  him.  He  also  fired,  but  missed  Fount, 
though  within  a  few  feet  of  him.  I  then  jumped  down 
from  my  horse  and  as  the  fellow  turned  to  me  I  rested 
my  carbine  against  a  tree  and  shot  him  dead,  He 
never  knew  what  struck  him.  Fount  fired  at  one  with 
his  pistol,  but  missed.  A  South  Carolinian  came  up  and 
killed  the  other.  .  .  .  The  man  I  killed  had  a  letter  in 
his  pocket  from  his  sweetheart  Clara.  .  .  .  They  were 
of  the  Brooklyn  Zouaves  and  fought  at  Manassas. 

—  1862. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

Get  Aaron  to  give  you  a  full  account  of  his  adven- 
ture, —  his    memorable    retreat    from    Bunker    Hill, 


92  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

—  his  doctoring  the  sick  men  *  during  the  battle.     He 
is  a  good  deal  thought  of  in  the  company. 

At  the  end  of  1861  occurred  an  event  which 
greatly  disappointed  Southern  hopes.  Mason  and 
Slidell  had  been  sent  as  ambassadors  to  England 
and  France.  They  escaped  through  the  block- 
ading fleet  at  Charleston  and  arrived  at  Nassau, 
where  they  took  passage  on  the  English  steamer 
Trent.  The  vessel  was  stopped  on  the  high  seas 
by  Captain  Wilkes  of  the  San  Jacinto,  and  the 
ambassadors  were  taken  off  and  confined  in  Fort 
Warren,  Boston.  This  action  was  hailed  with 
as  much  joy  in  the  South  as  in  the  North.  The 
Confederates  thought  their  ambassadors  would 
be  held  as  prisoners  and  conceived  it  to  be  im- 
possible that  they  would  be  surrendered  on  the 
demand  of  England  after  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  had  approved  the  conduct  of  Wilkes,  and 
Congress  had  given  him  a  vote  of  thanks.  For- 
tunately for  the  Union  cause,  neither  Mr.  Lincoln 
nor  Mr.  Seward  had  committed  himself  to  an 
approval  of  it,  but  both  had  kept  a  judicious 
silence  until  they  could  hear  from  England.  In 
the  South  we  all   felt  sure   that   England  would 

1  The  story  of  the  "  sick  "  men  concerns  the  Battle  of  Manassas. 
They  covered  themselves  with  heavy  blankets  and  shivered  when  the 
shells  were  flying.  When  they  were  not,  they  would  recover  and  raise 
up  and  ask  Aaron,  "  Haven't  you  got  a  few  more  of  those  corn  cakes  ?  " 


ABOUT  FAIRFAX  COURT  HOUSE    93 

never  submit  to  such  an  indignity  and  breach  of 
neutrality. 

War  between  England  and  the  United  States 
was  considered  inevitable,  and  we  could  almost 
hear  the  roar  of  English  guns  dispersing  the  fleets 
which  were  blockading  our  coasts.  With  Eng- 
land as  an  ally  of  the  South  our  success  was  cer- 
tain. But  the  Administration  wisely  yielded  to 
England's  demand  and  surrendered  the  captives. 
Mr.  Seward,  in  a  letter  to  Lord  Lyons,  ingen- 
iously maintained  that  he  was  consistent  in  so 
doing,  and  that  in  demanding  their  release  Eng- 
land had  at  last  claimed  for  neutrals  the  rights 
for  which  the  United  States  had  always  contended. 
Mason  and  Slidell  were  transferred  to  an  Eng- 
lish gunboat  lying  off  Cape  Cod,  and  thus  with- 
ered our  hopes  of  having  England  as  an  ally. 
There  was  no  longer  a  casus  belli. 

The  Richmond  Examiner,  January  1,  1862,  said 
of  this  affair:  "The  year  which  has  just  begun 
opens  with  evil  tidings.  We  fear  there  is  no 
doubt  of  the  fact  that  the  Northern  Union  has 
consented  to  the  surrender  of  Mason  and  Slidell, 
and  with  that  event  all  hopes  of  an  immediate 
alliance  between  the  Southern  Confederacy  and 
Great  Britain  must  cease." 

It  happened   that   I   brought  to  the  camps  in 


94  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

Fairfax  the  first  news  of  the  capture  of  Mason 
and  Slidell.  Fitzhugh  Lee  took  a  part  of  my 
regiment  on  a  scout  and  we  came  upon  the  Brook- 
lyn 14th  that  was  doing  picket  duty.  They  wore 
red  breeches,  so  we  called  them  the  red-legged 
Yankees.  As  soon  as  we  got  in  sight  of  them  we 
charged.  A  portion  of  them  were  in  a  dense 
thicket,  which  we  couldn't  penetrate  on  horse- 
back, and  so  a  few  of  us  dismounted  and  charged 
on  foot,  with  carbines,  to  the  point  where  the 
reserve  had  a  fire.  We  took  a  number  of  prisoners 
and  I  picked  up  a  newspaper.  It  was  about 
sundown  ;  the  paper  was  a  copy  of  the  Wash- 
ington Star  of  that  evening,  and  had  an  account 
of  the  capture  of  Mason  and  Slidell.  When  we 
brought  the  prisoners  to  Fitz  Lee,  I  said,  "Colonel, 
here's  a  copy  of  to-day's  paper."  Fitz  Lee  re- 
plied, "The  ruling  passion  strong  in  death," 
referring  to  my  reputation  of  always  being  the 
first  man  in  the  company  to  get  hold  of  a  news- 
paper. Colonel  Jones  sent  the  paper  to  General 
Johnston's   headquarters   at   Centreville. 

A  popular  notion  has  prevailed  that  a  great 
benefit  would  have  resulted  to  the  South  if  Eng- 
land and  France  had  received  our  ministers  and 
established  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Southern 
Confederacy.     I    never    thought   so,    unless    they 


ABOUT   FAIRFAX   COURT  HOUSE         95 

had  gone  further  and  intervened  in  our  behalf, 
as  France  did  with  the  Colonies,  and  sent  their 
fleets  to  break  the  blockade.  In  that  event  they 
would  have  become  parties  to  the  war.  When 
they  proclaimed  their  neutrality  and  accorded 
us  belligerent  rights  and  the  hospitality  of  their 
ports  to  Confederate  cruisers,  they  just  as  much 
recognized  the  independence  of  the  South  as  if 
they  had  officially  received  its  ministers.  The 
human  mind  cannot  conceive  of  belligerent  rights 
except  as  attached  to  a  supreme  independent 
power. 

There  was  a  great  deal  of  complaint  against 
England  for  her  haste  in  proclaiming  neutrality 
and  thus  recognizing  the  belligerent  character 
of  the  contest.  But  the  Congress  called  by  Mr. 
Lincoln,  in  July,  1861,  before  Bull  Run  had  been 
fought,  as  Webster  said  about  Bunker  Hill,  ele- 
vated an  insurrection  into  a  public  war.  It  passed 
an  act  forbidding  commercial  intercourse  between 
persons  living  north  and  south  of  the  Potomac, 
and  declaring  the  forfeiture  of  goods  caught  in 
transit  and  also  the  seizure  of  vessels  on  the  high 
seas  as  enemy  property,  if  the  owners  lived  in 
the  South.  It  also  declared  that  such  seizures 
and  intercourse  should  be  governed,  not  by  the 
municipal  law  of  the  country,  but  by  the  law  of 


96  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

nations.  It  thus  recognized  our  sectional  conflict 
as  a  public  territorial  war  and  not,  like  the  Wars 
of  the  Roses,  a  contest  of  factions. 

The  law  of  nations  regulates  the  relations  of 
alien  enemies  in  war  and  can  have  no  application 
to  citizens  of  the  same  country.  This  act  of 
Congress  was  a  declaration  of  a  war  inter  gentes, 
as  much  so  as  that  between  France  and  Prussia. 
The  Amy  Warwick,  owned  in  Richmond,  sailed 
from  Rio  without  notice  of  the  blockade.  She 
was  seized  on  the  voyage  and  condemned  as  a 
prize  of  war.  It  was  contended  that  there  was 
no  proof  that  her  owner  was  in  rebellion.  But  the 
Supreme  Court  held  that  international  law  took  no 
notice  of  the  personal  sentiments  of  individuals,  but 
that  their  domicile  determined  their  legal  status. 

In  the  opening  of  the  year  1862  there  was  a 
great  deal  of  depression  in  the  Southern  Confed- 
eracy. A  considerable  amount  of  this  was  due 
to  the  failure  of  our  hopes  of  having  England  as 
an  immediate  ally,  but  most  of  it  was  on  account 
of  the  expiration,  in  the  coming  spring,  of  the 
terms  of  enlistment  of  most  of  the  regiments  and 
the  reluctance  of  the  men  to  reenlist  before  going 
to  their  homes.  General  Joe  Johnston  issued  an 
address  urging  the  twelve-months'  volunteers  to 
reenlist,  but  it  had  little  or  no  effect.     He  said : 


ABOUT   FAIRFAX   COURT   HOUSE         97 

The  Commanding  General  calls  upon  the  twelve- 
months' men  to  stand  by  their  brave  comrades  who 
have  volunteered  for  the  war,  to  revolunteer  at  once 
and  thus  show  the  world  that  the  patriots  who  engaged 
in  this  struggle  do  not  swerve  from  the  bloodiest  path 
they  may  be  called  to  tread. 

The  fear  that  the  army  would  disappear  like 
a  morning  mist  is  shown  in  the  farewell  address 
of  General  Beauregard,  dated  January  30,  1862, 
when  he  was  about  to  leave  to  take  command 
in  the  West.     He  said  : 

Above  all  I  am  anxious  that  my  brave  countrymen 
here  in  arms  fronting  the  haughtily  arrayed  master  of 
Northern  mercenaries  should  thoroughly  appreciate 
the  exigency,  and  hence  comprehend  that  this  is  no 
time  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  —  the  men  of 
Manassas  —  to  stack  their  arms  and  quit,  even  for  a 
brief  period,  the  standards  they  have  made  glorious  by 
their  manhood. 

The  fact  that  Beauregard  italicized  the  latter 
part  of  this  sentence  was  an  omen  of  impending 
danger.  Mr.  Davis  also  sent  a  message  to  Con- 
gress in  which  he  said,  "I  therefore  recommend 
the  passage  of  a  law  declaring  that  all  persons 
residing  within  the  Confederate  States  between 
the  ages  of  eighteen  and  thirty-five  years  and 
rightfully  subject  to  military  duty  shall  be  held 


98  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

to  be  in  the  military  service  of  the  Confederate 
States." 

The  conscription  law  increased  the  numbers 
but  impaired  the  esprit  de  corps  of  the  volunteer 
army  that  won  the  victory  of  Manassas,  —  the 
flower  of  Southern  manhood  had  been  gathered 
there.  But  the  law  saved  the  Confederacy  from 
the  danger  of  collapse  without  another  battle 
through  the  disbandment  of  its  army.  After  the 
war  I  heard  severe  criticism  of  the  Conscription 
Act  which,  in  fact,  saved  the  Confederacy  — 
for  a  time. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Campaigning  with  Stuart 

The  last  time  I  went  on  picket  was  on  the  12th 
of  February  (1862).  By  this  time  Stuart  had 
been  made  a  brigadier-general,  and  Jones  was 
colonel  of  the  regiment.  The  road  from  our 
camp  to  the  outpost  passed  through  Centreville, 
where  General  Joe  Johnston  and  Stuart  had  their 
headquarters.  On  that  February  day  Stuart 
joined  us,  and  I  observed  that  an  empty  carriage 
was  following,  although  I  did  not  understand  the 
reason.  When  we  arrived  at  Fairfax  Court  House, 
Stuart  asked  Captain  Blackford  to  detail  a  man 
to  go  in  the  carriage  with  some  ladies.  There 
was  a  fine  family  in  the  place,  who  always  gave 
me  my  breakfast  when  I  was  on  picket  and,  as 
one  of  the  ladies  in  the  party  was  a  member  of  the 
family,  I  was  detailed  to  go  as  an  escort  several 
miles  inside  our  lines.  They  did  not  like  being 
on  the  picket  line  where  there  were  frequent  skirm- 
ishes. So  I  left  my  horse  for  my  messmate, 
Fount  Beattie,  to  bring  back  to  camp  the  next 

99 


ioo  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

day,  and  took  my  seat  in  the  carriage  with  the 
ladies.  It  was  a  raw,  cold  morning,  and  it  soon 
began  to  snow.  We  arrived  at  our  journey's 
end  in  the  evening,  and  I  then  started  for  Stuart's 
headquarters.  When  I  reached  there  it  was 
dark,  and  the  snow  was  still  falling.  Although 
I  had  been  in  Stuart's  regiment  from  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  I  had  no  acquaintance  with  him  and 
no  reason  to  suppose  that  he  had  ever  heard  of 
me.  So  I  went  into  the  house,  reported  to  him 
that  I  had  left  the  ladies  at  their  destination,  and 
asked  him  for  a  pass,  as  my  camp  on  the  Bull 
Run  was  several  miles  away.  The  sentinels 
would  not  let  me  go  back  without  one. 

Now  the  weather  would  not  have  been  any 
more  severe  on  me  if  I  had  walked  back  to  camp 
that  night  than  if  I  had  stayed  on  picket.  I  never 
dreamed  of  Stuart's  inviting  me  to  spend  the 
night  at  headquarters,  or  that  I  should  ever  rise 
to  intimacy  with  him.  There  could  have  been 
nothing  prepossessing  in  my  general  appearance 
to  induce  him  to  make  an  exception  of  me,  for 
I  was  as  roughly  dressed  as  any  common  soldier. 
But  he  told  me  the  weather  was  too  bad  and  to 
stay  there  that  night.  Of  course  I  obeyed  and 
took  my  seat  before  a  big,  blazing  fire.  Both  of 
the  generals  were  sitting  there,  but  I  felt  so  small 


CAMPAIGNING   WITH  STUART  101 

in  their  presence  that  I  looked  straight  into  the 
fire  and  never  dared  to  raise  my  head.  I  would 
have  felt  far  more  comfortable  trudging  back 
to  camp  through  the  snow.  Presently  a  boy 
announced  that  supper  was  ready.  The  generals 
arose  and,  as  Stuart  walked  into  the  supper  room, 
he  told  me  to  come  in  and  get  some  supper.  I 
was  astonished  and  kept  my  seat.  Stuart  ob- 
served my  absence  from  the  table  and  sent  for 
me.  So  I  obeyed,  went  in,  and  took  a  seat  with 
the  generals.  I  do  not  think  I  raised  my  eyes 
from  my  plate,  although  they  chatted  freely. 
When  it  was  time  to  go  to  sleep  Stuart  had  some 
blankets  spread  on  the  floor,  and  I  was  soon 
snoring.  The  same  thing  happened  in  the  morn- 
ing —  a  boy  announced  breakfast  —  Stuart  told 
me  to  come  in,  and  I  again  stayed  behind  —  and 
he  had  to  send  for  me. 

It  has  always  been  a  mystery  to  me  why  Stuart 
made  me  his  guest  that  night  and  did  not  put 
me  with  his  couriers  —  which  would  have  been 
more  agreeable  to  me.  After  breakfast  Stuart 
sent  me,  mounted,  to  my  camp,  with  a  courier 
to  bring  back  the  horse  I  rode.  So  here  began 
my  friendship  for  Stuart  which  lasted  as  long  as 
he  lived.  It  is  a  coincidence  that  it  began  on  the 
very  day  I  received  my  first  promotion.     I  had 


102  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

scarcely  reached  our  camp  when  a  message  came 
from  the  commander  of  the  regiment,  Colonel 
Jones,  to  come  to  his  tent.  I  went,  and  he  offered 
me  the  position  of  adjutant.  I  was  as  much 
astonished  as  I  had  been  the  night  before  to  be 
asked  to  sit  at  the  table  with  the  generals.  Of 
course  I  was  glad  to  accept  it,  and  Jones  wrote 
to  the  War  Department  requesting  my  appoint- 
ment. The  Journal  of  the  Confederate  Senate 
shows  that  I  was  confirmed  to  take  rank  from 
February  17,  1862.  I  have  always  had  a  repug- 
nance to  ceremonials  and  was  not  half  so  much 
frightened  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  as  I  was  on 
the  first  dress  parade  I  conducted.  On  such 
occasions  the  adjutant  is  the  most  conspicuous 
figure.  I  never  could  repeat  the  formulas  of  the 
regulations,  and  for  this  reason  I  remember  the  few 
weeks  I  served  as  an  adjutant  with  less  satisfaction 
than  any  other  portion  of  my  life  as  a  soldier. 

[Undated    fragment  of  a  letter  to   Mrs.   Mosby.] 

We  are  suffering  the  most  intense  anxiety  to  hear 
the  final  result  from  Donelson,  —  if  we  are  defeated 
there  it  will  prolong  the  war,  I  fear,  but  the  idea  of 
giving  up  or  abandoning  the  field  now  should  never 
enter  a  Southern  man's  head.  To  be  sure  there  must 
be  a  costly  sacrifice  of  our  best  blood,  but  the  coward 
dies  a  thousand  deaths,  the  brave  man  dies  but  one. 


CAMPAIGNING  WITH   STUART         103 

When  news  came  to  Richmond  that  Grant's 
attack  on  Fort  Donelson  had  been  repulsed,  Con- 
federate hopes  of  final  success  were  raised  to  a  high 
pitch.  But  they  sank  to  zero  the  next  day  when  a 
dispatch  came  announcing  the  fall  of  Donelson  and 
the  surrender  of  most  of  the  garrison.  Kentucky 
was  now  lost  to  us  and  most  of  middle  Tennessee. 

A  greater  blunder  was  never  committed  in 
war  than  when  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston 
sent  Floyd,  Buckner,  and  Pillow  down  the  Cum- 
berland River,  with  about  17,000  troops,  to  hold 
a  fort  situated  in  the  angle  made  by  the  conflu- 
ence of  the  Cumberland  and  a  deep,  unfordable 
creek.  There  was  no  line  of  retreat  open  by  land 
and  no  transportation  provided  for  escape  by 
water,  in  case  of  defeat.  The  Confederates  were 
caught  in  a  trap,  and  their  surrender  was,  of 
course,  inevitable.  The  first  attacks  of  the  gun- 
boats under  Commodore  Foote  were  repulsed, 
and  in  the  evening  the  situation  was  about  the 
same  as  it  had  been  in  the  morning.  But  Buckner 
and  Pillow  seemed  to  think  that  their  men  would 
not  fight  any  longer,  although  they  had  an  abun- 
dance of  rations,  and  Floyd  swore  that  he  would 
not  surrender  either  himself  or  his  brigade. 
Floyd  was  the  senior  officer,  and  it  was  agreed 
that  he  should  turn  over  the  command  to  Pillow, 


104  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

who  was  next  in  rank,  and  that  he,  in  turn,  should 
turn  it  over  to  Buckner.  Floyd  with  his  brigade 
escaped  at  night  on  two  steamboats  that  hap- 
pened to  come  down  with  supplies  from  Nash- 
ville that  evening.  Pillow  in  some  way  got  to 
the  opposite  bank  of  the  river  and  left  his  troops 
behind  him.  It  has  never  been  explained  why  a  few 
boats  were  not  on  hand  to  set  the  Confederates  over 
the  river,  when  resistance  became  hopeless,  or  why 
the  two  which  Floyd  took  were  not  used  during  the 
night  to  convey  the  army  to  the  other  bank. 

At  daybreak  Buckner  ordered  a  parley  to  be 
sounded  and  capitulated  to  Grant  without  condi- 
tions. He  did  not  even  get  as  good  terms  as 
General  Lee  got  for  the  fragment  of  his  army  at 
Appomattox.  Mr.  Davis  relieved  both  Floyd 
and  Pillow  of  command,  but  with  strange  incon- 
sistency he  praised  General  Johnston  for  putting 
them  in  a  hole  where  they  fought  for  two  days 
to  get  out.  The  affair  of  Donelson  was  a  most 
discreditable  thing  to  our  side  of  the  war. 

Camp  of  1st  Cavalry, 

March  I,  1862. 
Dear  Pauline : 

Nobody  here  is  the  least  discouraged  at  our  late 
reverses ;    that  they  will  prolong  the  war  I   have  no 


CAMPAIGNING  WITH   STUART         105 

doubt.  But  they  have  not  made  the  first  step  towards 
subjugation.  Nothing  can  reverse  my  own  decision 
to  stay  in  the  foremost  ranks,  "where  life  is  lost  or 
freedom  won."  I  want  to  see  in  Southern  women 
some  of  that  Spartan  heroism  of  the  mother  who  said 
to  her  son,  when  she  buckled  on  his  armor:  "Return 
with  your  shield  or  return  upon  it."  Our  army  is  now 
falling  back  from  Centreville,  but  whether  to  Manassas 
or  Gordonsville  I  don't  know.  We  haven't  moved  our 
camp. 

When  Johnston  retired  from  Centreville,  in 
the  spring  of  1862,  our  regiment  was  the  rear- 
guard of  the  army.  Johnston  fell  back  leisurely ; 
first  to  the  Rappahannock  and  then  to  the  Rapi- 
dan,  where  he  waited  for  McClellan  to  develop 
his  campaign.  In  December,  1864,  I  had  dinner 
with  General  Lee  at  his  headquarters  near  Peters- 
burg, and  he  told  me  that  Johnston  should  never 
have  moved  from  the  Rapidan  to  Richmond ; 
that  when  it  was  discovered  that  McClellan 
was  moving  down  the  Potomac,  he  wrote  Johnston 
and  urged  him  to  move  back  against  Washing- 
ton. Lee  was  confident  that  such  a  menace  of 
the  capital  would  recall  McClellan  to  defend  it. 

A  considerable  Union  force  followed  our  regi- 
ment as  we  withdrew  along  the  railroad,  and  when 
it  got  near  our  picket  line  on  Cedar  Run,  it  de- 
ployed in  an  open  field  and  made  a  great  display. 


106  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

Jones  was  on  the  picket  line  that  day,  and  I  was  with 
him  and  witnessed  the  exhibition.  The  pickets 
withdrew,  and  the  enemy  occupied  the  ground  on 
which  we  had  been  for  several  days.  That  night 
my  regiment  camped  near  Bealeton  Station. 

The  next  morning  I  rode  there  and  met  Stuart. 
The  enemy  was  already  in  sight  and  advancing. 
I  had  become  pretty  well  acquainted  with  Stuart 
after  I  became  an  adjutant  and  had  already 
conducted  several  scouting  expeditions  for  him. 
As  we  met  that  morning,  he  said  to  me  very 
earnestly,  —  he  seemed  puzzled,  —  "General 
Johnston  wants  to  know  if  McClellan's  army  is 
following  us,  or  if  this  is  only  a  feint  he  is  mak- 
ing." Evidently  Stuart  wanted  me  to  find  out 
for  him,  but  did  not  like  to  order  me.  I  saw  the 
opportunity  for  which  I  had  longed  and  said 
in  a  self-confident  tone,  "I  will  find  out  for  you, 
if  you  will  give  me  a  guide."  He  gave  me  one 
who  knew  the  road,  and  with  two  others  of  my 
party  I  started  around  the  flank  of  the  hostile 
column  and  got  in  its  rear  while  it  was  advancing 
to  the  Rappahannock.  As  the  enemy  moved 
south  and  we  went  north,  my  party  was  in  its 
rear  when  the  Union  column  reached  the  Rappa- 
hannock and  began  shelling  the  Confederates 
who  had  just  crossed. 


CAMPAIGNING  WITH   STUART         107 

As  we  were  behind  the  enemy,  we  soon  dis- 
covered that  an  isolated  body  was  following 
Johnston,  and  that  it  kept  up  no  line  of  communi- 
cation with  Washington.  It  was  clear  that  the 
movement  was  a  mask  to  create  a  diversion  and 
cover  some  operation.  Of  course,  I  was  proud 
to  have  made  the  discovery,  and  I  rode  nearly 
all  night  to  report  it  to  Stuart.  When  we  got 
near  the  river,  we  halted  at  a  farmhouse,  for  there 
was  danger  of  being  shot  by  our  own  pickets 
if  we  attempted  to  cross  the  river  in  the  dark. 
As  soon  as  it  was  daylight,  I  started,  leaving  my 
companions  asleep.  A  picket  halted  me  when 
I  got  halfway  across  the  river,  and  it  was  with 
great  difficulty  that  I  could  persuade  him  not  to 
fire.  At  last  I  made  him  ashamed  of  himself 
when  I  told  him  I  was  only  one  man  and  asked 
him  if  he  was  afraid  of  one  Yankee.  He  told  me 
to  come  on,  but  he  kept  his  gun  levelled  at  me. 

I  went  on  at  a  gallop  and  found  Stuart  with 
General  Ewell,  whose  division  was  in  line  of 
battle  expecting  the  enemy  to  attempt  to  cross 
the  river  —  a  heavy  fog  concealed  their  backward 
movement.  I  told  Stuart  that  there  was  no  sup- 
port behind  the  force  in  front,  and  that  it  was 
falling  back.  A  curtain  of  cavalry  had  been  left 
behind    to   cover   the   retreat.     Our   cavalry  was 


108  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

immediately  ordered  in  pursuit,  and  I  went  with 
it.  In  the  rapture  of  the  moment  Stuart  told 
me  I  could  get  any  reward  I  wanted.  His  report 
confirms  this  statement  about  the  information 
that  was  obtained  —  but  I  got  no  reward. 

Culpeper  Co., 

April  1st,  1862. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

.  .  .  Although  I  do  not  belong  to  that  Company 
(Blackford's),  being  on  the  regimental  staff,  I  went  with 
them  into  the  fight.  .  .  .  The  appearance  of  the 
enemy  when  they  crossed  Cedar  Run  was  the  most 
magnificent  sight  I  ever  beheld.  .  .  .  We  let  them 
[advance  guard  of  cavalry]  cross,  when,  dismounting, 
we  delivered  a  volley  with  our  carbines  which  sent 
them  back  across  the  deep  stream  in  the  wildest 
confusion.  One  fellow  was  thrown  into  the  water 
over  his  head ;  and  scrambling  out  ran  off  and  left  his 
horse ;  another  horse  fell,  rose,  and  fell  again,  burying 
his  rider  with  him  under  the  water.  We  ceased  firing, 
threw  up  our  caps,  and  indulged  in  the  most  boister- 
ous laughter.  .  .  .  Col.  Jones  speaks  of  some  service 
I  have  recently  rendered.  At  one  time,  with  four 
men,  I  passed  around,  got  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy, 
discovered  that  they  were  making  a  feint  movement  on 
the  railroad,  while  they  were  really  moving  in  another 
direction.  I  rode  nearly  all  night  to  give  the  informa- 
tion, which  resulted  in  General  Stuart's  ordering  our 
regiment  in  pursuit  and  the  capture  of  about  30  pris- 


CAMPAIGNING  WITH  STUART         109 

oners,  16  horses,  arms,  etc.  General  Stuart  was  so 
much  pleased  with  my  conduct  that  he  wrote  a  report 
to  General  Johnston  commending  me  very  highly  and 
also  recommending  my  promotion. 

When  our  regiment  got  to  the  vicinity  of 
Yorktown,  it  was  reorganized,  and  Fitz  Lee, 
who  had  been  a  lieutenant-colonel,  was  elected 
colonel.  Stuart  invited  me  to  come  to  his  head- 
quarters and  act  as  a  scout.  I  got  no  commission 
and  stayed  with  his  couriers.  In  this  ambiguous 
condition  I  remained  for  a  year,  or  until  I  took  up 
my  independent  command. 

April  25,  1862. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

Our  regiment  was  reorganized  day  before  yester- 
day. Col.  [Fitzhugh]  Lee  was  elected  over  Col.  Jones. 
Col.  Jones  left  immediately  for  Richmond.  He  ex- 
pects to  be  a  Brigadier-General.  Immediately  after 
the  election  I  handed  in  my  resignation  of  my  com- 
mission. The  President  had  commissioned  me  for 
the  war,  but  I  would  not  be  adjutant  of  a  Colonel 
against  his  wishes  or  if  I  were  not  his  first  choice. 
General  Stuart  told  me  yesterday  that  he  would  see  that 
I  had  a  commission. 

Richmond,  June  2,  1862. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

The  papers  will  give  you  about  as  much  as  I  know 
of  the  fight  [Battle  of  Fair  Oaks,   or  Seven  Pines]. 


no  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

I  went  down  over  the  battlefield  yesterday.  Our 
men  were  all  among  the  enemy's  tents,  which  were 
still  standing,  their  camp  kettles  on  the  fire,  etc.  We 
whipped  them  in  their  fortifications.  .  .  .  General 
Lee  is  now  in  command,  General  Johnston  being 
wounded.  .  .  .  There  is  so  much  confusion  in  Rich- 
mond that  I  do  not  know  whether  I  can  get  your 
memorandum  filled  to-day.  There  is  nothing  like  a 
panic,  everybody  being  engaged  in  preparing  to  take 
care  of  the  wounded. 


In  June  (1862)  McClellan  was  astraddle  of 
the  Chickahominy  ;  his  right  rested  on  the  Pa- 
munkey,  but  there  was  a  gap  of  several  miles 
between  his  left  and  the  James.  The  two  armies 
were  so  close  to  each  other  that  the  cavalry  was 
of  little  use,  and  it  was  therefore  kept  in  the 
rear. 

One  morning  I  was  at  breakfast  with  Stuart, 
and  he  said  that  he  wanted  to  find  out  if  McClellan 
was  fortifying  on  the  Totopotomy,  a  creek  that 
empties  into  the  Pamunkey.  I  was  glad  to  go 
for  him  and  started  off  with  three  men.  But  we 
found  a  flag  of  truce  on  the  road  and  turned  off 
to  scout  in  another  direction  —  I  did  not  want 
to  go  back  without  doing  something.  We  did 
not  get  the  information  for  which  we  were  sent, 
but  we  did  get  intelligence  of  even  more  value. 


CAMPAIGNING  WITH  STUART         in 

We  penetrated  McClellan's  lines  and  discovered 
that  for  several  miles  his  right  flank  had  only 
cavalry  pickets  to  guard  his  line  of  communica- 
tion with  his  depot  at  the  White  House  on  the 
Pamunkey.  Here,  it  seemed  to  me,  was  an  oppor- 
tunity to  strike  a  blow.  McClellan  had  not  antici- 
pated any  such  move  and  had  made  no  provision 
against  it. 

On  discovering  the  conditions,  I  hastened  back 
to  Stuart  and  found  him  sitting  in  the  front  yard. 
It  was  a  hot  day  —  I  was  tired  and  lay  down  on 
the  grass  to  tell  him  what  I  had  learned.  A 
martinet  would  have  ordered  me  to  stand  in  his 
presence.  He  listened  to  my  story  and,  when 
I  had  finished,  told  me  to  go  to  the  adjutant's 
office  and  write  it  down.  At  the  same  time  he 
ordered  a  courier  to  get  ready  to  go  with  him  to 
General  Lee's  headquarters.  I  did  as  he  requested 
and  brought  him  a  sheet  of  paper  with  what  I 
had  written.  After  reading  it,  Stuart  called  my 
attention  to  its  not  being  signed.  I  signed  it, 
although  I  had  thought  he  only  wanted  a  memo- 
randum of  what  I  had  said  —  General  Lee  had 
never  heard  of  me.  Stuart  took  the  paper  and 
went  off  with  a  courier  at  a  gallop.  As  soon  as 
he  returned,  orders  were  issued  to  the  cavalry 
to  be  ready. 


ii2  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

General  Lee's  instructions  authorizing  the  ex- 
pedition were  dated  June  II.  I  had  reported 
the  day  before.  On  the  morning  of  the  twelfth, 
with  1200  cavalry  and  two  pieces  of  artillery, 
Stuart  passed  through  Richmond  and  took  the 
road  towards  Ashland.  I  was  at  headquarters 
when  Stuart  was  leaving.  The  officer  in  charge 
asked  him  when  he  would  be  back.  His  answer 
was,  "It  may  be  for  years,  it  may  be  forever." 
His  spirits  were  buoyant. 

The  column  moved  on  to  Old  Church  in  Han- 
over where  two  squadrons  of  U.  S.  regular  cav- 
alry were  stationed  under  the  command  of  Cap- 
tain Royall.  When  the  pickets  were  chased 
in,  Royall  heard  the  firing  and  went  to  their 
support.  He  had  no  cause  to  suspect  the  num- 
bers he  was  meeting,  for  McClellan  had  never 
even  considered  the  possibility  of  a  force  breaking 
through  his  lines  and  passing  around  him.  A 
squadron  of  the  Ninth  Virginia  Cavalry  led  our 
column.  Captain  Latan6  was  in  command.  A 
charge  was  ordered,  and  in  the  combat  Royall 
was  wounded  and  routed,  and  Latane  was  killed. 
We  could  not  stay  to  give  him  even  a  hasty  burial. 
Our  forces  soon  had  possession  of  the  abandoned 
camp  and,  as  the  enemy  had  had  no  time  to  pack 
up,  there  was  a  festival. 


CAMPAIGNING  WITH  STUART         113 

We  were  now  on  the  flank  of  the  enemy  but 
nine  miles  from  the  railroad  which  was  his  line 
of  communication.  The  question  which  Stuart 
had  to  determine  was  whether  to  go  on  or  turn 
back.  We  were  near  the  Pamunkey,  and  if  we 
kept  on,  the  road  would  soon  be  closed  behind 
us.  The  only  way  of  return  would  then  be  to 
pass  around  McClellan.  I  felt  great  anxiety 
for  fear  that  Stuart  would  halt,  for  I  realized 
that  there  was  a  chance  for  him  to  do  some- 
thing that  had  never  been  done.  His  decision 
to  go  on  showed  that  he  possessed  true  military 
genius. 

Just  before  Stuart  gave  the  order  for  us  to 
move,  he  turned  to  me  and  said,  "I  want  you  to 
go  on  some  distance  ahead."  "Very  well,"  said 
I,  "but  give  me  a  guide."  Two  soldiers  who 
knew  the  roads  were  ordered  to  go  with  me.  I  was 
proud  to  be  selected  for  such  a  duty  and  was 
full  of  enthusiasm.  We  had  not  gone  far  before 
Stuart  sent  one  of  his  staff  to  tell  me  to  go  faster 
and  increase  the  distance  between  us.  As  we 
jogged  along  two  miles  in  advance  of  the  column, 
we  came  upon  a  sutler's  wagon.  It  was  filled 
with  so  many  tempting  things  which  we  had  not 
seen  for  nearly  two  years  that  we  felt  as  if  the 
blockade    had    been    raised.     We    exercised    the 


114  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

belligerent  right  of  search.  At  the  same  time 
I  could  see,  about  a  mile  away  in  the  Pamunkey 
River,  a  forest  of  masts  of  schooners  which  were 
unloading  supplies  into  a  train  of  wagons  ready 
to  carry  them  to  the  army.  So  I  sent  one  man 
back  to  tell  Stuart  to  hurry  and  capture  the  prizes 
and  put  the  other  as  a  guard  over  the  sutler.  I 
then  went  on  alone.  When  Stuart  came  up,  he 
sent  a  squadron  to  burn  the  schooners  and  the 
wagon  train.  Capturing  watercraft  was  a  novel 
experiment  in  cavalry  tactics.  At  a  bend  in  the 
road,  I  came  upon  a  vidette  and  a  sutler's  wagon  ; 
they  submitted  quietly.  Just  then  a  bugle 
sounded,  and  I  saw  a  body  of  cavalry  a  few  hun- 
dred yards  away.  Fugitives  from  the  camp  we 
had  captured  had  given  the  alarm,  and  the  second 
troop  was  getting  ready  to  leave.  As  soon  as 
the  head  of  our  column  appeared,  the  enemy's 
force  at  once  disappeared. 

A  Confederate  newspaper  described  my  part 
as  follows : 

Appreciating  the  public  interest  in  the  recital  of 
everything  connected  with  the  recent  exploit  of  Gen- 
eral Stuart's  cavalry  in  his  reconnaissance  through 
the  enemy's  lines,  we  have  gathered,  from  reliable 
participants  in  the  affair,  these  additional  particulars. 
After  destroying  the  enemy's  camp  near  the  old  church, 


CAMPAIGNING  WITH   STUART  115 

Lieutenant  John  S.  Mosby,  aid  to  General  Stuart 
and  who  had  been  most  daring  and  successful  as  a 
scout,  was  sent  on  in  advance,  with  a  single  [sic] 
guide,  towards  Tunstall  Station,  to  reconnoitre  and 
ascertain  the  position  and  force  of  the  enemy.  On 
his  way  he  met  two  Yankees  whom  he  took  prisoners 
and  sent  to  the  rear  in  charge  of  his  guide.  Alone  he 
pushed  on  and  overtook  a  cavalryman  and  an  artillery- 
man of  the  enemy's  forces,  having  in  charge  a  quarter- 
master's wagon  and  stores.  Lieutenant  Mosby  dashed 
up  and,  drawing  his  pistols,  demanded  their  surrender. 
The  New  Yorker  surrendered  at  once,  but  the  Pennsyl- 
vanian,  beginning  to  fumble  for  his  pistol,  the  lieu- 
tenant made  a  more  emphatic  demand  for  his  surrender, 
and  at  the  same  moment  compelled  him  to  look  quite 
closely  into  the  muzzle  of  his  pistol.  All  this  time 
there  was  drawn  up,  not  four  hundred  yards  distant,  a 
company  of  Yankee  cavalry  in  line  of  battle.  In  a 
moment  a  bugle  sounded  as  for  a  movement  on  him, 
when,  anxious  to  secure  his  prisoners  and  stores, 
Lieutenant  Mosby  put  spurs  and  galloped  across  the 
field,  at  the  same  time  shouting  to  his  imaginary  men 
to  follow  him,  when  none  of  the  Confederate  cavalry 
were  in  sight  and  the  swiftest  more  than  a  mile  in  the 
rear.  The  Yankees,  hearing  the  word  of  command  and 
apprehending  the  descent  of  an  avalanche  of  Confed- 
erate cavalry  upon  them,  broke  line,  each  man  gallop- 
ing off  to  take  care  of  himself.  The  wagon,  prisoners, 
and  stores  were  then  secured  and  among  them  were 
found  forty  splendid  Colt's  pistols  with  holsters,  be- 
sides boots,  shoes,  blankets,  etc.,  etc. 


116  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

About  sundown  we  reached  the  York  River 
Railroad,  and  the  column  still  went  on.  The 
only  way  to  get  back  to  Richmond  was  now  to 
recross  the  Chickahominy  near  its  mouth  and 
pass  by  McClellan's  left  flank.  As  some  evidence 
of  the  consternation  that  prevailed  among  the 
Union  troops,  I  remember  that,  after  we  left  the 
camp,  a  sergeant  and  twenty-five  men  of  the 
regular  cavalry  followed  on  under  a  flag  of  truce 
and  surrendered  to  the  rearguard.  That  night 
was  a  feast  for  Stuart's  cavalry.  On  all  the 
roads  were  burning  trains  with  supplies  and  sut- 
lers' goods.  Champagne  and  Rhine  wine  flowed 
copiously. 

A  force  was  sent  in  pursuit  of  us  under  the 
command  of  General  St.  George  Cooke  —  Stuart's 
father-in-law.  Although  the  march  of  our  column 
was  slow,  we  never  saw  an  armed  foe  after  we  left 
Royall's  camp,  except  a  small  guard  at  the  rail- 
road. General  Warren,  who  commanded  a  bri- 
gade behind  us,  said,  "It  was  impossible  for  the 
infantry  to  overtake  him  and  as  the  cavalry 
did  not  move  without  us,  it  was  impossible  for 
them  to  overtake  him."  Fitz-John  Porter  re- 
gretted that  "When  General  Cooke  did  pursue, 
he  should  have  tied  his  legs  with  the  infantry 
command."     As  there  were  six  cavalry  regiments, 


CAMPAIGNING  WITH  STUART         117 

including  all  the  regulars,  with  a  battery,  on 
our  track,  it  is  hard  to  see  why  they  wanted 
infantry. 

Although  more  than  forty-eight  hours  elapsed 
between  the  time  when  we  passed  McClellan's 
right  flank  and  back  around  his  left,  he  made 
no  attempt  to  intercept  us.  In  making  the 
circuit  of  his  army,  the  Confederate  column 
was  at  all  times  within  five  or  six  miles  of  his 
headquarters,  with  two  navigable  rivers  enclosing 
it,  and  another  river  over  which  we  had  to  build 
a  bridge  in  order  to  cross.  McClellan  was  a 
soldier  of  great  organizing  ability  and  trained 
in  the  science  of  war  —  I  mean  in  those  opera- 
tions that  can  be  regulated  by  rules.  But  he 
had  none  of  the  inspiration  that  decides  and 
acts  instantly,  and  he  was  now  confronted  by  a 
condition  without  a  precedent.  So  he  was  help- 
less. 

About  daylight  we  reached  a  ford  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  a  narrow  crooked  stream  which  meanders 
between  the  Pamunkey  and  the  James.  We  had 
crossed  it  on  the  morning  before.  Stuart  had 
expected  to  be  able  to  ford  this  stream,  but  at 
this  point  it  was  overflowing.  A  guide  told  us 
of  a  bridge  a  mile  below  —  or  where  one  had  been 
—  so    the    column    was    headed    for    that    point. 


n8  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

When  we  got  there,  we  found  that  the  bridge 
was  gone,  although  the  piles  were  standing. 
Near  by  were  the  remains  of  an  old  warehouse, 
which  furnished  material  for  building  another. 
It  was  soon  constructed  —  it  seemed  to  rise 
out  of  the  water  by  magic.  It  may  not  have 
been  so  good  a  bridge  as  Caesar  threw  over  the 
Rhine,  but  it  answered  our  purpose.  While  the 
bridge  was  building,  Stuart  showed  no  anxiety 
and  was  in  as  gay  a  humor  as  I  ever  saw  him. 
During  the  night  I  had  provided  for  our  com- 
missary department  a  lot  of  stores  from  the 
sutlers'  wagons,  and  these  were  soon  spread  about 
on  the  grass.  We  had  not  been  disturbed  on 
the  night  march,  but  just  as  the  bridge  was  fin- 
ished a  body  of  lancers  came  in  sight  and  halted. 
They  had  captured  one  of  our  men,  a  German, 
whom  we  had  to  leave  behind,  as  he  was  too  full 
of  Rhine  wine  to  travel.  When  we  reached  West- 
over,  the  command  was  halted  to  rest  and  get 
forage,  for  we  knew  that  the  road  to  Richmond 
was  open.  Stuart  now  left  Fitz  Lee  in  command 
and  rode  on  to  report  to  General  Lee.  The 
column  moved  on  by  moonlight  and  at  day- 
break was  in  sight  of  Richmond.  The  game 
was  won. 

I   had   ridden  several   miles   ahead   of   the   col- 


CAMPAIGNING  WITH   STUART         119 

umn  and  met  Stuart  returning.  Of  course,  he 
was  delighted  to  hear  that  the  cavalry  was 
safe. 

To  excuse  himself  for  what  he  had  not  done, 
McClellan,  in  a  dispatch,  tried  to  belittle  this 
affair  by  saying  that  Stuart's  cavalry  did  nothing 
but  gain  a  little  eclat;  but  it  can  be  said  with 
more  truth  that  he  himself  lost  a  good  deal.  It 
was  the  first  blow  at  his  reputation. 

The  Comte  de  Paris,  one  of  McClellan's  staff 
officers,  said  with  more  truth,  "They  had,  in  point 
of  fact,  created  a  great  commotion,  shaken  the 
confidence  of  the  North  in  McClellan,  and  made 
the  first  experiment  in  those  great  cavalry  ex- 
peditions which  subsequently  played  so  novel 
and  important  a  part  during  the  war." 

Richmond,  Monday, 

June  16,  1862. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

I  have  just  received  your  letter  this  morning.  I 
returned  yesterday  with  General  Stuart  from  the  grand- 
est scout  of  the  war.  I  not  only  helped  to  execute  it, 
but  was  the  first  one  who  conceived  and  demonstrated 
that  it  was  practicable.  I  took  four  men,  several 
days  ago,  and  went  down  among  the  Yankees  and 
found  out  how  it  could  be  done.  The  Yankees  gave 
us  a  chase,  but  we  escaped.     I  reported  to  General 


120  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

Stuart,  —  suggested  his  going  down,  —  he  approved, 
—  asked  me  to  give  him  a  written  statement  of  the 
facts,  and  went  immediately  to  see  General  Lee,  who 
also  approved  it.  We  were  out  nearly  four  days,  — 
rode  continuously  four  days  and  nights,  —  found 
among  the  Yankee  camps  and  sutlers'  stores  every 
luxury  of  which  you  ever  conceived.  I  had  no  way  of 
bringing  off  anything.  General  Stuart  gave  me  the 
horses  and  equipments  I  captured.  What  little  I 
brought  off  is  worth  at  least  $350.  Stuart  does  not 
want  me  to  go  with  Floyd,  —  told  me  before  this  affair 
that  I  should  have  a  commission,  —  on  returning 
yesterday  he  told  me  that  I  would  have  no  difficulty 
in  doing  so  now.  I  met  Wyndham  Robertson  on  the 
street  to-day.  He  congratulated  me  on  the  success 
of  the  exploit,  and  said  I  was  the  hero,  and  that  he 
intended  to  write  an  account  of  it  for  the  papers,  — 
made  me  promise  to  dine  with  him  to-day.  I  send 
you  some  captured  things,  —  the  carpet  was  in  an 
officer's  tent.  .  .  .  There  is  no  prospect  of  a  battle 
here,  —  heavy  reinforcements  have  been  going  to 
Jackson.  ...  I  got  two  splendid  army  pistols. 
Stuart's  name  is  in  every  one's  mouth  now.  I  was  in 
both  cavalry  charges,  —  they  were  magnificent.  .  .  . 
I  have  been  staying  with  General  Stuart  at  his  head- 
quarters. .  .  .  The  whole  heavens  were  illuminated 
by  the  flames  of  the  burning  wagons,  etc.  of  the  Yan- 
kees. A  good  many  ludicrous  scenes  I  will  narrate 
when  I  get  home.  Richmond  in  fine  spirits,  —  every- 
body says  it  is  the  greatest  feat  of  the  war.  I  never 
enjoyed  myself  so  much  in  my  life.  .  .  . 


CAMPAIGNING  WITH   STUART         121 

Headquarters  Cavalry  Brigade, 

June  20,  1862. 
Hon.  Geo.  W.  Randolph, 

Secretary  of  War. 
General : 

Permit  me  to  present  to  you  John  S.  Mosby,  who 
for  months  past  has  rendered  time  and  again  services 
of  the  most  important  and  valuable  nature,  exposing 
himself  regardless  of  danger,  and,  in  my  estimation, 
fairly  won  promotion. 

I  am  anxious  that  he  should  get  the  Captaincy  of  a 
Company  of  Sharpshooters  in  my  brigade,  but  the 
muster  rolls  have  not  yet  been  sent  in.  I  commend  him 
to  your  notice. 

Most  respectfully,  General, 
Your  obedient  servant, 
J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
Brigadier  General  Commanding  Cavalry. 


CHAPTER   IX 

The  Campaign  Against  Pope 

Richmond,  July  4,  1862. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

I  reached  our  wagon  camp  near  Richmond  about 
twelve  o'clock  Tuesday  and  as  the  battle  [Malvern 
Hill]  was  raging  below  did  not  go  to  Richmond.  I 
came  up  to  get  my  horse  shod.  McClellan  has  re- 
treated about  thirty-five  miles  and  is  now  under  cover 
of  his  gun-boats  on  James  River.  .  .  .  McClellan  is 
badly  whipped. 

Richmond,  July  7,  1862. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

I  came  up  to  Richmond  yesterday  from  our  camp 
below.  Our  army  has  now  fallen  back  near  Richmond, 
as  we  could  not  attack  McClellan  under  his  gun  boats, 
it  was  no  use  keeping  our  army  so  far  off  from  sup- 
plies. ...  I  have  just  returned  from  an  expedition 
down  James  River  where  I  succeeded,  with  half  a 
dozen  men,  in  breaking  up  an  assemblage  of  negroes 
and  Yankees.     They  were  armed. 

It  is  an  open  secret  that  in  August,  1862,  the 
disobedience  of  two   Confederate  generals   saved 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST   POPE       123 

Pope's  army  in  Virginia  from  ruin  and  nearly 
resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  Confederate  Chief 
of  Cavalry.  But  historians  have  been  strangely 
silent  about  it.  I  had  a  part  in  the  play,  and  I 
take  more  pleasure  in  telling  about  it  now  than  I 
did  when  I  was  an  actor  in  the  great  drama.  In 
war  there  are  lights  mingled  with  shadows.  In  the 
retrospect  we  see  a  great  deal  of  the  comedy 
where  once  all  seemed  to  be  tragedy. 

After  the  Seven  Days'  Battles  around  Richmond, 
that  closed  on  July  1,  several  weeks  of  calm  suc- 
ceeded. McClellan  had  shifted  his  base  from  the 
Pamunkey  to  the  James,  and  both  armies  rested  for 
another  collision.  If  McClellan  had  possessed 
the  intuition  of  Grant,  he  would  not  have  halted 
on  the  bank  of  the  river,  but  would  have  crossed 
and  seized  the  communications  of  the  Confederate 
Capital.  General  John  Pope  had  been  called  from 
the  West  to  take  command  of  an  army  in  front  of 
Washington.  This  army  was  organized  mostly 
from  fragments  which  Jackson  had  overlooked  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Pope  came  East  with 
some  reputation,  but  he  soon  lost  it. 

Pope  opened  his  campaign  in  northern  Virginia 
with  a  bombastic  manifesto  that,  by  an  invidious 
comparison,  gave  offence  to  his  own  side  and 
amusement  to  ours.     He  was,  however,  unjustly 


124  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

criticised  for  declaring  that  his  army  should  sub- 
sist on  the  country  it  occupied.  That  is  a  right  as 
old  as  war  —  to  live  on  the  enemy.  I  did  the 
same  thing  whenever  I  could.  Pope  declared  that 
in  the  West  he  had  seen  only  the  backs  of  his 
enemies,  and  that  he  would  look  only  to  his  front 
and  let  his  rear  take  care  of  itself.  But  he  must 
be  acquitted  of  the  charge,  so  often  repeated,  of 
having  said  that  his  headquarters  would  be  in  the 
saddle.  I  know  that  it  is  no  use  to  deny  it  now  — 
it  is  a  part  of  our  mythology,  and  the  people  of 
Virginia  believe  it  as  religiously  as  they  do  the 
legend  of  Pocahontas.  It  is  said  that  even  so 
grave  a  person  as  General  Lee  made  humorous 
remarks  about  this  proclamation. 

But  what  interested  me  most  in  this  proclama- 
tion was  the  following : 

I  hear  constantly  of  taking  strong  positions  and 
holding  them,  of  lines  of  retreat  and  bases  of  supplies. 
Let  us  dismiss  such  ideas,  ...  let  us  study  the  prob- 
able lines  of  retreat  of  our  opponents  and  leave  our 
own  to  take  care  of  themselves.  Let  us  look  before 
us  and  not  behind. 

At  this  time  I  was  at  cavalry  headquarters,  in 
Hanover  County,  about  ten  miles  from  Richmond. 
When  I  read  what  Pope  said  about  looking  only 
to  his  front  and  letting  his  rear  take  care  of  itself, 


THE   CAMPAIGN  AGAINST   POPE       125 

I  saw  that  the  opportunity  for  which  I  had  longed 
had  come.  He  had  opened  a  promising  field  for 
partisan  warfare  and  had  invited,  or  rather  dared, 
anybody  to  take  advantage  of  it.  The  cavalry 
at  Richmond  was  doing  nothing  but  picket  duty, 
and  " quiet  to  quick  bosoms  is  a  hell."  So  I 
asked  Stuart  for  a  dozen  men  to  make  the  harvest 
where  the  laborers  were  few,  and  do  for  Pope  what 
he  would  not  do  for  himself,  take  care  of  his  rear 
and  communications  for  him.  Stuart  was,  of 
course,  well-disposed  to  me.  He  had  spoken  well 
of  me  in  his  report  of  his  ride  around  McClellan 
on  the  Chickahominy,  and  General  Lee  had  also 
mentioned  me  in  his  general  order  announcing  it  to 
the  army. 

I  really  thought  that  there  was  a  chance  to 
render  effective  service.  I  had  served  the  first 
year  of  the  war  in  a  regiment  of  cavalry  in  the 
region  which  was  now  in  Pope's  department  and 
had  a  general  knowledge  of  the  country.  I  was 
sure  then  —  I  am  surer  now  —  that  I  could  make 
Pope  pay  as  much  attention  to  his  rear  as  his  front, 
and  that  I  could  compel  him  to  detail  most  of  his 
cavalry  to  guard  his  long  line  of  communications, 
or  turn  his  commissary  department  and  rear  over 
to  me  —  which  would  have  been  perfectly  satis- 
factory to  me.     There  never  was  afterwards  such 


126  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

a  field  for  partisan  war  in  Virginia.  Breaking 
communications  is  the  chief  work  for  a  partisan  — 
it  defeats  plans  and  starts  confusion  by  destroying 
supplies,  thus  diminishing  the  offensive  strength 
of  an  army. 

Judged  in  the  light  that  is  before  us  now,  it  looks 
strange  that  I  was  refused.  Stuart  told  me  that 
he  was  getting  his  cavalry  ready  for  the  active 
campaign  soon  to  begin,  but  that  he  would  give  me 
a  letter  to  Jackson,  who,  no  doubt,  would  give  me 
the  men  I  wanted.  I  had  to  beg  for  the  privilege 
of  striking  the  enemy  at  a  vulnerable  point.  If 
the  detail  had  been  given  me,  I  would  have  started 
directly  to  cross  the  Rapidan  to  flank  Pope,  and. 
my  partisan  war  would  have  begun  then. 

I  accepted  the  letter  to  Jackson  —  the  best  I 
could  get  —  and  with  a  club-footed  companion, 
an  exempt  from  military  service,  I  started  off.  I 
was  so  anxious  to  be  at  work  that  I  concluded  to 
go  by  rail  and  arrange  with  Jackson  for  the  cavalry 
to  go  with  me.  We  spent  the  night  with  a  farmer 
near  Beaver  Dam  station  on  what  is  now  the 
Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Railroad.  I  sent  my  com- 
panion on  to  lead  my  horse  to  Jackson's  head- 
quarters and  went  to  the  depot.  I  laid  down  my 
pistols  and  haversack  that  had  the  letter  to  Jack- 
son —  the   man   leading   my   horse   had   scarcely 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST   POPE       127 

gotten  out  of  sight  —  when  somebody  exclaimed, 
"Here  they  are!"  A  regiment  of  Northern 
cavalry  was  not  a  hundred  yards  away,  coming  up 
at  a  trot.  I  ran,  but  they  caught  me  and  got  my 
pistols  and  haversack.  This  capture  apparently 
blasted  my  hopes,  especially  when  I  was  sent  to 
the  Old  Capitol  Prison  in  Washington,  but  an 
exchange  of  prisoners  was  agreed  upon  the  next  day. 
I  was  captured  by  a  New  York  regiment  —  the 
Harris  Cavalry.  It  had  ridden  all  night  to  break 
the  communications  between  Lee  and  Jackson. 
The  men  did  not  wait  for  my  train,  although  I 
told  them  it  could  be  taken  with  impunity.  It 
was  not  true,  but  I  suppose  I  was  justified  by  the 
code  of  war.  I  was  taken  to  General  King's 
headquarters  at  Fredericksburg  and  very  kindly 
treated.  He  let  me  write  a  letter  to  my  family, 
which  he  sent  through  the  lines.  Some  letters 
were  captured  at  the  depot.  General  King  read 
one  aloud  —  everybody  laughed.  It  was  from 
a  Richmond  girl  to  her  country  cousin.  I  remem- 
ber four  lines.  I  hope  they  won't  shock  people 
who  read  them  now  : 

"Jeff  Davis  is  our  President, 
Lincoln  is  a  fool. 
Jeff  Davis  rides  a  white  horse, 
Lincoln  rides  a  mule." 


128  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

A  history  of  the  Harris  Cavalry  says : 

At  six  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  July  19th  the  Harris 
Light  was  set  in  rapid  motion  almost  directly  south. 
By  means  of  a  forced  march  through  the  night,  at 
gray  dawn  of  morning  we  descended  upon  Beaver  Dam 
depot  on  the  Virginia  Central,  like  so  many  ravenous 
wolves.  During  an  affray  we  captured  a  young  Con- 
federate, who  gave  his  name  as  Captain  John  S.  Mosby. 
By  his  sprightly  appearance  and  conversation  he  at- 
tracted considerable  attention.  He  is  slight  but  well 
formed ;  has  a  keen  blue  eye  and  a  blond  complexion, 
and  displays  no  small  amount  of  Southern  bravado  in 
his  dress  and  manners.  His  gray  plush  hat  is  sur- 
mounted by  a  waving  plume,  which  he  tosses,  as  he 
speaks,  in  real  Prussian  style.  He  had  a  letter  in  his 
possession  from  General  Stuart  commending  him  to 
the  kind  regards  of  General  Jackson. 

Old  Capitol  Prison, 

Washington,  July  23,  '62. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

I  wrote  you  from  Falmouth  [opposite  Fredericks- 
burg], announcing  my  capture  by  the  enemy's  cavalry 
at  Beaver  Dam.  I  was  going  up  to  see  General 
Jackson  for  Stuart.  I  had  a  young  man  with  me.  I 
concluded  to  let  him  lead  my  horse  and  I  would  take 
the  train  and  pay  you  a  flying  visit.  I  had  just  arrived 
at  the  depot,  —  had  pulled  off  my  arms  and  placed 
them  in  a  storehouse  and  was  sitting  down  outdoors 
waiting  for  a  train,  which  was  due  in  the  course  of  an 


THE   CAMPAIGN  AGAINST   POPE       129 

hour,  —  when  the  cavalry  suddenly  appeared  and  I 
had  no  time  to  escape.  The  Colonel  and  Captain 
treated  me  with  the  greatest  courtesy.  General  King, 
before  whom  I  was  carried,  ordered  my  arms  to  be 
restored  to  me.  In  my  haversack  was  a  letter  from 
General  Stuart  introducing  me  to  General  Jackson. 
You  need  feel  no  uneasiness  about  me.  .  .  .  Colonel 
Davis,  who  captured  me,  offered  to  lend  me  Federal 
money.     I  thanked  him,  but  declined. 

I  had  been  a  prisoner  about  ten  days  when  I 
was  taken,  with  a  good  many  prisoners,  down  the 
Potomac  to  Fortress  Monroe.  Here  we  waited 
four  days  for  others  to  arrive,  that  we  might  go 
up  the  James  River  to  the  place  of  exchange. 
When  we  arrived  at  Hampton  Roads,  I  saw  a 
large  number  of  transports  with  troops  lying  near. 
As  a  prisoner  I  kept  up  my  habits  as  a  scout  and 
soon  learned  that  they  were  Burnside's  troops 
who  had  just  come  from  North  Carolina.  If 
they  were  reinforcements  for  McClellan,  it  would 
indicate  that  he  would  advance  again  on  Richmond 
from  his  new  base  on  the  James.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  they  sailed  up  the  Chesapeake,  it  would 
show  that  they  were  going  to  join  Pope,  and  that 
McClellan  would  be  withdrawn  from  the  penin- 
sula. 

This  was  the  problem  that  I  had  to  solve.    It  was 


i3o  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

a  pivotal  point  in  the  campaign.  There  were 
several  officers  of  high  rank  among  the  prisoners, 
but  I  did  not  communicate  my  purpose  to  any- 
one, for  fear  my  secret  work  might  leak  out,  with 
the  result  that  we  should  be  detained.  I  was, 
however,  much  surprised  that  none  of  them  seemed 
to  regard  what  was  before  their  eyes  as  of  any 
significance. 

On  the  fourth  day,  several  steamers  with  pris- 
oners from  their  places  of  confinement  in  the  North 
anchored  near  us,  and  I  was  told  that  we  were  to 
start  that  evening  up  the  James  River,  to  the 
point  where  the  commissioners  would  meet  for 
the  exchange.  During  the  day,  I  saw  the  trans- 
ports with  Burnside's  troops  weighing  anchor  and 
passing  out  by  the  fort.  I  had  become  pretty 
well  acquainted  with  the  captain  of  the  steamer 
that  brought  us  down  from  Washington,  and 
found  out  that  he  was  a  Confederate  in  sympathy ; 
so  when  he  was  going  ashore  for  his  orders,  I  asked 
him  to  find  out  where  the  transports  were  going. 

When  he  returned,  he  whispered  to  me  that 
Aquia  Creek,  on  the  Potomac,  was  the  point. 
That  settled  it  —  McClellan's  army  would  not 
advance,  but  would  follow  the  transports  north- 
ward. 

I  was  feverish  with  excitement  and  anxiety  to 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST   POPE       131 

carry  the  news  to  General  Lee,  but  nobody  sus- 
pected what  I  had  discovered,  nor  did  I  hear  any 
comment  on  the  movement  of  Burnside's  troops. 
I  was  so  restless  that  I  sat  nearly  all  night  on  the 
deck  of  the  steamer,  watching  for  the  day  star. 

Early  in  the  morning  we  arrived  at  the  landing, 
and  I  was  the  first  to  jump  ashore.  As  I  was  in 
a  hurry,  and  afraid  of  being  detained  by  some 
formality  in  exchanging,  I  whispered  to  the  Con- 
federate Commissioner  that  I  had  important  in- 
formation for  General  Lee,  and  asked  him  to  let 
me  go.     He  made  no  objection. 

It  was  a  hot  day  in  August,  and  I  set  out  alone 
to  walk  twelve  miles  to  headquarters.  Some  one 
in  Washington  had  given  me  a  patent-leather 
haversack  and  a  five-dollar  greenback.  The  latter 
I  had  invested  in  lemons  at  Fortress  Monroe, 
for  the  blockade  kept  them  out  of  Virginia. 
After  trudging  several  miles  I  was  so  exhausted 
and  footsore  that  I  had  to  lie  down  by  the  road- 
side ;  but  I  held  on  to  my  lemons.  A  horseman 
—  one  of  Hampton's  legion  —  came  along,  and 
I  told  him  how  anxious  I  was  to  get  to  General 
Lee.  He  proved  a  benefactor  indeed,  for  he  put 
me  on  his  horse,  walked  to  his  camp  with  me,  got 
another  horse,  and  rode  to  General  Lee's  head- 
quarters with  me.     I  wish  I  knew  his  name,  for 


132  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

I  have  always  thought  his  conduct  was  one  of  the 
most  generous  deeds  of  the  war. 

When  we  reached  headquarters,  I  dismounted 
and  told  a  staff  officer,  who  was  standing  on  the 
porch,  that  I  had  important  information  for 
General  Lee  and  wished  to  see  him.  As  I  was 
roughly  dressed  and  unkempt,  no  doubt  the 
officer  thought  I  was  presumptuous  to  ask  the 
privilege.  In  the  imperious  tone  customary  with 
staff  officers,  he  said  that  I  could  not  see  the 
General.  I  protested  that  I  must,  but  he  would 
accept  no  explanation.  So  I  turned  to  leave, 
but  another  officer,  who  had  overheard  what  I 
had  said,  told  me  to  wait.  He  went  inside  the 
house,  but  soon  came  out  and  told  me  to  go  inside. 
I  did  so  and  found  myself  in,  what  was  then  to  me, 
the  awful  presence  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

We  had  never  met  before,  but  I  was  soon  re- 
lieved of  embarrassment ;  General  Lee's  kind, 
benevolent  manner  put  me  at  ease.  I  found 
him  looking  over  a  map  on  the  table.  As  quickly 
as  I  could,  I  told  him  that  Burnside's  troops  had 
been  sent  to  Pope.  I  then  said  that  he  did  not 
know  what  confidence  he  could  put  in  my  report 
and  told  him  my  name  and  that  I  was  on  Stuart's 
ride  around  McClellan.  "Oh,"  he  said,  "I  re- 
member." 


THE   CAMPAIGN  AGAINST   POPE       133 

After  I  had  finished  my  story,  he  asked  me  a 
few  questions.  I  remember  very  well  that  he  in- 
quired on  what  line  I  thought  the  next  movement 
against  Richmond  would  be  made,  and  that  I 
considered  it  a  high  compliment  that  he  should 
ask  my  opinion  on  such  an  important  matter. 
He  then  called  one  of  his  staff*  into  the  room  and 
told  him  to  have  a  courier  ready  to  go  to  General 
Jackson.  At  that  time  Jackson  was  about  eighty 
miles  west  of  Richmond,  on  the  railroad  near 
Gordonsville,  but  ever  since  the  affair  at  Beaver 
Dam,  Lee  had  been  afraid  to  trust  the  telegraph, 
and  kept  a  relay  line  of  couriers.  As  soon  as 
Jackson  got  the  news  about  Burnside,  he  hastened 
to  strike  Pope  at  Cedar  Mountain  before  reinforce- 
ments could  reach  him. 

Richmond,  August  6,  '62. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

I  arrived  here  yesterday  evening.  I  came  by  flag 
of  truce  steamer,  —  landed  twelve  miles  below  Rich- 
mond and  had  to  walk  all  the  way  up.  My  feet  were 
so  sore  I  could  scarcely  stand.  As  soon  as  I  got  here 
I  went  out  to  see  General  Lee,  as  I  had  a  good  deal  of 
very  important  information  to  give  him.  ...  I 
brought  information  of  vital  importance. 

The  Comte  de  Paris  said  in  his  "History  of  the 
Civil  War  in  America"  : 


134  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

So  long  as  Burnside  and  the  fleet  of  transports  which 
lay  in  readiness  to  ship  his  troops  remained  at  the 
mouth  of  the  James,  whence  they  could  proceed  either 
to  Harrison's  Landing  or  to  Aquia  Creek,  it  was  evi- 
dent to  Lee  that  the  movement  of  the  Federals  had  not 
yet  been  determined  upon.  Accordingly  he  sought 
with  particular  care  for  every  item  of  intelligence 
calculated  to  enlighten  him  as  to  the  design  of  his 
adversaries. 

Finally,  one  evening,  on  the  4th  or  5th  of  August, 
a  small  steamer  bearing  a  flag  of  truce  was  seen  coming 
up  the  James,  passing  the  Confederate  outposts  and 
approaching  Aiken's  Landing,  a  place  designated  for 
the  exchange  of  prisoners.  In  the  midst  of  the 
soldiers,  whose  gray  coats  were  worn  out  by  long  con- 
finement, and  the  sick  and  wounded,  to  whom  the 
thought  of  freedom  restored  both  strength  and  health, 
an  officer  was  making  himself  conspicuous  by  his 
extreme  anxiety  to  land.  Llis  face  was  well  known  to 
every  Virginian,  and  his  name  to  all  his  companions 
in  arms ;  it  was  the  celebrated  partisan,  Colonel  John 
Mosby. 

His  eagerness,  which  everybody  attributed  to  his 
ardent  temperament,  was  very  natural,  for  he  had 
news  of  the  greatest  importance  to  communicate  to 
Lee.  A  few  hours  later  he  was  at  the  headquarters  of 
his  chief,  to  whom  he  made  known  the  fact  that  at  the 
very  moment  when  he  was  leaving  Hampton  Roads, 
that  same  morning,  the  whole  of  Burnside's  corps  was 
being  embarked,  and  that  its  destination,  as  he  knew 
positively,  was  Aquia  Creek. 


THE   CAMPAIGN  AGAINST   POPE       135 

Lee  lost  no  time  in  availing  himself  of  this  informa- 
tion, which  chance  had  opportunely  thrown  into  his 
hands. 

When  I  rose  to  leave  General  Lee  at  this  my 
first  meeting  with  him,  I  opened  my  haversack 
and  put  a  dozen  lemons  on  the  table.  He  said  I 
had  better  give  them  to  some  of  the  sick  and 
wounded  in  the  hospitals ;  but  I  left  them  and 
bade  him  good-by.  I  had  little  expectation  of 
ever  seeing  him  again. 

I  went  to  see  Stuart,  who  was  still  in  Hanover, 
and  then  went  home  to  get  my  horse.  I  reached 
the  army  again  on  August  17,  just  in  time  to  meet 
Stuart  who  had  come  by  rail  from  Richmond, 
leaving  Fitz  Lee  to  bring  up  the  cavalry.  By 
this  time  it  was  plain  that  McClellan  was  about 
to  leave  the  peninsula,  so  that  General  Lee  was 
concentrating  on  the  Rapidan.  Stuart  had  just 
had  a  conference  with  General  Lee  and  had 
received  his  final  instructions.  He  did  not  say 
what  they  were,  but  the  coming  event  cast  its 
shadow  before.  Stuart  was  to  meet  Fitz  Lee  at 
Verdiersville,  and  I  went  with  him.  I  had  no 
arms  —  I  had  lost  my  pistols  when  I  was  cap- 
tured at  Beaver  Dam  —  but  trusted  to  luck  to 
get  another  pair. 

On  the  way  to  meet  Fitz  Lee,  we  passed  Long- 


i36  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

street's  camp.  The  soldiers  knew  instinctively 
that  a  movement  was  on  foot ;  they  were  cooking 
their  rations  for  a  march  and  singing  "Annie 
Laurie."  We  reached  the  appointed  rendezvous 
that  night  but  found  a  deserted  village.  There 
were  no  signs  of  the  cavalry,  and  Stuart  was 
greatly  disappointed  and  worried,  for  the  opera- 
tion, which  had  been  planned  for  the  next  morn- 
ing, depended  on  the  cavalry.  I  did  not  then 
suspect  how  much  depended  on  meeting  the  cav- 
alry and  how  much  was  lost  by  its  absence.  It 
was  the  crucial  point  of  the  campaign. 

A  staff  officer,  Major  Fitzhugh,  went  in  search 
of  Fitz  Lee,  and  Stuart  and  I  tied  our  horses  and 
lay  down  to  sleep  on  the  porch  of  a  house  by  the 
road.  Before  sunrise  I  was  awakened  by  a 
young  man,  Gibson,  who  had  just  come  with  me, 
unarmed,  from  prison.  He  said  that  he  heard 
the  tramp  of  cavalry  down  the  plank  road  ;  that 
it  was  probably  Fitz  Lee,  but  it  might  be  Yankee 
cavalry.  Although  we  were  near  the  Rapidan, 
we  thought  we  were  inside  of  Longstreet's  picket 
line,  but  I  did  not  want  to  be  caught  napping 
again.  So  I  awoke  Stuart  and  told  him  what 
we  had  heard  and  that  Gibson  and  I  would  ride 
down  the  road  to  see  what  was  there.  We  soon 
saw  a  body  of  cavalry  that   had   stopped   at    a 


THE  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST   POPE       137 

house  a  few  hundred  yards  away.  A  heavy  fog 
made  it  impossible  to  distinguish  friends  from  foes. 
But  we  were  soon  relieved  of  doubt  — two  cavalry- 
men saw  us  and  rode  forward.  When  they  got  in 
pistol  range,  they  opened  fire  —  that  settled  it. 
We  knew  they  were  not  our  friends.  As  Gibson 
and  I  had  no  arms,  there  was  nothing  for  us  to 
do  but  wheel  and  run  —  which  we  did  —  and  used 
our  spurs  freely.  The  firing  gave  the  alarm  and 
saved  Stuart.  He  mounted  his  horse,  bare- 
headed, leaped  a  fence  in  the  back  yard,  and  got 
away.     But  he  left  his  hat ! 

Before  Gibson  and  I  got  to  the  house  where  we 
had  slept,  a  Prussian  on  Stuart's  staff  dashed 
through  the  front  gate  and  went  down  the  road 
ahead  of  us  as  fast  as  his  horse  could  carry  him. 
We  never  overtook  him.  After  the  war  he  pub- 
lished a  lot  of  fables  in  which  he  described  an 
encounter  he  had  with  the  Yankees  that  morning 
as  more  wonderful  than  the  feat  of  St.  George  and 
the  Dragon.  Our  ambition  was  to  escape.  We 
ran  as  fast  as  we  could,  but  the  Prussian  ran 
faster.     That  was  all  the  distinction  he  won. 

Pope  had  advanced  to  the  line  of  the  Rapidan, 
with  his  army  stretched  across  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria  Railway,  which  was  his  line  of  supply. 
His  forces  were  massed  near  the  river.     Lee,  with 


138  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

Jackson  and  Longstreet,  was  in  Orange  County, 
a  few  miles  in  his  front.  Our  cavalry  picketed 
the  south  bank  of  the  river.  As  late  as  the  seven- 
teenth Pope  did  not  know  —  and  this  was  the 
evening  before  he  retreated  in  such  a  hurry  — 
that  Lee  had  arrived  with  Longstreet.  He 
thought  Jackson  was  at  Gordonsville,  twenty 
miles  south.  Pope  spoke  of  crossing  the  river 
and  making  a  demonstration  towards  Richmond  ; 
he  told  Halleck  "our  position  is  strong  and  it  will 
be  very  difficult  to  drive  us  from  it."  A  worse 
position  for  an  army  could  not  have  been  selected 
for  Pope  by  an  enemy.  He  urged  Halleck  to  let 
him  cross  the  river  and  take  the  offensive,  but  the 
latter  would  not  consent. 

General  Lee  never  again  had  such  an  opportu- 
nity to  destroy  an  army.  It  would  have  been  easy, 
on  that  day,  to  pass  around  under  cover  of 
Clarke's  Mountain  —  that  is  on  the  south  bank 
of  the  Rapidan  —  cross  at  the  fords  below,  and 
strike  Pope  both  in  flank  and  rear  at  the  same 
time.  It  was  particularly  so,  as  Pope  had  said 
he  would  look  only  to  his  front.  The  fact  is, 
the  railroad  turns  east  at  such  an  angle  in  Cul- 
peper  that,  after  crossing  the  river  below  Pope, 
Lee's  army  would  have  been  nearer  the  Rappa- 
hannock   bridge    than    Pope's    army   was.      His 


THE  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST   POPE       139 

railroad  communications  with  Washington  would 
have  been  seized,  and  reinforcements  from 
McClellan  cut  off.  According  to  Pope's  dis- 
patches of  that  day  to  Halleck,  there  was  no 
sign  of  a  movement  to  cross  the  Rapidan.  He  was 
anxious  to  attack  Jackson.  By  an  accident 
Pope  was  rudely  awakened  from  his  dream  of 
security. 

John  C.  Ropes,  the  historian,  wrote : 

Hence,  when  he  saw  him  (Pope)  quickly  occupying 
the  line  of  the  Rapidan,  Lee  at  once  saw  his  oppor- 
tunity. He  ordered  Longstreet  and  Jackson  to  cross 
the  river  at  Raccoon  and  Somerville  fords  and  to  move 
on  Culpeper  Court  House,  while  the  cavalry  of  Stuart, 
crossing  further  to  the  east  at  Morton's  Ford,  was  to 
make  Rappahannock  Station,  destroying  the  bridge 
there  and  then  turning  to  the  left,  form  the  right  of 
Longstreet's  corps.  Pope  would  have  been  attacked 
in  the  rear  and  flank  and  his  communications  severed 
in  the  bargain.  Doubtless,  he  would  have  made  a 
strenuous  fight,  but  he  could  hardly  have  escaped 
defeat,  and  defeat  under  such  circumstances  might 
well  have  been  ruin.  From  this  disaster  fortune  saved 
Pope  through  the  capture  of  Stuart's  staff  officer. 

Stuart  had  sent  Major  Fitzhugh  to  Look  for 
Fitz  Lee,  whose  orders  required  him  to  be  at 
Verdiersville  the  night  of  the  seventeenth.  The 
place  is  a  few  miles  south  of  the  Rapidan.     Day- 


140  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

break  on  the  eighteenth  was  the  time  fixed  for 
crossing  the  river.  But  Fitz  Lee,  as  appears  from 
Stuart's  report,  after  leaving  Hanover,  instead  of 
marching  directly  to  the  vicinity  of  Raccoon 
Ford,  as  he  was  ordered,  changed  his  course  and 
turned  back  to  follow  his  wagons  that  had  been 
sent  by  Louisa  Court  House  for  provisions.  By 
this  detour  he  was  a  day  late  in  reaching  his 
destination.  The  delay  was  fatal  to  General 
Lee's  plan  and  saved  Pope.  General  Lee  would 
not  make  the  movement  without  his  cavalry,  but 
Jackson  wanted  to  go  on  without  it.  Major 
Fitzhugh,  while  looking  for  Fitz  Lee,  was  captured 
on  the  night  of  the  seventeenth  by  a  body  of 
cavalry  that  had  been  sent  over  the  river  on  a 
scout.  It  was  the  same  body  that  came  so  near 
getting  us  the  next  morning.  They  got  Lee's 
letter  to  Stuart  that  disclosed  his  plan  to  cross 
on  the  morning  of  the  eighteenth  and  flank  Pope. 
The  dispatch  was  sent  in  hot  haste  to  headquarters 
and  created  a  panic. 

General  Pope,  in  his  report,  spoke  of  the  cap- 
ture of  this  letter  as  the  cause  of  his  hasty  and 
unpremeditated  retreat.  He  said  the  cavalry 
expedition  he  sent  out  captured  the  Adjutant 
General  of  Stuart  and  was  near  capturing  that 
officer   himself.     Among   the   papers   taken    from 


THE  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  POPE       141 

him  was  an  autograph  letter  of  General  Lee  to 
General  Stuart  ''which  made  manifest  the  dis- 
position and  force  of  the  enemy,  and  their  destina- 
tion to  overwhelm  the  army  and  my  command 
before  it  could  be  reinforced  by  any  portion  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac." 

But  Fitz  Lee  was  not  alone  responsible  for 
General  Lee's  failure  to  envelop  Pope.  General 
Longstreet  said  that,  as  the  cavalry  had  not  come 
up  on  the  seventeenth,  he  ordered  two  regiments 
of  Toombs's  brigade  to  be  sent  to  guard  the  Rapi- 
dan  fords.  Toombs  had  ridden  from  his  head- 
quarters to  have  dinner  with  a  farmer.  When  the 
order  came,  his  next  in  rank  ordered  the  detail 
to  be  sent.  When  Toombs  learned  what  had 
been  done  without  asking  him,  he  ordered  the 
regiment  back  to  their  camp.  So  the  fords  were 
unguarded,  and  Pope's  cavalry  crossed  without 
giving  any  alarm,  captured  Stuart's  staff  officer 
with  General  Lee's  order,  and  saved  Pope's  army. 
Longstreet  put  Toombs  under  arrest,  but  Fitz 
Lee  was  not  relieved  of  his  command.  In  the 
midst  of  the  battle  of  Manassas,  a  few  days  later, 
Toombs  rode  up  to  Longstreet  and  begged  to  lead 
his  brigade.  Longstreet  relented,  and  Toombs 
led  his  men  into  battle.  So  it  seemed  that  Gen- 
eral Pope  was  saved  by  a  comedy  of  errors.     Gen- 


142  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

eral  Lee  had  to  wait  for  his  cavalry  to  come  up, 
but  when  they  came  the  opportunity  was  gone. 

If  Toombs  had  not  withdrawn  the  picket  from 
the  Rapidan,  the  Union  cavalry  could  not  have 
crossed  ;  if  Fitz  Lee  had  obeyed  orders,  even  if 
the  cavalry  had  crossed,  they  would  have  been 
caught.  By  this  combination  of  errors,  Pope  got 
warning  and  lost  no  time  in  getting  away. 

I  rode  with  Stuart  to  the  signal  station  on 
Clarke's  Mountain  where  we  could  see  Pope's 
army  retreating  and  his  trains  scudding  back  to 
the  Rappahannock. 

General  George  Gordon,  who  was  with  Pope, 
said:  "Without  delay  the  retreat  began.  By 
rail  and  along  the  roadways,  in  cars  and  in  baggage 
wagons,  from  Mitchell's  Station  and  Culpeper 
(Court  House)  vast  stores  of  subsistence,  forage, 
and  ammunition  streamed  out  for  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rappahannock.  .  .  .  The  Confederates 
were  disappointed  ;  many  of  them  scolded  bit- 
terly. Rarely  had  a  better  opportunity  offered 
for  the  destruction  of  an  army." 

Dabney,  Jackson's  staff  officer  and  biographer, 
in  an  account  of  the  campaign  written  when  it 
was  fresh  in  memory,  said  that  the  plan  of  the 
commander-in-chief  was  for  the  movement  to 
begin  at  dawn  on  the  eighteenth,  but  was  defeated 


THE  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  POPE       143 

by  dilatory  subordinates,  and  that  he  overruled  the 
eagerness  of  Jackson  and  postponed  it  until  the 
twentieth.  "It  was  then,"  he  wrote,  "most 
fortunate  that  Jackson  was  not  in  command." 

A  few  days  afterwards  Stuart  went  on  a  raid 
around  Pope.  As  he  galloped  by  me,  he  said,  "I 
am  going  after  my  hat."  Sure  enough,  he  cap- 
tured Pope's  headquarters  wagons,  with  the  hat 
and  plume  and  full-dress  uniform,  besides  his 
money  chest.  Stuart  was  now  at  least  even  with 
Pope. 

Dranesville,  September  5,  '62. 

My  dearest  Pauline : 

Our  arms  have  been  crowned  with  a  glorious  vic- 
tory [Second  Battle  of  Manassas  and  Chantilly]. 
Our  army  is  now  marching  on  toward  Leesburg,  and 
we  all  suppose  it  will  cross  into  Maryland.  I  have 
escaped  unhurt,  though  I  got  my  horse  slightly  shot 
in  the  shoulder  and  had  a  bullet  through  the  top  of 
my  hat,  which  slightly  grazed  my  head.  ...  I  have 
a  very  good  Yankee  horse,  also  two  fine  saddles  and 
two  pistols  I  captured.  With  one  man  I  captured 
seven  cavalry  and  two  infantry. 

[Colonel  Mosby  accompanied  Stuart  on  the  fall 
campaign  which  culminated  in  the  battle  of 
Antietam.  Of  this  campaign  Mosby  noted  two 
incidents  as  follows : 


144  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

I  rode  just  behind  Jackson  when  he  marched  at  the 
head  of  his  columns  through  Frederick  City,  Md.,  in 
September,  1862,  with  his  band  playing  "My  Mary- 
land." But  I  never  heard  the  story  of  Barbara 
Frietchie  shaking  the  Stars  and  Stripes  in  his  face  until 
I  read  Whittier's  poem.  I  am  sorry  the  story  is  a 
myth,  for,  as  the  poet  tells  it,  the  respect  which  the 
Confederates  showed  her  was  a  great  contrast  with  the 
treatment  an  order  of  a  certain  general  required  to  be 
shown  to  a  woman  who  by  word,  sign,  or  gesture  should 
be  disrespectful  to  the  U.  S.  soldier  or  flag. 

I  only  once  saw  Stonewall  Jackson  in  battle.  At 
Antietam  I  rode  with  Stuart  by  some  batteries  where 
Jackson  was  directing  their  fire  on  the  flank  of  a  col- 
umn that  was  advancing  against  him,  and  I  stopped  a 
minute  to  look  at  the  great  soldier  who  was  then  trans- 
figured with  the  joy  of  battle.  In  a  quiet  way  he  was 
giving  orders.  McClellan  had  sent  three  corps  in 
succession  against  him  —  Hooker's,  Mansfield's,  and 
Sumner's  —  and  each  in  turn  was  repulsed.  While  I 
was  near  him,  the  last  onset  was  made,  but  Jackson 
held  the  same  ground  at  sunset  that  he  held  in  the 
morning. 

I  rode  on  and  overtook  Stuart,  but  the  killed  and 
wounded  were  strewn  on  the  ground  "like  leaves  of 
the  forest  when  autumn  hath  blown",  and  I  had  to 
be  careful  not  to  ride  over  them.  Whole  ranks  seemed 
to  have  been  struck  down  by  a  volley.  Although 
hundreds  were  lying  all  around  me,  my  attention  was 
in  some  way  attracted  to  a  wounded  officer  who  was 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST   POPE       145 

lying  in  an  uncomfortable  position  and  seemed  to  be  suf- 
fering great  agony.  I  dismounted,  fixed  him  more 
comfortably,  and  rolled  up  a  blanket  on  which  he 
rested  his  head,  and  then  got  a  canteen  of  water  for 
him  from  the  body  of  a  dead  soldier  lying  near  him. 
As  I  passed  a  wounded  soldier,  I  held  the  canteen 
toward  him  so  that  he  could  drink.  He  said,  "No, 
take  it  to  my  Colonel,  he  is  the  best  man  in  the  world." 
[This  was  a  speech  worthy  of  Sidney,  the  model  of 
chivalry.] 


CHAPTER   X 
First  Exploits  as  a  Partisan 

Near  Culpeper,  November  24,  '62. 

My  dearest  Pauline : 

I  have  been  on  another  big  scout  since  I  wrote. 
General  Stuart  sent  me  with  nine  men  down  to  recon- 
noitre in  the  vicinity  of  Manassas.  There  was  a 
Yankee  regiment  there.  We  came  upon  ten.  We 
charged  them  with  a  yell.  The  Yankees  ran  and  stam- 
peded their  whole  regiment,  thinking  all  of  Stuart's 
cavalry  were  on  them.  .  .  .  Jackson  is  in  the  Valley. 
I  will  join  Stuart  in  a  day  or  so.  I  stayed  behind  on  a 
scout  and  have  just  returned. 

Tuesday,  December  2nd,  '62. 

My  dearest  Pauline : 

I  am  now  with  the  1st  regiment  near  Spottsylvania 
Court  House,  but  it  is  uncertain  how  long  we  will  be 
here.  Jackson  has  arrived.  I  reckon  you  saw  the 
account  in  the  Richmond  papers  of  my  scout  and  stam- 
pede of  the  Yankees  near  Manassas.  .  .  .  Several  of 
my  old  company  have  been  shot  lately. 

146 


FIRST   EXPLOITS  AS  A   PARTISAN      147 

December  9. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

Enclosed  I  send  a  copy  of  my  report  to  General 
Stuart  of  my  scout  down  to  Manassas  when  with  nine 
men  I  stampeded  two  or  three  thousand  Yankees. 
I  see  the  Richmond  papers  give  Col.  Rosser  [Fifth 
Va.  Cavalry]  the  credit  of  it.  He  had  nothing  to  do 
with  it,  and  was  not  in  twenty-five  miles  of  there.  .  .  . 
General  Lee  sent  me  a  message  expressing  his  gratifi- 
cation at  my  success.  I  believe  I  have  already  written 
of  my  trip  around  McClellan  at  Catlett's  Station, 
when  I  saw  him  leave  his  army  at  the  time  he  was 
superseded  by  Burnside.  The  courier  by  whom  I  sent 
the  dispatch  to  General  Stuart  announcing  it  passed 
five  Yankee  cavalry  in  the  road.  Not  dreaming  there 
was  a  rebel  army  in  their  rear,  they  passed  on  by  him, 
merely  saying  "Good  morning."  We  did  not  go  in 
disguise,  as  spies,  but  in  Confederate  uniform  and  with 
our  arms.  Had  a  slip  from  a  Northern  paper,  which  I 
lost,  giving  an  account  of  a  squad  of  rebel  cavalry  hav- 
ing been  seen  that  day  in  their  rear.  Aaron  thinks 
himself  quite  a  hero,  though  he  does  not  want  to  come 
again  in  such  disagreeable  proximity  to  a  bombshell. 
I  want  you  to  send  me  some  books  to  read.  Send 
Plutarch,  Macaulay's  "History"  and  "Essays,"  "En- 
cyclopedia of  Anecdotes,"  Scott's  Works,  Shakespeare, 
Byron,  Scott's  Poems,  Hazlitt's  "Life  of  Napoleon," 
—  if  you  can  get  me  a  copy  of  "My  Novel,"  send  it, 
also  "Memoirs  of  an  Irish  Gentleman"  (for  Fount 
Beattie),  "Corinne,"  and  "Sketch  Book." 


148  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

The  situation  is  now  changed.  McClellan  and 
Pope  have  been  driven  from  Virginia,  and  Burn- 
side  has  met  a  bloody  repulse  at  Fredericksburg. 
The  two  hostile  armies  are  in  winter  quarters  on 
the  Rappahannock,  and  the  pickets  on  opposite 
banks  have  declared  a  truce  and  are  swapping 
coffee  and  tobacco.  Occasionally  a  band  on  the 
Northern  bank  plays  a  favorite  Southern  air  and 
soon,  in  response,  the  strain  of  the  Star  Spangled 
Banner  comes  from  our  side.  The  cavalry  is 
not  used  for  picketing  and  has  been  sent  to  the 
rear  to  be  more  convenient  to  forage. 

To  relieve  the  monotony  Stuart  resolved  to  take 
his  cavalry  on  a  Christmas  raid  to  Dumfries  on 
Burnside's  line  of  communication  with  Washing- 
ton. A  good  many  wagons  with  supplies  were  cap- 
tured, and  we  chased  a  cavalry  regiment  through 
their  own  camp  and  got  all  their  good  things. 
There  is  a  dispatch  in  the  history  of  the  telegraph 
in  the  war  from  an  operator  in  Fairfax,  which 
says,  "The  17th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  just  passed 
here,  furiously  charging  to  the  rear." 

When  he  returned,  Stuart  let  me  stay  behind  a 
few  days  with  six  men  to  operate  on  the  enemy's 
outposts.  He  was  so  satisfied  with  our  success 
that  he  let  me  have  fifteen  men  to  return  and 
begin   my   partisan    life   in    northern   Virginia  — 


FIRST   EXPLOITS  AS  A   PARTISAN      149 

which  closed  with  the  war.  That  was  the  origin 
of  my  battalion.  On  January  24,  1863,  we 
crossed  the  Rappahannock  and  immediately  be- 
gan operations  in  a  country  which  Joe  Johnston 
had  abandoned  a  year  before.  It1  looked  as 
though  I  was  leading  a  forlorn  hope,  but  I  was 
never  discouraged.  In  general  my  purpose  was 
to  threaten  and  harass  the  enemy  on  the  border 
and  in  this  way  compel  him  to  withdraw  troops 


1  [A  Confederate  newspaper  described  the  Mosby  of  this  time  as 
follows.  "His  figure  is  slight,  muscular,  supple,  and  vigorous;  his  eye 
is  keen,  penetrating,  and  ever  on  the  alert." 

Another  description  of  his  appearance  during  the  war:  — 
"He  was  thin,  wiry,  and  I  should  say  about  five  feet  nine  or  ten 
inches  in  height.  A  slight  stoop  in  the  back  was  not  ungraceful.  His 
chin  was  carried  well  forward  ;  his  lips  were  thin,  and  wore  a  somewhat 
satirical  smile ;  the  eyes,  under  the  brown  felt  hat,  were  keen,  sparkling, 
and  roved  curiously  from  side  to  side.  He  wore  a  gray  uniform,  with 
no  arms  but  two  revolvers,  —  the  sabre  was  no  favorite  with  him.  His 
voice  was  low,  and  a  smile  was  often  on  his  lips.  He  rarely  sat  still 
ten  minutes.  Such  was  his  appearance  at  that  time.  No  one  would 
have  been  struck  with  anything  noticeable  in  him  except  his  eyes. 
These  flashed  at  times,  in  a  way  which  might  have  induced  the  opinion 
that  there  was  something  in  the  man,  if  it  only  had  an  opportunity  to 
come  out.  .  .  .  The  face  of  this  person  is  tanned,  beardless,  youthful 
looking,  and  pleasant.  He  has  white  regular  teeth,  which  his  habitual 
smile  reveals.  His  piercing  eyes  flash  out  from  beneath  his  brown  hat, 
with  its  golden  cord  ;  and  he  reins  his  horse  with  the  ease  of  a  practised 
rider.  A  plain  soldier,  low  and  slight  of  stature,  ready  to  talk,  to  laugh, 
to  ride,  to  oblige  you  in  any  way,  —  such  was  Mosby  in  outward  ap- 
pearance. Nature  had  given  no  sign  but  the  restless,  roving,  flashing 
eyes,  that  there  was  much  worth  considering  beneath.  The  common- 
place exterior  of  the  partisan  concealed  one  of  the  most  active,  daring, 
restless  minds  of  an  epoch  fruitful  in  such.  .  .  .  His  activity  of  mind 
and  body,  —  call  it,  if  you  choose,  restless,  eternal  love  of  movement, 
was  something  wonderful."] 


150  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

from  his  front  to  guard  the  line  of  the  Potomac  and 
Washington.  This  would  greatly  diminish  his 
offensive  power.  General  "Joe"  Hooker  said 
before  a  committee  of  Congress  that  we  created  so 
much  anxiety  that  the  planks  on  the  bridge  across 
the  Potomac  were  taken  up  every  night  to  prevent 
us  from  carrying  off  the  Government. 

Recruits  came  to  us  from  inside  the  enemy's 
lines,  and  they  brought  valuable  information. 
Then,  I  had  picketed  for  some  time  in  Fairfax  the 
year  before  and  had  acquired  considerable  local 
knowledge.  The  troops  attached  to  the  defence 
of  Washington,  south  of  the  Potomac,  were  dis- 
tributed in  winter  quarters  through  Fairfax  County 
and  extended  in  an  arc  of  a  circle  from  the  upper 
to  the  lower  Potomac.  The  headquarters  of  Gen- 
eral Stoughton,  who  commanded  them,  were  at 
the  Court  House.  In  a  day  or  so  after  I  arrived 
in  Loudoun,  we  began  operations  on  the  outposts 
of  Fairfax.  The  weak  points  were  generally 
selected  for  attack.  Up  to  that  time  the  pickets 
had  passed  a  quiet  life  in  their  camps  or  dozing 
on  the  picket  posts,  but  now  they  were  kept  under 
arms  and  awake  all  night  by  a  foe  who  generally 
assailed  them  where  he  was  least  expected.  At 
first  they  accounted  for  our  attacks  on  the  theory 
that   the   farmers   and   cripples   they   saw   in   the 


•Olxa^,     *>^ 


/7v^^/-^c^Z^t-  Lo  4l  erf  y  cfy^*^-  (*-& 


FIRST   EXPLOITS   AS  A   PARTISAN      151 

daytime  ploughing  their  fields  and  taking  care  of 
their  flocks  collected  in  bands  at  night,  raided 
their  camps,  and  dispersed  at  daybreak.  But 
when  they  went  around  at  night  searching  the 
homes  for  these  invisible  foes,  they  generally 
found  the  old  farmers  in  bed,  and  when  they 
returned  to  camp,  they  often  found  that  we  had 
paid  them  a  visit  in  their  absence.  The  farmers 
could  prove  an  alibi. 

An  English  officer,  Colonel  Percy  Wyndham,  a 
soldier  of  fortune  who  had  been  with  Garibaldi  in 
Italy,  commanded  the  cavalry  brigade  and  had 
charge  of  the  outposts.  He  was  familiar  with  the 
old  rules  of  the  schools,  but  he  soon  learned  that 
they  were  out  of  date,  and  his  experience  in  war 
had  not  taught  him  how  to  counteract  the  forays 
and  surprises  that  kept  his  men  in  the  saddle  all 
the  time.  The  loss  of  sleep  is  irritating  to  anybody 
and,  in  his  vexation  at  being  struck  by  and  striking 
at  an  invisible  foe,  he  sent  me  a  message  calling 
me  a  horse  thief.  I  did  not  deny  it,  but  retorted 
that  all  the  horses  I  had  stolen  had  riders,  and 
that  the  riders  had  sabres,  carbines,  and  pistols. 
There  was  a  new  regiment  in  his  brigade  that  was 
armed  only  with  sabres  and  obsolete  carbines. 
When  we  attacked  them  with  revolvers,  they  were 
really  defenceless.     So  I  sent  him  word  through 


152  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

a  citizen  that  the  men  of  that  regiment  were  not 
worth  capturing,  and  he  must  give  them  six- 
shooters.  We  used  neither  carbines  nor  sabres, 
but  all  the  men  carried  a  pair  of  Colt  pistols.  We 
did  not  pay  for  them  but  the  U.  S.  Government 
did. 

Fauquier  Co.,  Va.,1 

Feb.  4,  '63. 

...  I  have  been  in  this  neighborhood  over  a 
week.  Have  had  a  gay  time  with  the  Yankees. 
Have  captured  twenty-eight  Yankee  cavalry,  twenty- 
nine  horses.  ...  I  have  15  men  with  me  .  .  .  Fount 
Beattie  was  captured  by  the  Yankees,  —  his  horse 
fell  with  him.  There  were  over  two  hundred  Yankees. 
The  Yankees  set  what  they  thought  was  a  sure  trap 
to  catch  me  a  few  nights  ago.  I  went  into  it  and 
brought  the  whole  of  them  off,  —  killed  and  captured 
twelve. 

During  the  first  days  as  a  partisan,  there  were 
more  comic  than  tragic  elements  in  the  drama  of 
war.  About  that  time  occurred  an  episode  that 
would  have  furnished  Goldsmith  with  all  the 
elements  of  a  comedy.  It  was  a  dark  night  with 
a  deep  snow  on  the  ground,  but  the  weather  was 
warm  and  the  snow  soft.  I  received  information 
that  there  was  a  pretty  strong  outpost  on  a  cer- 

1  A  letter  to  Mrs.  Mosby. 


FIRST   EXPLOITS  AS  A   PARTISAN      153 

tain  road  in  Fairfax,  and  I  was  determined  to 
capture  it.  Of  course,  the  fine  horses  were  a 
great  attraction.  Several  citizens  had  joined  my 
command  and  acted  as  guides.  Near  the  post 
lived  a  man  named  Ben  Hatton,  who  traded  in  the 
camps  and  was  pretty  familiar  with  them.  So, 
around  midnight,  we  stopped  at  his  house  about  a 
mile  from  the  picket  post,  and  he  told  us  that  he 
had  been  there  that  evening  —  I  suppose  to  get 
coffee  and  sugar.  Ben  was  impressed  as  a  guide 
to  conduct  us  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy.  When  we 
reached  that  point,  I  determined  to  dismount,  leave 
our  horses,  and  attack  on  foot.  Ben  had  fully 
discharged  his  duty  and,  as  he  was  a  non-comba- 
tant, I  did  not  want  to  expose  him  to  unnecessary 
danger.  The  blazing  fire  by  which  the  Yankees 
were  sleeping  and  dreaming  was  sufficient  for  us. 
So  the  horses  were  tied  to  the  trees,  and  two  of  my 
men  —  Jimmie,  an  Irishman,  and  another  we 
called  "Coonskin ",  from  the  cap  he  wore  — 
stayed  with  Ben  as  a  guard  over  the  horses. 

Walking  on  the  soft  snow,  we  made  no  noise  and 
were  soon  upon  the  picket  post.  The  surprise 
was  complete,  and  they  had  no  time  to  prepare 
for  resistance.  We  were  soon  ready  to  start  back 
with  our  prisoners  and  their  horses,  when  a  fire 
opened  in  our  rear,  where  we  had  left  the  guard 


154  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

and  horses.  The  best  scheme  seemed  to  be  to 
mount  the  Yankee  horses,  dash  back,  and  re- 
capture our  own.  Some  of  the  men  were  left  to 
bring  the  prisoners  on  foot.  A  considerable  fusil- 
lade had  been  going  on  where  the  guard  had  been 
left,  but  it  ceased  suddenly  when  we  got  near  the 
place.  To  our  surprise  we  found  the  horses  all 
standing  hitched  to  the  trees,  and  Ben  Hatton 
lying  in  a  snowbank,  shot  through  the  thigh. 
But  neither  "Coonskin"  nor  Jimmie  was  there. 
Ben  told  us  that  the  Yankees  had  come  up  and 
attacked  them  ;  that  was  all  he  knew,  except  that 
they  had  shot  him.  He  did  not  know  whether 
the  Yankees  had  carried  off  Jimmie  and  "Coon- 
skin ",  or  whether  they  had  carried  off  the  Yankees, 
nor  could  he  explain  why  the  horses  were  there. 
That  was  a  mystery  nobody  could  solve.  We 
mounted  ;  Ben  was  lifted  on  a  horse  behind  one  of 
the  men,  and  we  started  off  with  all  the  horses  and 
prisoners.  By  that  time  the  Yankees  from  the 
camp  had  been  attracted  by  the  firing.  They 
came  up  and  opened  fire  at  us  at  long  range,  but 
let  us  leave  without  venturing  to  come  near. 
Ben  was  bleeding  profusely,  but  it  was  only  a 
flesh  wound.  We  left  him  at  home,  curled  up  in 
bed,  with  his  wife  to  nurse  him.  He  was  too 
near  the  enemy's  lines  for  me  to  give  him  surgical 


FIRST   EXPLOITS  AS  A   PARTISAN      155 

assistance,  and  he  was  afraid  to  ask  any  from  the 
camps.  The  wound  would  have  betrayed  him 
to  the  Yankees  had  they  known  about  it,  and 
Ben  would  have  been  hung  as  a  spy !  He  was 
certainly  innocent,  for  he  had  no  desire  to  serve 
any  one  but  himself.  His  wound  healed,  but  the 
only  reward  he  got  was  the  glory  of  shedding  his 
blood  for  his  country. 

As  soon  as  it  was  daylight,  a  strong  body  of 
cavalry  was  sent  up  the  turnpike  to  catch  us  — 
they  might  as  well  have  been  chasing  a  herd  of 
antelope.  We  had  several  hours'  start  of  them, 
and  they  returned  to  camp  in  the  evening,  lead- 
ing a  lot  of  broken-down  horses.  The  pursuit  had 
done  them  more  harm  than  our  attack. 

We  brought  off  "Coonskin's"  and  Jimmie's 
horses,  but  we  couldn't  invent  a  theory  to  solve 
the  mystery.  Two  days  afterwards,  "Coonskin" 
and  Jimmie  reappeared.  They  had  trudged 
twenty-five  miles  through  the  snow,  arriving 
within  a  few  hours  of  each  other,  but  from  op- 
posite directions,  and  each  thought  he  was  the  only 
survivor.  Neither  knew  that  Ben  Hatton  had 
been  shot,  and  each  said  that  he  had  fought  until 
they  saw  a  body  of  Yankees  riding  down  upon 
them.  Then  they  ran  off  and  left  the  horses  in 
the  belief  that  we  were  all  prisoners. 


156  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

By  a  comparison  of  their  statements,  I  found 
out  that  the  facts  were  about  as  follows.  To 
keep  themselves  warm,  the  three  had  walked 
around  among  the  trees  and  got  separated. 
"Coonskin"  saw  Ben  and  Jimmie  moving  in  the 
shadows  and  took  them  for  Yankees.  He  opened 
on  them  and  drew  blood  at  the  first  fire.  Ben 
yelled  and  fell.  Jimmie  took  it  for  granted  that 
"Coonskin"  was  a  Yankee  and  returned  his  fire. 
So  they  were  firing  at  each  other  and  dodging 
among  the  trees  when  they  saw  us  coming  up  at 
a  gallop.  As  we  had  left  them  on  foot,  they  could 
not  understand  how  we  could  come  back  on  horse- 
back. So  after  wounding  Ben  Hatton  and  shoot- 
ing at  each  other,  they  had  run  away  from  us. 

A  few  days  after  this  adventure,  Fate  com- 
pelled me  to  act  a  part  in  a  comedy  which  appeared 
to  be  heroic,  but  for  which  I  was  really  entitled 
to  as  little  credit  as  Ben  Hatton  was  for  getting 
shot.  From  our  rendezvous  along  the  base  of  the 
Blue  Ridge  we  continued  to  make  night  attacks 
on  the  outposts  near  Washington.  So  it  was 
determined  in  Washington  to  put  a  stop  to  what 
were  called  our  depredations,  and  an  expedition 
was  sent  against  us  into  Loudoun.  Middleburg, 
a  village,  was  supposed  to  be  our  headquarters,  and 
it  was  thought  that  by  surrounding  it  at  night  the 


FIRST   EXPLOITS  AS  A   PARTISAN      157 

marauders  could  be  caught.  The  complaints 
against  us  did  not  recognize  the  fact  that  there 
are  two  parties  of  equal  rights  in  a  war.  The 
error  men  make  is  in  judging  conduct  in  war  by 
the  standards  of  peace.  I  confess  my  theory  of 
war  was  severely  practical  —  one  not  acquired  by 
reading  the  Waverley  novels  —  but  we  observed 
the  ethics  of  the  code  of  war.  Strategy  is  only 
another  name  for  deception  and  can  be  practised 
by  any  commander.  The  enemy  complained 
that  we  did  not  fight  fair  ;  the  same  complaint  was 
made  by  the  Austrians  against  Napoleon. 

A  Major  Gilmer  was  sent  with  200  men  in  expec- 
tation of  extirpating  my  gang  —  as  they  called  us. 
He  might  have  done  more  if  he  had  taken  less 
whiskey  along.  But  the  weather  was  cold  !  Be- 
fore daybreak  he  had  invested  the  town  and  made 
his  headquarters  in  the  hotel  where  he  had  learned 
that  I  slept.  I  had  never  been  in  the  village 
except  to  pass  through.  The  orders  were  to 
arrest  every  man  that  could  be  found,  and  when 
his  searching  parties  reported  to  him,  they  had  a 
lot  of  old  men  whom  they  had  pulled  out  of  bed. 
Gilmer  pretended  to  think  these  were  the  parties 
that  had  captured  his  pickets  and  patrols  and 
stampeded  his  camps.  If  so,  when  he  saw  the 
old  cripples  on  crutches,  he  ought  to  have  been 


158  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

ashamed.  He  made  free  use  of  his  bottle  and 
ordered  a  soldier  to  drill  the  old  men  and  make 
them  mark  time  just  to  keep  warm.  As  he  had 
made  a  night  march  of  twenty-five  miles,  he  con- 
cluded to  carry  the  prisoners  to  his  camp  as 
prizes  of  war.  So  each  graybeard  had  to  ride 
double  with  a  trooper.  There  were  also  a  number 
of  colored  women  whom  he  invited,  or  who  asked, 
to  go  with  him.  They  had  children,  but  the  major 
was  a  good-natured  man.  So  each  woman  was 
mounted  behind  a  trooper  —  and  the  trooper 
took  her  baby  in  his  arms.  With  such  encum- 
brances, sabres  and  pistols  would  be  of  little  use, 
if  an  attack  was  made.  When  they  started,  the 
column  looked  more  like  a  procession  of  Canter- 
bury Pilgrims  than  cavalry. 

News  came  to  me  that  the  enemy  were  at  Mid- 
dleburg,  so,  with  seventeen  men,  I  started  that 
way,  hoping  to  catch  some  stragglers.  But  when 
we  got  to  the  village,  we  heard  that  they  had  gone, 
and  we  entered  at  a  gallop.  Women  and  children 
came  out  to  greet  us  —  the  men  had  all  been  carried 
off  as  prisoners.  The  tears  and  lamentations  of  the 
scene  aroused  all  our  sentiments  of  chivalry,  and 
we  went  in  pursuit.  With  five  or  six  men  I  rode 
in  advance  at  a  gallop  and  directed  the  others 
to    follow    more    slowly.     I    had    expected    that 


FIRST   EXPLOITS  AS  A   PARTISAN      159 

Major  Gilmer  might  halt  at  Aldie,  a  village  about 
five  miles  ahead,  but  when  we  got  there  a  citizen 
told  us  that  he  passed  on  through.  Just  as  we 
were  ascending  to  the  top  of  a  hill  on  the  out- 
skirts of  the  village,  two  cavalrymen  suddenly 
met  us.  We  captured  them  and  sent  them  to  the 
rear,  supposing  they  were  videttes  of  Gilmer's 
command.  Orders  were  sent  to  the  men  behind 
to  hurry  up.  Just  then  I  saw  two  cavalrymen 
in  blue  on  the  pike.  No  others  were  visible,  so 
with  my  squad  I  started  at  a  gallop  to  capture 
them.  But  when  we  got  halfway  down  the  hill 
we  discovered  a  considerable  body  —  it  turned 
out  to  be  a  squadron  —  of  cavalry  that  had  dis- 
mounted. Their  horses  were  hitched  to  a  fence, 
and  they  were  feeding  at  a  mill.  I  tried  to  stop, 
but  my  horse  was  high-mettled  and  ran  at  full 
speed,  entirely  beyond  my  control.  But  the  cav- 
alry at  the  mill  were  taken  absolutely  by  surprise 
by  the  irruption  ;  their  videttes  had  not  fired,  and 
they  were  as  much  shocked  as  if  we  had  dropped 
from  the  sky.  They  never  waited  to  see  how  many 
of  us  there  were.  A  panic  seized  them.  Without 
stopping  to  bridle  their  horses  or  to  fight  on  foot, 
they  scattered  in  all  directions.  Some  hid  in  the 
mill ;  others  ran  to  Bull  Run  Mountain  near  by. 
Just  as  we  got  to  the  mill,  I  saw  another  body 


160  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

of  cavalry  ahead  of  me  on  the  pike,  gazing  in 
bewildered  astonishment  at  the  sight.  To  save 
myself,  I  jumped  off  my  horse  and  my  men 
stopped,  but  fortunately  the  mounted  party  in 
front  of  me  saw  those  I  had  left  behind  coming  to 
my  relief,  so  they  wheeled  and  started  full  speed 
down  the  pike.  We  then  went  back  to  the  mill 
and  went  to  work.  Many  had  hidden  like  rats, 
and  as  the  mill  was  running,  they  came  near  being 
ground  up.  The  first  man  that  was  pulled  out 
was  covered  with  flour ;  we  thought  he  was  the 
miller.  I  still  believed  that  the  force  was  Major 
Gilmer's  rearguard.  All  the  prisoners  were  sent 
back,  and  with  one  man  I  rode  down  the  pike  to 
look  for  my  horse.  But  I  never  got  him  —  he 
chased  the  Yankees  twenty-five  miles  to  their 
camp. 

I  have  said  that  in  this  affair  I  got  the  reputation 
of  a  hero  ;  really  I  never  claimed  it,  but  gave  my 
horse  all  the  credit  for  the  stampede.  Now  comes 
the  funniest  part  of  the  story.  Major  Gilmer  had 
left  camp  about  midnight.  The  next  morning  a 
squadron  of  the  First  Vermont  Cavalry,  which 
was  in  camp  a  few  miles  away  from  him,  was  sent 
up  the  pike  on  Gilmer's  track.  Major  Gilmer 
did  not  know  they  were  coming.  When  he  got  a 
mile  below  Aldie,  he  saw  in  front  a  body  of  cavalry 


FIRST   EXPLOITS  AS  A   PARTISAN      161 

coming  to  meet  him.  He  thought  they  were  my 
men  who  had  cut  him  off  from  his  camp.  He 
happened  to  be  at  the  point  where  the  historic 
Braddock  road,  along  which  young  George  Wash- 
ington marched  to  the  Monongahela,  crossed  the 
turnpike.  As  Major  Gilmer  was  in  search  of  us, 
it  is  hard  to  see  why  he  was  seized  with  a  panic 
when  he  thought  he  saw  us.  He  made  no  effort 
to  find  out  whether  the  force  in  front  was  friend 
or  foe,  but  wheeled  and  turned  off  at  full  speed  from 
the  pike.  He  seemed  to  think  the  chances  were 
all  against  him.  There  had  been  a  snow  and  a 
thaw,  and  his  horses  sank  to  their  knees  in  mud 
at  every  jump.  But  the  panic  grew,  the  farther  he 
went,  and  he  soon  saw  that  he  had  to  leave  some 
of  his  horses  sticking  in  the  road.  He  concluded 
now  that  he  would  do  like  the  mariner  in  a  storm  — 
jettison  his  cargo.  So  the  old  men  were  dropped 
first ;  next  the  negro  women,  and  the  troopers  were 
told  to  leave  the  babies  in  the  arms  of  their 
mothers.  The  Braddock  road  had  seen  one  such 
wreck  and  retreat  a  hundred  years  before. 

I  had  not  gone  far  before  I  met  the  old  men  com- 
ing back,  and  they  told  me  of  their  ludicrous  ad- 
venture and  thanked  me  for  their  rescue.  They 
did  not  know  that  the  Vermont  cavalry  was 
entitled  to  all  the  glory  for  getting  up  the  stampede, 


162  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

and  that  they  owed  me  nothing.  In  the  hurry 
to  find  my  horse,  I  had  asked  the  prisoners  no 
questions  and  thought  that  we  had  caught  a  rear- 
guard. Among  the  prisoners  were  two  captains. 
One  was  exchanged  in  time  to  be  at  Gettysburg, 
where  he  was  killed.  Major  Gilmer  was  tried 
for  cowardice  and  drunkenness  and  was  dismissed 
from  the  army.  Colonel  Johnstone,  who  put  him 
under  arrest  when  he  got  back,  said  in  his  report, 
"The  horses  returned  exhausted  from  being  run 
at  full  speed  for  miles."  They  were  running  from 
the  Vermont  cavalry. 

Among  the  accessions  to  my  command  was  a 
young  man  named  John  Underwood,  whom  I 
found  in  the  Fairfax  forests.  I  was  largely  in- 
debted to  his  skill  and  intelligence  for  whatever 
success  I  had  in  the  beginning  of  my  partisan  life. 
He  was  killed  a  few  months  afterward,  and  I  never 
found  his  like  again,  for  he  was  equally  at  home 
threading  his  way  through  the  pines  or  leading  a 
charge.  Why  he  had  stayed  at  home  and  let  me 
discover  him  is  a  mystery  to  me.  Soon  after  the 
affair  in  which  Ben  Hatton  became  an  involuntary 
hero,  Underwood  reported  another  outpost  in 
Fairfax  which  was  in  an  exposed  position.  I  could 
hardly  believe  it ;  the  Yankees  seemed  to  have 
learned  nothing  by  experience.    It  looked  much  as 


FIRST   EXPLOITS  AS  A   PARTISAN      163 

though  they  had  been  put  there  just  to  be  caught, 
or  as  a  snare  to  catch  me,  so  I  resolved  to  give 
them  another  lesson  in  the  art  of  war. 

We  had  a  suspicion  that  it  was  a  trap  set  for  us 
and  that  there  was  danger,  but  war  is  not  an 
exact  science,  and  it  is  necessary  to  take  some 
chances.  I  determined  to  try  my  luck  in  the 
daytime  —  they  would  not  be  expecting  us,  as 
all  our  attacks  had  been  at  night.  Underwood 
led  us  by  paths  through  the  woods  to  their  rear 
until  we  arrived  at  a  road  leading  from  their  camp 
to  the  picket.  A  vidette  was  there,  but  he  was 
caught  before  he  could  fire  and  give  the  alarm. 
It  was  then  plain  that  the  surprise  we  had  planned 
would  be  complete.  A  few  hundred  yards  away 
the  boys  in  blue  were  lounging  around  an  old  saw- 
mill, with  their  horses  tied  to  a  fence.  It  was  past 
twelve  o'clock,  there  was  bright  sunlight,  and  there 
was  snow  on  the  ground.  They  were  Vermont 
cavalry,  and  they  had  no  suspicion  that  an  enemy 
was  near.  It  was  just  the  hour  for  their  relief 
to  come,  and  as  we  came  from  the  direction  of  their 
camp,  they  thought,  when  they  saw  us,  that  we 
were  friends. 

When  we  got  within  a  hundred  yards  of  them, 
an  order  to  charge  was  given.  They  were  panic- 
stricken  —  they  had  no  time  to  untie  their  horses 


164  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

and  mount  —  and  took  refuge  in  the  loft  of  the  mill. 
I  was  afraid  that  if  they  had  time  to  recover  from 
their  shock,  they  would  try  to  hold  the  mill  against 
us  with  their  carbines  until  reinforcements  came. 
There  was  a  pile  of  dry  timber  and  shavings  on  the 
floor,  and  the  men  were  ordered,  in  a  loud  voice, 
to  set  the  mill  on  fire.  When  we  reached  the  head 
of  the  stairs,  the  Yankees  surrendered.  They 
were  defenceless  against  the  fire,  and  it  was  not 
their  ambition  to  be  cremated  alive.  Not  a  shot 
was  fired.  After  all  were  mounted,  we  saw  four 
finely-equipped  horses  tied  in  front  of  a  near-by 
house.  My  men  at  once  rushed  to  find  the  riders. 
They  found  a  table  spread  with  lunch.  One  of 
the  men  ran  up-stairs  where  it  was  pitch  dark ; 
he  called  but  got  no  answer.  As  a  pistol  shot 
could  do  no  harm,  he  fired  into  the  darkness. 
The  flash  of  the  pistol  in  his  face  caused  one  of 
the  Yankees  to  move,  and  he  descended  through 
the  ceiling.  He  had  stepped  on  the  lathing  and 
caved  it  in.  After  he  was  brushed  off,  we  saw  that 
he  was  a  major.  The  three  other  officers  who 
were  with  him  came  out  of  their  holes  and  sur- 
rendered. My  men  appropriated  the  lunch  by 
right  of  war. 

Just  as  the  Yankee  relief  appeared,  John  Under- 
wood was  sent  off  with  the  prisoners.     We  kept 


FIRST   EXPLOITS  AS  A   PARTISAN      165 

a  rear  guard  behind,  but  no  attack  was  made  on 
it,  although  one  was  threatened.  Major  Taggart, 
in  his  report  of  the  affair,  censured  the  officer  in 
command,  as  he  had  a  larger  force  than  ours  and 
made  no  attempt  either  to  capture  us  or  to  recap- 
ture the  prisoners.  Major  Wells,  the  major  we 
captured,  was  exchanged  in  time  to  be  at  Gettys- 
burg where  he  was  promoted  to  be  a  brigadier- 
general. 

There  was  more  than  one  ludicrous  affair  that 
day.  A  man  named  Janney  lived  at  the  place 
and  was  permitted  to  conduct  a  store  since  he 
was  inside  the  picket  lines.  He  had  just  brought 
a  barrel  of  molasses  from  Washington  to  retail  to 
his  neighbors,  and  he  was  in  the  act  of  filling  a 
jug  for  a  customer  when  he  heard  the  yell  of  my 
men  as  they  rushed  at  the  picket  post.  As  the 
place  was  occupied  by  the  Unionists,  he  could  not 
have  been  more  surprised  if  a  comet  had  struck  it. 
Janney  did  not  aspire  to  be  a  hero,  so  he  ran  away 
as  fast  as  his  heels  could  carry  him,  and,  if  pos- 
sible, the  molasses  ran  even  faster.  When  he 
ventured  to  return  to  the  store,  he  found  the 
molasses  spread  all  over  the  floor,  and  not  a  drop 
in  the  barrel. 

After  we  were  a  safe  distance  away,  the  privates 
were  paroled  and  allowed  to  go  home,   and  the 


166  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

officers  gave  their  paroles  to  report  to  Fitz  Lee 
in  Culpeper.  Jake,  a  Hungarian,  was  sent  with 
them  as  an  escort.  Now  Jake  had  served  under 
Kossuth  and  did  not  put  much  trust  in  paroles. 
They  spent  the  night  with  a  farmer  and,  when  the 
officers  went  to  bed,  Jake  volunteered  to  take 
their  boots  to  the  kitchen  to  be  shined.  As  long 
as  he  had  their  boots,  Jake  had  no  fear  of  their 
going  off  in  the  snow.  When  he  got  back,  Jake 
told  me,  with  a  chuckle,  of  the  trick  he  had  played 
on  the  Yankees. 

War  is  not  always  grim-visaged,  and  incidents 
occur  which  provoke  laughter  in  the  midst  of 
danger.  In  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  a  Yankee 
cavalry  regiment  went  into  camp  one  evening. 
One  of  the  men  rode  off  to  a  house  to  get  some- 
thing to  eat  and  called  a  colored  woman  to  the 
door.  He  wanted  to  feel  safe,  so  he  asked  if  any- 
body was  there.  "  Nobody  but  Mosby,"  she 
replied. 

"Is  Mosby  here?"  he  asked. 

"Yes,"  she  said. 

He  dashed  off  to  the  camp  and  reported  that 
Mosby  was  in  a  house  near  by.  Orders  were  given 
to  saddle  and  mount  quickly,  and  they  marched 
to  the  house  and  surrounded  it.  The  Colonel 
entered  and  asked  the  woman  if  Mosby  was  there. 


FIRST   EXPLOITS  AS  A   PARTISAN      167 

"Yes,"  she  answered. 

"Where  is  he?"  demanded  the  Colonel. 

"There  he  is,"  she  said,  pointing  to  a  negro  baby 
in  the  cradle. 

One  night  I  was  with  one  man  near  the  enemy's 
camps  in  Fairfax.  We  were  passing  a  house, 
when  I  heard  a  dog  bark  and  somebody  call, 
"Come  here,  Mosby."  So  I  turned,  rode  up 
to  the  house,  and  asked  the  man  if  he  had  called 
me. 

"  No,"  he  said,  "  I  was  calling  Mosby.  I  wanted 
him  to  stop  barking." 

So  I  have  had  the  distinction  of  having  had 
negro  babies  and  dogs  named  after  me. 


CHAPTER   XI 

The  Raid  on  Fairfax 

When  we  captured  prisoners,  it  was  my  custom 
to  examine  them  apart,  and  in  this  way,  together 
with  information  gained  from  citizens,  I  obtained 
a  pretty  accurate  knowledge  of  conditions  in  the 
enemy's  camps.  After  a  few  weeks  of  partisan 
life,  I  meditated  a  more  daring  enterprise  than 
any  I  had  attempted  and  fortunately  received 
aid  from  an  unexpected  quarter.  A  deserter 
from  the  Fifth  New  York  Cavalry,  named  Ames, 
came  to  me.  He  was  a  sergeant  in  his  regiment 
and  came  in  his  full  uniform.  I  never  cared  to 
inquire  what  his  grievance  was.  The  account  he 
gave  me  of  the  distribution  of  troops  and  the  gaps 
in  the  picket  lines  coincided  with  what  I  knew  and 
tended  to  prepossess  me  in  his  favor.  But  my 
men  were  suspicious  of  his  good  faith  and  rather 
thought  that  he  had  been  sent  to  decoy  me  with 
a  plausible  story.  At  first  I  did  not  give  him  my 
full  confidence  but  accepted   him  on   probation. 

1 68 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  169 

Ames  stood  all  tests,  and  until  he  was  killed  I 
never  had  a  more  faithful  follower. 

Ames  had  come  out  from  his  camp  on  foot  and 
proposed  to  me  that  he  would  go  back  into  his 
camp  and  return  on  horseback,  if  I  would  accept 
him.  A  recruit,  Walter  Frankland,  had  just 
come  to  me,  but  he  was  not  mounted.  With  my 
approval  he  agreed  to  go  with  Ames  to  get  a  horse. 
They  trudged  on  foot  through  the  snow  —  twenty- 
five  miles  —  entered  the  camp  of  the  Fifth  New 
York  Cavalry  at  night,  unchallenged,  and  rode 
out  on  fine  horses. 

At  the  same  time,  with  a  number  of  men,  I 
started  on  a  raid  in  another  direction  and  had 
rather  a  ludicrous  adventure.  We  met  an  old 
country  doctor,  Doctor  Drake,  in  a  desolate  con- 
dition, walking  home  through  mud  and  snow. 
He  told  us  he  had  been  going  the  rounds,  visiting 
his  patients,  when  he  had  met  a  body  of  cavalry 
that  was  not  far  ahead  of  us.  They  had  robbed 
him  of  his  horse,  saddlebags,  and  medicine.  As 
the  blockade  had  made  medicine  scarce,  this 
was  a  severe  loss  to  the  community.  We  spurred 
on  to  overtake  the  raiders  and  intercepted  a  party 
that  had  stopped  at  a  house.  They  exceeded  us 
in  numbers,  but  they  were  more  intent  on  saving 
themselves   and    their   plunder   than  on  fighting. 


170  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

They  scampered  away,  with  us  close  behind 
them.  Soon  they  got  to  Horsepen  Run,  which  was 
booming  from  the  melting  snows,  and  the  fore- 
most man  plunged  into  the  stream.  He  got  a 
good  ducking  and  was  glad  to  get  back  a  prisoner. 
His  companions  did  not  try  to  swim  after  him  but 
preferred  to  surrender.  They  were  loaded  with 
silver  spoons  and  valuables  they  had  taken,  but 
the  chief  prize  was  old  Doctor  Drake's  saddle- 
bags, which  they  had  not  opened.  The  silver 
was  returned  to  the  owners,  and  the  prisoners  were 
sent  to  Richmond. 

When  we  got  back  to  Middleburg,  we  found 
Ames  and  Frankland  with  their  fine  horses.  I 
now  determined  to  give  Ames  one  more  trial  and 
so  took  him  with  me  on  a  raid  to  Fairfax.  But 
he  went  as  a  combatant  without  arms.  I  had 
found  out  that  there  was  a  picket  post  at  a  cer- 
tain crossroads  and  went  to  attack  it  in  a  rain  on 
a  dark  night,  when  there  was  snow  on  the  ground. 
As  only  a  raccoon  could  be  supposed  to  travel  on 
such  a  night,  I  knew  the  pickets  would  feel  safe 
and  would  be  sound  asleep,  so  that  a  single  shot 
would  create  a  panic.  We  stopped  to  inquire 
of  a  farmer  the  location  of  the  post.  He  had 
been  there  during  the  day  and  said  that  there 
were   ioo  men  who  slept  in  a  schoolhouse.     He 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  171 

asked  me  how  many  men  I  had,  and  I  replied, 
"Seventeen,  but  they  will  think  there  are  a  hun- 
dred." They  could  not  count  in  the  dark.  We 
made  no  attempt  to  flank  the  picket  to  prevent 
his  giving  the  alarm,  but  we  went  straight  down 
the  road.  One  of  the  men,  Joe  Nelson,  was  sent 
ahead  to  catch  the  vidette.  When  the  vidette 
saw  Joe,  he  fired  at  him  and  started  at  full  speed 
to  the  reserve ;  but  we  were  on  his  heels  and  got 
there  almost  as  soon  as  he  did.  The  yells  of  my 
men  resounded  through  the  pines,  and  the  Yankees 
all  fled  and  left  their  horses  hitched  to  the  trees. 
As  it  was  very  dark,  we  could  not  catch  many  of 
the  men,  but  we  got  all  their  horses.  My  at- 
tention was  attracted  to  Ames,  who  struck  a  man 
with  a  carbine  he  got  from  him  —  I  don't  remember 
why.  We  were  soon  back  on  the  pike  and  trotting 
towards  the  Blue  Ridge  with  the  prisoners  and 
horses.  When  it  was  daylight,  Wyndham  mounted 
his  squadrons  and  started  full  speed  after  us. 
After  going  twenty  miles,  he  returned  to  camp  with 
half  of  his  men  leading  broken-down  horses. 
Wyndham  was  soon  afterwards  relieved,  but 
not  before  we  had  raided  his  headquarters  and 
carried  off  his  staff,  his  horses,  and  his  uniform. 
I  now  determined  to  execute  my  scheme  to 
capture  both  General  Stoughton  and  Wyndham 


172  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

at  their  headquarters.  Ames,  about  whose  fidel- 
ity there  was  no  longer  any  question,  knew  where 
their  headquarters  were,  and  the  place  was  fa- 
miliar to  me  as  I  had  been  in  camp  there.  I  also 
knew,  both  from  Ames  and  the  prisoners,  where 
the  gaps  in  the  lines  were  at  night.  The  safety 
of  the  enterprise  lay  in  its  novelty ;  nothing  of 
the  kind  had  been  done  before. 

On  the  evening  of  March  8,  1863,  in  obedience 
to  orders,  twenty-nine  men  met  me  at  Dover, 
in  Loudoun  County.  None  knew  my  objective 
point,  but  I  told  Ames  after  we  started.  I  re- 
member that  I  got  dinner  that  day  with  Colonel 
Chancellor,  who  lived  near  Dover.  Just  as  I 
was  about  to  mount  my  horse,  as  I  was  leaving,  I 
said  to  him,  "I  shall  mount  the  stars  to-night  or 
sink  lower  than  plummet  ever  sounded."  I  did 
not  rise  as  high  as  the  stars,  but  I  did  not  sink. 
I  then  had  no  reputation  to  lose,  even  if  I  failed, 
and  I  remembered  the  motto,  "Adventures  to 
the  adventurous." 

The  weather  conditions  favored  my  success. 
There  was  a  melting  snow  on  the  ground,  a  mist, 
and,  about  dark,  a  drizzling  rain.  Our  starting 
point  was  about  twenty-five  miles  from  Fairfax 
Court  House.  It  was  pitch  dark  when  we  got 
near  the  cavalry  pickets  at  Chantilly  —  five  or 


.THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  173 

six  miles  from  the  Court  House.  At  Centreville, 
three  miles  away  on  the  Warrenton  pike  and 
seven  miles  from  the  Court  House,  were  several 
thousand  troops.  Our  problem  was  to  pass  be- 
tween them  and  Wyndham's  cavalry  without 
giving  the  alarm.  Ames  knew  where  there  was 
a  break  in  the  picket  lines  between  Chantilly  and 
Centreville,  and  he  led  us  through  this  without 
a  vidette  seeing  us.  After  passing  the  outpost 
the  chief  point  in  the  game  was  won.  I  think  no 
man  with  me,  except  Ames,  realized  that  we  were 
inside  the  enemy's  lines.  But  the  enemy  felt 
secure  and  was  as  ignorant  as  my  men.  The 
plan  had  been  to  reach  the  Court  House  by  mid- 
night so  as  to  get  out  of  the  lines  before  daybreak, 
but  the  column  got  broken  in  the  dark  and  the 
two  parts  travelled  around  in  a  circle  for  an  hour 
looking  for  each  other.  After  we  closed  up,  we 
started  off  and  struck  the  pike  between  Centre- 
ville and  the  Court  House.  But  we  turned  off 
into  the  woods  when  we  got  within  two  or  three 
miles  of  the  village,  as  Wyndham's  cavalry  camps 
were  on  the  pike.  We  entered  the  village  from 
the  direction  of  the  railroad  station.  There  were 
a  few  sentinels  about  the  town,  but  it  was  so 
dark  that  they  could  not  distinguish  us  from 
their  own   people.     Squads  were  detailed   to  go 


174  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

around  to  the  officers'  quarters  and  to  the  stables 
for  the  horses.  The  court-house  yard  was  the 
rendezvous  where  all  were  to  report.  As  our  great 
desire  was  to  capture  Wyndham,  Ames  was  sent 
with  a  party  to  the  house  in  which  he  knew  Wynd- 
ham had  his  quarters.  But  fortune  was  in  Wynd- 
ham's  favor  that  time,  for  that  evening  he  had 
gone  to  Washington  by  train.  But  Ames  got  his 
two  staff  officers,  his  horses,  and  his  uniform. 
One  of  the  officers,  Captain  Barker,  had  been 
Ames's  captain.  Ames  brought  him  to  me  and 
seemed  to  take  great  pride  in  introducing  him 
to  me  as  his  former  captain. 

When  the  squads  were  starting  around  to  gather 
prisoners  and  horses,  Joe  Nelson  brought  me  a 
soldier  who  said  he  was  a  guard  at  General  Stough- 
ton's  headquarters.  Joe  had  also  pulled  the 
telegraph  operator  out  of  his  tent ;  the  wires  had 
been  cut.  With  five  or  six  men  I  rode  to  the 
house,  now  the  Episcopal  rectory,  where  the 
commanding  general  was.  We  dismounted  and 
knocked  loudly  at  the  door.  Soon  a  window  above 
was  opened,  and  some  one  asked  who  was  there. 
I  answered,  "  Fifth  New  York  Cavalry  with  a 
dispatch  for  General  Stoughton."  The  door  was 
opened  and  a  staff  officer,  Lieutenant  Prentiss, 
was  before  me.     I   took  hold   of  his  nightshirt, 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  175 

whispered  my  name  in  his  ear,  and  told  him  to 
take  me  to  General  Stoughton's  room.  Resistance 
was  useless,  and  he  obeyed.  A  light  was  quickly 
struck,  and  on  the  bed  we  saw  the  general  sleeping 
as  soundly  as  the  Turk  when  Marco  Bozzaris 
waked  him  up.  There  was  no  time  for  ceremony, 
so  I  drew  up  the  bedclothes,  pulled  up  the  gen- 
eral's shirt,  and  gave  him  a  spank  on  his  bare 
back,  and  told  him  to  get  up.  As  his  staff  officer 
was  standing  by  me,  Stoughton  did  not  realize 
the  situation  and  thought  that  somebody  was 
taking  a  rude  familiarity  with  him.  He  asked 
in  an  indignant  tone  what  all  this  meant.  I  told 
him  that  he  was  a  prisoner,  and  that  he  must 
get  up  quickly  and  dress. 

I  then  asked  him  if  he  had  ever  heard  of 
"Mosby",  and  he  said  he  had. 

"I  am  Mosby,"  I  said.  "Stuart's  cavalry  has 
possession  of  the  Court  House ;  be  quick  and 
dress." 

He  then  asked  whether  Fitz  Lee  was  there.  I 
said  he  was,  and  he  asked  me  to  take  him  to  Fitz 
Lee  —  they  had  been  together  at  West  Point. 
Two  days  afterwards  I  did  deliver  him  to  Fitz 
Lee  at  Culpeper  Court  House.  My  motive  in 
trying  to  deceive  Stoughton  was  to  deprive  him 
of  all  hope  of  escape  and  to  induce  him  to  dress 


176  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

quickly.  We  were  in  a  critical  situation,  sur- 
rounded by  the  camps  of  several  thousand  troops 
with  several  hundred  in  the  town.  If  there  had 
been  any  concert  between  them,  they  could 
easily  have  driven  us  out ;  but  not  a  shot  was 
fired  although  we  stayed  there  over  an  hour.  As 
soon  as  it  was  known  that  we  were  there,  each 
man  hid  and  took  care  of  himself.  Stoughton  had 
the  reputation  of  being  a  brave  soldier,  but  a  fop. 
He  dressed  before  a  looking-glass  as  carefully  as 
Sardanapalus  did  when  he  went  into  battle.  He 
forgot  his  watch  and  left  it  on  the  bureau,  but  one 
of  my  men,  Frank  Williams,  took  it  and  gave  it 
to  him.  Two  men  1  ad  been  left  to  guard  our 
horses  when  we  went  into  the  house.  There 
were  several  tents  for  couriers  in  the  yard,  and 
Stoughton's  horses  and  couriers  were  ready  to 
go  with  us,  when  we  came  out  with  the  general 
and  his  staff. 

When  we  reached  the  rendezvous  at  the  court- 
yard, I  found  all  the  squads  waiting  for  us  with 
their  prisoners  and  horses.  There  were  three 
times  as  many  prisoners  as  my  men,  and  each 
was  mounted  and  leading  a  horse.  To  deceive 
the  enemy  and  baffle  pursuit,  the  cavalcade 
started  off  in  one  direction  and,  soon  after  it  got 
out  of  town,  turned  in  another.     We  flanked  the 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  177 

cavalry  camps,  and  were  soon  on  the  pike  between 
them  and  Centreville.  As  there  were  several 
thousand  troops  in  that  town,  it  was  not  thought 
possible  that  we  would  go  that  way  to  get  out  of 
the  lines,  so  the  cavalry,  when  it  started  in  pur- 
suit, went  in  an  opposite  direction.  Lieutenant 
Prentiss  and  a  good  many  prisoners  who  started 
with  us  escaped  in  the  dark,  and  we  lost  a  great 
many  of  the  horses. 

A  ludicrous  incident  occurred  when  we  were 
leaving  Fairfax.  A  window  was  raised,  and  a 
voice  inquired,  in  an  authoritative  tone,  what 
that  cavalry  was  doing  in  the  street.  He  was 
answered  by  a  loud  laugh  from  my  men,  which 
was  notice  to  him  that  we  were  not  his  friends. 
I  ordered  several  men  to  dismount  and  capture 
him.  They  burst  through  the  front  door,  but  the 
man's  wife  met  them  in  the  hall  and  held  her 
ground  like  a  lioness  to  give  her  husband  time  to 
escape.  He  was  Colonel  Johnstone,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  cavalry  brigade  during  Wynd- 
ham's  absence.  He  got  out  through  the  back  door 
in  his  night  clothes  and  barefooted,  and  hid  in 
the  garden.  He  spent  some  time  there,  as  he  did 
not  know  when  we  left,  and  his  wife  could  not 
find  him. 

Our  safety  depended  on  our  getting  out  of  the 


178  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

Union  lines  before  daybreak.  We  struck  the 
pike  about  four  miles  from  Centreville ;  the  dan- 
ger I  then  apprehended  was  pursuit  by  the  cav- 
alry, which  was  in  camp  behind  us.  When  we 
got  near  the  pike,  I  halted  the  column  to  close 
up.  Some  of  my  men  were  riding  in  the  rear,  and 
some  on  the  flanks  to  prevent  the  prisoners  from 
escaping.  I  left  a  sergeant,  Hunter,  in  command 
and  rode  forward  to  reconnoitre.  As  no  enemy 
was  in  front,  I  called  to  Hunter  to  come  on  and 
directed  him  to  go  forward  at  a  trot  and  to  hold 
Stoughton's  bridle  reins  under  all  circumstances. 
Stoughton  no  doubt  appreciated  my  interest  in 
him. 

With  Joe  Nelson  I  remained  some  distance 
behind.  We  stopped  frequently  to  listen  for  the 
hoofbeats  of  cavalry  in  pursuit,  but  no  sounds 
could  be  heard  save  the  hooting  of  owls.  My 
heart  beat  higher  with  hope  every  minute ;  it 
was  the  crisis  of  my  fortunes. 

Soon  the  camp  fires  on  the  heights  around 
Centreville  were  in  sight ;  my  plan  was  to  flank 
the  position  and  pass  between  that  place  and  the 
camps  at  Chantilly.  But  we  soon  saw  that 
Hunter  had  halted,  and  I  galloped  forward  to 
find  out  the  cause.  I  saw  a  fire  on  the  side  of 
the  road  about  a  hundred  yards  ahead  of  us  — 


THE   RAID  ON   FAIRFAX  179 

evidently  a  picket  post.  So  I  rode  forward  to 
reconnoitre,  but  nobody  was  by  the  fire,  and 
the  picket  was  gone.  We  were  now  half  a  mile 
from  Centreville,  and  the  dawn  was  just  breaking. 
It  had  been  the  practice  to  place  a  picket  on  our 
road  every  evening  and  withdraw  it  early  in  the 
morning.  The  officer  in  charge  concluded  that, 
as  it  was  near  daylight,  there  was  no  danger  in 
the  air,  and  he  had  returned  to  camp  and  left  the 
fire  burning.  That  was  the  very  thing  I  wanted 
him  to  do.  I  called  Hunter  to  come  on,  and 
we  passed  the  picket  fire  and  then  turned  off  to 
go  around  the  forts  at  Centreville.  I  rode  some 
distance  ahead  of  the  column.  The  camps  were 
quiet ;  there  was  no  sign  of  alarm  ;  the  telegraph 
wires  had  been  cut,  and  no  news  had  come  about 
our  exploit  at  the  Court  House.  We  could  see  the 
cannon  bristling  through  the  redoubts  and  hear  the 
sentinel  on  the  parapet  call  to  us  to  halt.  But  no 
attention  was  paid  to  him,  and  he  did  not  fire  to 
give  the  alarm.  No  doubt  he  thought  that  we  were 
a  body  of  their  own  cavalry  going  out  on  a  scout. 
But  soon  there  was  a  shot  behind  me  and,  turn- 
ing around,  I  saw  Captain  Barker  dashing  to- 
wards a  redoubt  and  Jake,  the  Hungarian,  close 
behind  him  and  about  to  give  him  another  shot, 
when  Barker's  horse  tumbled  and  fell  on  him  in 


180  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

a  ditch.  We  soon  got  them  out  and  moved  on. 
All  this  happened  in  sight  of  the  sentinels  and  in 
gunshot  of  their  camps. 

After  we  had  passed  the  forts  and  reached  Cub 
Run,  a  new  danger  was  before  us.  The  stream 
was  swift  and  booming  from  the  melting  snow, 
and  our  choice  was  to  swim,  or  to  turn  back. 
In  full  view  behind  us  were  the  white  tents  of  the 
enemy  and  the  forts,  and  we  were  within  can- 
non range.  Without  halting  a  moment,  I  plunged 
into  the  stream,  and  my  horse  swam  to  the  other 
bank.  Stoughton  followed  and  was  next  to  me. 
As  he  came  up  the  bank,  shivering  from  his  cold 
morning  bath,  he  said,  "Captain,  this  is  the  first 
rough  treatment  I  have  to  complain  of." 

Fortunately  not  a  man  or  a  horse  was  lost. 
When  all  were  over,  I  knew  there  was  no  danger  be- 
hind us,  and  that  we  were  as  safe  as  Tarn  O'Shanter 
thought  he  would  be  if  he  crossed  the  bridge  of 
Doon  ahead  of  the  witches.  I  now  left  Hunter 
in  charge  of  the  column,  and  with  one  of  my  men, 
George  Slater,  galloped  on  to  see  what  was  ahead 
of  us.  I  thought  a  force  might  have  been  sent  to 
intercept  us  on  the  pike  we  had  left  that  runs 
through  Centreville.  I  did  not  know  that  Colonel 
Johnstone,  with  his  cavalry,  had  gone  in  the 
opposite  direction. 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  181 

We  crossed  Bull  Run  at  Sudley  Ford  and  were 
soon  on  the  historic  battlefield.  From  the  heights 
of  Groveton  we  could  see  that  the  road  was  clear 
to  Centreville,  and  that  there  was  no  pursuit. 
Hunter  soon  appeared  in  sight.  The  sun  had 
just  risen,  and  in  the  rapture  of  the  moment  I 
said  to  Slater,  "George,  that  is  the  sun  of  Aus- 
terlitz !"  I  knew  that  I  had  drawn  a  prize  in  the 
lottery  of  life,  and  my  emotion  was  natural  and 
should  be  pardoned. 

I  could  not  but  feel  deep  pity  for  Stoughton 
when  he  looked  back  at  Centreville  and  saw  that 
there  was  no  chance  of  his  rescue.  Without  any 
fault  of  his  own,  Stoughton's  career  as  a  soldier 
was  blasted. 

There  is  an  anecdote  told  of  Mr.  Lincoln  that, 
when  it  was  reported  to  him  that  Stoughton 
had  been  captured,  he  remarked,  with  char- 
acteristic humor,  that  he  did  not  mind  so  much 
the  loss  of  a  general  —  for  he  could  make  another 
in  five  minutes  —  but  he  hated  to  lose  the  horses. 

Slater  and  I  remained  for  some  time  behind  as 
a  rear  guard  and  overtook  Hunter,  who  had  gone 
on  in  command,  at  Warrenton.  We  found  that 
the  whole  population  had  turned  out  and  were 
giving  my  men  an  ovation.  Stoughton  and  the 
officers  had  breakfast  with  a  citizen  named  Beck- 


1 82  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

ham.  The  general  had  been  a  classmate  at  West 
Point  with  Beckham's  son,  now  a  Confederate 
artillery  officer,  and  had  spent  a  vacation  with 
him  at  his  home.  Stoughton  now  renewed  his 
acquaintance  with  his  family. 

We  soon  remounted  and  moved  on  south. 
After  crossing  the  Rappahannock,  the  men  and 
prisoners  were  put  in  charge  of  Dick  Moran  with 
orders  to  meet  me  near  Culpeper  Court  House  the 
next  morning,  while,  with  Hunter  and  the  officers 
on  parole,  I  went  on  in  advance  and  spent  the 
night  near  Brandy.  As  I  had  been  in  the  saddle 
for  thirty-six  hours,  I  retired  to  rest  as  soon  as 
we  had  eaten  supper.  The  next  morning  there 
was  a  cold  rain,  but  after  breakfast  we  started 
for  General  Fitz  Lee's  headquarters. 

When  we  arrived  at  our  destination,  we  hitched 
our  horses  in  the  front  yard  and  went  into  the 
house,  where  we  found  Fitz  Lee  writing  at  a  table 
before  a  log  fire.  We  were  cold  and  wet.  In  the 
First  Virginia  Cavalry,  Fitz  Lee  and  I  had  been 
well  acquainted.  He  was  very  polite  to  his  old 
classmate  and  to  the  officers,  when  I  introduced 
them,  but  he  treated  me  with  indifference,  did  not 
ask  me  to  take  a  seat  by  the  fire,  nor  seem  im- 
pressed by  what  I  had  done. 

As  a  matter  of  historical  fact,  it  is  well  known 


THE   RAID  ON   FAIRFAX  183 

that  this  episode  created  a  sensation  in  both  armies, 
but  the  reception  I  received  convinced  me  that 
I  was  not  a  welcome  person  at  those  headquarters. 
So,  bidding  the  prisoners  good-by  and  bowing  to 
Fitz  Lee,  Hunter  and  I  rode  off  in  the  rain  to  the 
telegraph  office  to  send  a  report  to  Stuart,  who 
had  his  headquarters  at  Fredericksburg.  The 
operator  told  me  that  Stuart  was  on  his  way  to 
Culpeper  and  would  arrive  on  the  train  that 
evening,  but  he  sent  the  dispatch  and  it  was  de- 
livered to  Stuart.  I  met  him  at  the  depot  and 
can  never  forget  the  joy  his  generous  heart 
showed  when  he  met  me.  That  was  a  sufficient 
reward.  Major  John  Pelham  was  with  Stuart. 
This  was  the  last  time  I  ever  saw  Pelham,  for  he 
was  killed  a  week  afterwards.  As  we  walked  off, 
Stuart  handed  rne  a  commission  as  captain  from 
Governor  John  Letcher.  It  gave  me  rank  with 
the  Virginia  troops,  but,  as  there  were  no  such 
troops,  it  was  a  blank  form,  and  I  regarded  it  as 
a  mockery.  Stuart  remarked  that  he  thought 
the  Confederate  War  Department  would  recog- 
nize it.  I  said,  in  rather  an  abrupt  and  indignant 
tone,  "I  want  no  recognition."  I  meant  official 
recognition.  I  did  not  affect  to  be  indifferent  to 
public  praise.  Such  a  man  is  either  too  good  or 
too  bad  to  live  in  this  world.     Stuart  published 


1 84  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

a  general  order  announcing  the  capture  of  Stough- 
ton  and  had  it  printed,  giving  me  fifty  copies. 
That  satisfied  me,  and  I  soon  returned  to  my  field 
of  operations  and  again  began  war  on  the  Potomac. 

Headquarters  Cavalry   Division, 

March  12,  1863. 
General  Orders. 

Captain  John  S.  Mosby  has  for  a  long  time  attracted 
the  attention  of  his  generals  by  his  boldness,  skill,  and 
success,  so  signally  displayed  in  his  numerous  forays 
upon  the  invaders  of  his  native  soil. 

None  know  his  daring  enterprise  and  dashing  hero- 
ism better  than  those  foul  invaders,  those  strangers 
themselves  to  such  noble  traits. 

His  last  brilliant  exploit  —  the  capture  of  Brigadier- 
General  Stoughton,  U.  S.  A.,  two  captains,  and  thirty 
other  prisoners,  together  with  their  arms,  equipments, 
and  fifty-eight  horses  —  justifies  this  recognition  in 
General  Orders.  This  feat,  unparalleled  in  the  war, 
was  performed  in  the  midst  of  the  enemy's  troops,  at 
Fairfax  Court  House,   without  loss  or  injury. 

The  gallant  band  of  Captain  Mosby  shares  his 
glory,  as  they  did  the  danger  of  this  enterprise,  and  are 
worthy  of  such  a  leader. 

J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

In  a  few  days  Fitz  Lee  wrote  me  that  the  detail 
of  men  I  had  from  his  brigade  must  return  to  their 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  185 

regiment.  This  attempt  to  deprive  me  of  a  com- 
mand met  with  no  favor  from  Stuart.  I  sent  him 
Fitz  Lee's  letter,  and  he  issued  an  order  for  them 
to  stay  until  he  recalled  them.  When  the  armies 
began  to  move  in  April,  the  men  went  back,  but 
a  considerable  number  of  recruits  had  joined  me, 
and  what  the  enemy  called  my  "depredations" 
continued.  In  the  published  records  of  the  war 
is  the  following  letter  from  General  Robert  E. 
Lee  to  President  Davis,  informing  him  of  another 
success  I  had  soon  after  the  capture  of  Stoughton : 

Headquarters,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 

March  21,  1863. 

You  will,  I  know,  be  gratified  to  learn  by  the  en- 
closed despatch  that  the  appointment  conferred  a 
few  days  since  on  Captain  John  S.  Mosby  was  not 
unworthily  bestowed.  The  point  where  he  struck  the 
enemy  is  north  of  Fairfax  Court-House,  near  the 
Potomac,  and  far  within  the  lines  of  the  enemy.  I  wish 
I  could  receive  his  appointment  (as  major)  or  some  offi- 
cial notification  of  it,  that  I  might  announce  it  to  him. 

R.  E.  Lee,  General. 

A  dispatch  from  Lieutenant  O'Connor,  Provost- 
Marshal  at  Fairfax  Court  House,  sent  to  Washing- 
ton an  hour  after  we  left  the  village,  confirms  the 
account  I  have  given  of  our  visit.     He  said  : 


1 86  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

Captain  Mosby,  with  his  command,  entered  this 
town  this  morning  at  2  a.m.  They  captured  my 
patrols,  horses,  etc.  They  took  Brigadier-General 
Stoughton  and  horses,  and  all  his  men  detached  from 
his  brigade.  They  took  every  horse  that  could  be 
found,  public  or  private ;  and  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  post,  Colonel  Johnstone,  of  the  Fifth  New  York 
Cavalry,  made  his  escape  from  them  in  a  nude  state 
by  accident.  They  searched  for  me  in  every  direction, 
but  being  on  the  Vienna  road  visiting  outposts,  I  made 
my  escape. 

And  in  a  report  the  next  day  to  Colonel  Wynd- 
ham,  O'Connor  said : 

On  the  night  of  the  8th  instant,  say  about  two  or 
half  past  two  a.m.,  Captain  Mosby  with  his  command 
entered  the  village  by  an  easterly  direction.  They 
proceeded  to  Colonel  Wyndham's  headquarters  and 
took  all  his  horses  and  movable  property  with  them. 
In  the  meantime  another  party  of  them  entered  the 
residence  of  Colonel  Johnstone  and  searched  the  house 
for  him.  He  had  on  their  entering  the  town  heard  of 
their  movements  and  believing  them  to  be  the  patrol, 
went  out  to  halt  them,  but  soon  found  out  his  mis- 
take. He  then  entered  the  house  again  —  he  being 
in  a  nude  state  —  and  got  out  backwards  —  they  in 
hot  pursuit  of  him.  In  the  meantime  others  were 
dispatched  to  all  quarters  where  officers  were  lodged, 
taking  them  out  of  their  beds,  together  with  the  tele- 
graph operator  and   assistant. 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  187 

Stoughton  was  soon  exchanged  but  did  not 
return  to  the  army.  The  circumstances  of  his 
capture  wrecked  him  as  a  soldier.  He  was  ac- 
cused of  negligence  in  allowing  the  gap  in  the 
picket  line  through  which  we  entered.  The 
commander  of  the  cavalry  pickets,  Colonel  Wynd- 
ham,  was  responsible  for  that,  and  there  is  a  letter 
in  the  War  Records  from  Stoughton  to  Wynd- 
ham,  calling  his  attention  to  it.  I  allowed  Stough- 
ton to  write  a  letter,  which  I  sent  through  a  citi- 
zen, to  Wyndham,  in  which  he  reproached  him  for 
the  management  of  his  outposts.  But  Wynd- 
ham ought  not  to  be  blamed,  because  he  did  not 
anticipate  an  event  that  had  no  precedent.  He 
did  exercise  reasonable  vigilance.  In  this  life 
we  can  only  prepare  for  what  is  probable,  not 
for  every  contingency. 

Colonel  Johnstone  lost  his  clothes  and  lay  hid- 
den for  some  time  before  he  heard  we  were  gone. 
O'Connor  said  he  appeared  in  the  state  of  Adam 
before  the  fall.  But  he  could  not  survive  the 
ridicule  he  incurred  by  it  and  disappeared. 

Near  Piedmont,  Va.,  March  18,  1863. 

General : 

Yesterday  I  attacked  a  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry 
at  Herndon  Station,   in   Fairfax  County,   completely 


188  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

routing  them.  I  brought  off  twenty-five  prisoners 
—  a  major,  one  captain,  two  lieutenants,  and  twenty- 
one  men,  all  their  arms,  twenty-six  horses,  and  equip- 
ments. One,  severely  wounded,  was  left  on  the 
ground.  The  enemy  pursued  me  in  force,  but  were 
checked  by  my  rear-guard  and  gave  up  the  pursuit. 
My  loss  was  nothing. 

The  enemy  have  moved  their  cavalry  from  German- 
town  back  of  Fairfax  Court  House  on  the  Alexandria 
pike. 

In  this  affair  my  officers  and  men  behaved  splendidly. 

(Signed)     Jno.  S.  Mosby. 
(Indorsement) 
Maj.-Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart. 

Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 

March  21,  1863. 

Respectfully  forwarded  for  the  information  of  the 
department  and  as  evidence  of  the  merit  and  continued 
success  of  Captain  Mosby. 

R.  E.  Lee, 
General. 

[This  Dranesville  affair  led  to  the  following 
interesting  correspondence  after  the  war.  It  is 
of  special  value  in  illustrating  the  feelings  of  his 
enemies  —  the  men  who  actually  fought  with 
him  —  towards  Mosby. 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  189 

Washington,  Vt.,  December  19,  1910. 

Col.  John  S.  Mosby, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
Dear  Colonel  and  Friend  : 

You  will  be  surprised  to  receive  a  letter  from  me, 
one  you  know  so  little,  but  will  remember.  In  notic- 
ing to-day  the  item  of  the  enclosed  clipping  [Mosby's 
comment  on  President  Taft's  appointment  of  a  Con- 
federate soldier  (White)  to  be  Chief  Justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court]  I  could  not  resist  the  privilege  of 
writing  to  you,  as  I  believe  now  I  am  the  only  surviving 
one  of  the  four  officers  —  Major  Wells,  Capt.  Scho- 
field,  Lieut.  Watson,  and  myself  —  you  captured  at 
Herndon  Station,  near  Dranesville,  Va.,  St.  Patrick's 
day,  March  17,  1863,  and  with  us  the  picket  post  of 
twenty-one  men.  Your  treatment  and  [that  of] 
your  men  to  us  on  that  occasion  has  always  been 
gladly  remembered  by  us  all  —  in  every  respect  cour- 
teous. And  you  kindly  gave  us  our  horses  to  ride 
from  Upperville  to  Culpeper  Court  House,  which  was 
an  act  of  the  highest  type  of  a  man,  and  should  bury 
deep  forever  the  name  of  a  "guerrilla"  and  substitute 
"to  picket  line  a  bad  disturber."  .  .  . 

Most  sincerely  and  cordially  yours, 

Lieut.  P.  C.  J.  Cheney. 

Burlington,  Vt.,  December  28,  1910. 
Dear  Col.  Mosby : 

The  enclosed  letter  from  Lieut.  P.  C.  J.  Cheney,  of 
Washington,  Vt.,  explains  itself. 


190  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

During  the  war  for  the  Union  he  was  a  first  lieu- 
tenant in  the  First  Vermont  Cavalry,  and  was  cap- 
tured by  you  at  Herndon  Station  on  the  17th  of  March, 
1863.  Lieut.  Cheney  was  one  of  the  bravest  and 
best  officers  in  the  regiment,  and  was  dangerously 
wounded  in  the  charge  made  by  the  Company  in  front 
of  Round  Top  (Gettysburg)  on  the  afternoon  of  July  3, 
1863. 

...  I  had  the  pleasure  of  meeting  you  at  the 
inauguration  of  President  McKinley,  at  which  time 
I  was  adjutant  of  Vermont,  and  presented  you  to  Hon. 
Josiah  Grout,  then  Governor  of  this  state,  who  at  the 
Miskel  Farm  fight  between  the  First  Vermont  Cavalry 
and  yourself  was  most  dangerously  wounded.  .  .  . 
You  were  kind  enough  to  say  that  the  First  Vermont 
Cavalry  was  one  of  the  very  best  regiments  you  had 
met  in  action.  .  .  . 

Yours  very  truly, 

T.  S.  Peck. 

General  Stahel  described  the  Miskel  Farm  af- 
fair in  his  report  of  April  2,  1863,  as  follows: 

It  appears  that  on  the  evening  of  the  31st  ultimo, 
Major  Taggart,  at  Union  Church  two  miles  above 
Peach  Grove,  received  information  that  Mosby,  with 
about  sixty-five  men,  was  near  Dranesville.  He 
immediately  dispatched  Capt.  Flint,  with  150  men  of 
the  First  Vermont,  to  rout  or  capture  Mosby  and  his 
force.  .  .  .  Turning  to  the  right  they  followed  up  the 
Broad  Run  to  a  place  marked  J.  Meskel  [sic].     Here 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  191 

at  a  house,  they  came  upon  Mosby,  who  was  com- 
pletely surprised  and  wholly  unprepared  for  an  attack 
from  our  forces.  Had  a  proper  disposition  been  made 
of  our  troops,  Mosby  could  not,  by  any  possible  means, 
have  escaped.  It  seems  that  around  this  house  was 
a  high  board  fence  and  stone  wall,  between  which  and 
the  road  was  also  another  fence  and  ordinary  farm 
gate.  Capt.  Flint  took  his  men  through  the  gate, 
and,  at  a  distance  from  the  house,  fired  a  volley  at 
Mosby  and  his  men,  who  were  assembled  about  the 
house,  —  doing  but  slight  damage  to  them.  He  then 
ordered  a  sabre  charge,  which  was  also  ineffective, 
on  account  of  the  fence  which  intervened.  Mosby 
waited  until  the  men  were  checked  by  the  fence,  and 
then  opened  the  gate  of  the  barnyard,  where  his  men 
were  collected,  saddling  and  bridling  their  horses, 
and  opened  fire  upon  them,  killing  and  wounding 
several.  The  men  became  panic-stricken,  and  fled 
precipitately  through  this  gate,  through  which  to 
make  their  escape.  The  opening  was  small ;  they  got 
wedged  together,  and  a  fearful  confusion  followed ; 
while  Mosby's  men  followed  them  up,  and  poured 
into  the  crowd  a  severe  fire.  Here,  while  endeavoring 
to  rally  his  men,  Capt.  Flint  was  killed,  and  Lieut. 
Grout,  of  the  same  Company,  mortally  wounded  (will 
probably  die  to-day). 

Mosby,  who  had  not  had  time  to  mount  his  horse, 
personally  threw  open  the  barnyard  gate  and 
ordered  his  men  to  charge  through  it,  which  they 
did  with  a  terrific  yell.] 


192  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

Headquarters  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 

March  23,  1863. 
Capt.  J.  S.  Mosby, 
Captain : 

You  will  perceive  from  the  copy  of  the  order  here- 
with enclosed  that  the  President  has  appointed  you 
captain  of  partisan  rangers.  The  general  commanding 
directs  me  to  say  that  it  is  desired  that  you  proceed 
at  once  to  organize  your  company,  with  the  under- 
standing that  it  is  to  be  placed  on  a  footing  with  all 
the  troops  of  the  line,  and  to  be  mustered  uncondi- 
tionally in  the  Confederate  service  for  and  during  the 
war.  Though  you  are  to  be  its  captain,  the  men  will 
have  the  privilege  of  electing  the  lieutenants  so  soon 
as  its  members  reach  the  legal  standard.  You  will 
report  your  progress  from  time  to  time,  and  when 
the  requisite  number  of  men  are  enrolled,  an  officer 
will  be  designated  to  muster  the  company  into  the 
service. 

(Signed)     W.  W.  Taylor,  A.  A.  G. 

[Mosby's  report  to  General  Stuart] 

Fauquier  County,  Va.,  April  7,  1863. 
General : 

I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  of 
the  operations  of  the  cavalry  since  rendering  my  last 
report.  On  Monday,  March  16,  I  proceeded  down  the 
Little  River  pike  to  capture  two  outposts  of  the 
enemy,   each  numbering  60  or  70  men.     I   did  not 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  193 

succeed  in  gaining  their  rear  as  I  had  expected,  and 
only  captured  4  or  5  videttes.  It  being  late  in  the 
evening,  and  our  horses  very  much  jaded,  I  concluded 
to  return.  I  had  gone  not  over  a  mile  back  when  we 
saw  a  large  body  of  enemy's  cavalry,  which,  according 
to  their  own  reports,  numbered  200  men,  rapidly 
pursuing.  I  feigned  a  retreat,  desiring  to  draw  them 
off  from  their  camps.  At  a  point  where  the  enemy 
had  blockaded  the  road  with  fallen  trees,  I  formed 
to  receive  them,  for  with  my  knowledge  of  the  Yankee 
character  I  knew  they  would  imagine  themselves  fallen 
into  an  ambuscade.  When  they  had  come  within  100 
yards  of  me  I  ordered  a  charge,  to  which  my  men  re- 
sponded with  a  vim  that  swept  everything  before  them. 
The  Yankees  broke  when  we  got  in  75  yards  of  them ; 
and  it  was  more  of  a  chase  than  a  fight  for  4  or  5  miles. 
We  killed  5,  wounded  a  considerable  number,  and 
brought  off  1  lieutenant  and  35  men  prisoners.  I  did 
not  have  over  50  men  with  me,  some  having  gone  back 
with  the  prisoners  and  others  having  gone  on  ahead, 
when  we  started  back,  not  anticipating  any  pursuit. 
On  Monday,  March  31,  I  went  down  in  the  direction 
of  Dranesville  to  capture  several  strong  outposts  in 
the  vicinity  of  that  place.  On  reaching  there  I  dis- 
covered that  they  had  fallen  back  about  10  miles  down 
the  Alexandria  pike.  I  then  returned  6  or  8  miles 
back  and  stopped  about  10  o'clock  at  night  at  a  point 
about  2  miles  from  the  pike.  Early  the  next  morning 
one  of  my  men,  whom  I  had  left  over  on  the  Leesburg 
pike,  came  dashing  in,  and  announced  the  rapid  ap- 
proach of  the  enemy.     But  he  had  scarcely  given  us 


194  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

the  information  when  the  enemy  appeared  a  few  hun- 
dred yards  off,  coming  up  at  a  gallop.  At  this  time 
our  horses  were  eating ;  all  had  their  bridles  off,  and 
some  even  their  saddles  —  they  were  all  tied  in  a 
barnyard. 

Throwing  open  the  gate  I  ordered  a  counter-charge, 
to  which  my  men  promptly  responded.  The  Yankees 
never  dreaming  of  our  assuming  the  offensive,  terrified 
at  the  yells  of  the  men  as  they  dashed  on,  broke 
and  fled  in  every  direction.  We  drove  them  in  con- 
fusion seven  or  eight  miles  down  the  pike.  We  left 
on  the  field  nine  of  them  killed  —  among  them  a  cap- 
tain and  lieutenant  —  and  about  fifteen  too  badly 
wounded  for  removal ;  in  this  lot  two  lieutenants. 
We  brought  off  82  prisoners,  many  of  these  also 
wounded.  I  have  since  visited  the  scene  of  the  fight. 
The  enemy  sent  up  a  flag  of  truce  for  their  dead  and 
wounded,  but  many  of  them  being  severely  wounded, 
they  established  a  hospital  on  the  ground.  The 
surgeon  who  attended  them  informs  me  that  a  great 
number  of  those  who  escaped  were  wounded.  The 
force  of  the  enemy  was  six  companies  of  the  First  Ver- 
mont Cavalry,  one  of  their  oldest  and  best  regiments, 
and  the  prisoners  inform  me  that  they  had  every  avail- 
able man  with  them.  There  were  certainly  not  less 
than  200  ;  the  prisoners  say  it  was  more  than  that.  I 
had  about  65  men  in  this  affair.  In  addition  to  the 
prisoners,  we  took  all  their  arms  and  about  100  horses 
and  equipments.  Privates  Hart,  Hurst,  Keyes,  and 
Davis  were  wounded.  The  latter  has  since  died. 
Both  on  this  and  several  other  occasions  they  have 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  195 

borne  themselves  with  conspicuous  gallantry.  In 
addition  to  those  mentioned  above  I  desire  to  place  on 
record  the  names  of  several  others,  whose  promptitude 
and  boldness  in  closing  in  with  the  enemy  contributed 
much  to  the  success  of  the  fight.  They  are  Lieutenant 
Chapman  (late  of  Dixie  Artillery),  Sergt.  Hunter  and 
Privates  Wellington  and  Harry  Hatcher,  Turner, 
Wild,  Sowers,  Ames,  and  Sibert.  There  are  many 
others,  I  have  no  doubt,  deserving  of  honorable  men- 
tion, but  the  above  are  only  those  who  came  under  my 
personal  observation.  I  confess  that  on  this  occasion 
I  had  not  taken  sufficient  precautions  to  guard  against 
surprise.  It  was  10  at  night  when  I  reached  the  place 
where  the  fight  came  off  on  the  succeeding  day.  We 
had  ridden  through  snow  and  mud  upwards  of  40  miles, 
and  both  men  and  horses  were  nearly  broken  down ; 
besides,  the  enemy  had  fallen  back  a  distance  of  about 
18  miles. 

(Signed)     John  S.  Mosby, 
Captain  Commanding. 

Maj.-Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart. 

[Indorsements] 

Headquarters  Cavalry  Division, 

April  11,  1863. 

Respectfully  forwarded,  as  in  perfect  keeping  with 

his  other  brilliant  achievements.     Recommended   for 

promotion. 

J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 

Major-General. 


196  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

Headquarters  Army  Northern  Virginia, 

April  13,  1863. 

Respectfully  forwarded  for  the  information  of  the 
Department.     Telegraphic  reports  already  sent  in. 

R.  E.  Lee, 
General. 

April  22,  1863. 
Adjutant-General : 

Nominate  as  major  if  it  has  not  already  been  done. 

J.  A.  S.  (Seddon). 

[Report  of  General  Stahel] 

Fairfax  C.  H.,  May  5,  1863. 

.  .  .  On  the  third  of  May,  between  8  and  9  a.m., 
Mosby  with  his  band  of  guerrillas,  together  with  a 
portion  of  the  Black  Horse  Cavalry  and  a  portion  of 
a  North  Carolina  regiment,  came  suddenly  through 
the  woods  upon  50  of  our  men  of  the  First  Virginia 
Cavalry,  who  were  in  camp  feeding  their  horses,  just 
having  returned  from  a  scout,  the  remainder  of  that 
regiment  being  out  in  a  different  direction  to  scout  the 
country  on  the  right  of  the  Warrenton  and  Alexandria 
Railroad  and  toward  the  Rappahannock. 

Our  men  being  surprised  and  completely  surrounded, 
rallied  in  a  house  close  at  hand  and  where  a  sharp 
fight  ensued.  Our  men  defended  themselves  as  long 
as  their  ammunition  lasted,  notwithstanding  the  rebels 
built  a  large  fire  about  the  house,  of  hay  and  straw 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  197 

and  brushwood.  The  flames  reached  the  house  and 
their  ammunition  being  entirely  expended  they  were 
obliged  to  surrender.  At  this  juncture  a  portion  of 
the  Fifth  Regiment  New  York  Cavalry  which  was 
posted  in  the  rear  some  distance  from  the  First  Vir- 
ginia Cavalry  came  to  their  rescue,  making  a  brilliant 
charge,  which  resulted  in  the  complete  annihilation  of 
Mosby's  command  and  recaptured  our  men  and  prop- 
erty. Our  men  pursued  the  rebels  in  every  direction, 
killing  and  wounding  a  large  number,  and  had  our 
horses  been  in  better  condition  and  not  tired  out  by 
the  service  of  the  last  few  days,  Mosby  nor  a  single 
one  of  his  men  would  have  escaped. 

The  rebel  loss  was  very  heavy,  their  killed  being 
strewn  along  the  road.  .  .  .  [One  man  was  killed 
and  about  twenty  wounded.] 

[Telegram,  Stahel  to  Heintzelman] 

May  30,  1863. 

We  had  a  hard  fight  with  Mosby  this  morning,  who 
had  artillery,  —  the  same  which  was  used  to  destroy 
the  train  of  cars.  We  whipped  him  like  the  devil,  and 
took  his  artillery.     My  forces  are  still  pursuing  him. 

[Mosby's  report  to  General  Stuart] 

June  6,  1863. 

Last  Saturday  morning  I  captured  a  train  of  twelve 
cars  on  the  Virginia  and  Alexandria  Railroad  loaded 
with  supplies  for  the  troops  above.     The  cars  were 


198  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

fired  and  entirely  consumed.  .  .  .  Having  destroyed 
the  train,  I  proceeded  some  distance  back,  when  I 
recognized  the  enemy  in  a  strong  force  immediately  in 
my  front.  One  shell  which  exploded  in  their  ranks 
sufficed  to  put  them  to  flight.  After  going  about  a 
mile  further,  the  enemy  were  reported  pursuing. 
Their  advance  was  again  checked  by  a  shot  from  the 
howitzer.  In  this  way  we  skirmished  for  several 
miles,  until  seeing  the  approach  of  their  overwhelming 
numbers  and  the  impossibility  of  getting  off  the  gun,  I 
resolved  to  make  them  pay  for  it  as  dearly  as  possible. 
Taking  a  good  position  on  a  hill  commanding  the  road 
we  awaited  their  onset.  They  came  up  quite  gal- 
lantly, not  in  dispersed  order,  but  in  columns  of  fours, 
crowded  in  a  narrow  lane.  At  eighty  yards  we  opened 
on  them  with  grape  and  following  this  up  with  a  charge 
of  cavalry,  we  drove  them  half  a  mile  back  in  confu- 
sion. Twice  again  did  they  rally  and  as  often  were 
sent  reeling  back.  At  last  our  ammunition  became 
exhausted,  and  we  were  forced  to  abandon  the  gun. 
We  did  not  then  abandon  it  without  a  struggle,  and  a 
fierce  hand  to  hand  combat  ensued  in  which,  though 
overpowered  by  numbers,  many  of  the  enemy  were 
made  to  bite  the  dust.  In  this  affair  I  had  only  48 
men  —  the  forces  of  the  enemy  were  five  regiments  of 
cavalry.  My  loss,  one  killed  —  Captain  Hoskins,  a 
British  officer  who  fell  when  gallantly  fighting,  —  four 
wounded.  It  is  with  pleasure  I  recommend  to  your 
attention  the  heroic  conduct  of  Lieutenant  Chapman 
and  Privates  Mountjoy  and  Beattie,  who  stood  by  their 
gun  until  surrounded  by  the  enemy. 


THE   RAID   ON   FAIRFAX  199 

Middleburg,  Va.,  June  10,  1863. 

General : 

I  left  our  point  of  rendezvous  yesterday  for  the  pur- 
pose of  making  a  night  attack  on  two  cavalry  companies 
of  the  enemy  on  the  Maryland  shore.  Had  I  suc- 
ceeded in  crossing  the  river  at  night,  as  I  expected,  I 
would  have  had  no  difficulty  in  capturing  them ;  but 
unfortunately,  my  guide  mistook  the  road  and,  instead 
of  crossing  by  11  o'clock  at  night,  I  did  not  get  over 
until  after  daylight.  The  enemy  (between  80  and  100 
strong),  being  apprised  of  my  movement,  were  formed 
to  receive  me.  A  charge  was  ordered,  the  shock  of 
which  the  enemy  could  not  resist ;  and  they  were 
driven  several  miles  in  confusion,  with  the  loss  of 
seven  killed,  and  17  prisoners;  also  20  odd  horses  or 
more.  We  burned  their  tents,  stores,  camp  equipage, 
etc.  I  regret  the  loss  of  two  brave  officers  killed  — 
Capt.  Brawner  and  Lieut.  Whitescarver.  I  also  had 
one  man  wounded. 

(Signed)  John  S.  Mosby, 
Major  of  Partisan  Rangers. 

Maj.-Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart. 

[Indorsement] 

June  15,  1863. 

Respectfully  forwarded.  In  consideration  of  his 
brilliant  services,  I  hope  the  President  will  promote 
Maj.  Mosby. 

J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
Major  General. 


200  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

[Extracts  from  Stuart's  Report  of  the  Gettysburgv 
Campaign] 

Maj.  Mosby,  with  his  usual  daring,  penetrated  the 
enemy's  lines  and  caught  a  staff-officer  of  Gen.  Hooker 
—  bearer  of  despatches  to  Gen.  Pleasanton,  command- 
ing United  States  cavalry  near  Aldie.  These  de- 
spatches disclosed  the  fact  that  Hooker  was  looking  to 
Aldie  with  solicitude,  and  that  Pleasanton,  with  in- 
fantry and  cavalry,  occupied  the  place ;  and  that  a 
reconnaissance  in  force  of  cavalry  was  meditated  toward 
Warrenton  and  Culpeper.  I  immediately  despatched 
to  Gen.  Hampton,  who  was  coming  by  way  of  Warren- 
ton from  the  direction  of  Beverly  Ford,  this  intelli- 
gence, and  directed  him  to  meet  this  advance  at  War- 
renton. The  captured  despatches  also  gave  the  entire 
number  of  divisions,  from  which  we  could  estimate 
the  approximate  strength  of  the  enemy's  army.  I 
therefore  concluded  in  no  event  to  attack  with  cavalry 
alone  the  enemy  at  Aldie.  .  .  .  Hampton  met  the 
enemy's  advance  toward  Culpeper  and  Warrenton, 
and  drove  him  back  without  difficulty  —  a  heavy 
storm  and  night  intervening  to  aid  the  enemy's  retreat. 

I  resumed  my  own  position  now,  at  Rector's  cross 
roads,  and  being  in  constant  communication  with  the 
commanding  general,  had  scouts  busily  employed 
watching  and  reporting  the  enemy's  movements,  and 
reporting  the  same  to  the  commanding  general.  In 
this  difficult  search  the  fearless  and  indefatigable 
Maj.  Mosby  was  particularly  efficient.  His  informa- 
tion was  always  accurate  and  reliable. 


MAJOR   MOSBY 

Detail  from  an  Historical  Picture,  Painted  in  Richmond  in 

1863  by  Guillaume,  afterwards  in  charge  of  the 

Corcoran  Art  Gallery  at  Washington 


CHAPTER  XII 
Stuart  and  the  Gettysburg  Campaign 

After  Chancellorsville,  the  armies  resumed 
their  positions  on  the  Rappahannock.  A  brilliant 
but  barren  victory  had  been  won,  and  the  pickets 
on  the  opposite  banks  of  the  river  again  began  to 
trade  in  coffee  and  tobacco.  With  the  years  of 
hardship  and  danger,  war  had  not  lost  all  of  its 
romance,  and  the  soldiers  observed  in  their  inter- 
course the  courtesies  of  combatants  as  strictly  as 
did  the  Crusaders. 

General  Lee  now  determined  to  cross  the  Poto- 
mac and  make  a  strategic  offensive.  His  main 
object  was  really  to  create  a  diversion  and  con- 
duct a  great  foraging  expedition  into  Penn- 
sylvania for  the  relief  of  Virginia  and  his  fasting 
army  —  the  South  was  almost  exhausted.  The 
movement  would  temporarily  draw  the  enemy  from 
Virginia,  but  he  did  not  hope  to  dictate  a  peace 
north  of  the  Potomac,  nor  could  he  have  ex- 
pected to  maintain  his  army  there  without  a  line 
of  communication  and  base  of  supply. 

201 


202  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

When  Lee  crossed  the  Potomac,  he  had  no 
objective  point.  His  army  was  now  organized 
with  three  corps,  under  Longstreet,  Ewell,  and 
A.  P.  Hill  —  Stonewall  Jackson  had  crossed  the 
Great  River.     Stuart  was  his  Chief  of  Cavalry. 

Early  in  June  the  movement  that  terminated 
in  the  unexpected  encounter  at  Gettysburg  began 
from  Fredericksburg  up  the  river.  Previously 
the  cavalry  corps  had  been  sent  in  advance  to 
Culpeper  County  to  prevent  the  enemy's  cavalry 
from  crossing  the  Rappahannock  and  to  get  the 
benefit  of  the  grazing  ground.  Lee  followed  with 
Longstreet  and  Ewell.  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  was  left 
behind  to  amuse  Hooker.  Lee  wanted  to  conceal 
his  march  so  that  he  could  cross  the  Blue  Ridge 
and  surprise  Milroy  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 
Hooker's  man  in  the  balloon  discovered  that  some 
camp  grounds  had  been  abandoned,  so  a  re- 
connaissance was  ordered  to  find  out  what  it 
meant.  But  the  force  met  with  such  resistance 
that  Hooker  concluded  that  Lee's  whole  army 
was  there. 

To  relieve  the  Administration  of  anxiety  about 
invasion,  Hooker  telegraphed  to  Washington  what 
the  reconnoitring  force  reported  —  just  what  Lee 
wanted  him  to  do.  The  impression  was  confirmed 
by  pretended  deserters,  who  said  they  belonged  to 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    203 

reinforcements  that  had  just  come  to  Lee.     De- 
ception is  the  ethics  of  war. 

On  June  8,  at  Brandy  Station  in  Culpeper 
County,  there  was  a  review  of  the  cavalry.  The 
spectators  little  imagined  that  the  squadrons 
which  appeared  in  the  grand  parade  before  the 
Commander-in-Chief  would  be  in  deadly  combat 
on  the  same  ground  the  next  day  — 

"Rider  and  horse  —  friend,  foe  —  in  one  red  burial 
blent." 

Hooker  knew  that  the  Confederate  cavalry  was 
there  and  thought  it  was  assembled  for  a  raid 
across  the  Potomac.  So  he  sent  his  cavalry  corps 
up  the  river  to  intercept  it.  On  June  6  he  wrote 
Halleck  :  "As  the  accumulation  of  the  heavy  rebel 
force  of  cavalry  about  Culpeper  may  mean  mis- 
chief, I  am  determined,  if  practicable,  to  break  it 
up  in  its  incipiency.  I  shall  send  all  my  cavalry 
against  them,  stiffened  by  about  3000  infantry." 

Buford's  division  had  already  reached  the 
railroad.  He  was  instructed:  "On  arriving  at 
Bealeton,  should  you  find  yourself  with  sufficient 
force,  you  will  drive  the  enemy  out  of  his  camps 
near  Culpeper  Court  House  across  the  Rapidan, 
destroying  the  bridges  at  that  point."  The 
Rapidan  is  a  tributary  of  the  Rappahannock. 


204  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

Hooker's  instructions  to  Pleasanton  show  that 
his  object  was  not  to  get  information,  but  to 
prevent  a  cavalry  raid  across  the  Potomac. 
But,  to  cover  up  his  defeat,  Pleasanton  afterwards 
claimed  that  he  was  only  making  a  reconnaissance. 
A  reconnaissance  is  made  to  discover  the  position 
and  strength  of  an  enemy.  A  sufficient  force  is 
applied  to  compel  him  to  display  himself,  and, 
when  that  is  done,  the  object  is  accomplished  and 
the  attacking  force  retires.  No  matter  whether 
Pleasanton  was  making  a  real  attack,  or  a  recon- 
naissance, his  expedition  was  a  failure.  If  he 
had  discovered  the  presence  of  Lee,  with  Long- 
street  and  Ewell,  he  would  have  reported  it  to 
Hooker.  He  had  been  instructed  that  he  would 
be  absent  four  or  five  days,  and  to  take  along  five 
days'  rations,  with  pack  mules  and  tents  for  the 
officers.  Such  preparations  do  not  indicate  that 
he  was  expected  to  cross  the  Rappahannock  in  the 
morning  and  recross  in  the  evening. 

Stuart  knew  that  the  enemy's  camps  were  over 
the  river,  and  that  their  outposts  were  near. 
Confederate  pickets  lined  the  river  with  grand 
guards  in  support.  On  June  9,  at  daylight,  the 
enemy  began  crossing  at  Beverly's  and  Kelly's 
fords  —  several  miles  apart,  above  and  below  the 
railroad    bridge.     The    plan    was    for    the    two 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN     205 

divisions  to  unite  at  Brandy  —  four  miles  away  — 
and  then  move  on  six  miles  to  the  Court  House 
where  the  camps  of  Stuart's  cavalry  corps  were 
supposed  to  be.  The  Unionists  did  not  expect  to 
meet  anything  near  the  river  except  pickets. 
Their  error  was  in  thinking  the  Confederate 
camps  were  ten  miles  away,  and  that  there  would 
be  no  collision  in  force  before  the  columns  united. 
The  fact  was  that  Stuart's  headquarters  were 
between  Brandy  and  the  river  and  near  the  camps 
of  two  brigades.  Another  brigade,  Jones's,  was 
a  mile  and  a  half  from  Beverly's  Ford,  where 
Buford's  division  crossed.  Each  of  Pleasanton's 
divisions  was  supported  by  a  brigade  of  infantry. 

Captain  Grimsley's  company  was  picketing  at 
the  bridge.  Before  daybreak  a  vidette  informed 
him  that  he  could  hear  troops  crossing  the  rail- 
road. The  captain  put  his  ear  to  the  ground  and, 
hearing  the  click  of  the  artillery  wheels  passing 
over  the  iron  rails,  sent  a  courier  with  the  in- 
formation to  Jones.  Captain  Gibson's  company 
gallantly  resisted  the  crossing  at  the  ford.  The 
leading  regiment  was  the  Eighth  New  York 
Cavalry  under  the  command  of  a  Mississippian, 
"Grimes"  Davis.  He  had  hardly  reached  the 
southern  bank  before  he  fell. 

The  camps  were  aroused  by  the  firing  at  the 


206  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

fords,  and  there  was  saddling  and  mounting  in 
hot  haste.  The  Seventh  Virginia  Cavalry  was 
the  grand  guard,  and  it  is  said  that  many  rode 
into  the  fight  bareback  and  without  their  boots. 
For  some  unexplained  reason  Jones's  artillery  was 
between  his  camps  and  the  pickets  on  the  river. 
As  a  general  rule,  it  was  in  the  wrong  place,  but 
on  this  occasion  it  happened  to  be  in  the  right 
place.  On  account  of  the  scarcity  of  grain,  the 
horses  had  been  turned  out  to  graze,  and  there 
would  have  been  no  time  to  harness  and  hitch 
them  before  the  enemy  reached  the  camp.  The 
Yankees  were  driving  a  body  of  Confederate 
cavalry  back  and  just  emerging  through  the  woods, 
when  some  of  the  men  ran  a  gun  into  the  road,  by 
hand,  and  opened  fire  on  the  column.  The  troops 
halted  ;  the  delay  was  fatal,  and  the  guns  were 
saved. 

As  there  was  no  precedent  in  war  for  an  artil- 
lery camp  so  near  an  outpost  Pleasanton  nat- 
urally concluded  that  the  Confederates  knew  he 
was  coming  and  had  prepared  a  masked  battery 
to  receive  him ;  that  he  had  run  into  an  ambus- 
cade. War  is  not  a  science,  but  an  art.  Pleasan- 
ton was  surprised  and  halted  —  and  lost.  That  he 
had  miscalculated  the  resistance  he  would  meet  at 
the  ford  may  be  inferred  from  the  dispatch  he  sent 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    207 

Hooker  at  7.40  a.m.,  "The  enemy  is  in  strong 
cavalry  force  here.  We  had  a  severe  fight.  They 
were  aware  of  our  movement  and  prepared." 

To  prepare  Halleck  for  a  surprise  after  he  had 
promised  so  much,  Hooker  telegraphed  him, 
"Pleasanton  reports  that  after  an  encounter  with 
the  rebel  cavalry  over  the  Beverly  ford  he  has  not 
been  able  to  make  head  against  it." 

At  2.30  p.m.,  as  he  had  made  no  progress, 
Pleasanton  telegraphed  back,  "I  will  recross  this 
p.m."  And  so  ended  his  expedition  on  which  he 
had  started  to  the  Rapidan,  on  his  so-called  re- 
connaissance. 

When  the  firing  was  first  heard  at  the  fords, 
Stuart  sent  Robertson's  brigade  below,  towards 
Kelly's,  to  hold  Gregg's  division  in  check  on  that 
road,  and  with  Hampton's  brigade  went  at  a 
gallop  to  meet  the  force  at  Beverly's  ford. 
Buford's  division  would  soon  have  been  driven 
over  the  river,  but  the  news  came  that  Gregg's 
division  was  in  his  rear.  At  first  Stuart  would 
not  believe  this,  but  in  some  way  Robertson  had 
allowed  Gregg  to  pass  him  unobserved  on  another 
road.  So,  leaving  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  brigade,  which 
had  just  come  up,  on  Buford's  flank  to  hold  him 
in  check,  Stuart  turned  and  went  to  meet  Gregg 
with  Hampton's  and  Jones's  brigades. 


208  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

On  the  field  around  Brandy  there  was  now  the 
greatest  mounted  combat  of  the  war  —  probably 
of  any  war.  Gregg  was  driven  back  over  the  river, 
leaving  behind  him  three  guns  and  six  battle 
flags.  Buford  and  Pleasanton  followed  him  back 
to  their  camps.  Pleasanton  had  repeated  the 
Austrian  manoeuvre  at  Rivoli  of  having  a  double 
line  of  operations,  and  Stuart  had  done  just  what 
Bonaparte  did  there,  when  he  was  attacked  in 
front  and  on  his  flanks  and  nearly  surrounded  — 
struck  and  defeated  the  columns  in  succession 
before  they  united. 

Stuart's  great  credit  is  the  manner  in  which  he 
screened  the  movements  of  Lee  and  got  informa- 
tion of  the  enemy.  Referring  to  this  operation 
in  his  work  on  Cavalry,  General  Bernhardi  said  : 

The  American  War  of  Secession  showed  in  a  sur- 
prising manner  what  could  be  done  in  this  respect. 
Stuart's  screening  of  the  left  wheel  of  the  Confederate 
army,  after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  for  instance, 
was  a  masterpiece,  and  the  reconnaissance  carried  out 
by  Mosby's  scouts  during  the  same  period  was  equally 
brilliant. 

Early  in  the  morning  after  Brandy,  June  10,  Ewell 
started  to  cross  the  Blue  Ridge  into  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley.  On  June  13,  Milroy,  at  Winchester, 
who  had   relied  on   Hooker  to  warn   him   of  the 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    209 

approach  of  an  enemy  from  that  direction,  found 
himself  surrounded.  Pleasanton  had  not  dis- 
covered that  Lee,  with  two  army  corps,  was  in 
Culpeper;  and  Hooker  thought  that  the  whole  of 
Lee's  army  was  still  on  his  front  on  the  lower 
Rappahannock.  There  was  so  little  suspicion 
of  the  impending  blow  in  the  Valley  that  on  June 
12  Hooker  invited  President  Lincoln  to  come 
down  and  witness  some  practice  with  an  in- 
cendiary shell.  Lincoln  accepted,  but  afterwards, 
instead  of  going,  sent  Hooker  this  dispatch,  "Do 
you  think  it  possible  that  15,000  of  Ewell's  men  can 
be  at  Winchester?" 

At  first  Hooker  would  not  believe  it,  but  he 
soon  struck  his  tents  and  started  to  keep  between 
Lee  and  Washington.  To  Schenck,  at  Baltimore, 
Lincoln,  with  characteristic  humor,  said,  "Get 
Milroy  from  Winchester  to  Harper's  Ferry,  if 
possible.  He  will  be  gobbled  up,  if  he  is  not 
already  past  salvation." 

After  capturing  the  most  of  Milroy's  force, 
Ewell  moved  on  and  crossed  the  Potomac  on 
June  15.  Lee,  with  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill, 
followed  him  to  the  Valley  and  halted  a  week, 
while  Stuart's  cavalry  moved  east  of  the  ridge  as 
a  curtain  to  conceal  the  operation.  The  hostile 
armies  marched  in  concentric  circles,  Lee  having 


210  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

the  initiative.  When  Lee  moved,  Hooker  also 
moved  so  as  always  to  cover  Washington.  Of 
course  Lee  must  have  expected  that  Hooker 
would  maintain  the  same  relative  position  and 
follow  him  after  he  had  crossed  the  Potomac. 
The  right  of  Hooker's  army  now  rested  on  the 
river,  where  he  had  laid  pontoons  for  crossing. 
Stuart  was  on  his  front  to  watch  and  report  his 
movements  to  Lee.  On  June  15,  Ewell,  having 
crossed  into  Maryland,  had  sent  his  cavalry  on  to 
forage  in  Pennsylvania.  At  that  time  General 
Lee  seems  to  have  been  undecided  as  to  a  plan  of 
campaign,  except  to  subsist  on  the  enemy  and 
draw  him  out  of  Virginia.  On  the  nineteenth 
Lee  wrote  Ewell,  who  was  about  Hagerstown, 
that  "should  we  be  able  to  detain  General 
Hooker's  army  from  following  you,  you  would  be 
able  to  accomplish  as  much  unmolested  as  the 
whole  army  could  with  General  Hooker  in  its 
front.  If  your  advance  causes  Hooker  to  cross 
the  Potomac,  or  separate  his  army  in  any  way, 
Longstreet  can  follow  you." 

So  Lee's  crossing  the  Potomac  was  contingent 
on  Hooker's  following  Ewell.  All  that  Ewell 
then  had  to  do  was  to  collect  supplies,  for  he 
met  no  resistance.  Lee  said  nothing  about  A. 
P.    Hill    crossing    the    river.     This    letter    proves 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN     211 

that  he  then  had  no  objective,  but  a  biographer, 
Long  —  his  military  secretary  —  asserted,  in  the 
face  of  the  record,  that  Gettysburg  was  the 
objective  when  Lee  started  from  Fredericksburg, 
and  that  he  was  surprised  on  hearing  that  Hooker 
had  followed  him  over  the  Potomac.  There  was 
not  a  soldier  or  even  a  wagon-master  in  the  army 
who  was  surprised  to  hear  it.  Lee  seemed  to  be 
content  to  hold  Hooker  in  Virginia,  while  Ewell 
was  living  on  the  Pennsylvania  farmers,  and  his 
sending  another  corps  across  the  Potomac  de- 
pended on  Hooker.  So,  when  Lee  concluded  to 
follow  Ewell,  he  must  have  been  sure  that  Hooker 
was  ready  to  cross. 

On  June  22,  Lee  ordered  Ewell,  at  Hagerstown,  to 
move  into  Pennsylvania,  and  told  him  that  whether 
the  rest  of  the  army  followed  or  not  depended  on 
the  supplies  he  found  in  the  country.     Lee  said  : 

I  also  directed  General  Stuart,  should  the  enemy 
have  so  far  retired  from  his  front  as  to  permit  of  the 
departure  of  a  portion  of  the  cavalry,  to  march  with 
three  brigades  across  the  Potomac  and  place  himself 
on  your  right  and  in  communication  with  you,  keep 
you  advised  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  assist 
in  collecting  supplies  for  the  army. 

Lee  told  Ewell  that  his  best  course  would  be 
towards    the    Susquehanna,     that    he    must    be 


212  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

guided  by  circumstances,  and,  possibly,  he  might 
take  Harrisburg.  Lee  had  already  written  Stuart 
to  leave  two  brigades  to  watch  the  enemy  and 
take  care  of  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  army  and, 
with  three  brigades,  to  join  Ewell,  who  was 
marching  to  the  Susquehanna.  Stuart  was  in- 
structed to  act  as  Ewell's  Chief  of  Cavalry  and 
to  "collect  all  the  supplies  you  can  for  the  use 
of  the  army."  As  no  enemy  was  following  Ewell, 
and  as  there  was  none  on  his  front,  except  militia, 
Stuart  would  really  have  had  nothing  but  foraging 
to  do,  if  he  had  joined  Ewell,  who,  by  this  time, 
was  sending  back  long  trains  loaded  with  provisions. 
Longstreet  was  then  in  Virginia,  near  Ashby's 
Gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  this  order  was  sent 
through  him  and  was  subject  to  his  approval. 
Longstreet  forwarded  the  order,  and  in  a  letter 
to  Stuart  said  : 

He  speaks  of  your  leaving  via  Hopewell  Gap  [in 
Bull  Run  Mountain]  and  passing  by  the  rear  of  the 
enemy.  I  think  that  your  passage  of  the  Potomac 
by  our  rear  [west  of  the  Blue  Ridge  at  Shepherdstown] 
at  the  present  moment  will,  in  a  measure,  disclose  our 
plans.  You  had  better  not  leave  us,  therefore,  unless 
you  take  the  proposed  route  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy. 

Longstreet  wrote  to  General  Lee,  on  the 
twenty-second  : 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    213 

Yours  of  4  o'clock  this  afternoon  is  received.  I 
have  forwarded  your  letter  to  General  Stuart  with  the 
suggestion  that  he  pass  by  the  enemy's  rear,  if  he 
thinks  that  he  may  get  through.  We  have  nothing 
of  the  enemy  to-day. 

So  it  seems  that  General  Lee  suggested,  and 
Longstreet  urged,  Stuart  to  pass  by  the  enemy's 
rear.  At  that  time  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill 
had  not  been  ordered  to  follow  Ewell.  After 
the  war  Longstreet  wTrote  an  account  of  Gettys- 
burg, in  which  he  forgot  his  own  orders  to  Stuart 
and  charged  him  with  disobeying  his  instructions. 
He  said  he  ordered  Stuart  to  march  on  his  flank 
and  to  keep  between  him  and  the  enemy ;  Lee's 
staff  officers  and  biographers  repeat  the  absurd 
story.  They  do  not  explain  how  Stuart  could  be 
with  Ewell  on  the  Susquehanna  and,  at  the  same 
time,  on  Longstreet's  flank  in  Virginia.  No 
precedent  can  be  found  for  such  a  performance, 
except  in  the  Arabian  Nights. 

When  Lee  was  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  he 
wrote  twice  to  President  Davis  that  Hooker's 
army  was  drawing  close  to  the  Potomac  and  had 
a  pontoon  across  it,  and  that  he  thought  he  could 
throw  Hooker  over  the  river.  Lee  also  wrote  to 
Imboden,  who  was  moving  farther  west,  thanked 
him  for  the  cattle  and  sheep  he  had  sent  to  him, 


214  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

and  urged  him  to  collect  all  he  could.  On  June 
23,  5  p.m.,  Lee  wrote  again  to  Stuart.  He  re- 
peated the  instructions  about  joining  Ewell  and 
authorized  him  to  cross  the  Potomac  west,  at 
Shepherdstown,  or  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  by  the 
enemy's  rear.  "In  either  case,"  said  General 
Lee,  "after  crossing  the  river  you  must  move  on 
and  feel  the  right  of  Ewell's  troops,  collecting  in- 
formation, provisions,  etc." 

Lee  seemed  to  be  more  intent  about  gathering 
rations  than  anything  else.  There  is  not  a  word 
in  either  of  his  dispatches  to  Stuart  about  report- 
ing the  enemy's  movements  to  him.  Lee's  biog- 
raphers say  there  was.  He  would  neither  order 
nor  expect  Stuart  to  do  an  impossible  thing,  but 
he  told  him  what  instructions  to  give  the  com- 
manders of  the  two  cavalry  brigades  he  would 
leave  behind.  Stuart  did  give  each  of  the  com- 
manders minute  instructions  to  report  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy  directly  to  Lee,  and  to  follow 
on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  army  when  the  enemy 
left  Virginia.  There  was  no  complaint  against 
Jones  and  Robertson,  the  brigade  commanders, 
for  not  having  performed  this  duty  —  conclusive 
evidence  that  they  did. 

If  Stuart  had  gone  the  western  route  by 
Shepherdstown,  he  would  have  had  to  cross  and 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    215 

recross  the  Blue  Ridge  and  to  march  in  a  zigzag 
circuit  to  join  Ewell.  Thus  he  would  have  been 
a  long  way  from  the  enemy  and  out  of  com- 
munication with  Lee.  Lee's  movements  did  not 
depend  on  the  cavalry  he  had  ordered  to  join 
Ewell.  Stuart  chose  the  most  direct  route  to 
the  Susquehanna  by  the  rear  of  the  enemy.  It 
afforded  an  opportunity,  as  Lee  had  instructed 
him,  "  to  do  them  all  the  damage  you  can"  and  to 
"collect  provisions";  he  would  break  the  com- 
munications with  Washington  and  destroy 
Hooker's  transportation.  Such  a  blow  would 
compel  the  latter,  instead  of  following  Lee, 
to  retreat  to  his  base  and  wait  for  repairs. 

The  seven  corps  of  Hooker's  army  were 
scattered  through  three  counties  in  Virginia, 
with  his  right  resting  on  the  Potomac.  The  plan 
for  Stuart  to  pass  through  Hooker's  army  was 
really  a  copy  of  the  campaign  of  Marengo,  when 
Bonaparte  crossed  the  Alps  and  cut  the  Austrian 
communications  in  Italy.  It  was  a  bold  enter- 
prise —  its  safety  lay  in  its  audacity  —  the  enemy 
would  be  caught  unprepared,  and  at  the  same  time 
it  would  protect  Lee's  communications  by  drawing 
off  Hooker's  cavalry  in  pursuit.  It  was  known  that 
the  camps  of  the  different  corps  were  so  far  apart  that 
a  column  of  cavalry  could  easily  pass  between  them. 


216  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

I  was  at  headquarters  when  Stuart  wrote  his 
last  dispatch  to  Lee,  informing  him  of  the  route 
he  would  go,  and  sat  by  him  when  he  was  writing 
it  —  in  fact,  I  dictated  a  large  part  of  it.  I  had 
just  returned  from  a  scout  inside  the  enemy's 
lines  and  brought  the  intelligence  that  induced 
Stuart  to  undertake  to  pass  through  them.  I 
remember  that  Fitz  Lee  and  Hampton  came  into 
the  room  while  we  were  writing. 

I  had  arrived  from  this  scout  early  on  the 
morning  of  June  24,  and  found  that  Stuart  had 
just  received  the  orders  to  join  Ewell  with  three 
brigades  and  had  been  given  discretion  to  pass  by 
the  rear  of  the  Union  army.  John  Esten  Cooke,  the 
Ordnance  Officer  of  the  cavalry  corps,  was  at  head- 
quarters. In  his  "Wearing  of  the  Gray"  (1867) 
he  corroborated  my  statement  about  the  effect 
on  the  campaign  of  the  report  I  brought  Stuart. 
He  writes : 

General  Stuart  came,  finally,  to  repose  unlimited 
confidence  in  his  (Mosby's)  resources  and  relied  im- 
plicitly upon  him.  The  writer  recalls  an  instance  of 
this  in  June,  1863.  General  Stuart  was  then  near 
Middleburg,  watching  the  United  States  Army  — 
then  about  to  move  toward  Pennsylvania  —  but  could 
get  no  accurate  information  from  his  scouts.  Silent, 
puzzled,  and  doubtful,   the  General  walked  up  and 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN     217 

down,  knitting  his  brows  and  reflecting.  When  the 
lithe  figure  of  Mosby  appeared,  Stuart  uttered  an 
exclamation  of  relief  and  satisfaction.  They  were 
speedily  in  private  conversation,  and  Mosby  came  out 
again  to  mount  his  quick  gray  mare  and  set  out  in  a 
heavy  storm  for  the  Federal  camps.  On  the  next  day 
he  returned  with  information  which  put  the  entire 
cavalry  in  motion.  He  had  penetrated  General 
Hooker's  camps,  ascertained  everything,  and  safely 
returned.  This  he  had  done  in  his  gray  uniform  with 
his  pistols  in  his  belt,  and  I  believe  that  it  was  on  this 
occasion  that  he  gave  a  characteristic  evidence  of  his 
coolness. 

The  adventure  to  which  Cook  refers  occurred 
at  the  house  of  a  citizen  named  Coleman,  where 
I  captured  two  cavalrymen  who  were  sitting 
on  their  horses  gathering  cherries.  This  fact 
was  confirmed  by  General  Weld,  of  General 
Reynolds's  staff,  in  his  "War  Diary."  He 
said  : 

We  found  out  to-day  that  our  guide  was  captured 
at  Coleman's  house  yesterday.  Coleman  lives  about 
two  miles  from  here,  and  he  has  a  lot  of  forage ;  our 
guide  and  quarter-master  went  there  for  it  and  were 
caught  by  a  "Secesh"  there  said  to  be  Mosby.1 

1  Mosby  rode  along  with  his  two  prisoners  and  unexpectedly  came  upon 
a  body  of  enemy  cavalry.  He  thereupon  threatened  the  two  soldiers 
with  certain  death,  and  rode  with  the  enemy  a  considerable  distance,  at 
length  turning  into  a  lane  and  getting  safely  away,  with  his  prisoners. 


218  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

Lee  knew  that  while  Stuart  was  passing  be- 
tween Hooker's  army  and  Washington  com- 
munication with  him  would  be  impossible.  This 
was  before  the  days  of  wireless !  Lee  must 
have  relied  for  intelligence  on  the  cavalry  brigades 
he  had  with  him,  on  his  scouts,  and  his  signal  corps 
on  the  Blue  Ridge.  He  had  no  other  use  for 
them.  The  cavalry  commander  said  he  fre- 
quently sent  couriers  to  Lee  with  dispatches. 
I  regret  that  Lee's  report  says  that  he  expected 
Stuart  to  perform  a  miracle  and  keep  in  com- 
munication with  him. 

Three  of  Lee's  staff  officers,  Marshall,  Long, 
and  Taylor,  have  given  accounts  of  the  Gettys- 
burg campaign  that  misrepresent  the  orders  Stuart 
received  and  claim  that  Lee  relied  on  him  for 
intelligence.  Now  the  letters  of  Lee  to  Ewell, 
directing  him  to  move  to  the  Susquehanna  and 
to  Stuart  to  join  Ewell  with  three  brigades,  are 
copied  in  Lee's  dispatch  book  in  the  handwriting 
of  Colonel  Charles  Marshall,  who  also  wrote  Lee's 
reports.  The  implications  of  disobedience  against 
Stuart  in  the  reports  are  contradicted  by  these 
letters.  The  dispatch  book  was  in  Marshall's 
possession  when  he  delivered  a  philippic  on  Lee's 
birthday  (1896)  in  which  he  imputed  disobedience 
of  orders  to  Stuart  and  asserted  that  Lee  depended 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    219 

on  him  for  information.  He  did  not  say  what 
Lee  expected  the  two  cavalry  brigades  to  do,  nor 
did  he  say  what  they  didn't  do  —  he  didn't 
mention  them.  The  letter  of  5  p.m.,  June  23, 
directing  Stuart  to  go  to  Ewell  on  the  Susque- 
hanna and  authorizing  him  to  pass  by  the  enemy's 
rear,  is  in  the  handwriting  of  Colonel  Walter 
Taylor,  Lee's  Assistant  Adjutant-General.  He 
wrote  an  account  of  Gettysburg  charging  Stuart 
with  disobedience  in  going  to  Ewell  and  not  re- 
maining with  Lee  and  reporting  the  movements  of 
the  enemy  to  him,  and  blaming  Stuart,  as  Mar- 
shall did,  for  the  disaster  at  Gettysburg.  Long 
falsified  the  record  in  the  same  way.  Apparently 
they  never  dreamed  that  there  would  be  a  res- 
urrection of  Lee's  dispatch  book. 

On  the  authority  of  the  staff  officers,  a  historian 
wrote  that  Stuart  left  Lee  without  orders  and 
went  off  on  a  wild-goose  chase.  I  wrote  and 
asked  him  if  he  thought  that  Ewell  was  a  wild 
goose.  The  truth  is  Lee  was  so  anxious  for  Stuart 
to  cross  the  river  ahead  of  Hooker  that  he  wrote 
him,  "I  fear  he  will  steal  a  march  on  us  and  get 
across  the  Potomac  before  we  are  aware." 

Yet  his  report  says  that  he  was  astonished  to 
hear,  on  June  28,  at  Chambersburg,  that  Hooker 
had   crossed.     The   staff   officers   knew   perfectly 


220  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

well  how  the  battle  was  precipitated,  but  they 
concealed  it.  They  intentionally  misrepresented 
it.  Their  animus  towards  Stuart  is  manifest. 
Taylor,  in  his  narrative  of  his  service  with  General 
Lee,  did  not  even  mention  the  great  cavalry  com- 
bat at  Brandy,  which  his  chief  rode  on  the  field  to 
witness.  Marshall  and  Long,  to  disparage  Stuart, 
referred  to  the  battle  and  used  the  same  phrase, 
"he  was  roughly  handled."  Long,  to  deprive 
Stuart  of  the  glory  of  his  victory,  said  that  a 
division  of  infantry  came  to  his  support.  The 
record  shows  that  General  Lee  kept  his  infantry 
concealed  that  day. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  June  25,  Stuart's 
column  crossed  the  Bull  Run,  expecting  to  pass 
directly  through  Hooker's  army  and  to  reach  the 
Potomac  that  evening.  This  could  have  been 
done  easily  on  the  day  before.  But  on  the 
morning  of  the  twenty-fourth,  A.  P.  Hill's  corps, 
at  Charles  Town,  moved  to  the  Potomac  in  plain 
view  of  the  Federal  signal  station  on  Maryland 
Heights.  Longstreet,  at  Millwood,  three  times 
as  far  from  the  river  as  Hill,  started  at  the  same 
time,  but  he  marched  by  Martinsburg  and  out  of 
sight  of  the  signal  station,  crossing  at  Williams- 
port.  Hill  had  crossed  the  day  before  at  Shep- 
herdstown    and    waited    for    Longstreet.     There 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    221 

was  no  emergency  to  require  this  movement. 
Hooker  was  waiting  on  Lee  and  had  not  sent  a 
single  regiment  over  the  river,  although  Ewell 
was  foraging  in  Pennsylvania.  The  news  of 
Hill's  and  Longstreet's  crossing  the  river  was 
immediately  telegraphed  to  Hooker,  and  the  next 
morning  he  set  his  army  in  motion  for  the  pon- 
toons. As  his  corps  crossed  the  Potomac,  they 
marched  west  for  South  Mountain  and  occupied 
the  Gaps.  Longstreet  and  Hill  united  in  Mary- 
land and  spent  two  days  with  General  Lee  within 
a  few  miles  of  Hooker's  camps.  Hooker's  signal 
stations  were  in  full  view  on  peaks,  flapping  their 
flags.  Each  of  Lee's  corps  had  a  signal  corps, 
and  Lee  had  a  number  of  scouts  to  send  on  the 
mountain  to  see  Hooker's  army  on  the  other  side. 
The  truth  is  that  Lee  and  Stuart  got  their  in- 
formation of  the  enemy  through  individual  scouts 
and  not  by  using  the  cavalry  in  a  body.  Lee  says 
that  one  of  these  scouts  brought  him  the  informa- 
tion at  Chambersburg  that  Hooker  had  crossed 
the  Potomac.  I  have  no  doubt  that  Lee  used 
any  means  he  could  to  get  intelligence  of  the 
enemy,  for  the  simplicity  of  the  bucolic  ages 
was  not  a  characteristic  of  the  Confederate  com- 
mander. 

The   enemy   crossed    the   Potomac   in   front   of 


222  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

the  two  cavalry  brigades  that  were  left  to  watch 
him.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  cavalry  did 
their  duty,  and  that  Lee  waited  in  Maryland  for 
Hooker's  army  to  get  over  the  river.  If  A.  P. 
Hill  had  only  waited  a  day  longer  in  his  camps, 
Hooker  would  have  stood  still,  and  Stuart  could 
easily  have  crossed  the  Potomac  on  the  twenty- 
fifth.  It  would  be  a  severe  reflection  on  Lee  and 
his  generals  to  suppose  that  they  spent  two  days 
so  near  an  army  of  a  hundred  thousand  men  and 
didn't  even  suspect  it.  Hooker's  army  was  cross- 
ing the  river  twenty-five  miles  below  at  the  same 
time  Lee  was  crossing.  Stuart  soon  ran  against 
Hooker's  columns  on  the  roads  on  which  he  had 
expected  to  march.  But  they  had  the  right  of 
way  and  kept  on,  while  Stuart,  after  an  artillery 
duel,  had  to  make  a  detour  around  them  and 
did  not  cross  the  river  until  the  night  of  the 
twenty-seventh.  Thus  Stuart  was  delayed  two 
days,  but  he  sent  a  dispatch  informing  Lee  that 
Hooker  was  moving  to  the  Potomac.  The  appear- 
ance of  a  body  of  cavalry  on  the  flank  of  Hooker's 
army  created  great  anxiety  for  his  rear,  and 
Pleasanton's  cavalry  corps  was  kept  as  a  rear 
guard  and  was  the  last  to  cross  on  the  pontoons 
on  the  night  of  the  twenty-seventh. 

At  the  time  Stuart  was  crossing  the  Potomac  at 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    223 

Seneca,  Lee  had  reached  Chambersburg.  Ordi- 
narily the  Union  cavalry  should  have  been  in 
front,  harassing  Lee's  flank  and  rear,  but  up  to 
the  day  of  the  battle  Lee's  communications  were 
intact,  and  he  had  not  lost  a  wagon  or  a  straggler. 
The  enemy's  cavalry  were  in  Hooker's  rear,  on 
the  defensive,  and  they  had  no  idea  that  Stuart  was 
crossing  the  river  between  them  and  Washington. 

Stuart  spent  the  night  (June  27)  in  Maryland, 
capturing  a  lot  of  boats  carrying  supplies  to  the 
army  on  the  canal,  and  on  the  twenty-eighth 
moved  north  and  marched  all  night  to  join  Ewell. 
During  the  day  Stuart  caught  a  supply  train  going 
to  headquarters  from  Washington,  and,  as  his 
orders  required,  he  took  the  supplies  along  to 
Ewell.  The  presence  of  the  Confederate  cavalry 
between  the  army  and  Washington  created  a 
panic,  which  was  increased  by  the  report  that 
there  was  another  body  south  of  the  river.  For 
several  days  communication  with  the  Union  army 
was  cut,  Washington  was  isolated,  and  Stuart's 
column  attracted  more  attention  than  Lee's  army 
in  the  Cumberland  Valley. 

Meade  took  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac on  the  afternoon  of  the  twenty-eighth  at 
Frederick  City,  and  there  was  great  commotion 
in  his  camps  when  the  news  came  that  Stuart 


224  COLONEL  JOHN  S.    MOSBY 

had  their  mules  and  provisions.  The  quarter- 
master-general wired  to  Ingalls,  "Your  commu- 
nications are  now  in  the  hands  of  General  Fitz- 
hugh  Lee's  brigade." 

On  June  27,  the  day  that  General  Lee  arrived 
at  Chambersburg,  the  corps  that  Hooker  had 
advanced  to  the  Gaps  in  Maryland  were  with- 
drawn twenty  miles  to  the  east,  and  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  concentrated  at  Frederick 
City.  As  a  result,  Lee's  communications  were 
no  longer  even  threatened.  After  crossing  the 
river,  Hooker  had  moved  west,  as  he  said,  to 
strike  Lee's  rear,  but  the  War  Department  inter- 
fered with  the  plan,  and  he  asked  to  be  relieved. 
Ewell  was  then  marching  to  the  Susquehanna,  so 
Hooker's  counter  movement  to  Frederick  was 
made  to  protect  the  Capital  and  Baltimore  from 
any  movement  down  the  Susquehanna.  Lee  must 
have  considered  the  probability  of  an  operation 
against  his  rear,  when  he  wrote  President  Davis, 
after  he  reached  the  Potomac,  that  he  thought  he 
could  throw  Hooker's  army  over  the  river,  and 
that,  as  he  did  not  have  sufficient  force  to  guard 
his  communications,  he  would  have  to  abandon 
them.  But  as  he  would  live  on  the  country,  he 
did  not  have  to  guard  a  base  of  supply,  and  his 
communications  were  not  vital. 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN     225 

Colonel  Marshall,  it  seems  to  me  in  the  light  of 
the  evidence,  was  unjust  to  his  chief  when  he 
represented  him  to  have  been  surprised  and  almost 
in  a  panic  when  he  heard,  at  Chambersburg,  on 
the  night  of  the  twenty-eighth,  that  Hooker  had 
crossed  the  Potomac.  He  did  not  explain  how 
Lee  could  have  thought  that  the  Northern  army 
would  remain  in  Virginia,  while  the  Confederates 
were  ravaging  Pennsylvania,  nor  why  he  changed 
his  plan  of  campaign  to  protect  his  communica- 
tions. 

The  first  news  of  the  enemy  that  Meade  re- 
ceived after  he  assumed  command  was  the  fol- 
lowing discouraging  dispatch  from  Halleck  : 

It  is  reported  that  your  train  of  one  hundred  and 
fifty  wagons  has  been  captured  by  Fitzhugh  Lee  near 
Rockville.  Unless  cavalry  is  sent  to  guard  your 
communications  with  Washington,  they  will  be  cut  off. 
It  is  reported  here  that  there  is  still  a  considerable 
rebel  force  south  of  the  Potomac. 

General  Lee  had  passed  near  and  left  behind 
him  at  Harper's  Ferry  a  force  of  11,000  that  did 
not  seem  to  disturb  him  as  a  menace  to  his  com- 
munications, but  on  the  twenty-eighth  Meade 
withdrew  these  troops  to  guard  his  rear  and  the 
line  of  the  Potomac.  General  Lee  was  then  to 
the  west,  in  the  Cumberland  Valley,  but  Meade 


226  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

started  off  in  the  opposite  direction  on  Stuart's 
trail.  That  did  seem  as  hopeless  as  chasing  a 
wild  goose. 

Meade  said  to  Halleck,  "I  can  now  only  say 
that  it  appears  to  me  I  must  move  towards  the 
Susquehanna,  keeping  Washington  and  Baltimore 
well-covered,  and,  if  the  enemy  is  checked  in  his 
attempt,  to  cross  the  Susquehanna,  or,  if  he  turn 
towards  Baltimore,  to  give  him  battle." 

Meade  spent  a  day  at  Frederick  and  on  the 
thirtieth  started  on  his  campaign.  Lee  was  still 
at  Chambersburg.  His  staff  officers  say  that  at 
that  time  Gettysburg  was  the  objective  point  on 
which  both  Lee  and  Meade  were  marching,  and  that 
there  was  a  race  between  them  to  occupy  it  first. 
Lee  could  easily  have  occupied  Gettysburg  while 
Meade  was  still  at  Frederick.  Meade's  communi- 
cations were  now  broken,  and  for  several  days  he 
was  drifting.  He  sent  off  to  the  east  two  of  his 
cavalry  divisions  and  three  army  corps  to  intercept 
Stuart,  so  after  two  days'  marching  a  large  part 
of  Meade's  army  was  as  far  from  Lee  as  it  was  at 
Frederick.  If  General  Lee  had  known  how  Ewell 
and  Stuart  would  attract  Meade  to  the  east,  he 
would  not  have  recalled  Ewell  so  soon. 

On  the  night  of  the  thirtieth  Meade  was  still 
in   a   fog.     He   had   not   heard    that   Ewell   had 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    227 

withdrawn  from  the  Susquehanna,  so  he  wrote 
to  Halleck,  by  a  courier,  that  he  would  push 
farther  east  the  next  day  to  the  Harrisburg  rail- 
road, and  open  communication  with  Baltimore. 
But  at  11.30  p.m.,  on  the  thirtieth,  a  telegram  was 
sent  from  Harrisburg  to  be  forwarded  by  a  mes- 
senger to  Meade,  telling  him  that  Lee  was  falling 
back.  Meade  received  this  news  on  the  morning 
of  July  1,  and  he  at  once  recalled  the  orders  he 
had  issued  to  push  on  towards  the  Susquehanna 
and  determined  to  take  a  defensive  position.  He 
wrote  Halleck  of  the  change  and  that  he  would 
not  advance  farther,  but  would  retire  to  the  line 
of  Pipe  Creek  and  await  an  attack  —  which  would 
have  satisfied  Lee.  If  Ewell  had  remained  a  day 
longer  at  Carlisle  and  Early  at  York,  Meade  would 
have  moved  to  the  Susquehanna,  and  there  would 
have  been  no  battle  at  Gettysburg.  Halleck  must 
have  been  surprised  by  Meade's  dispatch,  for  he 
had  told  him  at  Frederick  that  his  object  was  to 
find  and  fight  Lee. 

After  he  got  the  news  about  Ewell,  Meade  issued 
a  circular  directing  the  corps  commanders  to  hold 
the  enemy  in  check,  if  attacked,  and  to  retire  to 
Pipe  Creek.  Reynolds,  with  the  First  Corps, 
was  on  his  extreme  left  and  had  been  directed 
to  move  early  on  July  1  on  Gettysburg  —  merely 


228  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

in  observation.  Meade  wrote  Reynolds  that  he 
had  been  ordered  to  Gettysburg  before  the  news 
came  that  Ewell  had  withdrawn  from  the  Susque- 
hanna. But  Reynolds  started  early,  never  re- 
ceived Meade's  letter  or  the  circular  of  recall, 
and  was  killed. 

On  the  night  of  the  thirtieth  Stuart  arrived  at 
Dover  and  learned  that  Early's  division  of  Ewell's 
corps,  which  he  expected  to  join  at  York,  had 
marched  west  that  morning.  As  he  was  ordered 
to  report  to  Ewell,  after  a  short  rest  Stuart  moved 
on  to  Carlisle,  where  he  knew  Ewell  had  been. 
But  he  sent  a  staff  officer  on  Early's  track  to 
report  to  General  Lee,  whom  he  found  on  the  field 
of  Gettysburg.  Stuart  reached  Carlisle  that 
night,  but  Ewell,  with  his  cavalry  and  two  divi- 
sions, had  gone  south.  It  was  fortunate  for  Lee 
that  Stuart  did  go  to  Carlisle. 

Couch  had  collected  a  force  of  about  15,000 
at  Harrisburg  and  had  been  ordered  to  cooperate 
with  Meade  and  attack  Lee's  communications. 
Stuart  met  his  advance  at  Carlisle,  an  artillery 
duel  ensued,  and  it  was  thought  by  the  Federalists 
that  Ewell  had  returned.  So  the  troops  on  the 
march  from  Harrisburg  turned  back,  and  the 
trains  that  were  bringing  their  supplies  from  differ- 
ent points  in  the  country  were  stampeded  by  the 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN     229 

firing.  Stuart  left  that  night  for  Gettysburg  and 
arrived  about  noon  the  next  day,  in  time  to  meet 
the  two  divisions  of  cavalry  which  had  been  away 
in  pursuit  of  him.  Couch's  force  started  again 
from  Harrisburg,  but  had  to  wait  for  rations. 
He  did  not  get  off  until  July  4,  after  the  battle 
had  been  fought,  and  never  overtook  Lee's  trains. 

Stuart's  march  of  a  column  of  cavalry  around  the 
Union  army  will  be  regarded,  in  the  light  of  the 
record,  as  one  of  the  greatest  achievements  in  war, 
viewed  either  as  an  independent  operation  or 
raid,  or  in  its  strategic  relation  to  the  campaign. 
But  all  the  advantage  gained  by  it  was  neutralized 
by  the  indiscretion  of  a  corps  commander  and  was 
obscured  by  the  great  disaster  to  our  arms  for 
which  it  was  in  no  way  responsible. 

General  Bernhardi  wrote : 

I  hold  therefore  that  such  circumstances  render  a 
disturbance  of  the  rear  communications  of  an  army  an 
important  matter.  It  will  often  do  the  opponent  more 
damage,  and  contribute  more  to  a  favorable  decision 
of  arms  than  the  intervention  of  a  few  cavalry  divisions 
in  the  decisive  battle  itself.  One  does  not,  of  course, 
exclude  the  possibility  of  the  other.  General  Stuart, 
in  the  campaign  of  Gettysburg,  rode  all  around  the 
hostile  army,  broke  up  its  communications,  drew 
hostile  troops  away  from  the  decisive  point,  and  yet 
was  in  place  on  the  wing  of  the  army  on  the  day  of  the 


230  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

battle.  What  this  man  performed  with  cavalry  and 
the  inestimable  damage  he  inflicted  on  his  opponent 
are  worth  studying.  The  fortune  of  war,  which  lay 
in  might  and  in  the  nature  of  things,  he  could  not  turn. 

Such  was  Stuart's  ride  around  McClellan  ;  the 
two  armies  stood  still  as  spectators. 

A  raid  is  a  predatory  incursion,  generally  against 
the  supplies  and  communications  of  an  enemy. 
The  object  of  a  raid  is  to  embarrass  an  enemy  by 
striking  a  vulnerable  point  and  destroying  his 
subsistence.  The  operation  should  be  in  coopera- 
tion with,  but  independent  of,  an  army.  But 
Stuart's  march  was  a  combined  movement  with 
Ewell  and  not  a  raid.  His  objective  was  Ewell's 
flank  on  the  Susquehanna.  The  spoil  he  captured 
was  an  incident,  not  the  object,  of  the  march. 
It  was  no  more  a  raid  than  if  he  had  crossed  the 
Blue  Ridge,  as  he  was  authorized  by  Lee,  and 
travelled  to  join  Ewell  by  a  route  on  which  he 
would  have  no  opportunity  for  adventure.  But 
General  Lee's  orders  show  that  he  was  not  in- 
different either  to  the  embarrassment  of  the  enemy 
or  to  the  spoil  he  might  capture.  Ewell  already 
had  an  abundance  of  cavalry  for  ordinary  out- 
post duty.  It  was  the  personality  of  Stuart  that 
was  needed  —  not  cavalry. 

During   this   campaign,    the   operations   of   the 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    231 

cavalry  were  coordinate  with  the  movements  of 
the  army  as  a  unit.  On  the  evening  of  June  27, 
Lee  arrived  at  Chambersburg,  while  Hill  turned 
east  and  went  on  seven  miles.  This  shows  that 
General  Lee  did  not  intend  to  move  farther  north, 
but  to  concentrate  in  that  vicinity.  Ewell  had 
reached  Carlisle  —  thirty  miles  distant.  So  Lee 
wrote  him  on  the  evening  of  the  twenty-seventh 
to  return  to  Chambersburg  and  informed  him  that 
Hooker  had  crossed  the  Potomac.  This  dispatch 
is  not  in  the  war  records.  But  it  seems  that  Lee 
changed  his  mind  and,  at  7.30  A.M.  on  the  twenty- 
eighth,  in  a  second  letter  repeated  the  substance 
of  what  he  wrote  Ewell  "last  night" ,  and  directed 
him  that,  if  he  had  not  already  started,  he  move 
south  with  his  trains,  but  east  of  South  Mountain. 
It  is  clear  that  Ewell's  destination  was  Cashtown 
—  a  village  at  the  eastern  base  of  the  mountain  — 
eight  miles  west  of  Gettysburg.  Discretion  was 
given  to  him  as  to  the  roads  he  should  travel. 
Ewell's  and  Early's  reports  say  that  Cashtown  was 
the  appointed  rendezvous ;  Lee's  that  it  was 
Gettysburg.  Cashtown  was  occupied  on  June 
28  by  a  part  of  Heth's  division.  In  the  next  two 
days  Hill  moved  with  two  divisions  to  that  point. 
Ewell  had  detached  Early's  division  to  make  a 
demonstration    towards    the    Susquehanna.     On 


232  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

the  way  Gordon's  brigade  spent  a  night  at  Gettys- 
burg, but  it  moved  on  and  joined  Early  at  York. 
If  Gettysburg  had  been  Lee's  objective,  he  would 
have  held  it  when  he  had  it. 

Lee's  report  says  that  on  the  night  of  June  28  a 
spy  came  in  and  informed  him  that  Hooker  was 
following  him.  The  news,  the  report  says,  was  a 
surprise  ;  that  he  had  thought  Hooker's  army  was 
in  Virginia,  that  he  had  expected  Stuart  to  give 
him  notice  when  Hooker  crossed  the  Potomac ; 
and  that  he  abandoned  a  campaign  he  had  planned 
against  Harrisburg,  recalled  Ewell,  and  ordered 
his  army  to  concentrate  at  Gettysburg.  As  he 
had  uninterrupted  communication  with  the  Poto- 
mac, Lee  knew  that  the  Union  army  must  be 
east  of  the  mountain. 

We  accept  as  of  poetical  origin  the  legends  of 
prehistoric  Rome,  which  Livy  transmitted  ;  but 
it  is  as  easy  to  believe  the  story  of  the  rape  of  the 
Sabines,  or  that  Horatius  stood  alone  on  the  bridge 
over  the  Tiber  against  the  army  of  the  Gauls,  as 
that  Lee  planned  a  campaign  into  Pennsylvania 
on  the  theory  that  his  army  could  march  to  Harris- 
burg and  Hooker's  army  would  stay  on  the  Poto- 
mac. If  Lee  had  not  known,  when  he  was  in 
Maryland,  that  Hooker  was  still  on  his  front,  he 
would  have  marched  directly  to  Washington.     If 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    233 

his  statement  be  true  that  the  news  brought  by  a 
spy  arrested  a  campaign  he  had  planned  to 
Harrisburg,  such  an  anticlimax  would  make  the 
campaign  a  subject  for  a  comic  opera. 

If  a  spy  had  come  from  Frederick  on  June  28, 
he  would  have  reported  that  Hooker's  army  was 
moving  eastward  toward  Baltimore  and  was 
concentrated  at  Frederick.  Colonel  Marshall 
said : 

On  the  night  of  the  28th  of  June  I  was  directed  by 
General  Lee  to  order  General  Ewell  to  move  directly 
upon  Harrisburg,  and  to  inform  him  that  General 
Longstreet  would  move  the  next  morning  (the  29th)  to 
his  support.  General  A.  P.  Hill  was  directed  to  move 
eastward  to  the  Susquehanna,  and  crossing  the  river 
below  Harrisburg,  seize  the  railroad  between  Harper's 
Ferry  and  Philadelphia ;  it  being  supposed  that  such 
a  movement  would  divert  all  reinforcements  that 
otherwise  might  be  coming  to  General  Hooker  to  the 
defense  of  that  city ;  and  that  there  would  be  such 
alarm  created  by  their  movement  that  the  Federal 
Government  would  be  obliged  to  withdraw  its  army 
from  Virginia  and  abandon  any  plan  it  might  have  for 
attack  upon  Richmond.  I  sent  the  orders  about  10 
o'clock  at  night  to  General  Ewell  and  General  Hill 
and  had  just  returned  to  my  tent  when  I  was  sent  for 
by  the  Commanding  General.  I  went  to  his  tent  and 
found  him  sitting  with  a  man  in  citizen's  dress,  who, 
General  Lee  informed  me,  was  a  scout  of  General  Long- 


234  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

street's  who  had  just  been  brought  to  him.  He  told 
me  that  this  scout  had  left  the  neighborhood  of  Fred- 
erick that  morning  and  had  brought  information  that 
the  Federal  army  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  moving 
northward ;  and  that  the  advance  had  reached  Fred- 
erick and  was  moving  westward  towards  the  Moun- 
tains. The  scout  also  informed  General  Lee  that 
General  Meade  was  then  in  command  of  the  army ; 
and  also  as  to  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  which  was 
the  first  information  General  Lee  had  received  since 
he  left  Virginia.  .  .  .  While  making  this  march  the 
only  information  he  possessed  led  him  to  believe  that 
the  army  of  the  enemy  was  moving  westward  from 
Frederick  to  throw  itself  upon  his  line  of  communica- 
tions with  Virginia ;  and  the  object  was,  as  I  have 
stated,  simply  to  arrest  this  supposed  plan  on  the  east 
side  of  the  mountain.  .  .  .  By  reason  of  the  absence 
of  the  cavalry  his  own  army,  marching  eastward  from 
Chambersburg  and  southward  from  Carlisle,  came  un- 
expectedly on  the  Federal  advance  on  the  first  day  of 
July. 

Marshall  said  that  Lee  countermanded  his  orders 
to  Ewell  and  Hill  to  move  to  the  Susquehanna 
and  ordered  them  to  Gettysburg,  in  order  to 
counteract  a  movement  against  his  communica- 
tions. He  did  not  mention  Lee's  letter  of  7.30 
a.m.,  June  28,  which  contradicts  the  story  of  the 
spy  at  Chambersburg  on  the  night  of  June  28. 
That  letter  shows  that  when  it  was  written,  Lee 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN     235 

thought  that  Hooker's  army  was  still  holding 
the  Gaps  in  Maryland,  and  had  not  heard  that  it 
had  been  withdrawn  to  Frederick.  Lee  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  uneasy  about  his  communica- 
tions. Instead  of  ordering  Ewell  to  proceed  to 
Harrisburg,  he  directed  him  to  return  to  Cash- 
town.  It  is  inconceivable  that  he  could  have 
ordered  A.  P.  Hill  to  cross  the  Susquehanna  and 
threaten  Philadelphia,  and  at  the  same  time  should 
have  ordered  Early,  at  York,  to  come  back  to  the 
Cumberland  Valley.  They  would  have  passed 
each  other  marching  in  opposite  directions.  If 
the  7.30  a.m.  letter  should  have  been  dated  the 
twenty-ninth,  as  has  been  suggested,  then  neither 
of  Lee's  letters  to  Ewell  could  have  reached  him 
at  Carlisle,  as  he  would  have  left  there  before 
they  arrived.  Lee  had  written  to  Mr.  Davis 
that  he  would  have  to  abandon  his  communica- 
tions ;  but  if  Hooker  had  moved  west  to  intercept 
them,  I  am  sure  that  General  Lee  would  have 
imitated  Napoleon  at  Austerlitz  and  marched  to 
Washington. 

Lee's  report  on  the  Gettysburg  campaign  was 
published  immediately  and  made  a  deep  and 
almost  indelible  impression.  It  is  really  a  law- 
yer's brief  and  shows  the  skill  of  the  advocate  in 
the  art  of  suppression  and  suggestion.     Stuart's 


236  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

report,  dated  August  20,  1863,  is  a  respectful 
answer,  but  it  was  buried  in  the  Confederate 
archives.  General  Lee  made  a  more  elaborate 
report,  in  January,  1864,  which  repeated  the 
implications  of  the  first  in  regard  to  the  cavalry, 
but  contradicted  what  it  said  about  his  orders  for 
the  concentration  at  Gettysburg.  Of  course,  he 
knew  his  own  orders  as  well  in  July  as  in  January. 
Now  the  essence  of  the  complaint  against  Stuart 
is  that  the  cavalry  —  the  eyes  of  an  army  —  were 
improperly  absent ;  that  the  Confederate  army 
was  ordered  by  Lee  to  Gettysburg,  and,  Colonel 
Marshall  and  Lee's  Assistant  Adjutant  General, 
Colonel  Walter  Taylor,  said,  and  the  report 
implies,  ran  unexpectedly  against  the  enemy. 
But  the  charge  falls  to  the  ground  when  Lee's 
second  report  admits  that  the  army  was  not 
ordered  to  Gettysburg,  and  that  the  force  that 
went  there  was  only  making  a  reconnaissance. 
However,  the  report  does  not  say  that  there  was 
any  order  for  a  reconnaissance,  or  any  necessity 
for  making  one.  Neither  does  it  explain  why 
Hill  did  not  come  back  to  Cashtown,  nor  why 
Lee  followed  him  to  Gettysburg.  Hill's  report 
says  that  on  the  thirtieth  he  sent  a  dispatch  to 
General  Lee,  telling  him  that  the  enemy  held 
Gettysburg.     A  collision,  then,  could  not  be  un- 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    237 

expected  —  if  he  went  there.  If,  as  Lee's  report 
says,  the  spy  brought  news  on  the  twenty-eighth 
that  the  Union  army  was  at  Frederick,  it  could  not 
have  been  expected  to  stand  still ;  nor  a  surprise 
to  learn  that  it  was  moving  north. 

But  there  is  even  less  color  to  the  truth  or  jus- 
tice in  the  complaint,  when  it  is  known  that  the 
story  that  a  spy  diverted  the  army  from  Harris- 
burg  is  a  fable,  and  that  Hill  and  Heth  went  off 
without  orders  and  without  Lee's  knowledge  on  a 
raid  and  precipitated  a  battle.  There  is  a  satis- 
factory explanation  for  Stuart's  absence  that  day, 
but  a  man  who  has  to  make  an  explanation  is 
always  at  a  disadvantage. 

Colonel  Taylor  does  not  seem  to  have  known 
where  Lee's  headquarters  were  on  the  morning  of 
July  1,  for  he  said  that  A.  P.  Hill  had  a  conference 
at  Cashtown  with  General  Lee  before  he  started. 
If  so,  Lee  was  responsible  for  the  blunder.  Hill's 
and  Heth's  reports  say  that  they  left  Cashtown  at 
5  A.M.,  and  soon  ran  against  the  enemy.  Lee's 
headquarters  were  then  ten  miles  distant  west  of 
the  mountain  at  Greenwood.  There  was  no  long 
distance  'phone  over  which  he  might  talk  with 
Hill.  That  morning  Lee  wrote  to  Imboden,  in 
his  rear,  and  said,  "My  headquarters  for  the 
present  will  be  at  Cashtown,  east  of  the  moun- 


238  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

tain."  This  letter  is  copied  in  his  dispatch  book 
in  the  handwriting  of  Colonel  Marshall,  who 
wrote  Lee's  report  which  states  that  Lee  at 
Chambersburg,  after  the  spy  came  in,  ordered 
the  army  to  Gettysburg  and  was  unprepared  for 
battle  when  the  armies  met,  placing  the  blame  on 
Stuart.  Yet  this  dispatch  shows  that  on  the 
morning  of  July  I  the  army  had  not  been  ordered 
to  Gettysburg.  Lee  would  not  have  had  his 
headquarters  at  one  place  and  his  army  eight  miles 
off  at  another.  Lee  started  during  the  day  for 
Cashtown,  as  he  told  Imboden  he  would,  and, 
when  crossing  the  mountain,  was  surprised  to  hear 
the  ominous  sound  of  battle.  He  passed  through 
Cashtown  at  full  speed  and  never  saw  the  place 
again.  His  surprise  was  not  at  the  enemy  being 
at  Gettysburg,  but  that  a  part  of  his  army  was 
there.  It  is  remarkable  that  Colonel  Taylor, 
who  was  in  close  relations  with  General  Lee, 
did  not  even  mention  a  projected  movement  to 
Harrisburg  that  was  arrested  by  a  spy. 

Lee's  report  omits  all  reference  to  Ewell's 
march  in  advance  of  the  army  to  the  Susquehanna 
and  the  order  to  Stuart  to  leave  the  army  in  Vir- 
ginia and  join  him.  As  it  complains  that  by  the 
route  he  chose  around  the  Union  army  communi- 
cation with  him  was  broken,  it  is  natural  to  con- 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    239 

elude  from  this  statement,  that  Stuart  disobeyed 
orders  to  keep  in  communication  with  Lee.  The 
report  speaks  of  Ewell's  entering  Maryland  and 
says  that  Longstreet  and  Hill  followed  and  that  the 
columns  were  reunited  at  Hagerstown.  The  infer- 
ence is  that  the  three  corps  united  at  that  place 
and  that  Stuart  was  directed  to  join  them  in 
Maryland.  The  fact  is  that  Ewell  was  then  some 
days  in  advance  in  Pennsylvania  and  that  the 
three  corps  united  on  the  field  of  Gettysburg. 

Stuart,  says  the  report,  was  left  to  guard  the 
passes,  observe  the  movements  of  the  enemy, 
and  harass  and  impede  him  if  he  attempted  to 
cross  the  Potomac.  "In  that  event  (Hooker's 
crossing)  he  was  directed  to  move  into  Maryland, 
crossing  the  Potomac  east  or  west  of  the  Blue 
Ridge,  as  in  his  judgment  should  be  best,  and  take 
position  on  the  right  of  our  column  as  it  advanced." 

Stuart's  crossing  the  Potomac  did  not  depend 
on  Hooker's  crossing,  and  he  had  no  such  instruc- 
tions. Lee's  orders  to  Stuart,  which  I  repeat, 
were,  "In  either  case  after  crossing  the  river 
(whether  you  go  by  the  eastern  or  western  route) 
you  must  move  on  and  feel  the  right  of  Ewell's 
troops,  collecting  information,  provisions,  etc." 
The  report  states  a  part  of  the  truth  in  saying 
that  Stuart  had  the  discretion  to  cross  the  Poto- 


240  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

mac  east  or  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  but  it  omits 
the  whole  truth  and  that  he  also  had  authority  to 
pass  by  the  enemy's  rear.  That  was  the  only 
route  he  could  go  if  he  crossed  east  of  the  Ridge. 
As  the  report  complains  of  the  Union  army  being 
interposed  and  preventing  communication  with 
him  by  the  route  he  went,  the  inference  is  that 
Stuart  violated  orders  in  passing  by  the  enemy's 
rear.  Stuart  had  no  orders,  as  stated  in  the  report, 
about  guarding  the  Gaps,  impeding  the  enemy, 
and  reporting  his  movements,  nor  to  watch  Hooker 
in  Virginia  and  forage  for  Ewell  on  the  Susque- 
hanna. Such  an  expectation  implies  a  belief  that 
Stuart  possessed  a  supernatural  genius. 

The  report  speaks  of  Stuart's  efforts  to  impede 
the  progress  of  the  Northern  army.  He  made 
no  such  efforts  —  he  had  no  such  orders  —  it 
impeded  him.  The  report  makes  no  mention  of 
the  use  that  Lee  and  Longstreet  made  of  the  two 
cavalry  brigades  which  Stuart  left  with  them. 
They  must  have  done  their  duty,  for  there  was  no 
complaint  that  they  did  not. 

To  return  to  Lee  at  Chambersburg.  On  the 
night  of  the  twenty-seventh  he  had  written  to 
Ewell  at  Carlisle  that  Hooker  had  crossed  the 
Potomac  and  was  in  the  Middletown  Valley  at 
the  east  end  of  the  Gaps,   and  directed  him  to 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN     241 

return  to  Chambersburg.  It  was  time  to  con- 
centrate the  army.  But  Lee  changed  his  mind, 
and,  at  7.30  A.M.  on  the  twenty-eighth  he  again 
wrote  Ewell,  repeating  what  he  had  told  him  in 
the  "last  night"  letter  about  Hooker,  but  directed 
him  to  move  south  by  the  pike  and  east  of  the 
mountain.  He  did  not  mention  Meade,  who  had 
not  then  been  placed  in  command.  The  letter  is 
indefinite  as  to  the  point  of  concentration  —  that 
was  evidently  a  precaution  in  the  event  of  its 
capture.  Such  an  important  dispatch  would  be 
sent  by  a  staff  officer  so  that  he  might  explain 
it  orally,  and,  as  they  were  in  the  enemy's 
country,  he  would  have  a  cavalry  escort.  Ewell 
sent  a  copy  of  this  dispatch,  by  a  staff  officer, 
to  Early,  thirty-six  miles  away  at  York.  It 
could  not  have  been  written  after  the  night  of  the 
twenty-seventh.  Early  said  that  he  received  it 
on  the  evening  of  the  twenty-ninth  and  started 
the  next  morning  to  unite  with  Ewell  west  of  the 
mountain,  but  during  the  day  he  met  a  courier 
with  a  dispatch  from  Ewell,  informing  him  of  the 
change  of  destination.  This  statement  proves 
that  Ewell  at  Carlisle  received  two  letters  from 
Lee.  Although  he  sent  a  copy  of  Lee's  first  order 
to  Early,  in  his  report  Ewell  only  referred  to  the 
second  order  under  which  he  marched  with  Rodes's 


242  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

division  for  Cash  town.  Edward  Johnson's  divi- 
sion left  Carlisle  for  Chambersburg  on  the  morning 
of  the  twenty-ninth,  before  the  second  order 
arrived,  and  marched  to  Green  Village  —  twenty 
miles  —  that  day. 

Lee's  dispatch  of  the  night  of  the  twenty- 
seventh  could  not  have  reached  Carlisle  before 
the  evening  of  the  twenty-eighth.  If  it  had  been 
written  on  the  night  of  the  twenty-eighth,  it  could 
not  have  reached  Ewell  before  he  got  to  Harris- 
burg.  The  trains  probably  started  back  that 
night  before  Edward  Johnson  left,  as  they  were 
passing  Chambersburg  at  midnight  on  the  twenty- 
ninth.  They  probably  halted  in  the  heat  of  the 
day  as  was  the  custom,  to  rest  and  feed  th~ 
animals.  Lee  directed  Ewell,  if  he  received  the 
second  order  in  time,  to  move  south  with  the 
trains  by  the  eastern  route.  So  it  is  clear  that 
Early's  and  Johnson's  divisions  marched  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  order  of  the  twenty-seventh, 
which  Ewell  did  not  mention. 

Early  said  he  met  Ewell  that  evening  (June 
30)  with  Rodes's  division  near  Heidlersburg. 
Rodes  told  him  that  Cashtown  was  to  be  the  point 
of  concentration  and  that  he  was  to  march  there 
the  next  morning.  On  July  1  Ewell  had  started, 
with  Rodes's  and  Early's  divisions,  on  the  road 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    243 

to  Cashtown,  when  he  received  a  note  from  Hill 
that  turned  him  off  to  Gettysburg.  Ewell  left 
Carlisle  with  Rodes's  division  on  the  thirtieth, 
after  he  had  received  Lee's  second  letter  changing 
his  destination.  Ewell  said,  "  I  was  starting  on  the 
twenty-ninth  for  that  place  (Harrisburg)  when 
ordered  by  the  General  Commanding  to  join  the 
main  body  at  Cashtown,  near  Gettysburg."  Al- 
though two  of  his  divisions  marched  under  the  first 
order,  Ewell's  report  speaks  only  of  the  second 
order.  He  is  clearly  inaccurate  in  saying  that  the 
second  order  to  move  south  to  Cashtown  was  the 
cause  of  his  halting  at  Carlisle.  He  had  already 
been  halted  by  the  first  order.  On  this  lapse  of  the 
pen  is  based  the  quibble  that  the  date  (June  27)  of 
Lee's  letter  to  Ewell  is  wrong,  and  Edward  John- 
son's division  had  started  back  to  Chambersburg. 
The  time  of  the  marching  of  Ewell's  three  divisions 
accords  with  the  dates  of  the  two  letters,  and 
proves  that  before  the  spy  is  alleged  to  have 
appeared  —  the  night  of  the  twenty-eighth  — 
Lee  had  sent  orders  to  Ewell  to  return  to 
Chambersburg,  and  that  he  afterwards  directed 
him  to  Cashtown.  In  these  letters  he  told  Ewell 
where  Hooker's,  not  Meade's,  army  was.  Again, 
Lee's  report  says  that  as  the  spy  had  informed  him 
on  the  night  of  the  twenty-eighth  that  the  head  of 


244  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

Hooker's  column  had  reached  the  South  Moun- 
tain, which  was  a  menace  to  his  communications, 
he  resolved  to  concentrate  at  Gettysburg,  east  of 
the  mountain,  to  prevent  his  further  progress, 
and  that  he  issued  orders  accordingly. 

But  Lee,  on  the  night  of  the  twenty-seventh 
and  morning  of  the  twenty-eighth,  had  directed 
the  army  to  return.  As  he  ordered  Ewell  back 
to  Chambersburg  on  the  night  of  the  twenty- 
seventh  and  then  to  Cashtown  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  twenty-eighth,  the  statement  that 
he  was  preparing  to  move  on  to  Harrisburg 
when  the  spy  came  in  on  the  night  of  the  twenty- 
eighth  and  brought  news  that  Hooker  was  in 
pursuit  cannot  stand  the  test  of  reason.  If  the 
order  to  Ewell  to  return  had  been  issued  after  the 
spy  is  alleged  to  have  come  in,  it  would  not  have 
overtaken  Ewell  before  he  got  to  Harrisburg.  Nor 
could  the  order  to  concentrate  at  Cashtown  have 
been  the  consequence  of  news  brought  by  the 
alleged  spy,  as  it  had  been  issued  before  it  is  said 
that  the  spy  came.  If  Gettysburg  had  been 
Lee's  objective,  he  could  easily  have  occupied 
it  on  the  twenty-ninth,  before  Meade  left  Fred- 
erick. As  Lee's  Chambersburg  letter  contradicts 
his  report,  his  biographers  did  not  mention  it. 

Lee's  second  report  speaks  of  two  cavalry  bri- 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN     245 

gades  being  in  Virginia  to  guard  the  Gaps,  and 
says  that  as  soon  as  it  was  known  that  the  enemy- 
was  in  Maryland,  orders  were  sent  them  to  join 
the  army.  They  were  not  put  there  to  guard  the 
Gaps,  for  the  Gaps  did  not  need  a  guard.  Their 
instructions  were  to  watch  and  report  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy  to  General  Lee  and  to  follow 
on  the  flank  of  the  army  when  the  enemy  moved 
from  their  front.  On  the  night  of  June  27 
Hooker's  rear  guard  crossed  the  river,  and  on  the 
twenty-ninth  the  two  cavalry  brigades  crossed 
the  Blue  Ridge  and  arrived  at  Chambersburg 
on  the  night  of  July  2.  If  an  order  was  sent  for 
them  after  the  spy  came  in,  as  the  report  says,  it 
could  not  have  reached  them  on  the  twenty-ninth 
in  Loudoun  County,  Virginia,  before  they  started. 
They  marched  in  accordance  with  Stuart's  orders. 
The  allegation  is  that  the  Confederate  army 
was  surprised  at  Gettysburg  on  account  of  the 
absence  of  the  cavalry.  The  gist  of  the  complaint 
is  that  Gettysburg  was  Lee's  objective,  as  his 
first  report  says ;  that  the  leading  divisions  of 
Hill's  corps  ran  unexpectedly  against  the  enemy 
there ;  and  that  he  had  to  fight  a  battle  under 
duress  to  save  his  trains.  The  trains  were  then 
in  the  Cashtown  Pass,  and  Longstreet's  corps 
and    Imboden's   command    were    at    the    western 


246  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

end  of  it,  while  Lee,  with  two  corps,  was  at  the 
other  end.  Now  the  party  surprised  is,  as  a  rule, 
the  party  attacked.  But  in  the  three  days' 
fighting  around  Gettysburg,  Lee's  army  was  the 
assailant  all  the  time  and  got  the  better  of  it  on 
the  first  and  second  days.  If  Lee  had  selected 
Gettysburg  as  a  battleground,  it  is  strange  that  he 
should  apologize  for  fighting  there.  General  Lee 
was  surprised  by  A.  P.  Hill  —  not  by  the  enemy. 
It  is  a  curious  thing  that  Lee's  report  should  have 
shielded  A.  P.  Hill  and  Heth,  who  broke  up  his 
plan  of  campaign.  It  is  not  claimed  that  Lee 
needed  cavalry  in  the  battle,  but  before  the  battle, 
to  bring  him  intelligence.  How  he  suffered  in 
this  respect  his  report  does  not  indicate,  but  it 
says  that  the  spy  told  him  where  the  enemy  were 
on  the  night  of  the  twenty-eighth  when  Meade's 
army  was  fifty  miles  away  at  Frederick.  If  this 
was  the  case,  Lee  had  ample  time  to  concentrate 
at  Gettysburg.  If  he  had  this  information,  it  is 
immaterial  how  he  got  it.  Nobody  can  show  that 
Lee  did  anything  or  left  anything  undone  for  want 
of  informatioti  that  cavalry  could  have  given  him. 

Stuart  was  absent  from  the  battlefield  on  the 
first  day  because  he  was  away  doing  his  duty 
under  orders,  and  two  divisions  of  Meade's  cavalry 
were  in  pursuit  of  him.     Lee  and  Longstreet  were 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN     247 

absent  from  the  field  on  that  day  because  they 
did  not  expect  a  battle  at  Gettysburg,  and  did 
not  have  foreknowledge  of  what  Hill  and  Heth 
were  going  to  do.  While  the  spy  that  is  alleged 
to  have  appeared  on  the  stage  at  night  and  to  have 
changed  the  program  of  invasion  is  an  invention 
for  dramatic  effect,  a  spy  did  appear  in  a  common- 
place way  two  days  afterwards,  when  the  army  was 
on  the  march  to  Cashtown.  He  brought  interest- 
ing but  unimportant  news. 

Colonel  Freemantle,  an  English  officer  and  a 
guest  at  Longstreet's  headquarters,  said  in  his 
diary : 

June  30th,  Tuesday.  .  .  .  We  marched  from 
Chambersburg  six  miles  on  the  road  toward  Gettys- 
burg. In  the  evening  General  Longstreet  told  me 
that  he  had  just  received  intelligence  that  Hooker  had 
been  disrated  and  Meade  was  appointed  in  his  place. 

In  another  item  Freemantle  alluded  to  a  spy. 
So  it  was  on  the  thirtieth,  after  Lee  had  left 
Chambersburg,  and  not  on  the  twenty-eighth 
of  June,  that  a  spy  reported.  Longstreet  had  a 
picture  of  the  spy  in  his  book,  and  under  it  was 
inscribed  that  he  brought  the  first  news  that 
Meade  was  in  command.  The  report  makes  news 
brought  by  a  spy  the  cause  of  what  had  occurred 
before  it  was  brought. 


248  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

Marshall  said  that  the  spy  appeared  at  head- 
quarters on  the  night  of  the  twenty-eighth  and 
told  of  the  change  of  commanders,  and  he  also 
said  how  much  surprised  Lee  was  to  hear  that 
Hooker  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  that  he 
spoke  of  returning  to  Virginia.  Now  it  is  be- 
tween fifty  and  sixty  miles  from  Frederick  City, 
where  Meade  took  command  of  the  army  on  the 
afternoon  of  that  day  (June  28),  to  Chambers- 
burg.  The  order  for  the  change  was  kept  a 
secret  until  it  was  published  that  evening.  Every 
road,  path,  and  gap  was  closely  picketed.  The 
spirit  in  "Manfred"  that  rode  on  the  wind  and 
left  the  hurricane  behind  might  have  made  the 
trip  in  that  time,  but  no  mortal  could  have  done 
it.  In  this  use  of  a  spy,  the  author  of  the  report 
imitated  a  Greek  dramatist  who  brought  down  a 
god  from  the  clouds  to  assist  in  the  catastrophe 
of  his  tragedies. 

i  Lee's  report  says  that  the  spy  informed  him 
that  the  Union  army  had  reached  South  Mountain. 
It  was  there  when  Lee  was  in  Maryland.  But  if 
the  spy  had  just  come  out  of  Hooker's  lines,  as 
Marshall  said,  and  told  of  the  change  in  com- 
manders, he  would  also  have  told  that  the  army 
had  been  withdrawn  from  the  mountain  on  the 
twenty-seventh  and   had   marched   east  to  Fred- 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    249 

erick  City.  Lee's  letter  to  Ewell  speaks  of  Hooker  s 
army,  which  shows  that  he  had  not  heard  of  any 
change  of  commanders  when  it  was  written  — 
and  there  had  not  been  —  and  he  does  not  men- 
tion Meade.  The  tale  of  the  spy  must  take  its 
place  with  Banquo's  ghost  and  other  theatrical 
fictions. 

On  June  30,  Heth,  with  his  division,  was  at 
Cashtown  and  sent  Pettigrew,  with  his  brigade, 
to  Gettysburg  to  get  a  lot  of  shoes  that  were 
said  to  be  there.  When  Pettigrew  got  in  sight 
of  the  place,  he  saw  a  body  of  cavalry  coming  in ; 
so  he  returned  and  reported  to  Heth  —  who 
proposed  to  go  there  the  next  morning.  The 
cavalry  was  Buford's  division,  which  kept  close 
to  Meade's  left  flank.  At  5  a.m.  on  July  1,  Hill, 
with  Heth's  and  Pender's  divisions  and  artillery, 
left  camp  for  Gettysburg  in  the  same  spirit  of 
adventure  that  took  Earl  Percy  to  hunt  the  deer 
at  Chevy  Chase.  They  evidently  intended  a 
raid  and  to  return  to  camp  and  meet  Lee  that 
evening.  All  of  the  impedimenta  were  left  behind. 
General  Lee  would  be  at  Cashtown  that  day, 
and  the  army  would  be  concentrated  by  evening. 
Lee  said  that  he  had  no  idea  of  taking  the  offensive. 
Heth's  leading  brigade,  Archer's,  soon  ran  against 
Buford's  pickets ;    the  latter  fought  his  cavalry 


250  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

dismounted  and  checked  Heth  until  Reynolds 
arrived.  Reynolds  had  left  his  camp  early  that 
morning  for  Gettysburg  before  Meade's  order 
had  come  to  retire  to  Pipe  Creek.  Heth's  report 
reads : 

It  may  not  be  improper  to  remark  that  at  this  time  — 
nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  July  1st —  I  was  igno- 
rant what  force  was  at  or  near  Gettysburg,  and  sup- 
posed it  consisted  of  cavalry,  most  probably  supported 
by  a  brigade  or  two  of  infantry.  .  .  .  Archer  and 
Davis  were  now  directed  to  advance,  the  object  being 
to  feel  the  enemy,  to  make  a  forced  reconnaissance 
and  determine  in  what  force  they  were  —  whether  or 
not  he  was  massing  his  forces  on  Gettysburg.  Heavy 
columns  of  the  enemy  were  soon  encountered.  .  .  . 
General  Davis  was  unable  to  hold  his  position. 

Archer's  brigade  was  soon  shattered,  and  he 
and  a  large  portion  of  his  brigade  were  captured. 
If  Heth  had  any  curiosity  about  the  enemy  being 
there  in  force,  he  and  Hill  ought  now  to  have  been 
satisfied  and  should  have  retired  —  that  is,  if  they 
were  only  seeking  information.  But  Pender's 
division  was  now  put  in  to  support  Heth's  and  was 
faring  no  better.  Hill  would  have  been  driven 
back  to  Cashtown,  but  Ewell,  without  orders, 
came  to  his  relief  and  won  the  day.  Early's 
division  gave  the  final  stroke  as  he  did    at    Bull 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    251 

Run.  Hill  said  that  his  division  was  so  exhausted 
that  it  could  not  join  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy. 
Yet  he  called  the  affair,  which  had  lasted  nearly  a 
whole  day,  a  reconnaissance  just  to  conceal  his 
blunder. 

After  the  war,  Heth  published  an  article  in 
which  he  said  nothing  about  their  making  a  re- 
connaissance, but  that  they  went  for  shoes.  He 
claimed  that  he  and  Hill  were  surprised  and  said 
it  was  on  account  of  the  want  of  cavalry,  yet  both 
said  they  knew  the  enemy  was  there.  The  want 
of  cavalry  might  have  been  a  good  reason  for 
not  going  there  —  it  was  a  poor  one  for  going. 
Heth  did  not  pretend  that  he  and  Hill  had  orders 
to  go  to  Gettysburg,  nor  was  there  any  necessity 
for  their  going.  All  that  the  army  had  to  do  was 
to  live  on  the  country  and  wait  for  the  enemy  at 
Cashtown  Pass  —  as  Lee  intended  to  do. 

The  truth  is  that  General  Lee  was  so  com- 
promised by  his  corps  commanders  that  he  stayed 
on  the  field  and  fought  the  battle  on  a  point  of 
honor.  To  withdraw  would  have  had  the  appear- 
ance of  defeat  and  have  given  the  moral  effect  of 
a  victory  to  the  enemy.  A  shallow  criticism  has 
objected  that  Lee  repeated  Hooker's  operation 
with  his  cavalry  at  Chancellorsville.  Both  Lee 
and   Hooker  did   right ;    both   retained   sufficient 


252  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

cavalry  with  the  main  body  for  observation  and 
outpost  duty.  The  difference  in  the  conditions 
was  that  Lee  sent  Stuart  to  join  Ewell,  and  the 
damage  he  would  do  on  the  way  would  be  simply 
incidental  to  the  march.  Hooker's  object  in 
detaching  his  cavalry,  on  the  other  hand,  was  to 
destroy  Lee's  supplies  and  communications.  With 
his  superior  numbers  Hooker  had  a  right  to  cal- 
culate on  defeating  Lee,  and,  in  that  event,  his 
cavalry  would  bar  Lee's  retreat  as  Grant's  did  at 
Appomattox. 

That  the  inventions  of  the  staff  officers  have 
been  accepted  by  historians  as  true  is  the  most 
remarkable  thing  in  literary  history  since  the 
Chatterton  forgeries.  But  the  history  of  the 
world   is  a   record   of  judgments   reversed. 

I  have  told  in  brief  the  story  of  Gettysburg,  of 
the  way  in  which  defeat  befell  the  great  Con- 
federate commander,  and  have  criticised  the 
report  which  has  his  signature,  but  which  it  is 
well  known  was  written  by  another.  It  does  as 
great  injustice  to  Lee  as  to  Stuart.  Lee  may 
have  had  so  much  confidence  in  the  writer  that 
he  signed  it  without  reading  it,  or,  if  it  was  read 
to  him,  he  was  in  the  mental  condition  of  the  dying 
gladiator  in  the  Coliseum  —  his  mind 

"Was  with  his  heart,  and  that  was  far  away." 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    253 

Stuart  was  the  protagonist  in  the  great  drama, 
and  no  other  actor  performed  his  part  so  well. 
In  a  late  work  by  Colonel  Furse,  of  the  English 
army,  we  read  : 

Stuart  was  a  genial  man  of  gay  spirits  and  energetic 
habits,  popular  with  his  men  and  trusted  by  his  su- 
periors as  no  other  officer  in  the  Confederate  army. 
His  authority  was  exercised  mildly  but  firmly ;  no 
man  in  the  South  was  better  qualified  to  mould  the 
wild  element  he  controlled  into  soldiers.  His  raids 
made  him  a  lasting  name  and  his  daring  exploits  will 
ever  find  a  record  alongside  the  deeds  of  the  most 
famous  cavalry  leaders.  He  was  mortally  wounded  in 
an  encounter  with  Sheridan's  cavalry  at  Yellow  Tav- 
ern, May,  1864,  and  died  a  few  days  afterward. 

I  will  add  that  after  General  Lee  lost  Stuart 
he  had  no  cavalry  corps  and  no  Chief  of  Cavalry. 
No  one  was  there  who  could  bend  the  bow  of 
Ulysses. 

"And  these  are  deeds  which  should  not  pass  away 
And  names  that  must  not  wither,  though  the  earth 
Forgets  her  empire  with  a  just  decay." 

[The  defence  of  Stuart's  conduct  in  the  Gettys- 
burg campaign  occupied  Mosby's  study  and 
thought  over  a  considerable  period  of  years.  His 
championship  of  his  beloved  chief  resulted  in 
various  controversies,   to  some  of  which  acrimo- 


254  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

nious  may  be  truthfully  applied,  as  well  as  in 
considerable  writing  and  publication  on  the  sub- 
ject. The  account  given  in  these  pages  was  his 
final  work  and  seems  to  answer  all  criticisms  which 
have  been  aimed  at  his  conclusions.  The  follow- 
ing letter  to  Mrs.  Stuart  explains,  in  a  measure, 
some  of  his  work  on  the  Gettysburg  campaign 
and  the  discussions  which  followed.] 

Washington,  D.C., 
June  9,  1915. 
Mrs.  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart : 
Dear  Mrs.  Stuart : 

I  have  received  your  letter  in  reply  to  mine  inquiring 
if  you  had  any  unpublished  correspondence  left  by 
General  Stuart  which  I  might  use  in  my  Memoirs  of 
the  war  which  I  am  preparing.  I  return  McClellan's 
letter  which  is  dated  March  22nd,  1899.1  He  claims 
credit  for  having  first  published,  in  reply  to  Colonel 
Marshall,  General  Lee's  and  Longstreet's  orders  to 
General  Stuart  which  authorized  him  to  go  the  route 
in  rear  of  Hooker's  army  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign. 
Governor  Stuart  and  you  know  that  this  is  not  true. 
...  In  the  winter  of  1886-87  I  was  in  Washington 
settling  my  accounts  as  Consul  at  Hong  Kong.  Long- 
street  about  that  time  had  an  article  in  the  Century 
charging  General  Stuart  with  disobedience  of  orders ; 
and  Long's  "Memoirs  of  Lee "  also  appeared  about  the 

1  Major  H.  B.  McClcllan,  author  of  "The  Life  and  Campaigns  of 
General  Stuart",  Boston  and  Richmond,  1885. 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    255 

same  time  with  a  similar  charge.  As  I  knew  the  inside 
history  of  the  transaction  and  that  the  charge  was 
false,  I  went  to  the  office  where  the  Confederate  ar- 
chives were  kept  and  got  permission  to  examine  them. 
The  three  volumes  of  the  Gettysburg  records  had  not 
then  been  published.  Colonel  Scott  gave  me  a  large 
envelope  that  had  the  reports  and  correspondence  of 
the  campaign  on  printed  slips.  Very  soon  I  discovered 
Lee's  and  Longstreet's  instructions  to  Stuart  to  do  the 
very  thing  that  he  did.  I  was  delighted  and  so  ex- 
pressed myself  to  Colonel  Scott.  He  was  surprised 
that  McClellan  had  made  no  use  of  them  and  told  me 
that  McClellan  had  spent  several  days  in  his  office 
and  that  he  had  given  him  the  same  envelope  and 
papers  that  he  had  given  me.  I  told  Mr.  Henry  Stuart, 
whom  I  met  at  the  National  Hotel,  all  about  my  dis- 
covery and  that  I  should  reply  to  Longstreet  and  pub- 
lish this  evidence  to  contradict  him  and  Long.  I  also 
wrote  to  Mr.  Wm.  A.  Stuart  and  to  McClellan  of  my 
discovery  and  told  them  that  I  should  reply  to  Long- 
street.  Mr.  Stuart  advised  me  to  publish  what  I  had 
discovered.  These  documents  with  a  communication 
from  me  appeared  in  the  Century  about  May  or  June, 
1887.  See  "Battles  and  Leaders."  ...  In  1896 
Colonel  Charles  Marshall  delivered  a  violent  philippic 
on  General  Lee's  birthday  against  General  Stuart.  He 
imputed  to  Stuart's  disobedience  all  the  blame  for  the 
Gettysburg  disaster.  I  replied  to  Marshall's  attack 
in  a  syndicated  article  which  was  published  in  Rich- 
mond and  Boston  and  again  published  Lee's  and 
Longstreet's  instructions  to  Stuart.     With  this  article 


256  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

I  also  published  for  the  first  time  Lee's  letter  to  Ewell, 
written  from  Chambersburg  on  June  28th,  1863, 
which  exploded  the  mythical  story  of  the  spy  on  which 
Marshall  had  built  his  fabric  of  fiction.  Some  time 
after  my  article  appeared,  in  reply  to  Marshall,  Mc- 
Clellan  also  published  a  reply  to  him  with  the  docu- 
ments which  I  had  published  nine  years  before  in  the 
Century.  .  .  .  But  McClellan,  like  Lee's  biographers, 
was  silent  about  the  Chambersburg  letter.  That  it 
contradicts  Lee's  report,  which  Marshall  wrote,  is 
admitted  by  Stuart's  critics;  but  to  avoid  the  effect 
of  it  they  say  the  date  in  the  records  is  wrong.  The 
only  evidence  they  produce  is  that  the  report  written 
a  month  afterward  is  not  consistent  with  the  letter. 
That  was  the  reason  I  published  the  letter.  But  I 
have  demonstrated  that  the  time  that  a  copy  of  it 
was  received  by  Early  from  Ewell  and  the  marching  of 
Ewell's  divisions  in  accordance  with  it  confirm  the 
correctness  of  the  date.  McClellan  says  that  Marshall 
had  not  dared  to  answer  him ;  and  I  can  say  that 
although  I  was  the  first  to  attack  him  he  never  dared 
to  answer  me.  He  also  speaks  of  John  C.  Ropes,  of 
Boston,  having  written  him  that  his  answer  was  con- 
clusive. But  Mr.  Ropes  had  read  my  article  in  the 
Boston  Herald  and  had  written  me  the  same  thing  a 
month  before  McClellan's  appeared.  Some  years 
before  I  had  read  a  review  by  Ropes  of  McClellan's 
"Life  of  Stuart",  in  which  he  seemed  to  be  very  friendly 
to  Stuart,  but  he  said  that  McClellan  had  made  a  very 
unsatisfactory  defense  of  him  on  the  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign.    I  then  wrote  to  Ropes  and  sent  him  Belford's 


STUART  AND  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN    257 

Magazine  (October-November,  1891)  with  an  article 
of  mine  that  had  Stuart's  orders  from  Lee  and  Long- 
street.  Ropes  wrote  me  that  my  article  had  changed 
his  opinion,  and  that  in  the  next  volume  of  his  history 
his  views  would  conform  to  mine.  Unfortunately  he 
died  before  the  volume  was  finished.  So  you  see  how 
unfounded  McClellan's  claim  of  precedence  is.  His 
book,  as  I  told  Mr.  Henry  Stuart  nearly  thirty  years 
ago,  does  General  Stuart  great  injustice.  It  deprives 
him  of  the  credit  of  the  ride  around  McClellan  —  I 
heard  Fitz  Lee  urge  General  Stuart  not  to  go  on  —  it 
defends  Fitz  Lee  against  the  just  criticism  of  Stuart's 
report  for  his  disobedience  of  orders  that  saved  Pope's 
army  from  ruin  and  came  near  getting  Stuart  and 
myself  captured;  and  it  represents  the  great  cavalry 
combat  and  victory  at  Brandy  as  "a  successful  recon- 
naissance" by  Pleasanton,  which  means  that  he 
voluntarily  recrossed  the  Rappahannock  after  he  had 
accomplished  his  object  and  not  because  he  was 
defeated.  .  .  . 

Very  truly  yours, 

(Signed)     Jno.  S.  Mosby. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

The  Year  after  Gettysburg 

[The  period  between  the  battle  of  Gettysburg 
and  the  arrival  of  Sheridan  in  Shenandoah  Val- 
ley, in  August,  1864,  was  one  of  incessant  activity 
on  the  part  of  Mosby's  command.  Scouts,  raids, 
and  pitched  battles  followed  each  other  in  rapid 
succession.  Mosby  destroyed  supply  trains,  broke 
up  the  means  of  conveying  intelligence,  thus 
isolating  troops  from  their  base,  and  confused 
plans  by  capturing  dispatches,  while  at  the  same 
time  compelling  the  use  of  large  numbers  of  the 
enemy's  troops  to  protect  Washington  and  the 
Potomac.  Attracted  by  the  chance  of  booty 
and  desire  for  adventure,  without  the  irksome 
duties  of  camp  life,  brave  and  dashing  spirits 
were  drawn  to  Mosby's  battalion  until  the  fifteen 
men  with  whom  he  had  started  his  partisan  war- 
fare became  five  companies,  regularly  mustered 
into  the  Confederate  service.  The  main  events 
of  these  months  are  told  in  the  following  reports 
which    Colonel    Mosby    made    to    his    superiors. 

258 


THE   YEAR  AFTER  GETTYSBURG      259 

Unlike  the  usual  formal  report  of  the  War  Records, 
these  records  are  permeated  by  the  zeal  and  en- 
thusiasm for  his  partisan  warfare  to  which  was 
due,  in  large  measure,  Mosby's  striking  success. 
The  spirit  of  the  man,  his  boundless  energy,  and 
the  unbridled  zest  with  which  he  made  war  on 
his  country's  foes  are  reflected  in  every  line  of 
his  official  story.] 

[Report,  Mosby  to  Stuart] 

July,  1863. 

I  sent  you  in  charge  of  Sergeant  Beattie,  one  hun- 
dred and  forty-one  prisoners  that  we  captured  from 
the  enemy  during  their  march  through  this  county. 
I  also  sent  off  forty-five  several  days  ago.  Included  in 
the  number,  one  Major,  one  Captain  and  two  lieu- 
tenants. I  also  captured  one  hundred  and  twenty-five 
horses  and  mules,  twelve  wagons  (only  three  of  which 
I  was  able  to  destroy),  fifty  sets  of  fine  harness,  arms, 
etc.,  etc. 

[Report,  Mosby  to  Stuart] 

Fauquier  Co.,  Va.,  Aug.  4,  1863. 

I  send  over  in  charge  of  Sergeant  Beattie  about  30 
prisoners  captured  on  an  expedition  into  Fairfax,  from 
which  I  have  just  returned.  Most  of  them  were  taken 
at  Padgett's,  near  Alexandria.  I  also  captured  about 
30  wagons,  brought   off  about  70  horses  and  mules, 


260  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

having  only  ten  men  with  me.  We  lost  a  good  many 
on  the  way  back,  as  we  were  compelled  to  travel  narrow, 
unfrequented  paths.  Among  the  captures  were  three 
sutlers'  wagons. 

At  Fairfax  Court  House  a  few  nights  ago  I  captured 
29  loaded  sutlers'  wagons,  about  100  prisoners  and  140 
horses.  I  had  brought  all  off  safely  near  Aldie,  where 
I  fell  in  with  a  large  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  who 
recaptured  them.  The  enemy  had  several  hundred. 
I  had  only  27  men.  We  killed  and  captured  several. 
My  loss  :  one  wounded  and  captured. 

[Report,  Mosby  to  Stuart] 

Culpeper,  August  20,  1863. 

On  Tuesday,  August  1 1,  I  captured  a  train  of  19 
wagons  near  Annandale,  in  Fairfax  County.  We 
secured  the  teams  and  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
most  valuable  stores,  consisting  of  saddles,  bridles, 
harness,  etc.     We  took  about  25  prisoners. 

[Report,  Mosby  to  Stuart] 

Sept.  30,  1863. 

.  .  .  On  the  morning  of  August  24,  with  about  30 
men,  I  reached  a  point  (Annandale)  immediately  on 
the  enemy's  line  of  communication.  Leaving  the 
whole  command,  except  three  men  who  accompanied 
me,  in  the  woods,  concealed,  I  proceeded  on  a  recon- 
naissance along  the  railroad  to  ascertain  if  there  were 
any  bridges  unguarded.     I  discovered  there  were  three. 


THE   YEAR  AFTER  GETTYSBURG      261 

I  returned  to  the  command  just  as  a  drove  of  horses 
with  a  cavalry  escort  of  about  50  men  were  passing. 
These  I  determined  to  attack  and  to  wait  until  night 
to  burn  the  bridges.  I  ordered  Lieutenant  Turner  to 
take  half  of  the  men  and  charge  them  in  front,  while 
with  the  remainder  I  attacked  their  rear. 

In  the  meantime  the  enemy  had  been  joined  by 
another  party,  making  their  number  about  63.     When 

1  overtook  them  they  had  dismounted  at  Gooding's 
Tavern  to  water  their  horses.  My  men  went  at  them 
with  a  yell  that  terrified  the  Yankees  and  scattered 
them  in  all  directions.  A  few  taking  shelter  under 
cover  of  the  houses,  opened  fire  upon  us.  They  were 
soon  silenced,  however.  At  the  very  moment  when  I 
had  succeeded  in  routing  them,  I  was  compelled  to 
retire  from  the  fight,  having  been  shot  through  the 
side  and  thigh.  My  men,  not  understanding  it,  fol- 
lowed me,  which  gave  time  to  the  Yankees  to  escape 
to  the  woods.  But  for  this  accident,  the  whole  party 
would  have  been  captured.  As  soon  as  I  perceived 
this,  I  ordered  the  men  to  go  back,  which  a  portion  of 
them  did,  just  as  Lieutenant  Turner,  who  had  met  and 
routed  another  force  above,  came  gallantly  charging 
up. 

Over  100  horses  fell  into  our  possession,  though  a 
good  many  were  lost  in  bringing  them  out  at  night ; 
also  12  prisoners,  arms,  etc.  I  learn  that  6  of  the 
enemy  were  killed.  ...     In  this  affair  my  loss  was 

2  killed  and  3  wounded.  .  .  . 

I  afterwards  directed  Lieutenant  Turner  to  burn  the 
bridges.     He  succeeded  in  burning  one. 


262  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

During  my  absence  from  the  command,  Lieuten- 
ant Turner  attacked  an  outpost  of  the  enemy  near 
Waterloo,  killing  2  and  capturing  4  men  and  27 
horses. 

About  September  15  he  captured  3  wagons,  20 
horses,  7  prisoners  and  a  large  amount  of  sutlers' 
goods  near  Warrenton  Junction. 

On  the  20th  and  21st  instant,  I  conducted  an  expedi- 
tion along  the  enemy's  line  of  communication,  in  which 
important  information  obtained  was  forwarded  to  the 
army  headquarters,  and  I  succeeded  in  capturing  9 
prisoners  and  21  fine  horses  and  mules. 

On  the  27th  and  28th  instant,  I  made  a  reconnais- 
sance in  the  vicinity  of  Alexandria,  capturing  Colonel 
Dulaney,  aide  to  the  bogus  Governor  Pierpont,  several 
horses,  and  burning  the  railroad  bridge  across  Cam- 
eron's Run,  which  was  immediately  under  cover  of 
the  guns  of  two  forts. 

The  military  value  of  the  species  of  warfare  I  have 
waged  is  not  measured  by  the  number  of  prisoners  and 
material  of  war  captured  from  the  enemy,  but  by  the 
heavy  detail  it  has  already  compelled  him  to  make, 
and  which  I  hope  to  make  him  increase,  in  order  to 
guard  his  communications  and  to  that  extent  diminish- 
ing his  aggressive  strength. 

[Indorsements] 

Headquarters  Cavalry  Corps,  October  5,  1863. 

Respectfully  forwarded,  and  recommend  that  Major 
Mosby  be  promoted  another  grade  in  recognition  of  his 


THE  YEAR  AFTER  GETTYSBURG      263 

valuable  services.  The  capture  of  these  prominent 
Union  officials,  as  well  as  the  destruction  of  bridges, 
trains,  etc.,  was  the  subject  of  special  instructions 
which  he  is  faithfully  carrying  out. 

J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  Major-General. 

Headquarters,  November  17,  1863. 

Respectfully  forwarded. 

Major  Mosby  is  entitled  to  great  credit  for  his  bold- 
ness and  skill  in  his  operations  against  the  enemy. 
He  keeps  them  in  constant  apprehension  and  inflicts 
repeated  injuries.  I  have  hoped  that  he  would  have 
been  able  to  raise  his  command  sufficiently  for  the 
command  of  a  Lieutenant-Colonel,  and  to  have  it 
regularly  mustered  into  the  service.  I  am  not  aware 
that  it  numbers  over  4  companies. 

R.  E.  Lee,  General. 

[Letter   to   Mrs.    Mosby] 

Fauquier  Co., 
Oct.  1,  '63. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

Just  returned  from  a  raid.  I  went  down  in  the 
suburbs  of  Alexandria  and  burned  a  railroad  bridge 
in  a  quarter  of  a  mile  of  two  forts  and  directly  in  range 
of  their  batteries,  also  captured  Colonel  Dulaney,  aide 
to  (Governor)  Pierpont.  Dulaney  lives  in  Alex- 
andria, —  has  a  son  in  my  command,  who  was  with 
me  at  the  time.  ...     It  was  quite  an  amusing  scene, 


264  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

the  interview  between  Colonel  Dulaney  and  his  son. 
Just  as  we  were  about  leaving  the  Colonel  sarcasti- 
cally remarked  to  his  son  that  he  had  an  old  pair  of 
shoes  he  had  better  take,  as  he  reckoned  they  were 
darned  scarce  in  the  Confederacy,  whereupon  the  son, 
holding  up  his  leg,  which  was  encased  in  a  fine  pair  of 
cavalry  boots  just  captured  from  a  sutler,  asked  the 
old  man  what  he  thought  of  that.  I  am  now  fixing 
my  triggers  for  several  good  things  which,  if  they 
succeed,  will  make  a  noise.  Old  Mrs.  Shacklett  is 
going  to  Baltimore  next  week  and  I  shall  send  for  some 
things  for  you  all.  .  .  .  In  Richmond  I  got  some 
torpedoes,  which  have  just  arrived,  and  my  next  trip 
I  shall  try  to  blow  up  a  railroad  train.  Went  to  see 
the  Secretary  of  War,  —  he  spoke  in  the  highest  terms 
of  the  services  of  my  command,  —  said  he  read  all  my 
official  reports.  Also  saw  old  General  Lee,  —  he  was 
very  kind  to  me  and  expressed  the  greatest  satisfaction 
at  the  conduct  of  my  command. 

[Report,  Mosby  to  Stuart] 

October  19,  1863. 

.  .  .  On  Thursday,  15th,  came  down  into  Fair- 
fax, where  I  have  been  operating  ever  since  in  the 
enemy's  rear. 

I  have  captured  over  100  horses  and  mules,  several 
wagons  loaded  with  valuable  stores,  and  between  75 
and  100  prisoners,  arms,  equipments,  etc.  Among  the 
prisoners  were  3  captains  and  1  lieutenant. 

I  had  a  sharp  skirmish  yesterday  with  double  my 


THE  YEAR  AFTER  GETTYSBURG      265 

number  of  cavalry  near  Annandale  in  which  I  routed 
them,  capturing  the  captain  commanding  and  6  or  7 
men  and  horses.  I  have  so  far  sustained  no  loss.  It 
has  been  my  object  to  detain  the  troops  that  are  occu- 
pying Fairfax,  by  annoying  their  communications  and 
preventing  them  from  operating  in  front.  ...  I 
contemplate  attacking  a  cavalry  camp  at  Falls  Church 
to-morrow  night. 

[Report,  Mosby  to  Stuart] 

Nov.  6,  1863. 

I  returned  yesterday  from  a  scout  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Catlett's.  I  was  accompanied  by  Captain 
Smith  and  2  men  of  my  command.  We  killed  Kil- 
patrick's  division  commissary  and  captured  an  adju- 
tant, 4  men,  6  horses,  etc.  Kilpatrick's  Division  (now 
reported  unfit  for  duty)  lies  around  Weaverville. 
...  I  sent  you  4  cavalrymen  on  Wednesday  captured 
by  my  scouts. 

[Report,  Mosby  to  Stuart] 

Nov.  22,  1863. 

Since  rendering  my  report  of  the  5th  [sic]  inst.  we 
have  captured  about  75  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  over 
100  horses  and  mules,  6  wagons,  a  considerable  number 
of  arms,  equipments,  etc. 

It  would  be  too  tedious  to  mention  in  detail  the 
various   affairs   in   which    these   captures   have   been 


266  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

made,  but  I  would  omit  the  performance  of  a  pleasant 
duty  if  I  failed  to  bring  to  your  notice  the  bold 
onset  of  Capt.  Smith,  when,  with  only  about  40  men, 
he  dashed  into  the  enemy's  camp  of  150  cavalry  near 
Warrenton,  killed  some  8  or  10,  wounded  a  number 
and  brought  off  9  prisoners,  27  horses,  arms,  equip- 
ments, etc.  In  various  other  affairs  several  of  the 
enemy  have  been  killed  and  wounded.  I  have  sus- 
tained no  loss.  .  .  . 

[Report,  Mosby  to  Stuart] 

January  4,  1864. 

I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  during  the  month  of 
December  there  were  captured  by  this  command  over 
100  horses  and  mules  and  about  100  prisoners.  A 
considerable  number  of  the  enemy  have  also  been 
killed  and  wounded.  It  would  be  too  tedious  to  men- 
tion the  various  occasions  on  which  we  have  met  the 
enemy,  but  there  is  one  which  justice  to  a  brave  officer 
demands  to  be  noticed.  On  the  morning  of  January  1, 
I  received  information  that  a  body  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  were  in  Upperville.  It  being  the  day  on  which 
my  command  was  to  assemble,  I  directed  Capt.  Wil- 
liam R.  Smith  to  take  command  of  the  men  while  I 
went  directly  toward  LTpperville  to  ascertain  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy.  In  the  meantime  the  enemy  had 
gone  on  toward  Rectortown,  and  I  pursued,  but  came 
up  just  as  Capt.  Smith  with  about  35  men  had  attacked 
and  routed  them  (75  strong),  killing,  wounding,  and 
capturing  57. 


THE  YEAR  AFTER  GETTYSBURG      267 

[Indorsements] 

Headquarters  Cavalry  Corps,  February  13,  1864. 

Respectfully  forwarded. 

A  subsequent  report  of  subsequent  operations  has 
been  already  sent  in,  this  having  been  mislaid.  Major 
Mosby  continues  his  distinguished  services  in  the 
enemy's  rear,  relieving  our  people  of  the  depredations 
of  the  enemy  in  a  great  measure. 

J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
Major-General. 

February  15,  1864. 

A  characteristic  report  from  Colonel  Mosby,  who 
has  become  so  familiar  with  brave  deeds  as  to  consider 
them  too  tedious  to  treat  unless  when  necessary  to 
reflect  glory  on  his  gallant  comrades.  Captain  Smith's 
was  a  brilliant  and  most  successful  affair. 

J.  A.  Seddon,  Secretary  of  War. 

[Report,  Mosby  to  Stuart] 

February  1,  1864. 

On  Wednesday,  January  6,  having  previously 
reconnoitered  in  person  the  position  of  the  enemy,  I 
directed  Lieutenant  Turner,  with  a  detachment  of 
about  30  men,  to  attack  an  outpost  of  the  enemy  in 
the  vicinity  of  Warrenton,  which  he  did  successfully, 
routing  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy,  killing  and 
wounding  several,  and  capturing  18  prisoners  and  42 
horses,  with  arms,  equipments,  etc. 


268  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

On  Saturday,  January  9,  having  learned  through 
Frank  Stringfellow  (Stuart's  scout),  that  Cole's  (Mary- 
land) Cavalry  was  encamping  on  Loudon  Heights, 
with  no  supports  but  infantry,  which  was  about  one- 
half  mile  off,  I  left  Upperville  with  about  100  men, 
in  hopes  of  being  able  to  completely  surprise  his  camp 
by  a  night  attack.  By  marching  my  command  by 
file,  along  a  narrow  path,  I  succeeded  in  gaining  a 
position  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  between  their  camp 
and  the  Ferry.  On  reaching  this  point,  without 
creating  any  alarm,  I  deemed  that  the  crisis  had 
passed,  and  the  capture  of  the  enemy  a  certainty.  I 
had  exact  information  up  to  dark  of  that  evening  of 
the  number  of  the  enemy  (which  was  between  175  and 
200),  the  position  of  their  headquarters,  etc.  When 
within  200  yards  of  the  camp,  I  sent  Stringfellow  on 
ahead  with  about  10  men  to  capture  Major  Cole  and 
staff,  whose  headquarters  were  in  a  house  about  100 
yards  from  their  camp,  while  I  halted  to  close  up  my 
command.  The  camp  was  buried  in  a  profound 
sleep ;  there  was  not  a  sentinel  awake.  All  my 
plans  were  on  the  eve  of  consummation,  when  suddenly 
the  party  sent  with  Stringfellow  came  dashing  over 
the  hill  toward  the  camp,  yelling  and  shooting.  They 
had  made  no  attempt  to  secure  Cole.  Mistaking  them 
for  the  enemy,  I  ordered  my  men  to  charge. 

In  the  meantime  the  enemy  had  taken  the  alarm, 
and  received  us  with  a  volley  from  their  carbines.  A 
severe  fight  ensued,  in  which  they  were  driven  from 
their  camp,  but,  taking  refuge  in  the  surrounding 
houses,   kept  up  a  desultory   firing.     Confusion  and 


THE   YEAR  AFTER  GETTYSBURG      269 

delay  having  ensued  from  the  derangement  of  my 
plans,  consequent  on  the  alarm  given  to  the  enemy, 
rendered  it  hazardous  to  continue  in  my  position,  as 
reinforcements  were  near  the  enemy.  Accordingly,  I 
ordered  the  men  to  retire,  which  was  done  in  good 
order,  bringing  off  6  prisoners,  and  between  50  and 
60  horses. 

My  loss  was  severe ;  more  so  in  the  worth  than  the 
number  of  the  slain.  It  was  4  killed,  7  wounded  (of 
whom  4  have  since  died),  and  1  captured.  A  pub- 
lished list  of  the  enemy's  loss  gives  it  at  5  killed  and 
13  wounded.  Among  those  who  fell  on  this  occasion 
were  Capt.  William  R.  Smith  and  Lieutenant  Turner, 
two  of  the  noblest  and  bravest  officers  of  this  army, 
who  thus  sealed  a  life  of  devotion  and  of  sacrifice  to 
the  cause  they  loved. 

In  numerous  other  affairs  with  the  enemy,  between 
75  and  100  horses  and  mules  have  been  captured, 
about  40  men  killed,  wounded,  and  captured.  A 
party  of  this  command  also  threw  one  of  the  enemy's 
trains  off  the  track,  causing  a  great  smash  up. 

[Indorsement] 

Headquarters  Cavalry  Corps, 

Respectfully  forwarded.  February  9,  1864. 

The  conduct  of  Major  Mosby  is  warmly  commended 
to  the  notice  of  the  commanding  general.  His  sleep- 
less vigilance  and  unceasing  activity  have  done  the 
enemy  great  damage.  He  keeps  a  large  force  of  the 
enemy's   cavalry  continually  employed  in  Fairfax  in 


270  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

the  vain  effort  to  suppress  his  inroads.  His  exploits 
are  not  surpassed  in  daring  and  enterprise  by  those  of 
petite  guerre  in  any  age.  Unswerving  devotion  to 
duty,  self-abnegation,  and  unflinching  courage,  with 
a  quick  perception  and  appreciation  of  the  opportunity, 
are  the  characteristics  of  this  officer.  Since  I  first 
knew  him,  in  1861,  he  has  never  once  alluded  to  his 
own  rank  or  promotion ;  thus  far  it  has  come  by  the 
force  of  his  own  merit.  While  self-consciousness  of 
having  done  his  duty  well  is  the  patriot  soldier's  best 
reward,  yet  the  evidence  of  the  appreciation  of  his 
country  is  a  powerful  incentive  to  renewed  effort, 
which  should  not  be  undervalued  by  those  who  have 
risen  to  the  highest  point  of  military  and  civic  emi- 
nence. That  evidence  is  promotion.  If  Major  Mosby 
has  not  won  it,  no  more  can  daring  deeds  essay  to  do 
it.  .  .  . 

J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  Major-General. 

[One  of  those  wounded  in  a  fight  at  Dranesville, 
February  22,  was  Baron  von  Massow,  who  later 
became  the  Chief  of  Cavalry  in  the  Imperial 
German  Army.  Von  Massow  was  the  son  of 
the  chamberlain  to  the  King  of  Prussia  and  came 
to  America  to  see  some  fighting.  He  offered 
his  services  to  General  Stuart  who  sent  him  to 
Mosby.  In  the  Dranesville  fight  Mosby's  com- 
mand charged  a  California  regiment  from  two 
directions  and  routed  it.     The  Baron  was  fight- 


WILLIAM   H.    CHAPMAN 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  next  in  rank  to  Colonel  Mosby  when  the 
war  closed.      Photographed  in  1863 


THE   YEAR  AFTER  GETTYSBURG      271 

ing  with  the  rest  when  he  espied  Captain  Reid 
of  the  Californians.  Von  Massow  made  a  rush 
at  Reid,  as  if  he  were  about  to  chop  his  head  off 
with  his  sword  —  the  Prussian  clung  to  the  sword 
in  a  fight  instead  of  using  a  revolver,  as  did  the 
rest  of  Mosby's  men.  Captain  Reid  was  caught 
so  that  he  could  not  defend  himself  and  made  a 
motion  which  the  Baron  interpreted  as  a  sign  of 
surrender.  The  latter  signed  for  Reid  to  go  to 
the  rear  and  rode  on  into  the  melee.  As  he  turned 
his  back  Reid  drew  a  revolver  and  shot  him.  At 
almost  the  same  instant  Captain  Chapman,  who 
had  seen  the  incident  and  divined  the  Californian's 
intention  to  shoot,  drew  his  revolver  and  shot 
Captain  Reid.  Reid  was  instantly  killed,  and  Von 
Massow  was  so  seriously  injured  that  he  was  never 
able  to  rejoin  Mosby's  command.] 

[Report,  Mosby  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Taylor, 
Assistant  Adjutant-General] 

September  11,  1864. 

On  March  10th  with  a  detachment  of  about  40 
men,  I  defeated  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry 
near  Greenwich,  severely  wounding  3,  and  capturing 
9  prisoners,  10  horses,  arms,  etc.  On  the  same  day 
Lieut.  A.  E.  Richards,  with  another  detachment  of 
about  30  men,   surprised   an   outpost  of   the  enemy 


272  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

near  Charles  Town,  killed  the  major  commanding  and 
a  lieutenant,  several  privates,  and  brought  off  21 
prisoners  with  their  horses,  arms,  etc.  In  neither  en- 
gagement did  my  command  sustain  any  loss. 

During  the  months  of  March  and  April  but  few 
opportunities  were  offered  for  making  any  successful 
attacks  on  the  enemy,  the  continual  annoyances  to 
which  they  had  been  subjected  during  the  winter 
causing  them  to  exert  great  vigilance  in  guarding  against 
surprises  and  interruptions  of  their  communications. 
During  most  of  these  months  I  was  myself  engaged  in 
scouting  in  the  enemy's  rear  for  Major-General  Stuart 
and  collecting  information  which  was  regularly  trans- 
mitted to  his  headquarters,  concerning  the  movements, 
numbers,  and  distribution  of  the  enemy's  forces  both 
east  and  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  During  this  time  my 
men  were  mostly  employed  in  collecting  forage  from 
the  country  bordering  on  the  Potomac. 

About  April  15,  Captain  Richards  routed  a  maraud- 
ing party  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  at  Waterford,  killing 
and  wounding  5  or  6  and  bringing  off  6  or  8  prisoners, 
15  horses,  arms,  etc. 

About  April  25  I  attacked  an  outpost  near  Hunter's 
Mills,  in  Fairfax,  capturing  5  prisoners  and  18  horses. 
The  prisoners  and  horses  were  sent  back  under  charge 
of  Lieutenant  Hunter,  while  I  went  off  on  a  scout  in 
another  direction.  The  enemy  pursued  and  captured 
the  lieutenant  and  6  of  the  horses. 

About  May  1st,  with  a  party  of  10  men,  I  captured 
8  of  Sigel's  wagons  near  Bunker  Hill,  in  the  Valley, 
but  was  only  able  to  bring  off  the  horses  attached  (34 


THE   YEAR  AFTER  GETTYSBURG      273 

in  number)  and  about  20  prisoners.  The  horses  and 
prisoners  were  sent  back,  while  with  another  detach- 
ment of  20  men  who  had  joined  me  I  proceeded  to 
Martinsburg,  which  place  we  entered  that  night,  while 
occupied  by  several  hundred  Federal  troops,  and 
brought  off  15  horses  and  several  prisoners. 

Returning  to  my  command,  I  learned  that  General 
Grant  had  crossed  the  Rapidan.  With  about  40  men 
I  moved  down  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappahannock 
to  assail  his  communications  wherever  opened,  and 
sent  two  other  detachments,  under  Captains  Richards 
and  Chapman,  to  embarrass  Sigel  as  much  as  possible. 
Captain  Richards  had  a  skirmish  near  Winchester  in 
which  several  of  them  were  killed  and  wounded. 
Captain  Chapman  attacked  a  wagon  train,  which  was 
heavily  guarded,  near  Strassburg,  capturing  about  30 
prisoners  with  an  equal  number  of  horses,  etc.  Near 
Belle  Plain,  in  King  George,  I  captured  an  ambulance 
train  and  brought  off  about  75  horses  and  mules,  and 
40  prisoners,  etc. 

A  few  days  after  I  made  a  second  attempt  near  the 
same  place,  but  discovered  that  my  late  attack  had 
caused  them  to  detach  such  a  heavy  force  to  guard 
their  trains  and  line  of  communication  that  another 
successful  attack  on  them  was  impracticable. 

About  May  10  I  attacked  a  cavalry  outpost  in  the 
vicinity  of  Front  Royal,  capturing  1  captain  and  15 
men  and  75  horses  and  sustained  no  loss. 

About  May  20,  with  about  150  men,  I  moved  to 
the  vicinity  of  Strassburg  with  the  view  of  capturing 
the  wagon  trains  of  General  Hunter,  who  had  then 


274  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

moved  up  the  Valley.  When  the  train  appeared  I 
discovered  that  it  was  guarded  by  about  600  infantry 
and  100  cavalry.  A  slight  skirmish  ensued  between 
their  cavalry  and  a  part  of  my  command,  in  which 
their  cavalry  was  routed  with  a  loss  of  8  prisoners  and 
horses,  besides  several  killed,  but  falling  back  on  their 
infantry,  my  men  in  turn  fell  back,  with  a  loss  of  1 
killed.  While  we  did  not  capture  the  train,  one  great 
object  had  been  accomplished  —  the  detachment  of 
a  heavy  force  to  guard  their  communications.  After 
the  above  affair,  only  one  wagon  train  ever  went  up 
to  Hunter,  which  was  still  more  heavily  guarded.  He 
then  gave  up  his  line  of  communication. 

After  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy's  forces  from 
Northern  Virginia,  for  several  weeks  but  few  oppor- 
tunities were  offered  for  any  successful  incursions  upon 
them.  Many  enterprises  on  a  small  scale  were,  how- 
ever, undertaken  by  detachments  of  the  command, 
of  which  no  note  has  been  taken. 

About  June  20  I  moved  into  Fairfax  and  routed  a 
body  of  cavalry  near  Centreville,  killing  and  wounding 
6  or  8,  and  capturing  31  prisoners,  securing  their 
horses,  etc. 

A  few  days  afterwards  we  took  Duffield's  Depot, 
on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad ;  secured  about 
50  prisoners,  including  2  lieutenants  and  a  large  number 
of  stores.  The  train  had  passed  a  few  minutes  before 
we  reached  the  place.  On  my  way  there  I  had  left 
Lieutenant  Nelson,  commanding  Company  A,  at 
Charles  Town,  for  the  purpose  of  intercepting  and 
notifying  me  of  any  approach  in  my  rear  from  Harper's 


THE  YEAR  AFTER  GETTYSBURG      275 

Ferry.  As  I  had  anticipated,  a  body  of  cavalry,  largely 
superior  in  numbers  to  his  force,  moved  out  from  that 
point.  Lieutenant  Nelson  gallantly  charged  and 
routed  them,  killing  and  wounding  several  and  taking 
19  prisoners  and  27  horses.  We  sustained  no  loss  on 
this  expedition. 

On  July  4,  hearing  of  General  Early's  movement 
down  the  Valley,  I  moved  with  my  command  east  of 
the  Blue  Ridge  for  the  purpose  of  cooperating  with  him 
and  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Point  of  Rocks,  driving 
out  the  garrison  (250  men,  strongly  fortified)  and  secur- 
ing several  prisoners  and  horses.  As  I  supposed  it  to 
be  General  Early's  intention  to  invest  Maryland 
Heights,  I  thought  the  best  service  I  could  render  would 
be  to  sever  all  communication  both  by  railroad  and 
telegraph  between  that  point  and  Washington,  which 
I  did,  keeping  it  suspended  for  two  days. 

As  this  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  I  had  used 
artillery  [sic]  the  magnitude  of  the  invasion  was 
greatly  exaggerated  by  the  fears  of  the  enemy,  and 
panic  and  alarm  spread  through  their  territory.  I 
desire  especially  to  bring  to  the  notice  of  the  com- 
manding general  the  unsurpassed  gallantry  displayed 
by  Captain  Richards,  commanding  First  Squadron. 
Our  crossing  was  opposed  by  a  body  of  infantry  sta- 
tioned on  the  Maryland  shore.  Dismounting  a  num- 
ber of  sharpshooters,  whom  I  directed  to  wade  the 
river  above  the  point  held  by  the  enemy,  I  superin- 
tended in  person  the  placing  of  my  piece  of  artillery  in 
position,  at  the  same  time  directing  Captain  Richards 
whenever  the  enemy  had  been  dislodged  by  the  sharp- 


276  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

shooters  and  artillery,  to  charge  across  the  river  in 
order  to  effect  their  capture.  The  enemy  were  soon 
routed  and  Captain  Richards  charged  over,  but  be- 
fore he  could  overtake  them  they  had  retreated  across 
the  canal,  pulling  up  the  bridge  in  their  rear.  My 
order  had  not,  of  course,  contemplated  their  pursuit 
into  their  fortifications,  but  the  destruction  of  the 
bridge  was  no  obstacle  to  his  impetuous  valor,  and 
hastily  dismounting  and  throwing  down  a  few  planks 
on  the  sills,  he  charged  across,  under  a  heavy  fire  from 
a  redoubt.  The  enemy  fled  panic  stricken,  leaving  in 
our  possession   their  camp  equipage,   etc.  .  .  . 

On  the  morning  of  July  6,  while  still  encamped  near 
the  Potomac,  information  was  received  that  a  consid- 
erable force  of  cavalry  was  at  Leesburg.  I  immediately 
hastened  to  meet  them.  At  Leesburg  I  learned  that 
they  had  gone  toward  Aldie,  and  I  accordingly  moved 
on  the  road  to  Ball's  Mill  in  order  to  intercept  them 
returning  to  their  camp  in  Fairfax,  which  I  succeeded 
in  doing,  meeting  them  at  Mount  Zion  Church,  and 
completely  routing  them,  with  a  loss  of  about  80  of 
their  officers  and  men  left  dead  and  severely  wounded 
on  the  field,  besides  57  prisoners.  Their  loss  includes  a 
captain  and  lieutenant  killed  and  1  lieutenant  severely 
wounded ;  the  major  commanding  and  2  lieutenants 
prisoners.     We  also  secured  all  their  horses,  arms,  etc. 

My  loss  was  1  killed  and  6  wounded  —  none  dan- 
gerously. 

After  this  affair  the  enemy  never  ventured,  in  two 
months  after,  the  experiment  of  another  raid  through 
that  portion  of  our  district. 


THE  YEAR  AFTER  GETTYSBURG      277 

A  few  days  afterward  I  again  crossed  the  Potomac 
in  cooperation  with  General  Early,  and  moved  through 
Poolesville,  Md.,  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  a  body 
of  cavalry  encamped  near  Seneca.  They  retreated, 
however,  before  we  reached  there,  leaving  all  their 
camp  equipage  and  a  considerable  amount  of  stores. 
We  also  captured  30  head  of  beef  cattle. 

When  General  Early  fell  back  from  before  Wash- 
ington I  recrossed  the  Potomac,  near  Seneca,  moving 
thence  to  the  Little  River  Pike  in  order  to  protect  him 
from  any  movement  up  the  south  side  of  the  river. 
The  enemy  moved  through  Leesburg  in  pursuit  of 
General  Early  and  occupied  Ashby's  and  Snicker's 
Gaps.  I  distributed  my  command  so  as  to  most 
effectually  protect  the  country.  These  detachments 
—  under  Captains  Richards  and  Chapman  and  Lieu- 
tenants Glasscock,  Nelson,  and  Hatcher  —  while  they 
kept  the  enemy  confined  to  the  main  thoroughfares 
and  restrained  their  ravages,  killed  and  captured  about 
300,  securing  their  horses,  etc.  My  own  attention 
was  principally  directed  to  ascertaining  the  numbers 
and  movements  of  the  enemy  and  forwarding  the  infor- 
mation to  General  Early,  who  was  then  in  the  Valley. 

At  the  time  of  the  second  invasion  of  Maryland  by 
General  Early,  I  moved  my  command  to  the  Potomac, 
crossed  over  3  companies  at  Cheek's  and  Noland's 
Fords,  while  the  remaining  portion  was  kept  in  re- 
serve on  this  side  with  the  artillery,  which  was  posted 
on  the  south  bank  to  keep  open  the  fords,  keeping  one 
company,  under  Lieutenant  Williams,  near  the  ford, 
on  the  north  bank.     Two  were  sent  under  Lieutenant 


278  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

Nelson,  to  Adamstown,  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad,  for  the  purpose  of  intercepting  the  trains 
from  Baltimore,  destroying  their  communications, 
etc.  Apprehending  a  movement  up  the  river  from  a 
considerable  body  of  cavalry  which  I  knew  to  be 
stationed  below,  I  remained  with  a  portion  of  the 
command  guarding  the  fords. 

Lieutenant  Nelson  reached  the  road  a  few  minutes 
too  late  to  capture  the  train,  but  destroyed  two  tele- 
graph lines.  On  his  return  he  met  a  force  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  near  Monocacy,  which  was  charged 
and  routed  by  the  gallant  Lieutenant  Hatcher,  who 
took  about  15  men  and  horses,  besides  killing  and 
wounding  several 

We  recrossed  the  river  in  the  evening,  bringing 
about  75  horses  and  between  20  and  30  prisoners. 

Our  loss,  2  missing. 

[The  battle  at  Mount  Zion  attracted  great 
attention  at  the  time  —  especially  in  the  North, 
and  made  the  already  redoubtable  figure  of  Mosby 
an  altogether  awe-inspiring  one.  The  capture 
of  Major  Forbes,  "Colonel  Lowell's  fighting 
Major",  was  also  an  important  incident  in  Mosby's 
life,  as  here  began  the  lifelong  friendship  between 
the  two  families. 

The  story  of  the  battle  was  well  told  in  the 
official  report  of  Colonel  Charles  R.  Lowell,  Jr., 
Second  Massachusetts  Cavalry.    The  report  reads  :] 


THE   YEAR  AFTER   GETTYSBURG      279 

Near  Falls  Church,  Va.,  July  8,  1864. 

I  have  the  honor  to  report  Major  Forbes'  scout  as 
completely  as  is  yet  possible.  I  have  not  talked  with 
Lieutenant  Kuhls  or  Captain  Stone,  who  is  badly 
wounded,  but  send  what  I  learned  on  the  ground. 

Major  Forbes  left  here  with  150  men  (100  Second 
Massachusetts  Cavalry,  50  Thirteenth  New  York 
Cavalry)  Monday,  p.m.  Tuesday,  a.m.,  went  through 
Aldie,  and  found  all  quiet  toward  the  Gaps.  Tuesday, 
p.m.,  went  by  Ball's  Mill  to  Leesburg.  Heard  of 
Mosby's  raid  at  Point  of  Rocks,  and  learned  that  he 
had  sent  four  or  five  wagons  of  plunder  through  Lees- 
burg, under  a  guard  of  about  60  men,  the  afternoon 
before.  Heard  nothing  of  any  other  force  this  side 
of  the  ridge.  He  returned  that  night  to  the  south  of 
Goose  Creek,  as  directed,  and,  on  Wednesday,  a.m., 
went  again  by  Ball's  Mill  to  Leesburg.  Still  heard 
nothing  of  Mosby  or  any  force.  From  what  I  learned 
from  citizens,  I  think  Mosby  passed  between  Leesburg 
and  the  Potomac  some  time  on  Tuesday,  crossed  Goose 
Creek,  and  moved  westward  toward  Aldie  on  Wednes- 
day ;  learned  of  Major  Forbes'  second  visit  to  Leesburg, 
and  laid  in  ambush  for  him  at  Ball's  Mill.  Major 
Forbes  returned  from  Leesburg  by  Centre's  Mill  (4 
miles  above),  came  down  by  Aldie,  and  halted  for  two 
or  three  hours  about  one  and  a  half  miles  east,  on  the 
Little  River  Pike ;  when  Mosby  learned  this  he  moved 
south  and  struck  the  pike  about  one  and  a  quarter 
miles  east  of  the  Major's  position,  being  hidden  till 
he  had  reached  about  half  a  mile  west  on  the  pike. 


280  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

Major  Forbes  was  duly  notified  by  his  advance  guard, 
mounted  his  men,  and  moved  them  from  the  north  to 
the  south  of  the  pike.  As  the  rear  was  crossing,  Mosby 
fired  one  shell  from  his  12-pounder,  which  burst  entirely 
too  high.  As  Major  Forbes  formed  on  the  south,  his 
advance  guard,  which  had  dismounted  and  fired  as 
Mosby  came  up,  fell  back,  still  keeping  a  little  north  of 
the  pike,  and  took  an  excellent  position  somewhat  on 
the  flank.  Up  to  this  time,  I  think,  all  the  dispositions 
were  admirable.  Major  Forbes'  two  squadrons  were 
formed,  his  third  squadron  and  rear  guard  not  formed 
but  nearly  so,  and  no  confusion.  Mosby's  men,  who 
were  not  in  any  order,  but  were  down  the  road  in  a 
"nick,"  had  just  reached  the  fence  corner  some  225 
yards  off,  and  a  few  had  dismounted,  under  a  fire  from 
the  advanced  guard,  to  take  down  the  fence.  When 
two  panels  of  the  fence  were  down  the  men  trotted 
through  for  about  75  yards,  and  came  gradually  down 
to  a  walk,  and  almost  halted.  Major  Forbes'  first 
platoon  was  ordered  to  fire  with  carbines.  Here  was 
the  first  mistake.  It  created  confusion  among  the 
horses,  and  the  squadron  in  the  rear  added  to  it  by 
firing  a  few  pistol  shots.  Had  the  order  been  given 
to  draw  sabres  and  charge,  the  rebels  would  never  have 
got  their  gun  off,  but  I  think  Major  Forbes,  seeing 
how  uneasy  his  horses  were  at  the  firing,  must  have 
intended  to  dismount  some  of  his  men.  At  any  rate, 
he  attempted  to  move  the  first  squadron  by  the  right 
flank.  The  rebels  saw  their  chance,  gave  a  yell,  and 
our  men,  in  the  confusion  of  the  moment,  broke.  The 
two  rear  squadrons  went  off  in  confusion.     Attempts 


THE   YEAR  AFTER   GETTYSBURG      281 

were  made,  with  some  success,  to  rally  parts  of  the 
first  squadron  in  the  next  field,  and  again  near  Little 
River  Church,  one  mile  off. 

Captain  Stone  was  wounded  here,  and  I  believe  all 
the  non-commissioned  officers  of  A  and  L  Companies 
present  were  wounded  or  killed.  There  was  little 
gained.  I  have  only  to  report  a  perfect  rout  and  a 
chase  for  five  to  seven  miles.  We  lost  Major  Forbes, 
Lieutenant  Amory,  and  Mr.  Humphreys  (Chaplain), 
from  Second  Massachusetts,  and  Lieutenant  Burns, 
Thirteenth  New  York  Cavalry,  prisoners,  all  unhurt. 
Captain  Stone,  Second  Massachusetts,  and  Lieutenant 
Schuyler,  Thirteenth  New  York,  very  badly  wounded. 
Lieutenant  Kuhls  alone  came  safely  to  camp.  Of 
men,  we  lost,  killed  outright,  7,  Second  Massachusetts ; 
5,  Thirteenth  New  York :  wounded,  we  brought  in 
27  and  left  10  too  bad  to  move.  I  fear  of  the  wounded 
at  least  12  will  die.  About  40  others  have  come  to 
camp  half  mounted,  and  Mosby  reported  to  have  44 
prisoners ;  quite  a  number,  you  will  see,  still  unac- 
counted for.  Some  of  them  are  probably  wounded, 
and  some  still  on  their  way  to  camp,  and  others  will 
be  made  prisoners. 

Mosby  went  up  toward  Upperville  with  his  prisoners 
and  his  dead  and  wounded  about  midnight  Wednesday. 
I  reached  the  ground  about  11.30  a.m.  and  remained  in 
plain  sight  for  about  three  hours ;  then  searched 
through  all  the  woods  and  moved  to  Centreville,  where 
I  again  waited  an  hour  in  hopes  some  stragglers  would 
join  us.  We  only  picked  up  half  a  dozen,  however. 
The  soldiers  and  citizens  all  speak  in  high  terms  of 


282  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

the  gallantry  of  the  officers ;  Major  Forbes  especially 
remained  in  the  first  field  till  every  man  had  left  it, 
emptied  his  revolver,  and,  in  the  second  field,  where 
Company  A  tried  to  stand,  he  disabled  one  man  with 
his  sabre,  and  lunged  through  Colonel  Mosby's  coat. 
His  horse  was  then  killed  and  fell  on  his  leg,  pinning  him 
till  he  was  compelled  to  surrender. 

More  than  ioo  horses  were  taken.  Accoutrements, 
arms,  etc.,  will  also  be  missing.  I  cannot  yet  give  the 
precise  number. 

Mosby's  force  is  variously  estimated  at  from  175  to 
200,  Mrs.  Davis  and  her  daughter  putting  it  at  250  to 
300  men.  I  think  he  had  probably  about  200.  What 
his  loss  is  I  cannot  say,  as  he  picked  up  all  his  dead  and 
wounded  and  took  them  off  in  the  night.  The  Union 
people  in  Aldie  report  that  he  took  them  in  five  wagons. 
A  wounded  sergeant  reports  hearing  the  names  of  3  or 
4  spoken  of  as  killed  ;  one  mortally  wounded  man  was 
left  on  the  ground.  [Mosby  actually  lost  seven  men 
wounded.  His  force  was  about  175  men.]  I  think 
the  chance  was  an  excellent  one  to  whip  Mosby  and 
take  his  gun.  I  have  no  doubt  Major  Forbes  thought 
so,  too,  as  the  wounded  men  say  there  was  not  enough 
difference  in  numbers  to  talk  about.  The  chance  was 
lost. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
The  Campaign  against  Sheridan 

According  to  Grant's  design,  Sheridan  left 
his  base  at  Harper's  Ferry  on  August  10,  1864, 
and  started  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Grant's 
main  object  was  to  cut  Lee's  line  of  communi- 
cation with  the  southwest,  for,  if  this  were  ac- 
complished, the  inevitable  result  would  be  the 
fall  of  Richmond  and  the  end  of  the  war.  It 
was  immaterial  whether  Sheridan  secured  this 
result  by  defeating  Early  —  who  was  defending 
the  Valley  —  in  battle  or  by  pushing  him  south 
by  flank  movements. 

During  this  campaign  of  1864,  my  battalion 
of  six  companies  was  the  only  force  operating  in 
the  rear  of  Sheridan's  army  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley.  Our  rendezvous  was  along  the  eastern 
base  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  in  what  is  known  as  the 
Piedmont  region  of  Virginia.  Fire  and  sword 
could  not  drive  the  people  of  that  neighborhood 
from  their  allegiance  to  what  they  thought  was 

283 


284  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

right,  and  in  the  gloom  of  disaster  and  defeat 
they  never  wavered  in  their  support  of  the  Con- 
federate cause.  The  main  object  of  my  campaign 
was  to  vex  and  embarrass  Sheridan  and,  if  pos- 
sible, to  prevent  his  advance  into  the  interior 
of  the  State.  But  my  exclusive  attention  was 
not  given  to  Sheridan,  for  alarm  was  kept  up 
continuously  by  threatening  Washington  and 
occasionally  crossing  the  Potomac.  We  lived 
on  the  country  where  we  operated  and  drew  noth- 
ing from  Richmond  except  the  gray  jackets  my 
men  wore.  We  were  mounted,  armed,  and 
equipped  entirely  off  the  enemy,  but,  as  we 
captured  a  great  deal  more  than  we  could  use, 
the  surplus  was  sent  to  supply  Lee's  army.  The 
mules  we  sent  him  furnished  a  large  part  of  his 
transportation,  and  the  captured  sabres  and 
carbines  were  turned  over  to  his  cavalry  —  we 
had  no  use  for  them. 

I  believe  I  was  the  first  cavalry  commander 
who  discarded  the  sabre  as  useless  and  consigned 
it  to  museums  for  the  preservation  of  antiquities. 
My  men  were  as  little  impressed  by  a  body  of 
cavalry  charging  them  with  sabres  as  though 
they  had  been  armed  with  cornstalks.  In  the 
Napoleonic  wars  cavalry  might  sometimes  ride 
down    infantry    armed    with    muzzle-loaders    and 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST  SHERIDAN    285 

flintlocks,  because  the  infantry  would  be  broken 
by  the  momentum  of  the  charge  before  more 
than  one  effective  fire  could  be  delivered.  At 
Eylau  the  French  cavalry  rode  over  the  Russians 
in  a  snowstorm  because  the  powder  of  the  in- 
fantry was  wet  and  they  were  defenceless.  Fixed 
ammunition  had  not  been  invented.  I  think 
that  my  command  reached  the  highest  point  of 
efficiency  as  cavalry  because  they  were  well  armed 
with  two  six-shooters  and  their  charges  combined 
the  effect  of  fire  and  shock.  We  were  called 
bushwhackers,  as  a  term  of  reproach,  simply 
because  our  attacks  were  generally  surprises, 
and  we  had  to  make  up  by  celerity  for  lack  of 
numbers.  Now  I  never  resented  the  epithet 
of  "bushwhacker"  —  although  there  was  no  sol- 
dier to  whom  it  applied  less  —  because  bush- 
whacking is  a  legitimate  form  of  war,  and  it  is 
just  as  fair  and  equally  heroic  to  fire  at  an  enemy 
from  behind  a  bush  as  a  breastwork  or  from  the 
casemate  of  a  fort. 

The  Union  cavalry  who  met  us  in  combat 
knew  that  we  always  fought  on  the  offensive 
in  a  mounted  charge  and  with  a  pair  of  Colt's 
revolvers.  I  think  we  did  more  than  any  other 
body  of  men  to  give  the  Colt  pistol  its  great  reputa- 
tion.    A  writer  on   the   history   of  cavalry   cites 


286  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

as  an  example  of  the  superiority  of  the  revolver 
a  fight  that  a  squadron  of  my  command,  under 
Captain  Dolly1  Richards,  had  in  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley,  in  which  more  of  the  enemy  were 
killed  than  the  entire  total  by  sabre  in  the 
Franco- Prussian  War.  But,  to  be  effective, 
the  pistol  must,  of  course,  be  used  at  close 
quarters. 

•  As  I  have  said,  during  this  campaign  our  opera- 
tions were  not  confined  to  this  valley.  The 
troops  belonging  to  the  defences  of  Washington 
and  guarding  the  line  of  the  Potomac  were  a 
portion  of  Sheridan's  command.  To  prevent 
his  being  reinforced  from  this  source,  I  made 
frequent  attacks  on  the  outposts  in  Fairfax  and 
demonstrations  along  the  Potomac.  The  Eighth 
Illinois  Cavalry,  the  largest  and  regarded  as  the 
finest  regiment  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
had  been  brought  back  to  Washington,  largely 
recruited,  and  stationed  at  Seneca  (or  Muddy 
Branch)  on  the  river  above  Washington.  There 
were  a  number  of  other  detachments  of  cavalry 
on  the  Maryland  side,  and  two  regiments  of 
cavalry  in  Fairfax.  General  Augur  commanded 
at  Washington.  Stevenson,  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
had    nine    thousand    men,    who    were     expected 

'Adolphus  E.  Richards. 


THE   CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  SHERIDAN    287 

to   keep   employed    in    watching   the   canal    and 
railroad. 

Sheridan  wanted  to  take  the  Eighth  Illinois  to 
the  Valley,  but  Augur  objected,  on  the  ground 
that  they  could  not  be  spared  from  Washington. 

[Sheridan  to  Augur] 

Harper's  Ferry,  August  8,  1864.  [The  day  after 
Sheridan  took  formal  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Shenandoah.] 

What  force  have  you  at  Edwards's  and  Noland's 
ferries?  (On  the  Potomac.)  Where  is  Colonel  La- 
zelle  posted?  Mosby  has  about  200  cavalry  at,  or 
near,  Point  of  Rocks. 

[Augur   to   Sheridan] 

Washington,  D.C.,  August  3. 

Colonel  Lazelle  is  posted  at  Falls  Church  (Fairfax 
County)  and  pickets  from  the  Potomac  near  Difficult 
Creek  to  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad.  Major 
Waite  (Eighth  Illinois)  has  near  600  cavalry  along  the 
Potomac  from  Great  Falls  to  the  mouth  of  the  Monoc- 
acy  watching  the  different  fords. 

[Sheridan  to  Augur] 

August  8th. 

Can  the  Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry  be  spared  ?  I 
find  that  the  cavalry  has  been  so  scattered  up  here  that 
it  is  no  wonder  that  it  has  not  done  so  well. 


288  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

[Augur  to  Sheridan] 

August  8th. 

The  Eighth  Illinois  is  scattered  worse  than  anything 
you  have.  The  headquarters  of  six  companies  are  in 
General  Wallace's  department.  Major  Waite,  with 
four  companies,  is  guarding  the  Potomac  between 
Great  Falls  and  the  Monocacy ;  another  company  is 
near  Port  Tobacco,  and  another  is  with  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  I  do  not  see  how  Major  Wake's  com- 
mand can  be  spared,  as  I  have  no  cavalry  to  replace  it. 

[Sheridan  to  Augur] 

August  8th. 

Your  dispatch  in  reference  to  the  Eighth  Illinois 
received.  Colonel  Lowell  left  about  6oo  men  of 
Gregg's  cavalry  division  in  support  of  Major  Waite. 
They  moved  this  morning  towards  the  mouth  of  the 
Monocacy,  and  will  remain  in  that  vicinity.  I  will 
not  change  the  Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry  for  the  present. 

[Augur   to   Waite] 

Upper  Potomac,  August  8th. 

General  Sheridan  reports  that  Mosby,  with  about 
300  men,  is  at  or  near  the  Point  of  Rocks.  Look 
out  well  for  him. 

[Taylor  to  Augur] 

August  10th. 

General  Sheridan  has  ordered  concentration  of 
the  Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry  at  Muddy  Branch  to  picket 


THE  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  SHERIDAN    289 

the  river  from  Monocacy  to  Washington.  The  river 
is  well  guarded  from  mouth  of  Monocacy  to  Harper's 
Ferry. 

[Sheridan  to  Augur] 

Charles  Town,  August  18th. 

Keep  scouts  out  in  Loudon  County.  I  have 
ordered  the  Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry  to  rendezvous  at 
Muddy  Branch  Station.  The  line  of  the  Potomac 
should  be  watched  carefully,  and  information  be  sent 
to  me  should  any  raiding  parties  attempt  to  cross. 

[Augur  to  Waite] 

August  1 8  th. 

Mosby  is  reported  to  have  within  reach  and  con- 
trol from  400  to  500  men  and  two  pieces  of  artillery. 
It  will  be  necessary  for  you  to  move  with  the  utmost 
caution. 

General  Lee  apprehended  a  raid  by  the 
cavalry  from  Washington  on  the  Central  Rail- 
road, and  instructed  me,  if  possible,  to  prevent 
it.  The  only  way  that  I  could  do  so  was  to  excite 
continual  alarm  in  their  camps.  Their  outposts 
were  often  attacked  all  along  their  lines  on  the 
same  night.  This  was  the  only  way  we  could 
keep  them  at  home.  On  the  same  day  three 
or  four  different  detachments  would  go  out ;  some 
to  operate  on  Sheridan  west  of  the  ridge,  some  to 


290  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

keep  Augur  in  remembrance  of  his  duty  to  guard 
the  Capital. 

Sheridan  was  obviously  greatly  solicitous  about 
preserving  his  communications,  for  he  knew  that 
they  were  weak  and  a  vital  necessity  for  his  army. 
He  evidently  had  some  information  which  in- 
creased his  anxiety  about  his  rear.  One  night, 
when  his  headquarters  were  at  Berryville,  I  sent 
my  best  scout,  John  Russell,  with  two  or  three 
men,  to  reconnoitre,  intending  to  deliver  a  blow 
at  Sheridan's  rear  and  thus  cripple  him  by  cutting 
off  his  supplies.  John  reported  long  trains  pass- 
ing down  along  the  valley  pike.  I  started  for 
the  vicinity  with  some  250  men  and  two  howitzers, 
one  of  which  became  an  encumbrance  by  break- 
ing down.  Through  Snicker's  Gap  we  crossed 
the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains  after  sundown  and 
passed  over  the  Shenandoah  River  not  far  from 
Berryville.  I  halted  at  a  barn  for  a  good  rest 
and  sent  Russell  to  see  what  was  going  on  upon 
the  pike.  I  was  asleep  when  he  returned  with 
the  news  that  a  very  large  train  was  just  passing 
along.  The  men  sprang  to  their  saddles.  With 
Russell  and  some  others  I  went  on  in  advance 
to  choose  the  best  place  for  attack,  directing 
Captain  William  Chapman  to  bring  on  the  com- 
mand.    About  sunrise  we  were  on  a  knoll  from 


LIEUTENANT   FOUNTAIN   BEATTY  (at  left);   LIEUTENANT  FRANK 
H.    RAHM  (in  centre);   SCOUT  JOHN   RUSSELL  (at  right) 

Detail  from  the  painting,  "  Mosby  and  His  Veterans,"  by  Otto  Walter  Beck 
Copyright,   I  91  7 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST  SHERIDAN    291 

which  we  could  get  a  good  view  of  a  great  train 
of  wagons  moving  along  the  road  and  a  large 
drove  of  cattle  with  the  train.  The  train  was 
within  a  hundred  yards  of  us,  strongly  guarded, 
but  with  flankers  out.  We  were  obscured  by 
the  mist,  and,  if  noticed  at  all,  were  doubtless 
thought  to  be  friends.  I  sent  Russell  to  hurry 
up  Chapman,  who  soon  arrived.  The  howitzer 
was  made  ready.  Richards,  with  his  squadron, 
was  sent  to  attack  the  front ;  William  Chapman 
and  Glasscock  were  to  attack  them  in  the  rear, 
while  Sam  Chapman  was  kept  near  me  and  the 
howitzer. 

My  scheme  was  nearly  ruined  by  a  ludicrous 
incident,  the  fun  of  which  is  more  apparent  now 
than  it  was  then.  The  howitzer  was  unlimbered 
over  a  yellow-jacket's  nest.  When  one  of  the 
men  had  rescued  the  howitzer,  a  shell  was  sent 
screaming  among  the  wagons,  beheading  a  mule. 
The  shot  was  like  thunder  from  a  clear  sky,  and 
the  mist  added  to  the  enemy's  perplexity.  This 
shot  was  our  signal  to  charge,  and  we  met  little 
resistance.  Panic  reigned  along  their  line,  and 
I  only  lost  two  men  killed  and  three  wounded. 
Before  the  fighting  ended,  as  I  knew  that  the 
guard  would  soon  recover  from  the  panic,  I  had 
men  unhitching  mules,  burning  wagons,  and  hurry- 


292  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

ing  prisoners  and  spoils  to  the  rear.  There  were 
325  wagons,  guarded  by  Kenly's  brigade  and  a 
large  force  of  cavalry.  They  had  not  stopped 
to  find  out  our  numbers.  We  set  a  paymaster's 
wagon  on  fire,  which  contained  —  this  we  did 
not  know  at  the  time  —  $125,000.  I  deployed 
skirmishers  as  a  mask,  until  my  command,  the 
prisoners,  and  booty  were  well  across  the  Shenan- 
doah River.  We  took  between  500  and  600  horses, 
200  beeves,  and  many  useful  stores ;  destroyed 
seventy-five  loaded  wagons,  and  carried  off  200 
prisoners,  including  seven  officers/ 

The  following  dispatches  illustrate  the  char- 
acter and  effect  of  my  partisan  operations  in 
Sheridan's  rear. 

[Stevenson  to  Sheridan] 

Harper's  Ferry,  Aug.  17th. 

Finding  all  trains  threatened  by  guerillas,  and  that 
they  are  in  force,  largely  increased  by  a  concentration 
of  several  organizations  under  Mosby  [there  had  been 
no  such  concentration],  making  the  vicinity  of  Charles 
Town  their  theater  of  operations,  I  am  of  opinion  that 
the  only  safety  of  our  trains  and  couriers  is  the  posting 
of  a  force  at  Charles  Town,  with  General  Duffie,  at 
Berryville,  and  one  thousand  of  Averell's  force  at 
Charles  Town,  with  orders  by  constant  scouting  to 
keep  the  country  clear.     I  think  we  can  send  forward 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST  SHERIDAN    293 

everything  without  loss.     As  matters  now  stand  no 
small  party  of  trains  with  small  guard  is  safe. 

[Stevenson  to  Averell] 

August  17th. 

Rebels  occupy  Charles  Town  (in  Sheridan's  rear) 
with  small  force  this  evening.  Attacked  party  of 
couriers  coming  in  about  five  o'clock,  capturing  two 
of  them ;  heard  nothing  of  your  command.  A  large 
supply  train  will  start  from  here  in  the  morning,  so 
as  to  reach  Charles  Town  by  6  a.m.  Have  but  a 
small  guard.  If  you  could  have  a  force  at  that  point 
before  the  train  to  join  escort  and  move  with  it  to 
Berryville,  it  would  secure  the  safety  of  train.  Mosby, 
with  his  command,  is  waiting  to  attack  train,  and  will 
capture  it,  if  possible.  The  supplies  are  needed  at  the 
front,  and  will  be  put  through  by  all  means. 

[Lazelle  to  Augur] 

Fairfax  County,  August  9th. 

I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  two  parties  sent  out 
from  this  command,  consisting  of  thirty  men  each, 
met  yesterday  afternoon  at  Fairfax  Station,  and  that 
while  united  and  acting  together  were  attacked  by  a 
force  of  rebels,  variously  estimated  at  from  forty  to 
fifty  men,  and  were  completely  dispersed  and  routed. 
Citizens  report  that  Mosby  himself  was  in  command 
of  the  rebels.  So  far  as  known,  our  loss  is  as  follows : 
Captain  J.  H.  Fleming,  Sixteenth  New  York  Cavalry, 
missing ;      thirty- three     men      missing.      Thirty-nine 


294  COLONEL  JOHN  S.    MOSBY 

horses  missing.  The  number  of  the  killed  and 
wounded  is  not  yet  known.  Captain  Fleming,  who  at 
the  time  of  the  attack  had  command  of  the  party,  is 
reported  killed. 

[Captain  Harrison  to  Kelly] 

Martinsburg,  August  14th. 

Several  of  our  scouts  here  say  they  cannot  get 
through  to  Sheridan,  Mosby  having  driven  them  back. 

[Lazelle  to  De  Russy] 

Fairfax  County,  August  24th. 

The  attack  at  Annandale  has  ceased,  and  the  rebels 
withdrew,  perhaps  with  the  intention  of  attacking  some 
other  part  of  my  picket  line.  The  attacking  party  is 
said  to  have  consisted  of  from  less  than  200  to  300,  even 
to  500  men,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery,  all  under  Mosby. 

[Augur  to  Sheridan] 

Washington,  September  1st. 

Major  Waite  has  returned  from  Upperville,  in  the 
vicinity  of  Snicker's  Gap ;  reports  no  rebel  forces  in 
that  vicinity,  except  Mosby's. 

[Lazelle  to  Augur] 

September  1st. 

Last  night  at  about  10.30  o'clock  one  of  our  pickets 
was  attacked  near  this  camp  ;  the  attacking  party  was 
driven  off,  with  a  loss  to  the  rebels  of  one  horse,  and  it 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST  SHERIDAN    295 

is  believed  one  man  wounded.  About  the  same  hour 
the  picket  posts  on  the  Braddock  Road  and  on  the 
road  to  Falls  Church  and  Annandale,  were  attacked 
simultaneously  and  driven  in.  This  morning  at  about 
6  A.M.,  one  of  our  pickets,  about  half  a  mile  west  of 
the  village  of  Falls  Church,  was  attacked  and  one  vi- 
dette  captured.  Late  to-day  two  of  our  picket  posts 
between  here  and  Annandale  were  attacked  at  about  the 
same  time  by  a  force  of  between  twenty  and  thirty 
men.  Five  men  were  captured  and  seven  horses, 
while  four  men  escaped.  At  about  the  same  hour  the 
picket  post  on  the  Little  River  pike,  towards  Fair- 
fax Court  House,  from  Annandale,  was  attacked,  and 
one  sergeant  and  a  horse  were  wounded  ;  two  men  and 
three   horses  captured. 

[Augur  to  Lazelle] 

September  1st. 

I  have  reliable  information  that  Mosby  is  still 
lying  in  the  woods  in  front  of  your  lines,  and  expects 
to  make  an  attack  to-night  somewhere  upon  it.  Please 
have  all  your  men  on  duty  notified  of  this,  that  they 
may  be  on  their  guard  and  take  proper  precautions. 
If  not  successful  to-night,  he  proposes  to  remain  until 
he  strikes  some  important  blow. 

[Gansevoort  to  Augur] 

Fairfax,  September  19th. 

Information  considered  very  reliable  has  reached 
here  to-day  that  in  the  skirmish  with  the  Thirteenth 


296  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

New  York  Cavalry,  on  the  last  scout  of  that  regiment, 
Colonel  Mosby  was  seriously  wounded,  a  pistol  bullet 
striking  the  handle  of  the  pistol  in  his  belt  and  glanc- 
ing off  in  his  groin.  He  was  able,  however,  to  ride 
off,  but  soon  fainted,  and  was  carried  in  a  wagon  to  a 
place  of  safety. 

[Lazelle  to  Augur] 

September  29th. 

Private  Henry  Smith,  of  Company  H,  Thirteenth 
New  York  Cavalry,  is  the  man  who  wounded  him 
(Mosby).  It  was  a  bold  deed,  and  Smith  deserves 
credit  for  it. 

[Sheridan  to  Augur] 

Strassburg,  September  21st. 

I  wish  you  to  send  to  Winchester  all  the  available 
troops  possible  to  the  number  of  between  four  thousand 
to  five  thousand,  without  delay,  to  relieve  the  troops 
left  there  to  guard  my  communication.  If  necessity 
should  require,  they  can  be  returned  at  short  notice. 

[Stevenson  to  Stanton] 

Harper's  Ferry,  Sept.  26th. 

Both  of  my  last  courier  parties  were  attacked  by 
Rebel  cavalry ;  dispersed  part  of  them,  capturing  the 
first  party  at  Strassburg,  the  second  at  a  point  between 
Charles  Town  and  Bunker  Hill.  Message  No.  31  was 
sent  by  both  parties,  and  both  have  failed.  I  shall 
try  another  duplicate  to-night.     The  country  between 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST  SHERIDAN     297 

this  and  Sheridan  yesterday  and  to-day  seemed  to  be 
alive  with  parties  of  Rebel  guerillas  and  cavalry.  Last 
night  they  attacked  ambulances  with  scout  of  seven- 
teen men  between  this  and  Charles  Town ;  severely 
wounded  Sergeant  of  Sixteenth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
I  doubt  if  we  should  be  able  to  get  any  dispatches 
through  without  sending  much  larger  body  of  cavalry 
than  I  can  get  hold  of.  I  have  but  small  force  for  such 
duty,  and  it  is  badly  worn  down. 

[Edwards  to  Neil] 
Martinsburg-Winchester,  Oct.  2d. 

The  train  that  left  Martinsburg  arrived  here  last 
night.  I  have  no  forces  here  to  escort  it  to  the  front, 
except  400  cavalry  (and  100  of  these  cannot  be  relied 
on)  ;  also,  some  straggling  infantry,  without  organiza- 
tion, numbering  300  men.  I  have  detained  the  train 
here  on  account  of  insufficiency  in  men  to  properly 
guard  it.  A  train  of  its  size  to  go  through  the  country 
where  it  has  to  should  have  an  escort  of  at  least  2000 
men  with  it.  Captain  Blazer,  of  the  Independent 
Scouts,  comes  in  this  morning  and  reports  Mosby's 
command  hovering  in  the  neighborhood  of  Newtown, 
etc.  No  escort  with  dispatches  can  get  through  with 
less  than  500  cavalry. 

[Stevenson  to  Stanton] 

Harper's  Ferry,  Oct.  1st. 

There  are  no  organized  troops  of  enemy  in  Valley 
this  side  of  Staunton,  except  Mosby's  guerillas. 


298  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

[Neil  to  Stanton] 

Martinsburg,  September  30th. 

About  300  or  400  guerillas  are  operating  between 
Winchester  and  Bunker  Hill.  I  do  not  consider  my 
post  safe  unless  I  have  stronger  force  to  protect  the 
large  amount  of  Government  property  rapidly  collect- 
ing here. 

As  the  Federal  dispatches  said,  I  was  wounded 
on  September  14,  four  days  before  the  battle 
of  Winchester.  But  it  was  hardly  the  bold  deed 
Lazelle  described.  Two  of  my  men,  Tom  Love 
and  Guy  Broadwater,  and  myself  met  five  of 
the  enemy's  cavalry  in  Fairfax.  As  we  were 
within  a  few  yards  of  each  other,  we  all  fired  at 
the  same  time.  Two  of  the  enemy's  horses  fell 
dead,  and  I  was  seriously  wounded.  The  other 
three  cavalry  then  fled  full  speed  with  Love  and 
Broadwater  after  them  until  I  called  them  back 
to  my  assistance.  We  then  left  the  other  men 
under  the  dead  horses,  and  I  was  carried,  for 
safety,  to  my  father's  home  near  Lynchburg. 
Captain  William  Chapman  commanded  my  battal- 
ion during  my  absence. 

On  the  day  after  I  was  wounded,  400  of  Sheri- 
dan's cavalry  came  over  the  Blue  Ridge  at  night, 
expecting,  by  aid  of  a  spy,  to  capture  a  good 
many   of   my    men.     The    expedition    was    com- 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST  SHERIDAN    299 

manded  by  General  George  H.  Chapman  of 
Indianapolis.  He  caught  several  of  my  men 
and  started  back,  with  Captain  Chapman  in 
pursuit  of  the  General.  Captain  Chapman  did 
not  go  on  his  trail,  but  took  a  road  running  along 
the  top  of  the  Blue  Ridge  in  order  to  intercept 
the  Union  troops  before  they  got  to  the  Shenan- 
doah River.  It  was  an  excessively  hot  day  and 
the  Union  troops  had  ridden  all  night.  The 
General  had  heard  of  my  being  wounded  and 
may  have  calculated  that  my  command  was 
disorganized  or  would  be  less  active.  So  when 
the  troops  reached  Snicker's  Gap,  all  lay  down 
in  the  shade  and  went  to  sleep.  Captain  Chap- 
man soon  came  plunging  down  the  mountain- 
side like  an  avalanche  and  was  firing  among  the 
men  before  they  were  awake.  They  had  not 
expected  an  enemy  to  come  like  a  bolt  from 
the  sky,  and  the  attack  caused  a  general  stampede. 
All  the  prisoners  were  recaptured,  and  many  of 
the  enemy  were  killed,  wounded,  and  captured. 
General  Chapman  returned  to  camp  and  wrote 
in  his  report : 

About  an  hour  had  elapsed  and  the  men  had  mostly 
fallen  asleep,  when  they  were  suddenly  charged  upon 
by  a  force  of  from  fifty  to  eighty  of  the  enemy,  and, 
being  stampeded  by    the    surprise,    a    number   were 


300  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

killed,  wounded,  and  captured  before  I  reached  the 
scene  of  the  encounter  with  the  main  body.  They 
had  approached  the  Gap  across  the  mountains  and 
charged  down  an  easy  slope,  and  they  retired  the 
same  way,  pursued  for  two  miles  by  my  men.  It  was 
near  sundown,  and  in  the  exhausted  state  of  men  and 
horses,  I  did  not  deem  further  pursuit  expedient. 

Captain  Tompson  had  captured  twelve  of  the  enemy 
but  they  were  recaptured.  From  citizens  I  ascertained 
that  Mosby  was  wounded  some  time  ago  and  had  gone 
to  Richmond.  Judging  from  indications,  I  should 
estimate  the  force  operating  under  Mosby  and  his 
colleague  at  from  200  to  250.  If  they  have  any  en- 
campment it  must  be  in  the  neighborhood  and  beyond 
Upperville. 

It  will  be  observed  that  General  Chapman 
did  not  say  that  he  was  bushwhacked. 

But  these  constant  raids  aroused  the  Federal 
officers  to  such  an  extent  that  on  September  22 
they  attempted  to  take  revenge  by  hanging  some 
of  my  men. 

An  eye  witness  described  the  scene  in  a  Con- 
federate newspaper  as  follows : 

The  Yankee  Cavalry,  under  General  Torbert,  entered 
the  town  (Front  Royal),  and  drove  out  the  four  Con- 
federates on  picket,  who  fell  back  to  Milford.  At 
this  latter  point  General  Wickham  met  the  Yankee 
force  and  repulsed  it.     A  part  of  Mosby's  men,  under 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST  SHERIDAN    301 

Captain  Chapman,  annoyed  the  enemy  very  much 
on  their  return  to  Front  Royal,  which,  with  the  morti- 
fication of  their  defeat  by  Wickham,  excited  them  to 
such  savage  doings  as  to  prompt  them  to  murder  six 
of  our  men  who  fell  into  their  hands.  Anderson, 
Overby,  Love,  and  Rhodes  were  shot  and  Carter  and 
one  other,  whose  name  our  informant  did  not  recollect, 
were  hung  to  the  limb  of  a  tree  at  the  entrance  of  the 
village.  .  .  .  Henry  Rhodes  was  quite  a  youth, 
living  with  his  widowed  mother  and  supporting  her 
by  his  labor.  He  did  not  belong  to  Mosby's  command. 
His  mother  entreated  them  to  spare  the  life  of  her  son 
and  treat  him  as  a  prisoner  of  war,  but  the  demons 
answered  by  whetting  their  sabres  on  some  stones  and 
declaring  they  would  cut  his  head  off  and  hers  too,  if 
she  came  near.  They  ended  by  shooting  him  in  her 
presence.  The  murders  were  committed  on  the  22nd 
day  of  September,  Generals  Torbert,  Merritt,  and 
Custer  being  present.  It  is  said  that  Torbert  and 
Merritt  turned  the  prisoners  over  to  Custer  for  the 
purpose  of  their  execution. 

An  account  in  the  Richmond  Examiner  was  as 
follows : 

On  Friday  last  Mosby's  men  attacked  a  wagon 
train,  which  was  protected  by  a  whole  brigade,  so  that 
their  charge  was  repelled  with  the  loss  of  six  prisoners. 
Two  of  their  prisoners  the  Yankees  immediately  hung 
to  a  neighboring  tree,  placing  around  their  necks 
placards  bearing  the  inscription,  'Hung  in  retaliation 


302  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

for  the  Union  officer  killed  after  he  had  surrendered 
—  the  fate  of  Mosby's  men.'  The  other  four  of  our 
prisoners  were  tied  to  stakes  and  mercilessly  shot 
through  the  skull,  each  one  individually.  One  of 
those  hung  was  a  famous  soldier  named  Overby,  from 
Georgia.  When  the  rope  was  placed  around  his  neck 
by  his  inhuman  captors,  he  told  them  that  he  was 
one  of  Mosby's  men,  and  that  he  was  proud  to  die  as  a 
Confederate  soldier,  and  that  his  death  was  sweetened 
with  the  assurance  that  Colonel  Mosby  would  swing  in 
the  wind  ten  Yankees  for  every  man  they  murdered. 

This  action  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  led  to 
my  writing  the  following  letter : 

November  II,  1864. 

Major  General  P.  H.  Sheridan, 

Commanding  U.  S.  Forces  in  the  Valley. 

General : 

Some  time  in  the  month  of  September,  during  my 
absence  from  my  command,  six  of  my  men  who  had 
been  captured  by  your  forces,  were  hung  and  shot  in 
the  streets  of  Front  Royal,  by  order  and  in  the  imme- 
diate presence  of  Brigadier-General  Custer.  Since 
then  another  (captured  by  a  Colonel  Powell  on  a 
plundering  expedition  into  Rappahannock)  shared  a 
similar  fate.  A  label  affixed  to  the  coat  of  one  of  the 
murdered  men  declared  "that  this  would  be  the  fate 
of  Mosby  and  all  his  men." 

Since  the  murder  of  my  men,  not  less  than  seven 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST  SHERIDAN    303 

hundred  prisoners,  including  many  officers  of  high 
rank,  captured  from  your  army  by  this  command 
have  been  forwarded  to  Richmond ;  but  the  execution 
of  my  purpose  of  retaliation  was  deferred,  in  order, 
as  far  as  possible,  to  confine  its  operation  to  the  men 
of  Custer  and  Powell.  Accordingly,  on  the  6th  instant, 
seven  of  your  men  were,  by  my  order,  executed  on  the 
Valley  Pike  —  your  highway  of  travel. 

Hereafter,  any  prisoners  falling  into  my  hands  will 
be  treated  with  the  kindness  due  to  their  condition, 
unless  some  new  act  of  barbarity  shall  compel  me, 
reluctantly,  to  adopt  a  line  of  policy  repugnant  to 
humanity. 

Very  respectfully, 

your  obedient  servant, 

John  S.  Mosby, 
Lieut.  Colonel. 

No  further  "acts  of  barbarity"  were  committed 
on  my  men. 

Although  Sheridan  defeated  Early  in  the  battle 
at  Winchester,  on  September  19,  1864,  and  was 
urged  by  Grant  to  move  on  south,  press  Early, 
and  end  the  war,  he  really  made  no  farther  prog- 
ress and  spent  the  winter,  with  an  overwhelming 
force,  where  he  had  won  a  victory  in  September. 
On  September  23,  after  Fisher's  Hill,  Grant  had 
telegraphed  him,  "Keep  on  and  you  will  cause 
the  fall  of  Richmond." 


304  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

On  the  twenty-ninth  Sheridan  wrote  to  Grant 
from  Harrisonburg : 

My  impression  is  that  most  of  the  troops  which 
Early  had  left  passed  through  these  mountains  to 
Charlottesville.  Kershaw's  division  came  to  his  assist- 
ance and,  I  think,  passed  along  the  west  base  of  the 
mountain  to  Waynesboro.  The  advance  of  my  in- 
fantry is  at  Mount  Crawford,  eight  miles  south  of 
Harrisonburg.  From  the  most  reliable  accounts 
Early's  army  was  completely  broken  up  and  dispirited. 
It  will  be  exceedingly  difficult  for  me  to  carry  the  in- 
fantry over  the  mountains  and  strike  at  the  Central 
road.  I  cannot  accumulate  stores  to  do  so,  and  think 
it  best  to  take  some  position  near  Front  Royal  and 
operate  with  cavalry  and  infantry. 

In  reply  to  Grant's  dispatch  a  few  days  before 
he  had  said,  "I  am  now  about  eighty  miles 
from  Martinsburg,  and  find  it  exceedingly  diffi- 
cult to  supply  this  army." 

Grant  rejoined  : 

Your  victories  have  caused  the  greatest  consterna- 
tion. If  you  can  possibly  subsist  your  army  to  the 
front  for  a  few  days  more,  do  it,  and  make  a  great  effort 
to  destroy  the  roads  about  Charlottesville,  and  the 
canal  wherever  your  cavalry  can  reach. 

If  this  advice  had  been  acted  on,  Sheridan's 
army  would  have  been  thrown  into  the  rear  of 
General   Lee.       Grant  did   not,   of  course,   mean 


THE   CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  SHERIDAN    305 

that  Sheridan  should  stop  at  Charlottesville. 
He  wanted  him  first  to  gain  a  foothold  there, 
accumulate  supplies  by  the  Orange  Railroad, 
and  make  it  a  new  starting  point  for  further 
operations. 

The  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad  runs 
south  by  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville  to 
Lynchburg.  From  Manassas  Junction  —  twenty- 
five  miles  from  Washington  —  a  branch  road 
runs  west  through  the  Blue  Ridge  to  Front  Royal 
and  Strassburg.  It  was  assumed  that  if  the 
Northern  army  held  the  Manassas  Gap  line,  my 
command  would  retire  south  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock. In  this  way  a  double  purpose  would  be 
effected ;  a  more  convenient  line  of  supplies 
would  be  secured,  as  well  as  the  annexation  of 
more  territory  to  the  United  States.  The  sequel 
shows  that  I  had  not  been  consulted. 

Without  securing  the  fruits  of  his  victory,  on 
October  6  Sheridan  began  his  retrograde  move- 
ment, no  doubt  much  to  Grant's  chagrin. 

On  October  3  Grant  telegraphed  Sheridan : 

You  may  take  up  such  position  in  the  Valley  as  you 
think  can  and  ought  to  be  held,  and  send  all  the  force 
not  required  for  this  immediately  here.  I  will  direct 
the  Railroad  to  be  pushed  towards  Front  Royal,  so 
that  you  may  send  our  troops  back  that  way. 


306  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

[Halleck  to  Sheridan] 

October  3rd. 

The  Orange  and  Alexandria  road  was  repaired 
to  the  Rappahannock,  in  the  expectation  that  you 
would  pursue  the  enemy  through  the  mountains  and 
receive  your  supplies  from  Culpeper.  By  General 
Grant's  order,  the  workmen  have  been  changed  to  the 
Manassas  Gap  road,  which  will  be  opened  to  Front 
Royal. 

On  October  4  Halleck  said  to  Grant,  with  ref- 
erence to  the  opening  and  holding  the  railroad 
from  Alexandria  to  Front  Royal : 

In  order  to  keep  up  my  communication  on  this  line 
to  Manassas  Gap  and  Shenandoah  Valley,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  send  south  all  rebel  inhabitants  between 
that  line  and  the  Potomac,  and  also  to  clean  out 
Mosby's  gang  of  robbers,  who  have  so  long  infested 
that  district  of  country ;  and  I  respectfully  suggest 
that  Sheridan's  cavalry  should  be  required  to  accom- 
plish this  object  before  it  is  sent  elsewhere.  The 
two  small  regiments  (Thirteenth  and  Sixteenth  New 
York,  stationed  in  Fairfax)  under  General  Augur, 
have  been  so  often  cut  up  by  Mosby's  band  that 
they  are  cowed  and  useless  for  that  purpose.  If 
these  dispositions  are  approved  and  carried  out,  it 
will  not  be  necessary  to  keep  so  large  a  force  at 
Harper's  Ferry  and  guarding  the  canal  and  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad. 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST  SHERIDAN    307 

By  sending  some  of  Sheridan's  troops  to  Grant, 
it  was  calculated  that  through  the  sudden  aug- 
mentation of  Grant's  strength,  he  could  make  a 
successful  assault  on  Lee  at  Petersburg  before 
Early's  troops  could  reach  him,  or  to  extend  his 
lines  so  as  to  seize  the  Southside  Railroad.  This 
combination  was  defeated. 

The  following  dispatch  (October  4)  from  Steven- 
son at  Harper's  Ferry,  to  Edwards  at  Winchester, 
is  significant  as  showing  the  dangers  that  beset 
Sheridan's  line  of  supply. 

Escorts  with  dispatches  have  to  cut  their  way  and 
generally  lose  half  their  men.  I  think  a  train  of  200 
wagons  should  have  an  escort  of  one  thousand  infantry 
and  500  cavalry  going  to  the  front.  The  train  going 
out  this  morning  will  have  nearly  1500  escort.  I  do 
not  think  I  overestimate  the  danger  between  here  and 
there. 

Although  I  was  still  on  crutches,  I  had  now 
resumed  command  of  my  men.  On  October  4 
a  body  of  infantry,  with  construction  force,  came 
up  on  the  Manassas  road ;  they  could  not  have 
anticipated  any  resistance,  as  they  had  only  a 
single  company  of  cavalry  for  couriers,  and 
General  Augur  did  not  accompany  them.  The 
next  day  I  attacked  this  force,  and  General  Lee 
reported  the  results  to  the  Secretary  of  War : 


308  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

Chaffin's  Bluff,  October  9,  1864. 
Hon.  James  A.  Seddon,  Secretary  of  War  : 

Colonel  Mosby  reports  that  a  body  of  about  a 
thousand  of  the  enemy  advanced  up  the  Manassas 
road  on  the  4th,  with  trains  of  cars  loaded  with  rail- 
road material,  and  occupied  Salem  and  Rectortown. 
He  attacked  them  at  Salem,  defeating  them,  capturing 
fifty  prisoners,  all  their  baggage,  camp  equipage, 
stores,  etc.,  and  killed  and  wounded  a  considerable 
number.  His  loss,  two  wounded.  The  enemy  is  now 
entrenched  at  Rectortown,  with  two  long  trains  of 
cars.  The  railroad  is  torn  up  and  bridges  burned  in 
their  rear,  and  all  communications  cut. 

All  work  repairing  the  railroad  was  stopped, 
and  both  the  soldiers  and  workmen  went  to  build- 
ing stockades  for  their  own  safety.  A  courier 
was  sent  immediately  to  Gordonsville  with  a 
telegram  to  General  Lee  informing  him  of  the 
movement  on  the  railroad.  In  reply  General 
Lee  said,  "Your  success  at  Salem  gives  great 
satisfaction.  Do  all  in  your  power  to  prevent 
reconstruction  of  the  road." 

[The  following  undated  fragment  of  letter  to 
Mrs.  Mosby  probably  refers  to  this  action,  —  see 
page  331.] 

...  at  Salem,  and  completely  routed  them. 
Captured  fifty  prisoners,  and  all  their  baggage,  tents, 
rations,  etc.     Yesterday  in  a  fight  near  the  Plains  my 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST   SHERIDAN    309 

horse  (or  rather  yours)  ran  entirely  through  the 
Yankees  in  a  charge.  He  was  badly  shot  and  tumbled 
over  me,  but  we  whipped  them.  They  are  camped 
all  along  the  railroad.  Bowie,  Ames,  have  both  been 
killed.  I  don't  think  the  Yankees  will  be  here  long. 
I  will  bring  you  all  over  as  soon  [as  they  leave  the 
Manassas  railroad]. 

The  intentions  cf  the  enemy  were  now  plainly 
developed,  and  it  was  my  duty  to  do  all  I  could 
to  defeat  them.  To  do  so  with  my  slender  means 
looked  a  good  deal  like  going  to  sea  in  a  saucer. 
The  troops  at  Salem  fled  to  Rectortown,  where 
the  railroad  runs  through  a  gorge.  Here  they 
took  shelter.  On  the  sixth  and  seventh  we 
shelled  them  to  keep  them  on  the  defensive.  My 
guns  could  not  be  depressed  sufficiently  to  do 
them  much  damage,  but  the  enemy  kept  under 
cover. 

On  the  seventh  of  October,  from  Woodstock, 
Sheridan  sent  the  following  dispatch  to  General 
Grant : 

I  commenced  moving  back  yesterday  morning.  I 
would  have  preferred  sending  troops  to  you  by 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Road.  It  would  have  been 
the  quickest  and  most  concealed  way  of  sending  them. 
The  keeping  open  of  the  road  to  Front  Royal  will 
require  large  guards  to  protect  it  against  a  very  small 
number  of  partisan  troops. 


3io  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

At  the  same  time  Sheridan  requested  Halleck 
not  to  send  railroad  transportation  to  Front 
Royal,  as  he  might  be  delayed.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  in  his  dispatch  to  General  Grant 
on  September  29,  he  had  suggested  falling 
back  to  Front  Royal  and  operating  from  there  as 
a  base.  Unless  he  used  the  railroad,  his  supplies 
would  have  to  be  brought  by  wagons  from 
Harper's  Ferry.  On  the  same  day  he  said  to 
Halleck : 

I  have  been  unable  to  communicate  more  frequently 
on  account  of  the  operations  of  guerillas  in  my  rear. 
They  have  attacked  every  party,  and  I  have  sent  my 
dispatches  with  a  view  of  economizing  as  much  as 
possible. 

Sheridan  went  to  Front  Royal  to  see  to  the  em- 
barkation of  10,000  troops  for  Grant,  but  he 
found  nothing  but  a  roadbed  without  iron.  The 
troops  remained  there  for  three  days  waiting  for 
Augur  to  build  the  road,  but  he  could  not  do  it ; 
his  troops  had  all  they  could  do  to  take  care  of 
themselves,  for  my  men  were  rather  active  those 
days. 

In  the  following  dispatch  to  Halleck,  Sheridan 
admitted  that  he  did  not  use  the  railroad  because 
Augur  could  not  repair  it : 


THE   CAMPAIGN   AGAINST  SHERIDAN    311 

October  12th. 

I  have  ordered  the  Sixth  Corps  (except  one  brigade 
now  at  Winchester)  to  march  to  Alexandria  to-morrow 
morning.  I  have  ordered  General  Augur  to  concen- 
trate all  his  forces  at  Manassas  Junction  or  Bull  Run 
until  he  hears  from  me.  He  could  not  complete  the 
railroad  to  Front  Royal  without  additional  forces  from 
me,  and  to  give  him  that  force  to  do  the  work  and 
transport  the  troops  by  rail  to  Alexandria  would 
require  more  time. 


CHAPTER   XV 

The  Greenback  Raid 

Throughout  the  fall  and  winter  of  1864  I 
kept  up  an  incessant  warfare  on  Sheridan  and 
his  communications.  On  October  12  I  wrote  to 
my  wife : 

Near  Middleburg. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

I  have  been  engaged  in  a  perpetual  strife  with  the 
Yankees  ever  since  my  arrival.  They  are  now  en- 
gaged in  repairing  the  railroad  (Manassas).  I  at- 
tacked a  camp  of  800.  .  .  . 

As  we  operated  in  Sheridan's  rear,  the  railroad 
that  brought  his  supplies  was  his  weak  point 
and  consequently  our  favorite  object  of  attack. 
For  security  it  had  to  be  closely  guarded  by  de- 
tachments of  troops,  which  materially  reduced 
his  offensive  strength.  We  kept  watch  for  un- 
guarded points,  and  the  opportunity  they  offered 
was  never  lost. 

Early  in  October  one  of  my  best  men,  Jim 
Wiltshire,   afterwards   a   prominent   physician   in 

312 


DR.  J.    WILTSHIRE  (at  left);   MAJOR   A.    E.    RICHARDS  (at  right) 

Detail  from  the  painting  "  Mosby  and  His  Veterans,"  by  Otto  Walter  Beck 
Copyright,  1917 


THE   GREENBACK   RAID  313 

Baltimore,  discovered  and  reported  to  me  a  gap 
through  which  we  might  penetrate  between  the 
guards  and  reach  that  railroad  without  exciting 
an  alarm.  It  was  a  hazardous  enterprise,  as 
there  were  camps  along  the  line  and  frequent  com- 
munication between  them,  but  I  knew  it  would 
injure  Sheridan  to  destroy  a  train  and  compel 
him  to  place  stronger  guards  on  the  road.  So  I 
resolved  to  take  the  risk.  Jim  Wiltshire  had  a 
time-table  and  we  knew  the  minute  when  the 
train  was  due  and  so  timed  our  arrival  that  we 
would  not  have  to  wait  long. 

There  was  great  danger  of  our  being  discovered 
by  the  patrols  on  the  road  and  our  presence  re- 
ported to  the  camps  that  were  near.  The  sit- 
uation was  critical,  but  we  were  so  buoyant  with 
hope  that  we  did  not  realize  it.  The  western- 
bound  passenger  train  was  selected  from  the 
schedule  as  I  knew  it  would  create  a  greater  sen- 
sation to  burn  it  than  any  other  ;  it  was  due  about 
two  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Wiltshire  conducted 
us  to  a  long,  deep  cut  on  the  railroad.  No  patrol 
or  picket  was  in  sight.  I  preferred  derailing  the 
train  in  a  cut  to  running  it  off  an  embankment, 
because  there  would  be  less  danger  of  the  pas- 
sengers being  hurt.  People  who  travel  on  a  rail- 
road in  a  country  where  military  operations  are 


3H  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

going  on  take  the  risk  of  all  these  accidents  of 
war.  I  was  not  conducting  an  insurance  business 
on  life  or  property. 

It  was  a  lovely  night,  bright  and  clear,  with  a 
big  Jack  Frost  on  the  ground.  I  believe  that 
I  was  the  only  member  of  my  command  who  went 
through  the  war  without  a  watch,  but  all  of  my 
men  had  watches,  and  we  knew  it  would  not  be 
long  before  the  train  would  be  due.  Videttes 
were  sent  out,  and  the  men  were  ordered  to  lie 
down  on  the  bank  of  the  railroad  and  keep  quiet. 
We  had  ridden  all  day  and  were  tired  and  sleepy, 
so  we  were  soon  peacefully  dreaming.  I  laid  my 
head  in  the  lap  of  one  of  my  men,  Curg  Hutchinson, 
and  fell  asleep.  For  some  reason  —  I  suppose 
it  was  because  we  were  sleeping  so  soundly  —  we 
did  not  hear  the  train  coming  until  it  got  up  in 
the  cut,  and  I  was  aroused  and  astounded  by  an 
explosion  and  a  crash.  As  we  had  displaced  a 
rail,  the  engine  had  run  off  the  track,  the  boiler 
burst,  and  the  air  was  filled  with  red-hot  cinders 
and  escaping  steam.  A.  good  description  of  the 
scene  can  be  found  in  Dante's  "Inferno."  Above 
all  could  be  heard  the  screams  of  the  passengers  — 
especially  women.  The  catastrophe  came  so  sud- 
denly that  my  men  at  first  seemed  to  be  stunned 
and  bewildered.     Knowing  that  the  railroad  guards 


THE  GREENBACK   RAID  315 

would  soon  hear  of  it  and  that  no  time  was  to  be 
lost,  I  ran  along  the  line  and  pushed  my  men 
down  the  bank,  ordering  them  to  go  to  work 
pulling  out  the  passengers  and  setting  fire  to 
the  cars. 

By  this  time  Curg  Hutchinson  had  recovered 
from  the  shock  and  had  jumped  on  the  train. 
When  the  train  came  up,  he  was  snoring  and 
dreaming  that  he  was  in  Hell ;  and  when  he  was 
awakened  by  the  crash,  he  found  himself  breathing 
steam  and  in  a  sparkling  shower.  He  had  no 
doubt  then  that  his  dream  was  not  all  a  dream. 
But  he  recovered  his  senses  when  I  gave  him  a 
push,  and  he  slid  down  a  bank. 

It  did  not  take  long  to  pull  out  the  passengers. 
While  all  of  this  was  going  on,  I  stood  on  the 
bank  giving  directions  to  the  men.  One  of  them 
reported  to  me  that  a  car  was  filled  with  Ger- 
mans, and  that  they  would  not  get  out.  I  told 
him,  "Set  fire  to  the  car  and  burn  the  Dutch,  if 
they  won't  come  out."  They  were  immigrants 
going  west  to  locate  homesteads  and  did  not 
understand  a  word  of  English,  or  what  all  this 
meant.  They  had  through  tickets  and  thought 
they  had  a  right  to  keep  their  seats.  There  was 
a  lot  of  New  York  Heralds  on  the  train  for  Sheri- 
dan's army.     So  my  men  circulated  the  papers 


316  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

through  the  train  and  applied  matches.  Sud- 
denly there  was  a  grand  illumination.  The  Ger- 
mans now  took  in  the  situation  and  came  tumbling, 
all  in  a  pile,  out  of  the  flames.  I  hope  they  all 
lived  to  be  naturalized  and  get  homes.  They 
ought  not  to  blame  me,  but  Sheridan ;  it  was  his 
business,  not  mine,  to  protect  them. 

While  we  were  helping  the  passengers  to  climb 
the  steep  bank,  one  of  my  men,  Cab  Maddux, 
who  had  been  sent  off  as  a  vidette  to  watch  the 
road,  came  dashing  up  and  cried  out  that  the 
Yankees  were  coming.  I  immediately  gave  or- 
ders to  mount  quickly  and  form,  and  one  was  sent 
to  find  out  if  the  report  was  true.  He  soon  came 
back  and  said  it  was  not.  The  men  then  dis- 
mounted and  went  to  work  again.  I  was  very 
mad  with  Cab  for  almost  creating  a  stampede  and 
told  him  that  I  had  a  good  mind  to  have  him 
shot.  Cab  was  quick-witted,  but,  seeing  how 
angry  I  was,  said  nothing  then.  But  he  often 
related  the  circumstance  after  the  war.  His 
well-varnished  account  of  it  was  that  I  ordered 
him  to  be  shot  at  sunrise,  that  he  said  he  hoped 
it  would  be  a  foggy  morning,  and  that  I  was  so 
much  amused  by  his  reply  that  I  relented  and 
pardoned  him.  Years  afterwards  Cab  confessed 
why  he  gave  the  false  alarm.     He  said  he  heard 


THE   GREENBACK   RAID  317 

the  noise  the  train  made  when  it  ran  off  the  track 
and  knew  the  men  were  gathering  the  spoils  and 
did  not  think  it  was  fair  for  him  to  be  away  picket- 
ing for  their  benefit.  He  also  said  that  after  he 
got  to  the  burning  cars  he  made  up  for  lost  time. 

A  great  many  ludicrous  incidents  occurred. 
One  lady  ran  up  to  me  and  exclaimed,  "Oh,  my 
father  is  a  Mason  !"  I  had  no  time  to  say  any- 
thing but,  "I  can't  help  it."  One  passenger 
claimed  immunity  for  himself  on  the  ground  that 
he  was  a  member  of  an  aristocratic  church  in 
Baltimore. 

Just  as  Cab  dashed  up,  two  of  my  men,  Charlie 
Dear  and  West  Aldridge,  came  to  me  and  reported 
that  they  had  two  U.  S.  Paymasters  with  their 
satchels  of  greenbacks.  Knowing  it  would  be 
safer  to  send  them  out  by  a  small  party,  which 
could  easily  elude  the  enemy,  one  of  my  lieu- 
tenants, Charlie  Grogan,  was  detailed  with  two 
or  three  men  to  take  them  over  the  ridge  to  our 
rendezvous. 

Whether  my  men  got  anything  in  the  shape  of 
pocketbooks,  watches,  or  other  valuable  articles, 
I  never  inquired,  and  I  was  too  busy  attending  to 
the  destroying  of  the  train  to  see  whether  they 
did.  We  left  all  the  civilians,  including  the  ladies, 
to  keep  warm  by  the  burning  cars,  and  the  sol- 


3i8  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

diers  were  taken  with  us  as  prisoners.  Among 
the  latter  was  a  young  German  lieutenant  who 
had  just  received  a  commission  and  was  on  his 
way  to  join  his  regiment  in  Sheridan's  army.  I 
was  attracted  by  his  personal  appearance,  struck 
up  a  conversation  with  him,  and  rode  by  him  for 
several  miles.  He  was  dressed  in  a  fine  beaver- 
cloth  overcoat ;  high  boots,  and  a  new  hat  with 
gilt  cord  and  tassel.  After  we  were  pretty  well 
acquainted,  I  said  to  him,  "We  have  done  you  no 
harm.  Why  did  you  come  over  here  to  fight 
us?"  "Oh,"  he  said,  "I  only  come  to  learn  de 
art  of  war."  I  then  left  him  and  rode  to  the  head 
of  the  column,  as  the  enemy  were  about,  and 
there  was  a  prospect  of  a  fight.  It  was  not  long 
before  the  German  came  trotting  up  to  join  me. 
There  had  been  such  a  metamorphosis  that  I 
scarcely  recognized  him.  One  of  my  men  had 
exchanged  his  old  clothes  with  him  for  his  new 
ones,  and  he  complained  about  it.  I  asked  him 
if  he  had  not  told  me  that  he  came  to  Virginia 
to  learn  the  art  of  war. 
"Yes,"  he  replied. 

"Very  well,"  I  said,  "this  is  your  first  lesson." 

Now  it  must  not  be  thought  that  the  habit  of 

appropriating  the  enemy's  goods  was  peculiar  to 

my    men  —  through    all    ages    it    has    been    the 


4J      l"» 


£    £ 


^    2 


THE  GREENBACK   RAID  319 

custom  of  war.  Not  long  after  this  incident  I 
had  to  suffer  from  the  same  operation  —  was 
shot  at  night  and  stripped  of  my  clothes.  Forty 
years  afterwards  a  lady  returned  to  me  the  hat 
which  I  was  wearing.  She  said  that  her  uncle, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Coles  of  the  regiment  that 
captured  it,  had  given  it  to  her  as  a  relic  of  the 
war.  That  is  war.  I  am  willing  to  admit,  however, 
that  in  a  statement  of  mutual  accounts  at  that 
time  my  men  were  largely  in  debt  to  Sheridan's 
men. 

Before  we  reached  the  Shenandoah  River,  a 
citizen  told  us  that  a  Captain  Blazer  was  roving 
around  the  neighborhood  looking  for  us.  He 
commanded  a  picked  corps,  armed  with  Spencer 
carbines  —  seven-shooters  —  that  had  been  as- 
signed by  Sheridan  to  the  special  duty  of  looking 
for  me.  My  men  had  had  an  easy  time  capturing 
the  train,  and,  although  they  were  not  indifferent 
to  greenbacks,  their  mettle  was  up  when  they 
heard  that  "Old  Blaze",  as  they  called  him,  was 
about.  They  were  eager  for  a  fight  in  which  they 
could  win  more  laurels.  It  was  not  long  before 
we  struck  Blazer's  trail  and  saw  his  camp  fires 
where  he  had  spent  the  night.  I  could  no  longer 
restrain  the  men  —  they  rushed  into  the  camp  "as 
reapers  descend  to  the  harvests  of  death."     But 


320  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

Blazer  was  gone !  He  was  a  bold  but  cautious 
commander  and  had  left  before  daybreak.  But 
this  only  postponed  his  fate  for  a  few  weeks,  when 
Captain  Dolly  Richards  met  him  near  the  same 
spot  and  wiped  him  out  forever. 

We  crossed  the  Shenandoah  and  Blue  Ridge 
before  noon  and  found  Grogan's  party  with  the 
greenbacks  waiting  for  us  at  the  appointed  place 
in  Loudoun  County.  The  men  were  ordered  to 
dismount  and  fall  in  line,  and  three  were  ap- 
pointed —  Charlie  Hall,  Mountjoy,  and  Fount 
Beattie  —  to  open  the  satchels  and  count  the 
money  in  their  presence.  I  ordered  it  to  be  di- 
vided equally  among  them  and  no  distinction 
to  be  made  between  officers  and  men.  My  com- 
mand was  organized  under  an  act  of  the  Con- 
federate Congress  to  raise  partisan  corps ;  it  ap- 
plied the  principle  of  maritime  prize  law  to  land 
war.  Of  course,  the  motive  of  the  act  was  to 
stimulate  enterprise. 

The  burning  of  this  train  in  the  midst  of  Sheri- 
dan's troops  and  the  capture  of  his  paymasters 
created  a  great  sensation.  Of  course,  the  rail- 
road people  thought  that  Sheridan  had  not  given 
adequate  protection  to  their  road.  The  follow- 
ing dispatch  shows  what  General  Lee  thought  of 
the  importance  of  the  blow  I  struck. 


THE   GREENBACK   RAID  321 

Chaffin's  Bluff, 
October  16th,  1864. 

On  the  14th  instant  Colonel  Mosby  struck  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  at  Duffield's,  destroyed 
U.  S.  military  train  consisting  of  locomotive  and  ten 
cars,  securing  twenty  prisoners  and  fifteen  horses. 
Amongst  the  prisoners  are  two  paymasters  with 
$168,000  in  Government  funds. 

(Signed)     R.  E.  Lee,  General. 
Hon.  James  A.  Seddon,  Secretary  of  War. 

The  paymasters  and  other  prisoners  were  sent 
south  to  prison,  and  one  of  them,  Major  Ruggles, 
died  there.  They  were  unjustly  charged  with 
being  in  collusion  with  me,  but  their  capture  was 
simply  an  ordinary  incident  of  war.  As  the 
Government  held  them  responsible  for  the  loss 
of  the  funds,  they  had  to  apply  to  Congress  for 
relief.  After  the  war,  Major  Moore  came  to  see 
me  to  get  a  certificate  of  the  fact  that  I  had  cap- 
tured the  money.  The  certificate  stated  that  my 
report  to  General  Lee  of  $168,000  captured  was 
based  upon  erroneous  information  and  was  sent 
off  before  I  had  received  the  report  of  the  com- 
missioners appointed  to  count  and  distribute  the 
money.     The  sum  captured  was  $173,000. 

The  attack  was  made  on  the  train  on  the  night 
of   October    13    between    Martinsburg   and    Har- 


322  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

per's  Ferry.  During  the  day,  as  the  following 
dispatch  shows,  we  had  operated  on  the  Valley 
Pike  and  moved  at  night  to  the  railroad. 

[Seward,  at  Martinsburg,  to  Stevenson,  at 
Harper's  Ferry] 

Four  scouts  have  just  arrived  and  reported  that 
they  were  attacked  about  eight  miles  this  side  of  Win- 
chester by  a  party  of  fifty  guerrillas  this  afternoon. 
They  all  seem  to  be  positive  that  they  were  attacked 
by  Mosby's  men  and  that  Mosby  with  one  foot  bound 
up  was  with  them. 

It  is  true  that  I  was  there  and  with  one  foot 
bound  up.  In  fact  I  had  on  only  one  boot.  I 
suppose  the  scouts  heard  this  from  some  citizen 
who  saw  me.  A  few  days  before  my  horse  had 
been  shot  in  a  fight,  and  a  Yankee  cavalryman 
rode  over  me.  His  horse  trod  on  my  foot  and 
bruised  it  so  that  for  some  time  I  could  wear  only 
a  sock  and  had  to  use  a  cane  when  I  walked.  I 
was  in  this  condition  when  we  captured  the  train. 

[Stanton,  Secretary  of  War,  to  Stevenson,  Harper's 

Ferry] 

Washington,  October  14,  1864. 

It  is  reported  from  Martinsburg  that  the  railroad  has 
been  torn  up  and  a  paymaster  and  his  funds  captured. 


THE  GREENBACK   RAID  323 

When  and  where  did  this  occur  and  have  any  measures 
been  taken  for  recapture  ?     Immediate  answer. 

[Stevenson  to  Stanton] 

Just  heard  from  captured  train.  The  attacking 
party  was  part  of  Mosby's  command.  They  removed 
a  rail,  causing  train  to  be  thrown  off  track,  then  robbed 
the  passengers  and  burned  train.  The  point  of 
attack  was  about  two  miles  east  of  Kearneysville, 
about  2.30  a.m.  Paymasters  Moore  and  Ruggles 
with  their  funds  were  captured  and  carried  off.  .  .  . 
General  Seward  telegraphs  that  his  courier  parties 
were  attacked  last  night  twice  by  Mosby's  command 
between  Bunker  Hill  and  Winchester  and  dispersed. 

[Stevenson  to  Stanton] 

The  cavalry  sent  out  in  pursuit  of  Mosby's  guer- 
rillas, who  burned  the  train,  have  returned.  Report 
they  failed  to  overtake  them.  They  learned  that  they 
moved  off  in  the  direction  of  the  Shenandoah  and 
having  several  hours'  start,  succeeded  in  getting  away 
with  their  prisoners  and  plunder. 

At  that  time  there  were  a  number  of  paymasters 
at  Martinsburg  on  their  way  to  pay  off  Sheridan's 
soldiers,  and  they  were  now  in  a  state  of  blockade. 
One  of  them  who  was  shut  up  there  said  in  a 
dispatch : 

I  have  my  funds  in  the  parlor  of  the  United  States 
Hotel  here,  guarded  by  a  regiment.     The  express  train 


324  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

was  burned  eight  miles  west  of  Harper's  Ferry  between 
2  and  3  o'clock  this  A.M.  Major  Ruggles'  clerk  es- 
caped and  is  now  with  me.  .  .  .  General  Seward, 
who  is  in  command  here,  says  he  will  use  all  his  efforts 
to  protect  us  and  our  money.  I  shall  make  no  move 
till  I  can  do  so  with  safety. 

The  following  telegram  from  Stevenson  to  Sheri- 
dan shows  his  anxiety  about  the  safety  of  the 
trains  and  that  Sheridan  had  as  much  cause  to 
give  his  attention  to  his  rear  as  to  his  front : 

Mosby  has  now  concentrated  his  guerrillas  in  your 
rear  and  commenced  operations ;  burning  railroad 
trains,  robbing  passengers,  which  without  cavalry  I 
am  powerless  to  prevent.  He  at  the  same  time 
threatens  all  your  supply  trains. 

[Stevenson  to  Halleck] 

At  least  iooo  good  cavalry  should  be  attached  to 
this  command  to  protect  us  against  the  sudden  dashes 
of  the  guerrilla  organizations  infesting  this  part  of 
the  country.  [My  battalion  was  the  only  Confederate 
force  in  that  region.]  If  I  had  this  cavalry  I  could 
safely  say  Mosby  could  not  reach  the  railroad. 

But  our  operations  that  day  were  not  confined 
to  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  but  extended  east  of 
the  Blue  Ridge  to  the  vicinity  of  Washington, 
where  preparations  were  made  to  keep  us  south 
of  the  Potomac.     Later  in  the  same  day  we  cap- 


THE  GREENBACK  RAID  325 

tured  the  train  ten  miles  west  of  Harper's  Ferry. 
Captain  William  Chapman,  with  two  companies 
of  my  battalion,  crossed  the  Potomac  a  few  miles 
east  of  it  and  struck  the  canal  and  railroad  in 
Maryland.  The  alarm  caused  by  the  burning  of 
the  train  in  the  morning  had  not  subsided  before 
news  came  of  a  fresh  attack  on  the  road  at  an- 
other point,  and  troops  were  hurried  from  Balti- 
more and  other  places  to  meet  it.  But,  of  course, 
when  the  troops  got  there,  the  damage  had  been 
done  and  my  men  had  gone. 

[Stevenson  to  French] 

Move  with  all  your  available  cavalry  at  once  to 
Point  of  Rocks,  Md. ;  unite  your  force  with  the  forces 
in  that  vicinity  and  attack  a  body  of  rebel  cavalry  near 
Adamstown. 

[Lawrence,  A.  A.  G.,  to  Halleck] 

Bal't.,  Oct.  14th,  1864. 

The  enemy  was  at  Buckeyestown,  four  miles  from 
the  Monocacy,  at  4  p.m.  this  evening. 

Another  dispatch  said  : 

All  lost.  Even  citizens  were  passing  through  here 
from  Poolsville  with  horses  to  get  away  from  the 
rebels.  They  report  2000  rebels  between  there  and 
Monocacy. 


326  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

[Prescott  Smith  to  President  Garrett  of  the  Balti- 
more and  Ohio  Railroad] 

October  15. 

We  have  no  fresh  alarms  but  the  two  affairs  badly 
damaged  the  working  of  the  road  and  will  involve  an 
immense  loss  to  the  company  in  every  way. 

This  meant  that  the  railroad  must  be  more 
strongly  guarded  if  communication  was  to  be 
kept  up  between  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  Wash- 
ington, and  Baltimore.  Troops  were  rushed  from 
many  points  to  guard  the  railroad  and  the  canal. 
My  object  had  then  been  accomplished. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

Last  Days  in  the  Valley 

After  returning  from  the  so-called  "Green- 
back Raid",  two  of  my  companies,  under  Richards 
and  Mountjoy,  made  a  demonstration  on  Wash- 
ington to  keep  reinforcements  from  Sheridan. 

[Taylor,  A.  A.  G.,  to  De  Russy] 

Washington,  October  17th,  1864. 

I  have  telegraphed  General  Slough  to  send  at  once 
500  infantry  to  Annandale.  A  small  infantry  force  at 
either  place,  Annandale  or  Buffalo,  will  be  sufficient 
to  drive  off  Mosby,  who  cannot  have  100  men. 

[Taylor  to  Slough] 

October  17th,  1864,  —  5  p.m. 

Notify  Lazelle  at  Fall's  Church  that  he  may  not  be 
surprised.  Your  infantry  certainly  is  strong  enough 
to  hold  any  force  of  Mosby's  in  check. 

[Slough  to  Taylor] 

October  17th,  1864.     8  p.m. 

Mosby  has  driven  in  Lazelle's  pickets.  Send 
Wells'  cavalry,  if  any  is  in  Alexandria,  to  Lazelle  and 
let  the  Fifth  Wisconsin  move  rapidly  to  Annandale. 

327 


328  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

[Winship  to  Taylor] 

Alexandria,  October  17th,  1864. 

It  is  reported  that  Mosby  with  about  300  men  is 
in  the  vicinity  of  Burke's  station  this  afternoon. 

[Augur  to  Taylor] 
Rectortown,  October  18th,  1864. 

I  have  sent  the  Eighth  Illinois  down  through  Centre- 
ville  to  find  Mosby's  force. 

The  panic  in  Washington  was  very  great,  as  is 
shown  by  many  similar  dispatches  in  the  war 
records.  When  the  Eighth  Illinois  got  to  Fairfax, 
they  found  that  we  had  gone  back  towards  the 
Blue  Ridge.  They  did  what  I  was  manoeuvring 
to  make  them  do  —  spend  their  time  and  waste 
their  strength  in  pursuit  of  a  Jack-o'-lantern. 

About  this  time  I  heard  that  a  force  was  moving 
to  repair  the  Manassas  Railroad  to  make  a  new 
base  for  Sheridan,  and  I  determined  to  move 
against  it  and,  if  possible,  defeat  it.  My  suc- 
cess in  accomplishing  this  was  of  greater  military 
value  than  anything  I  did  in  the  war,  for  it  saved 
Richmond  for  several  months.  I  sent  Tom  Ogg, 
one  of  my  scouts,  to  reconnoitre  and  report  to  me 
at  Haymarket,  a  little  village  on  the  road,  which 
the  enemy  had  not  occupied.  When  we  got]  near 
Haymarket  about  eleven  o'clock  that  night,  we 


LAST   DAYS   IN   THE  VALLEY  329 

saw  a  large  number  of  camp  fires.  The  Yankees 
were  ahead  of  us ! 

After  Tom  got  the  information  he  was  sent  for, 
he  came  to  meet  me  according  to  our  appointment. 
He  saw  the  camp  fires  and  naturally  thought  they 
were  mine.  When  he  got  near  them,  a  picket 
halted  him  and  called  out,  "Who  comes  there?" 
Ogg  had  no  suspicion  that  the  demand  came  from 
an  enemy,  so  he  replied,  "Ogg,  Tom  Ogg.  Don't 
you  know  Ogg?" 

The  picket  had  never  heard  of  Ogg.  He  did 
not  know  whether  he  was  friend  or  foe,  so,  ac- 
cording to  military  rule,  he  ordered  Tom  to  dis- 
mount and  advance.  Tom  protested  and  again 
told  the  picket  that  he  was  Tom  Ogg,  that  he  had 
been  sent  by  "the  Colonel"  on  a  scout,  and 
asked  the  picket  to  what  company  he  belonged. 

The  picket  replied,  "Company  E",  and  swore 
he  had  never  heard  of  Ogg.  Tom  then  said, 
indignantly,  "I  thought  you  were  one  of  that 
d — d  green  Company  E."  [E  was  a  new  com- 
pany I  had  just  organized.] 

At  last  Ogg  was  compelled  to  dismount  and 
advance  on  foot  leading  his  horse.  It  was  pitch 
dark,  and  Tom  did  not  discover,  until  he  got 
right  up  against  the  sentinel,  that  the  latter  had 
a  musket  and  a  bayonet  was  pointed  at  his  breast. 


330  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

But  Tom  never  lost  his  presence  of  mind.  So 
he  said,  "I  am  lame,  and  you  must  let  me  ride  to 
see  the  Colonel." 

The  poor  picket  did  not  suspect  Tom's  stratagem 
and  consented.  He  really  thought  that  he  was 
only  doing  his  duty  and  was  talking  to  a  brother 
in  arms.  Tom  mounted  and,  as  soon  as  he  was 
in  the  saddle,  drove  his  spurs  into  his  horse,  and 
darted  off  in  the  darkness,  shouting  to  his  men, 
"Break,  boys !" 

A  volley  was  fired  on  his  track,  but  it  never 
overtook  Ogg.  It  was  a  coincidence  that  this 
occurred  just  after  we  approached  the  camp  from 
the  opposite  direction.  When  I  heard  the  firing, 
I  laughed  and  told  the  men  that  I  would  bet  it 
was  Tom  Ogg  and  that  he  had  ridden  into  the 
Yankees  by  mistake.  But  all  is  well  that  ends 
well.  Tom  lived  many  years  after  the  war,  and 
we  often  laughed  about  his  surprise  that  the 
Yankees  had  never  heard  of  "Ogg,  Tom  Ogg !" 

Near  Upperville, 
Oct.  22,  '64. 
My  dearest  Pauline : 

I  have  just  returned  from  a  successful  trip  to  the 
valley,  —  captured  a  brigadier  general  (Duffie),  cap- 
turing ambulance  horses,  etc.  Sent  them  out,  then 
returning  by  another  route,  captured  seven  wagons, 


LAST  DAYS   IN  THE  VALLEY  331 

fifty-five  prisoners,  and  forty-one  horses.  As  soon 
as  the  Yankees  leave  the  Manassas  road  I  will  send  for 
you  all. 

[Fragment  of   a  letter  to  Mrs.  Mosby,  probably 
November,  1864] 

We  killed  and  captured  about  600  from  the  time  of 
their  occupying  to  their  abandonment  of  the  railroad 
(Manassas  road).  Since  my  return  to  my  command, 
I  have  been  in  the  saddle  the  whole  time. 

[From  a  Confederate  newspaper,  1864] 

The  following  is  a  clear  admission  of  the  injuries 
Mosby  has  been  inflicting  on  the  enemy  of  late.  When 
they  begin  war  on  unoffending  persons  in  this  way 
it  is  evidence  of  the  desperation  to  which  they  are 
driven. 

"  Working  parties  are  now  engaged  in  felling  timber 
on  each  side  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  to  prevent 
its  use  by  guerrillas  as  a  place  of  concealment.  Orders 
have  been  issued  that  if  another  attack  should  be  made 
on  a  Government  train,  similar  to  the  last  one,  in  which 
so  many  lives  were  lost,  every  house  of  a  rebel  within 
five  miles  of  the  road,  on  either  side,  shall  be  imme- 
diately destroyed,  meanwhile  every  train  bears  a 
party  of  rebel  sympathizers,  selected  from  the  abundant 
number  in  Alexandria,  to  receive  such  bullets  as  their 
friends  the  guerrillas  may  choose  to  fire  at  them. 
Three  physicians  and  one  clergyman  were  among  the 
first  party  thus  sent." 


332  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

[Another  Confederate  paper  quoted  "the  Yan- 
kee newspaper"  published  at  Alexandria  as  fol- 
lows :] 

General  Slough,  acting  under  special  orders  from 
the  War  Department,  yesterday  arrested  a  number  of 
well-known  rebel  sympathizers  in  this  city,  for  the 
purpose  of  sending  them  out  on  trains  of  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  and  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  in  order 
to  secure  their  property  against  guerrilla  attacks.  .  .  . 
When  once  the  guerrillas  hear  that  the  trains  are  run 
for  the  special  accommodation  of  their  friends,  they 
will  not  disturb  the  road.  .  .  .  P.S.  Since  the  above 
was  in  type,  we  learn  that  all  those  arrested  in  this 
city  yesterday  were  sent  out  on  the  railroad  train 
to-day.1 

By  December,  1864,  the  war  had  practically 
ceased  between  the  contending  armies  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  The  greater  portion  of 
Early's  forces  had  been  transferred  to  the  lines 
about  Petersburg,  while  Sheridan  had  taken  up 
his  winter  quarters  at  Winchester.  My  own 
command,  which  had  been  operating  against  his 
communications,  never  went  into  winter  quar- 
ters, but  kept  up  a  desultory  warfare  on  outposts, 
supply  trains,  and  detachments.     And,  although 

1  Word  was  sent  to  Mosby  that  a  number  of  women  and  children 
would  be  sent  on  certain  trains.  His  answer  was  that  he  did  not  under- 
stand that  it  hurts  women  and  children  to  be  killed  any  more  than  it 
hurts  men. 


LAST   DAYS   IN  THE   VALLEY  333 

the  Southern  army  had  disappeared  from  his 
front,  these  few  hundred  rangers  kept  Sheridan's 
soldiers  as  busily  employed  to  guard  against  sur- 
prises as  when  that  army  confronted  them.  Un- 
able to  exterminate  the  hostile  bands  by  arms, 
Sheridan  had  applied  the  torch  and  attempted 
to  drive  us  from  the  district  in  which  we  operated 
by  destroying  everything  that  could  support  man 
or  horse.  But  so  far  from  quelling,  his  efforts 
only  stimulated  the  fury  of  my  men.  In  snow, 
sleet,  and  howling  storms,  through  the  long 
watches  of  the  winter  nights,  his  men  had  to 
wait  for  a  sleepless  enemy  to  capture  or  kill  them. 

[Telegram  —  Sheridan  to  Halleck] 

Kernstown,  Va. ;  Nov.  26,  1864. 

I  will  soon  commence  work  on  Mosby.  Heretofore 
I  have  made  no  attempt  to  break  him  up,  as  I  would 
have  employed  ten  men  to  his  one,  and  for  the  reason 
that  I  have  made  a  scapegoat  of  him  for  the  destruction 
of  private  rights.  Now  there  is  going  to  be  an  intense 
hatred  of  him  in  that  portion  of  the  valley  which  is 
nearly  a  desert.  I  will  soon  commence  on  Loudoun 
County,  and  let  them  know  there  is  a  God  in  Israel. 
Mosby  has  annoyed  me  considerably ;  but  the  people 
are  beginning  to  see  that  he  does  not  injure  me  a  great 
deal,  but  causes  a  loss  to  them  of  all  that  they  have 
spent  their  lives  in  accumulating.     Those  people  who 


334  COLONEL  JOHN  S.    MOSBY 

live  in  the  vicinity  of  Harper's  Ferry  are  the  most 
villainous  in  this  valley,  and  have  not  yet  been  hurt 
much.  If  the  railroad  is  interfered  with,  I  will  make 
some  of  them  poor.  Those  who  live  at  home  in  peace 
and  plenty  want  the  duello  part  of  this  war  to  go  on ; 
but  when  they  have  to  bear  the  burden  by  loss  of 
property  and  comforts,  they  will  cry  for  peace. 

As  I  wanted  to  have  a  conference  with  Gen- 
eral Robert  E.  Lee  about  my  plans  for  future 
operations,  I  turned  my  command  over  to  the 
next  in  rank,  William  Chapman,  and,  taking 
one  of  my  men,  Boyd  Smith,  went  on  a  visit  to 
the  army  headquarters  near  Petersburg.  When 
I  got  off  the  train  there,  I  recognized  in  the  crowd 
the  face  of  Doctor  Monteiro,  an  old  college  mate 
whom  I  had  not  seen  for  thirteen  years.  I  had 
changed  so  much  that  he  did  not  recognize  me 
until  I  told  him  my  name.  He  was  then  a  sur- 
geon with  Wise's  brigade,  and  I  told  him  he  was 
the  very  man  I  wanted,  for  the  surgeon  I  had, 
Doctor  Will  Dunn,  was  too  fond  of  fighting.  I 
wanted  a  surgeon  that  took  more  pride  in  curing 
than  killing.  I  had  Monteiro  transferred  to  my 
command  before  I   returned. 

After  spending  a  few  hours  with  General  Lee 
and  getting  his  recommendation  for  the  promo- 
tion of  two  of  my  officers,  Chapman  and  Richards, 


MAJOR   A.   E.   RICHARDS 

He  commanded  Mosby's  Men  at  the  Mt.  Carmel  fight  and  on  other 
occasions,  emulating  his  dashing  courage 


LAST  DAYS   IN  THE  VALLEY  335 

I  returned  to  Richmond,  and  in  a  few  days  was 
back  with  my  men.  On  the  day  after  my  re- 
turn, December  21,  I  had  gone  to  the  house  of 
Joe  Blackwell,  a  farmer  in  upper  Fauquier,  to 
attend  the  wedding  of  my  ordnance  sergeant, 
Jake  Lavender.  A  report  came  that  a  body  of 
the  enemy's  cavalry  was  advancing  on  the  road 
to  Salem,  a  few  miles  away.  Not  caring  to  in- 
terrupt the  wedding  festivities,  with  one  man  — 
Tom  Love  —  I  rode  off  to  reconnoitre.  We 
were  riding  across  the  field  of  the  Glen  Welby 
farm,  as  it  was  safer  than  going  by  the  main  road, 
where  there  was  danger  of  running  against  the 
enemy's  column,  when  we  saw  two  cavalrymen 
approaching.  Soon  a  number  of  others  appeared 
and  began  firing  at  us.  I  knew  then  that  these 
were  the  flankers  of  the  main  body  of  the  enemy 
out  of  sight  over  the  hill.  So  Love  and  I  gal- 
loped away  a  few  hundred  yards  and  then  halted 
on  an  eminence.  They  did  not  pursue,  and  we 
soon  saw  the  whole  column  in  blue  moving  on  the 
road  to  Rectortown.  After  reaching  there,  they 
kindled  fires  and  seemed  to  be  preparing  to  biv- 
ouac for  the  night. 

It  was  about  dusk ;  a  cold,  drizzling  rain  was 
falling  and  freezing,  the  road  was  covered  with 
sleet,  and  icicles  hung  in  clusters  from  the  trees. 


336  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

After  reconnoitring  the  encampment  and  satis- 
fying myself  that  they  had  prepared  to  spend 
the  night  there,  I  dispatched  a  man  to  inform 
Chapman  and  Richards  that  I  wanted  them  to 
attack  the  Northern  camp  about  daybreak  the 
next  morning,  and  to  get  their  men  ready.  Love 
and  I  then  started  off  in  another  direction  for  the 
purpose  of  notifying  some  of  the  other  officers  and 
collecting  the  men.  (When  we  stayed  inside  the 
enemy's  lines  we  were  obliged  to  disperse  for 
safety.)  As  we  were  passing  the  house  of  a 
citizen,  Ludwell  Lake,  who  was  famous  for  al- 
ways setting  a  good  table,  the  lights  shining 
through  the  windows  tempted  me,  as  I  was  cold 
and  hungry,  to  stop  where  I  knew  we  would  be 
welcome.  So,  when  we  got  to  the  front  gate, 
I  proposed  to  dismount  and  to  go  in  to  get  warm 
and  something  to  eat.  Love  said  he  would 
stay  out  at  the  gate  and  keep  watch  while  I  was 
eating  my  supper. 

"No,  Tom,"  I  said;  "it  wouldn't  do  me  any 
good  if  you  were  out  here  in  the  cold.  There  is 
no  danger  ;    get  down." 

We  tied  our  horses  and  went  in.  The  family 
was  at  supper,  and  we  were  soon  seated  at  the 
table  enjoying  some  good  coffee,  hot  rolls,  and 
spareribs.     Among  those  there  was  a  Mrs.  Skin- 


LAST   DAYS   IN   THE   VALLEY  337 

ner,  whose  husband  was  then  a  prisoner  at  Point 
Lookout.  She  had  managed  to  get  a  pass  through 
the  lines  to  visit  him  and  had  seen  a  number  of 
my  men  who  were  also  prisoners  there.  We 
were  enjoying  our  supper  and  her  account  of 
the  trip  and  the  various  devices  to  which  the 
prisoners  resorted  for  amusement,  when  sud- 
denly we  heard  the  tramp  of  horses  around  the 
house.  One  door  of  the  dining  room  opened 
toward  the  back  yard,  and  on  opening  it,  I  dis- 
covered several  cavalrymen.  Hastily  shutting 
the  door,  I  turned  to  the  other  one,  but  just  then 
a  number  of  Northern  officers  and  soldiers  walked 
into  the  room. 

I  was  better  dressed  that  evening  than  I  ever 
was  during  the  war.  Just  before  starting  to  Rich- 
mond I  got  through  the  blockade  across  the 
Potomac  a  complete  suit  from  head  to  foot.  I 
had  a  drab  hat  with  an  ostrich  plume,  with  gold 
cord  and  star ;  a  heavy,  black  beaver-cloth  over- 
coat and  cape  lined  with  English  scarlet  cloth, 
and,  as  it  was  a  stormy  evening,  over  this  I  wore 
a  gray  cloak,  also  lined  with  scarlet.  My  hat, 
overcoat,  and  cape  were  lying  in  the  corner.  I 
wore  a  gray  sack  coat  with  two  stars  on  the  collar 
to  indicate  my  rank  as  lieutenant-colonel,  gray 
trousers  with  a  yellow  cord  down  the  seam,  and 


338  COLONEL  JOHN   S.    MOSBY 

long  cavalry  boots.  As  the  Northerners  entered 
the  room,  I  placed  my  hands  on  my  coat  collar 
to  conceal  my  stars,  and  a  few  words  passed  be- 
tween us.  The  situation  seemed  desperate,  but  I 
had  made  up  my  mind  to  take  all  the  chances  for 
getting  away.  I  knew  that  if  they  discovered  my 
rank,  to  say  nothing  of  my  name,  they  would 
guard  me  more  carefully  than  if  I  were  simply  a 
private  or  a  lieutenant. 

But  a  few  seconds  elapsed  before  firing  began 
in  the  back  yard.  One  of  the  bullets  passed 
through  the  window,  making  a  round  hole  in  the 
glass  and  striking  me  in  the  stomach.  Old  man 
Lake,  who  weighed  about  three  hundred  pounds 
and  was  as  broad  as  he  was  long,  and  his  daughter, 
Mrs.  Skinner,  were  standing  between  me  and 
the  window.  It  was  a  miracle  how  the  shot 
could  have  missed  them  and  hit  me  —  but 
it  did.  I  have  always  thought  that  Yankee  had 
a  circular  gun.  My  self-possession  in  concealing 
the  stars  on  my  collar  saved  me  from  being  car- 
ried off  a  prisoner,  dead  or  alive.  The  officers 
had  not  detected  the  stratagem,  when  I  exclaimed, 
"I  am  shot!"  The  fact  was  that  the  bullet 
created  only  a  stinging  sensation,  and  I  was  not 
in  the  least  shocked.  My  exclamation  was  not 
because  I  felt  hurt,  but  to  get  up  a  panic  in  order 


LAST   DAYS   IN   THE   VALLEY  339 

that  I  might  escape.  It  had  the  desired  effect. 
Old  man  Lake  and  his  daughter  waltzed  around 
the  room,  the  cavalrymen  on  the  outside  kept  up 
their  fire,  and  this  created  a  stampede  of  the 
officers  in  the  room  with  me.  In  the  confusion 
to  get  out  of  the  way  there  was  a  sort  of  hurdle 
race,  in  which  the  supper  table  was  knocked  over, 
and  the  tallow  lights  put  out.  In  a  few  seconds 
I  was  left  in  the  room  with  no  one  but  Love,  Lake, 
and  his  daughter. 

I  saw  that  this  was  my  opportunity.  There 
were  nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine  chances  out 
of  a  thousand  against  me.  I  took  the  single 
chance  and  won.  There  were  at  least  three  hun- 
dred cavalry  surrounding  the  house,  and,  if  I 
had  not  been  wounded,  I  should  have  tried  to 
get  off  in  the  dark.  But  by  this  time  the  terrible 
wound  was  having  its  effect ;  I  was  bleeding 
profusely  and  getting  faint.  There  was  a  door 
which  opened  from  the  dining  room  into  an  ad- 
joining bedroom,  and  I  determined  to  play  the 
part  of  a  dying  man.  I  walked  into  the  room, 
pulled  off  my  coat,  on  which  were  the  insignia 
of  my  rank,  tucked  it  away  under  the  bureau  so 
that  no  one  could  see  it,  and  then  lay  down  with 
my  head  towards  the  bureau.  After  several 
minutes  the  panic  subsided,  and  the  Northerners 


340  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

returned  to  the  scene  from  which  the  shots  of  their 
own  men  had  frightened  them.  They  found  my 
old  friend  Lake  dancing  a  hornpipe.  He  missed 
a  button  from  his  waistcoat  and  swore  that  the 
bullet  which  had  killed  me  had  carried  it  off. 
Having  heard  me  fall  on  the  floor,  he  thought 
I  was  dead  —  the  truth  was  he  was  almost  as  near 
dead  as  I  was.  The  daughter  was  screaming,  the 
room  in  which  I  lay  was  dark,  and  it  was  some 
minutes  before  the  soldiers  collected  their  senses 
sufficiently  to  strike  a  light. 

During  all  this  time  I  lay  on  the  floor  with  the 
blood  gushing  from  my  wound.  In  those  few 
minutes  it  seemed  to  me  that  I  lived  my  whole 
life  over  again ;  my  mind  traveled  away  from 
the  scenes  of  death  and  carnage,  in  which  I  had 
been  an  actor  for  four  years,  to  the  peaceful 
home  and  the  wife  and  children  I  had  left 
behind. 

I  overheard  the  soldiers  ask  Mrs.  Skinner  who 
I  was  —  I  was  well  acquainted  with  her,  and 
her  brother  was  in  my  command  —  and  I  listened 
with  fear  and  trembling  for  her  answer.  She 
declared  that  I  was  a  stranger  —  that  she  had 
never  seen  me  before  —  that  I  was  not  one  of 
Mosby's  men,  and  she  did  not  know  my  name. 
I   am  sure   that  in   the  eternal  records  there  is 


LAST   DAYS   IN   THE   VALLEY  341 

nothing  registered  against  that  good  woman  who 
denied  my  name  and  saved  my  life. 

At  last,  after  a  candle  had  been  lighted,  my 
enemies  came  into  the  room,  and  the  first  thing 
they  asked  me  was  my  name.  I  gave  a  fictitious 
one.  They  wanted  to  know  to  what  command 
I  belonged.  I  did  not  tell  them  the  right  one. 
My  reason  for  doing  so  was  that  I  wanted  to 
conceal  my  identity.  As  I  knew  the  feeling  at 
the  North  against  me  and  the  great  anxiety  to 
either  kill  or  capture  me,  I  was  sure  I  would  be 
dragged  away  as  a  trophy,  if  they  knew  who  their 
prisoner  was.  I  had  on  a  flannel  shirt  which  was 
now  soaked  with  my  blood.  The  soldiers  opened 
my  clothes  and  looked  at  my  wound,  while  I  ap- 
parently gasped  for  breath.  A  doctor  examined 
the  wound  and  said  that  it  was  mortal  —  that  I 
was  shot  through  the  heart.  He  located  the 
heart  rather  low  down,  and  even  in  that  supreme 
moment  I  felt  tempted  to  laugh  at  his  ignorance 
of  human  anatomy.  I  only  gasped  a  few  words  and 
affected  to  be  dying.  They  left  the  room  hurriedly, 
after  stripping  me  of  my  boots  and  trousers,  evi- 
dently supposing  that  a  dead  man  would  have  no 
use  for  them.  The  only  sensible  man  among  them 
was  an  Irishman,  who  said,  as  he  took  a  last  look 
at  me,  "He  is  worth  several  dead  men  yet." 


342  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

There  was  a  good  deal  of  whiskey  in  the  crowd, 
but  they  had  sense  enough  left  to  take  away 
my  clothes.  Fortunately  they  never  saw  my 
coat. 

I  listened  to  hear  them  getting  away  —  they 
passed  out  and  left  my  fat  friend  and  his  daughter 
under  the  impression  that  I  was  ready  for  the  grave. 
I  lay  perfectly  still  for  some  five  or  ten  minutes 
—  it  seemed  to  me  that  many  hours  —  but  at 
last,  as  I  felt  assured  that  the  enemy  had  gone, 
I  rose  from  the  pool  of  blood  in  which  I  was  lying 
and  walked  into  the  room  where  Lake  and  his 
daughter  were  sitting  by  the  fire.  They  were  as 
much  astonished  to  see  me  as  if  I  had  risen  from 
the  tomb ;  they  had  thought  me  dead  and  were 
now  sure  the  general  resurrection  had  come. 
There  was  a  big  log  fire  blazing,  and  the  room  was 
warm.  We  examined  the  wound,  but  we  could 
not  tell  whether  the  bullet  had  passed  straight 
into  the  body,  or,  after  penetrating,  had  passed 
around  it.  Shortly  I  became  sick  and  faint. 
My  own  belief  was  that  the  wound  was  mortal ; 
that  the  bullet  was  in  me ;  that  the  intestines 
had  been  cut.  Mrs.  Skinner  gave  me  some 
coffee,  but  I  was  too  sick  to  drink  it.  My  fear 
was  that  I  had  some  documents  in  my  pockets 
which  would  disclose  my  name.     Although  Provi- 


LAST   DAYS   IN   THE  VALLEY  343 

dence  had  not  protected  me  from  the  bullet,  it 
had  saved  me  from  getting  caught.  That  day  I 
had  been  at  Glen  Welby,  the  home  of  the  Car- 
ters, and  for  some  unaccountable  reason,  just  as 
I  was  leaving  to  go  to  the  wedding,  I  took  from 
my  pocket  several  official  documents  and  gave 
them  to  one  of  the  young  ladies  to  keep  for  me. 
If  I  had  not  done  this,  I  would  never  have  lived 
to  write  an  account  of  this  adventure,  for  if  I 
had  been  taken  off  as  a  prisoner  that  night,  I 
could  not  have  survived  it. 

The  force  of  cavalry  that  I  had  seen  go  into 
camp  at  Rectortown  was  the  Thirteenth  and 
Sixteenth  New  York,  under  command  of  Major 
Frazar.  They  had  only  built  fires  to  warm  them- 
selves, and,  after  staying  there  a  short  time,  they 
started  on  to  Middleburg  to  join  Colonel  Clen- 
denin,  with  the  Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry,  from  which 
they  had  separated  a  few  hours  before.  That 
night  they  encamped  at  Middleburg.  Several  of 
my  men,  including  Love,  were  prisoners,  and 
they  were  shown  my  hat  and  overcoat  and 
asked  if  they  knew  the  person  who  had  worn 
them.  All  denied  any  knowledge  of  him.  The 
next  day  the  Unionists  returned  to  camp,  little 
dreaming  who  it  was  that  had  been  a  prisoner  in 
their  hands.     My  own  belief  is  that   I   was  in- 


344  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

debted  to  whiskey  for  my  escape,  and  I  have  always 
thought  since  then  that  there  is  a  deal  of  good 
in  whiskey. 

As  soon  as  Lake  recovered  from  the  shock  at 
seeing  me  alive,  he  went  out  and  got  a  couple  of 
negro  boys  to  yoke  up  a  pair  of  young,  half- 
broken  oxen  to  haul  me  away  to  a  place  of  safety, 
for  we  feared  that  the  enemy  would  find  out  who 
I  was  and  return.  After  a  while  the  ox-cart  was 
announced,  and  I  was  rolled  up  in  quilts  and 
blankets  and  put  into  it.  It  was  an  awful  night 
—  a  howling  storm  of  snow,  rain,  and  sleet.  I 
was  lying  on  my  back  in  the  cart  —  we  had  to 
go  two  miles  to  the  house  of  a  neighbor,  over  a 
frozen  road  cut  into  deep  ruts.  When  we  reached 
there,  I  was  almost  perfectly  stiff  with  cold,  and 
my  hair  was  a  clotted  mass  of  ice.  The  family 
had  not  gone  to  bed,  and  one  of  my  men,  George 
Slater,  was  at  the  house.  A  courier  was  sent  to 
the  wedding  party  to  carry  the  news  to  my  brother 
and  my  other  men,  and  before  daybreak  a  great 
many  of  the  men  and  two  surgeons  were  with  me. 
Slater  had  been  present  when  Stuart  had  been 
shot  a  few  months  before.  After  I  had  been  laid 
by  the  fire,  I  called  him  to  me  and  said, 

"George,  look  at  my  wound,  I  think  I  am  shot 
just  like  General  Stuart  was." 


LAST   DAYS   IN   THE  VALLEY  345 

Slater  pulled  up  my  shirt  —  I  was  bleeding  pro- 
fusely —  and  told  me  that  he  thought  the  bullet 
had  run  around  my  body.  This  turned  out  to 
be  the  case,  for  it  had  lodged  in  my  right  side. 
Early  in  the  morning  chloroform  was  admin- 
istered, and  the  ball  extracted. 

Another  of  the  good  effects  of  the  whiskey  on 
my  captors  was  that  they  went  off  leaving  my 
horse  standing  at  the  front  gate,  with  the  pistols 
in  the  holsters.  If  I  had  had  them  with  me  in 
the  house,  I  am  very  confident  I  could  have 
cleared  the  way  through  the  back  yard  and  es- 
caped in  the  dark.  Neither  Love  nor  I  had  a 
chance  to  fire  a  shot,  and  there  is  no  truth  in  the 
reports  that  shots  were  fired  from  the  house.  I 
had  nothing  to  shoot  with.  As  I  said,  a  Northern 
officer  was  standing  near,  talking  to  me  when  I 
was  shot.  Although  I  was  a  prisoner  at  the  time, 
I  have  never  complained  of  it,  for  it  proved  to  be 
a  lucky  shot  for  me.  It  was  the  means  of  my  es- 
cape from  imprisonment.  A  few  days  afterwards 
tidings  came  to  the  camp  down  in  Fairfax  that 
I  was  the  man  who  was  wounded  at  Lake's.  A 
force  of  cavalry  was  sent  to  search  for  me,  but 
although  I  was  still  in  the  neighborhood,  they 
did  not  find  me.  At  the  same  time  General 
Torbert,  returning   from   an  unsuccessful  expedi- 


346  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

tion  to  Gordonsville,  passed  within  a  few  miles 
of  where  I  was  lying,  but  also  failed  to  discover  me. 

About  a  week  after  all  this  occurred  I  was  taken 
to  my  father's  house  near  Lynchburg.  Richmond 
papers  had  already  announced  my  death.  Doctor 
Monteiro  had  not  reached  my  command  before 
I  was  brought  away,  so  he  came  to  my  father's 
house  to  see  me.  Monteiro  was  a  great  wit  and 
had  been  with  me  only  a  few  minutes  when  he  got 
me  to  laughing.  This  produced  a  hemorrhage 
from  my  wound,  and  it  took  all  his  surgical  skill 
to  repair  the  damage  his  talk  had  done. 

Major  Frazar  reported  my  capture  and  escape 
as  follows : 

Fairfax  Court  House, 
December  31,  1864. 

Colonel  William  Gamble,  Commanding  Cavalry 

Brigade, 
Colonel : 

In  obedience  to  your  command,  I  have  the  honor 
to  report  concerning  the  wounding  of  Colonel  Mosby. 
He  was  shot  by  a  man  of  my  advance  guard,  under 
Captain  Brown,  in  Mr.  Lake's  house,  near  the  Rector's 
Cross-roads,  on  the  evening  of  the  21st  instant.;  about 
9  p.m.;  at  which  time  I  was  in  command  of  the  13th 
and  1 6th  New  York  regiments.  Several  shots  were 
fired,  and  I  was  informed  that  a  rebel  lieutenant  was 
wounded.     I    immediately    dismounted    and    entered 


LAST  DAYS   IN  THE  VALLEY  347 

the  house,  and  found  a  man  lying  on  the  floor,  ap- 
parently in  great  agony.  I  asked  him  his  name  — 
he  answered,  "Lieutenant  Johnson,  Sixteenth  Virginia 
Cavalry."  He  was  in  his  shirtsleeves  —  a  light  blue 
cotton  shirt  — -  no  hat  —  no  boots  —  no  insignia  of 
rank;  nothing  to  denote  in  the  slightest  degree  that 
he  was  not  what  he  pretended  to  be.  I  told  him  I 
must  see  his  wounds  to  see  whether  to  bring  him  or 
not.  I  opened,  myself,  his  pants  and  found  that  a 
pistol  bullet  had  entered  the  abdomen  about  two 
inches  below  and  to  the  left  of  the  navel ;  a  wound  that 
I  felt  assured  was  mortal.  I  therefore  ordered  all 
from  the  room,  remarking,  "He  will  die  in  twenty- 
four  hours."  Being  behind  time  on  account  of  skir- 
mishing all  the  afternoon  with  the  enemy,  I  hurried  on 
to  meet  Lieutenant-Colonel  Clendenin  at  Middleburg, 
according  to  orders  received.  Nearly  every  officer 
in  my  command,  if  not  all,  saw  this  wounded  man,  and 
no  one  had  the  slightest  idea  that  it  was  Mosby. 
Captain  Brown  and  Major  Birdsall  were  both  in  the 
room  with  me  when  this  occurred.  After  arrival  at 
Middleburg  I  reported  the  fact  of  having  wounded  a 
rebel  lieutenant  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Clendenin.  As 
soon  as  the  camp  fires  were  lit  so  that  things  could  be 
seen,  an  orderly  brought  me  Mosby's  hat  dressed  with 
gold  cord  and  star.  I  took  the  hat  and  went  imme- 
diately among  the  prisoners,  eight  in  number,  of 
Mosby's  men  that  I  had  captured,  and  told  them  the 
man  who  wore  that  cap  was  shot  dead,  and  asked 
them  if  it  was  Mosby  or  not ;  it  was  no  use  to  conceal  it 
if  it  was,  as  he  was  shot  dead.     They  all  said  "No," 


348  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

that  it  was  not  Mosby,  that  he  never  had  such  a  hat, 
etc.,  etc.  Some  of  them  said  it  was  Major  Johnson, 
Sixth  Virginia  Cavalry,  home  on  leave.  In  the  morn- 
ing I  reported  the  facts  and  showed  the  cap  to  Colonel 
Clendenin  and  Mr.  Davis,  the  guide ;  all  this,  while  I 
considered,  as  did  all  my  other  officers,  that  the  wound 
was  mortal.  From  Middleburg  I  came  to  camp. 
On  this  scout,  from  which  I  have  just  returned  to-day, 
I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  the  man  shot  in  Lake's 
house  was  Colonel  Mosby.  He  was  moved  half  an 
hour  after  he  was  shot  to  Quilly  Glasscock's,  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  distant,  where  he  remained  three 
days  and  had  the  ball  extracted,  it  having  passed 
around  or  through  the  bowels,  coming  out  behind  the 
right  side.  I  conversed  with  several  persons  who  saw 
him.  He  was  very  low  the  first  two  days,  the  third 
much  better.  I  tracked  him  to  Piedmont,  thence  to 
Salem,  and  out  of  Salem  towards  the  Warrenton  Pike. 
I  met  pickets  in  various  parts  of  the  country,  and  under- 
stood that  until  within  the  last  night  or  two  they  had 
extended  as  far  down  as  Aldie.  Various  signalling  was 
carried  on  by  means  of  white  flags  above  Piedmont. 
Several  persons  who  saw  him  in  the  ambulance  report 
him  spitting  blood,  and  it  seems  to  be  the  general  im- 
pression that  he  cannot  live.  There  is  no  doubt  in  my 
mind  but  what  he  is  yet  in  the  country,  concealed  ;  seri- 
ously, if  not  mortally  wounded.  In  both  expeditions  I 
lost  neither  men  nor  horses  and  captured  nine  prisoners. 

(Signed)     Douglas  Frazar, 

Major  Commanding. 


LAST   DAYS    IN   THE   VALLEY  349 

[Indorsement] 

Headquarters  First  Separate  Brigade, 
Fairfax  C.  H.,  Va.,  Jan.  I,  1865. 

Respectfully  forwarded  to  department  headquarters. 
I  exceedingly  regret  that  such  a  blunder  was  made. 
I  have  given  direction  that  all  wounded  officers  and 
men  of  the  enemy  be  hereafter  brought  in,  although 
any  officer  ought  to  have  brains  and  common  sense 
enough  to  do  so  without  an  order. 

(Signed)  W.  Gamble, 
Colonel  Commanding  Brigade. 

[Gamble  to  Augur] 

I  am  also  informed  that  Major  Frazar  was  too  much 
under  the  influence  of  liquor  to  perform  his  duty  at 
the  time  in  a  proper  manner.  Under  the  circum- 
stances I  have  deemed  it  best  to  send  Major  Frazar 
with  300  men  to  scour  the  neighborhood  and  ascertain, 
if  possible,  something  definite  about  it,  he  being  the 
officer  present  at  the  time  the  rebel  officer  was  shot  in 
the  house  where  it  is  supposed  Mosby  was  wounded. 

Sheridan  seemed  as  much  delighted  to  hear  of 
my  death  as  the  troops  in  Fairfax.  No  doubt  he 
expected  no  more  annoyances  that  winter.  A 
short  time  afterward  he  sent  a  body  of  cavalry 
under  a  Major  Gibson  to  that  neighborhood  one 
night,  but  Dolly  Richards  got  after  him  and  sent 
most  of   his   men   prisoners   to    Richmond.     The 


350  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

last  heard  of  Major  Gibson  was  that  he  had  been 
unhorsed  and  was  getting  back  to  his  camp  full 
speed  over  the  snow  in  a  sleigh. 

[Stevenson  to  Sheridan] 

December  29,  1864. 

Mosby  was  shot  by  a  party  from  General  Augur's 
command  at  Rector's  Crossroads.  There  were  two  or 
three  men  in  the  party ;  they  fired  at  Mosby  and 
some  of  his  men  through  the  windows,  wounding  Mosby 
in  the  abdomen.  He  was  then  moved  to  the  house  of 
widow  Glasscock.  Torbert  tried  to  catch  him  there, 
but  he  had  been  taken  away  in  an  ambulance.  Tor- 
bert searched  the  house  of  Rogers  at  Middleburg,  but 
he  was  not  there.  Mosby's  wound  is  mortal.  He  and 
his  party  were  eating  supper  when  the  attack  was 
made  on  the  house  by  General  Augur's  men. 

[Augur  to  Sheridan] 

December  30,  1864. 

Richmond  papers  of  the  27th  report  Mosby's  death 
as  having  occurred  at  Charlottesville. 

[Sheridan  to  Emory] 

December  31,  1864. 

How  are  you  getting  along?  The  storm  is  unfor- 
tunate. I  have  no  news  to-day  except  the  death  of 
Mosby.     He  died  from  his  wound  at  Charlottesville. 


LAST   DAYS   IN  THE  VALLEY  351 

The  following  account  of  the  wounding  of  Mosby 
was  written  by  a  "Yankee  Major  General"  for 
the  New  York  Herald  of  December  31,  1864,  and 
was  copied  by  the  Confederate  newspapers : 

On  Tuesday,  December  17,  an  expedition  compris- 
ing the  Thirteenth  and  Sixteenth  New  York  and  Eighth 
Illinois  Cavalry,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Clendenin,  started  to  scout  the  country  this 
side  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  in  search  of  Mosby.  On 
arriving  at  White  Plains  on  Wednesday  the  command 
separated.  .  .  .  The  first  named  (13th  New  York) 
proceeded  toward  Salem,  and  when  a  short  distance 
from  Middleburg  came  upon  the  house  at  which  Mosby 
was  then  dining.  Captain  Taylor's  Company  of  the 
13th  New  York  were  in  the  advance,  and  manceuvered 
to  surround  the  house,  near  which  two  horses,  with 
cavalry  equipment  were  fastened.  Corporal  Cane  or 
Kane,  of  Company  F,  rode  near  the  house  and  was 
about  to  secure  the  horses,  when  Mosby  opened  the 
door  and  fired  at  the  Corporal.  Kane  raised  his  car- 
bine to  fire  in  return  ;  when  Mosby  closed  the  door  and 
ran  into  another  part  of  the  house.  The  Corporal, 
seeing  him  pass  a  window,  instantly  fired,  shooting 
Mosby  through  the  bowels.  Captain  Taylor  and 
others  hastily  entered  the  house.  Some  of  the  men 
proposed  finishing  the  rebel ;  but  Captain  Taylor, 
having  examined  his  wound,  pronounced  it  mortal. 
Major  Frazar,  13th  New  York  Cavalry,  also  examined 
the  wound  and  declared  that  the  man  would  die.  The 
rank  and  name  of  the  wounded  man  were  not  known 


352  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

at  this  time.  He  had  on  a  magnificent  cloak  of  gray, 
trimmed  with  English  scarlet  and  gold  clasps.  This 
cloak  had  often  been  talked  about  by  inhabitants  of 
the  valley  as  belonging  to  Mosby,  and  was  described 
by  citizens  as  the  richest  article  of  the  kind  in  either 
army.  The  boots  of  the  wounded  man  were  carried 
off  and  found  to  agree  exactly,  in  make  and  maker's 
name,  with  a  pair  taken  from  Mosby's  house  when 
burned  last  summer.  The  rebel  accounts  show  that 
their  conclusions  were  correct ;  but,  if  we  are  to  believe 
the  rebel  stories,  Mosby  is  not  yet  dead.  He  may 
possibly  recover  :   "The  devil  takes  care  of  his  own." 


CHAPTER   XVII 
Final  Scenes l 

The  war  drama  was  now  drawing  to  a  close. 
According  to  General  John  B.  Gordon,  Lee's 
troops  were  subsisting  on  parched  corn,  and  one 
day  a  private  accosted  him  with  the  request, 
"I  say,  General,  can't  you  give  us  a  little  fod- 
der?" Gordon  also  said  that  Lee's  surgeons 
reported  to  him  that  the  men  were  in  such  bad 
condition  that,  if  wounded,  they  would  become 
gangrened.  Grant's  remorseless  policy  had 
caused  the  Confederates  "to  rob  the  cradle  and 
the  grave."  And  the  blockade  had  all  the  time 
been  aiding  the  Federal  armies,  silently  but 
effectively. 

Colonel  Mosby  was  wounded  on  December  21, 
1864,  and,  naturally,  it  was  some  time  before  he 
could  get  to  work  again. 

1  This  chapter  was  prepared  from  material  collected  by  Colonel 
Mosby. 

353 


354  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

[Extracts  from  the  diary  of  Mosby's  mother] 

Sunday,  Jan.  I,  1865. 

Hear  by  the  papers  to-day  that  dear  John  is  re- 
covering. We  feel  intense  anxiety  about  John.  No 
tidings  from  John. 

Tuesday,  3rd. 

This  evening  .  .  .  John  arrived  safely  and  doing  well. 

Feb.  24th. 

John  sent  Mrs.  J.  S.  Mosby  his  photograph  and  a 
piece  dedicated  to  Mosby  and  his  men  —  "They  Will 
Never  Win  Us  Back."  We  feel  so  sad  at  the  thought 
of  our  dear  John  leaving  us  to-morrow. 

Feb.  25th. 

The  day  has  come  and  the  hour  has  passed  that  saw 
our  dearest  one  leave  once  more  the  household  group 
to  go  back  to  battle  for  his  country  and  all  that  is  dear 
to  man  and  woman.  It  is  one  of  the  saddest  events  of 
my  life,  when  I  have  to  part  from  my  dear  boys, 
to  go  to  the  Army,  yet  I  know  God  is  there  as  well 
as  around  the  peaceful  and  secure  fireside.  ...  A 
crisis  is  upon  us.  We  are  beset  on  all  sides  by  a  power- 
ful enemy. 

But  while  Colonel  Mosby  was  recovering  his 
men  were  by  no  means  idle. 

[Extract  from  a  Confederate  newspaper] 

The  part  attributed  to  Captain  Taylor's  Company, 
in  a  notice  copied  into  yesterday's  paper,  was  in  reality 


FINAL  SCENES  355 

an  exploit  of  Major  Richards,  of  Mosby's  command, 
as  accurate  accounts  have  since  established.  On 
Thursday  last,  Major  Richards,  with  a  force  of  sixty 
men,  struck  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  between 
Duffield  and  Martinsburg,  and  captured  a  train  of 
fifteen  cars  propelled  by  two  engines  and  loaded  with 
supplies  for  Sheridan's  army.  The  engines  were 
blown  up  and  the  cars  consumed  by  fire.  Our  adven- 
turous soldiers  loaded  their  horses  with  such  articles 
as  they  could  carry ;  many  of  them  possessing  them- 
selves in  this  manner  of  sacks  of  coffee,  besides  other 
desirable  supplies.  Major  Richards  has  already  estab- 
lished his  fame  as  one  of  the  most  active  and  success- 
ful of  Mosby's  indefatigables. 

When  Mosby  went  to  Richmond  early  in  De- 
cember, 1864,  he  presented  the  following  letter 
to  the  Confederate  War  Department : 

December  6,  1864. 
Hon.  James  A.  Seddon, 
Secretary  of  War. 

Sir: 

I  beg  leave  to  recommend,  in  order  to  secure  greater 
efficiency  in  my  command,  that  it  be  divided  into  two 
battalions,  each  to  be  commanded  by  a  Major.  The 
scope  of  duties  devolving  upon  me  being  of  a  much 
wider  extent  than  on  officers  of  the  same  rank  in  the 
regular  service,  but  small  time  is  allowed  me  to  attend 
to  the  duties  of  organization,  discipline,  etc.  I  am 
confident  that  the  arrangement  I  propose  would  give 


356  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

me  much  more  time  both  for  planning  and  executing 
enterprises  against  the  enemy.  I  would  recommend 
Capt.  Wm.  H.  Chapman  (Commanding  Co.  C.  43d 
Va.  P.  R.  Battalion)  and  Captain  Adolphus  E.  Richards 
(Commanding  Co.  B.  same  battalion)  for  the  command 
of  the  two  .  .  .  [letter  mutilated]  have  both  on  many 
occasions  .  .  .  valor  and  skill  to  which  my  reports 
...  so  in  engagements  with  the  .  .  .  Aldie,  Charles 
Town,  and  .  .  . 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)  John  S.  Mosby, 

Lieutenant  Colonel. 

On  January  9,  1865,  Mosby's  commission  as 
a  colonel  was  issued.  William  Chapman,  whose 
brother  Sam,  a  Baptist  preacher,  whom  Colonel 
Mosby  described  as  the  only  man  he  ever  saw 
who  really  enjoyed  fighting,  and  who  generally 
went  into  the  fray  with  his  hat  in  one  hand  and 
banging  away  with  his  revolver  with  the  other, 
became  a  lieutenant-colonel. 

On  March  27,  1865,  Colonel  Mosby  was  put 
in  command  of  all  northern  Virginia.  And  then 
on  April  9th  came  the  surrender  of  Lee  at  Appo- 
mattox. 

The  Colonel  often  said  that  if  his  small 
mother  had  been  in  command  of  the  Southern 
armies,  the  war  would  have  been  going  on  yet. 


COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

Photographed  in  Richmond  in  March,  1865 


FINAL  SCENES  357 

[Extracts  from  the  diary  of  Mosby's  mother] 

Saturday,  March  6. 

To-day  will  be  a  day  never  to  be  forgotten.  We 
heard  the  Yankees  occupied  Charlottesville  last  even- 
ing and  are  advancing  up  here.  All  is  consternation 
and  confusion.  We  are  trying  to  get  our  things  out  of 
the  way.  Rumor  after  rumor  arrives,  and  we  know 
not  how  to  proceed.  We  expect  to  be  driven  from  our 
homes.  Oh  !  may  we  be  spared,  and  our  house,  and 
the  vile  Yankees  driven  back. 

Saturday,  April  3. 

Captain  Kennon  left  and  Mr.  Moore  to  go  to  Col. 
Mosby's  command.  .  .  .  There  is  a  craven  spirit 
abroad  with  our  people.  If  overpowered  we  will 
have  to  submit  to  the  powers  that  be,  but  I  would  feel 
that  the  Yankees  themselves  would  despise  us,  if  we 
recanted  our  Southern  principles.  They  would  have  no 
confidence  in  us  and  look  with  contempt  on  us,  as  they 
should  do.  I  think  a  deserter  on  either  side  the  most 
degraded  human  being  that  breathes.  Yes,  we  hate 
them,  and  the  Yankees  do  too,  and  they  will  hiss  them. 

Sunday,  April  9th. 

I  went  out  and  heard  the  deep  toned  cannon,  carry- 
ing hundreds  and  perhaps  thousands  to  that  long  sleep 
that  knows  no  waking.  Oh,  how  my  heart  went  up 
for  our  great,  our  noble  Lee,  that  God  would  give  him 
strength  in  weakness  to  bring  us  out  of  battle  a  vic- 
torious people.  If  God  does  see  fit  to  crush  us  and 
bow  us  down,  because  of  our  sins  and  the  sins  of  this 


358  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

nation,  I  feel  it  will  be  in  justice  and  mercy,  and  will 
even  believe  he  doeth  all  things  well ;  but  there  are 
hearts  too  noble  to  be  conquered.  Our  Lee  will  stand 
out  a  man  in  all  the  nations  of  the  earth,  nobler  and 
greater  in  adversity  than  any  other  man  with  a  crown 
on  his  head.  ...  I  hear  of  fearful  desertions.  Poor 
craven  spirits,  —  I  hope  the  Yankee  bullets  will  yet 
pierce  their  hateful  hides.  General  Lee  surrendered  to 
superior  numbers  to-day  at  Appomattox  Court  House. 

Headquarters  Middle  Military  Division, 

Winchester,  Ya.,  April  10,  1865. 

The  Major-General  Commanding  announces  to  the 
citizens  in  the  vicinity  of  his  lines  that  General  Robert 
E.  Lee  surrendered  with  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia yesterday  to  Lieut.  General  Grant  near  Appo- 
mattox Court  House.  .  .  .  Officers  and  men  were 
all  paroled.  .  .  . 

(Signed)  W.  S.  Hancock, 
Maj.  Genl.  U.  S.  Vols. 
Official, 

E.  B.  Parsons, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General, 
A.  P.  M.  G. 

P.  S.  All  detachments  and  stragglers  from  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  will,  upon  complying  with  the 
above  conditions,  be  paroled  and  allowed  to  go  to 
their  homes.  Those  who  do  not  so  surrender  will  be 
brought  in  as  prisoners  of  war.  The  Guerilla  Chief 
Mosby  is  not  included  in  the  parole. 

W.  S.  H. 


FINAL  SCENES  359 

Headquarters  Middle  Military  Division, 
Winchester,  April  11,  1865. 
Colonel  John  S.  Mosby, 
Commanding  Partizans, 

Colonel : 

I  am  directed  by  Major  General  Hancock  to  inclose 
you  copies  of  letters  which  passed  between  Generals 
Grant  and  Lee  on  the  occasion  of  the  surrender  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Major  General  Hancock 
is  authorized  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  force  under 
your  command  on  the  same  conditions  offered  to  Gen- 
eral Lee,  and  will  send  an  officer  of  equal  rank  with 
yourself  to  meet  you  at  any  point  and  time  you  may 
designate,  convenient  to  the  lines,  for  the  purpose  of 
arranging  the  details,  should  you  conclude  to  be  gov- 
erned by  the  example  of  General  Lee. 

Very  respectfully, 
Your  servant, 
C.  H.  Morgan, 
Bat.  Brig.  Genl. 
Chief  of  Staff. 

April  15,  1865. 
Major  General  W.  S.  Hancock, 

Commanding, 
General : 

I  am  in  receipt  of  a  letter  from  your  Chief  of  Staff 
General  Morgan,  enclosing  copies  of  correspondence 
between  Generals  Grant  and  Lee,  and  informing  me 
that  you  would  appoint  an  officer  of  equal  rank  with 
myself  to  arrange  the  details  for  the  surrender  of  the 


360  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

forces  under  my  command.  As  yet  I  have  no  notice 
through  any  other  source  of  the  facts  concerning  the  sur- 
render of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  nor,  in  my  opin- 
ion, has  the  emergency  yet  arisen  which  would  justify  the 
surrender  of  my  command.  With  no  disposition,  how- 
ever, to  cause  the  useless  effusion  of  blood  or  to  inflict 
upon  a  war-worn  population  any  unnecessary  distress,  I 
am  ready  to  agree  to  a  suspension  of  hostilities  for  a  short 
time,  in  order  to  enable  me  to  communicate  with  my  own 
authorities  or  until  I  can  obtain  sufficient  intelligence  to 
determine  my  future  action.  Should  you  accede  to  this 
proposition,  I  am  ready  to  meet  any  person  you  may  des- 
ignate to  arrange  the  terms  of  the  armistice.  I  am, 
Very  respectfully, 
Your  obedient  servant, 

John  S.  Mosby, 
Colonel  C.  S.  A. 

(This  letter  to  Hancock,  who  was  at  Winchester, 
was  written  at  Warrenton,  Fauquier  Co.,  Va., 
the  home  of  the  Washington  family.  It  was 
sent  by  a  flag  of  truce  that  was  carried  by  Colonel 
Wm.  H.  Chapman,  Dr.  Monteiro,  and  my  brother, 
Wm.  H.  Mosby,  who  was  my  adjutant.     J.  S.  M.) 

[Mosby's  Farewell  Address  to  his  Command] 

Fauquier  County,  April  21,  1865. 
Soldiers  — 

I  have  summoned  you  together  for  the  last  time. 
The  visions  we  have  cherished  of  a  free  and  independent 


WILLIAM  H.    MOSBY 

Colonel  Mosby's  Adjutant  and  only  brother.     Photographed 
(about)  1867 


FINAL  SCENES  361 

country  have  vanished,  and  that  country  is  now  the 
spoil  of  the  conqueror.  I  disband  your  organization 
in  preference  to  surrendering  it  to  our  enemies.  I  am 
no  longer  your  Commander.  After  an  association  of 
more  than  two  eventful  years,  I  part  from  you  with 
a  just  pride  in  the  fame  of  your  achievements  and  a 
grateful  recollection  of  your  generous  kindness  to 
myself.  And  at  this  moment  of  bidding  you  a  final 
adieu,  accept  the  assurance  of  my  unchanging  confi- 
dence and  regard.     Farewell ! 

Jno.  S.  Mosby, 

Colonel- 
Valley  Farm,  Aug.  27,  '65. 

My  dearest  Pauline : 

I  staid  almost  a  week  at  Pa's  and  then  returned  to 
Uncle  John's,  as  the  infernal  Yankees  were  in  Lynch- 
burg, which  made  it  dangerous  to  remain  there  longer. 
Uncle  John  made  John  Hipkins  go  to  Richmond,  as 
we  were  anxious  to  learn  what  were  the  designs  of 
the  Yankees  towards  me.  Mr.  Palmer  went  to  see 
General  Lee.  General  Lee  sent  me  word  by  Willie 
Cabell  that  he  was  waiting  to  see  General  Grant ;  he 
also  said  that  he  entirely  approved  of  everything  I 
had  done.  He  is  going  to  move  up  to  Haymarket. 
When  I  passed  through  Charlottesville  there  were 
fourteen  Yankee  cavalry  in  the  place.  I  met  a  lieu- 
tenant and  one  man  in  the  street.  They  said  nothing 
to  me.  I  went  up  to  the  University  to  call  on  Dr. 
McGuffey.     A  short  while  after   I   left,   it  was  sur- 


362  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

rounded  by  two  companies  of  Yankee  cavalry.  If  you 
see  Willie  tell  him  Pa  is  anxious  for  him  to  return 
home.  I  want  to  find  out  what  will  be  the  course  of 
the  Yankees  towards  me  before  I  return  to  Fauquier. 

[Extract  from   a  Lynchburg,    Virginia,   paper  of 

1865] 
Some  little  stir  was  created  in  the  city  yesterday  by 
the  report  that  Col.  Mosby,  the  celebrated  partisan 
chieftain,  was  in  Lynchburg.  Various  reasons  were 
expressed  as  to  the  cause  of  his  appearance,  but  the 
following  are,  we  believe,  the  facts  of  the  case.  Some 
days  since  Col.  Mosby's  brother  came  to  Captain 
Swank,  Provost  Marshal  of  this  city,  to  inquire  if 
Mosby  would  be  paroled  on  coming  in  and  surrender- 
ing to  the  authorities.  Capt.  Swank  replied  that  he 
would  make  inquiries  upon  the  subject,  and  give 
him  an  answer  in  a  few  days.  Day  before  yesterday, 
he  again  called  to  see  the  marshal  upon  the  subject, 
and  was  told  that  Col.  Mosby  would  be  paroled  if  he 
would  come  in  and  give  himself  up.  In  accordance 
with  this  information,  Mosby  came  into  Lynchburg 
yesterday,  and  applied  at  the  Provost  Marshal's 
office  for  a  parole.  Capt.  Garnett  happened  to  be 
attending  to  the  duties  of  the  office  at  the  time  and, 
not  being  aware  of  the  arrangement,  sent  to  Col. 
Duncan  for  instructions.  He  was  immediately  ordered 
not  to  parole  Col.  Mosby  until  further  orders  from  Col. 
Duncan.  In  the  meantime  a  dispatch  was  received 
from  Richmond,  and  Mosby  was  ordered  to  leave  town 
immediately,  while  the  Provost  guard  were  instructed 


MOSBY   IN    1866 


FINAL  SCENES  363 

to  see  that  he  did  so  without  molestation  or  hindrance. 
The  dispatch  is  generally  supposed  to  have  been  an 
order  for  his  arrest,  probably  under  a  misapprehension 
of  the  facts,  —  and,  as  he  had  come  here  under  an 
implied  safeguard  from  the  military  authorities,  they 
felt  bound  in  honor  not  to  take  advantage  of  the  act. 

[Extract  from  the  Alexandria  State  Journal,  1865] 

We  last  night  noticed  the  fact  that  Major  [sic] 
Mosby  was  in  the  city,  and  his  presence  was  much 
courted  by  his  friends  and  admirers.  An  hour  after 
his  arrival  there  was  hardly  a  sympathizer  with  the 
late  Confederacy  here  who  did  not  know  of  his  pres- 
ence. Wherever  he  went  he  was  followed  by  a  large 
crowd  of  friends.  He  seemed  to  make  Harper's  store 
his  headquarters,  and  whenever  stationed  there  large 
crowds,  composed  of  a  plentiful  sprinkling  of  colored 
men  and  boys,  gathered  on  the  corner  and  blockaded 
the  sidewalk,  sometimes  almost  obstructing  the  street. 
This  became  so  annoying  that  about  four  o'clock 
P.M.  last  evening,  the  military  authorities  ordered  his 
arrest.  He  was  arrested  by  Capt.  McGraw  at  the 
residence  of  Mrs.  Boyd  Smith,  on  St.  Asaph  Street, 
and  taken  before  Genl.  Wells,  who  held  him  until  he 
communicated  with  headquarters  at  Washington  and 
received  orders  for  his  release. 

Leesburg,  January  8,  '66. 
Dearest  Pauline : 

I  was  just  in  the  act  of  starting  home  this  morning 
when  an  order  came  for  my  arrest.     I  am  now  under 


364  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

arrest    here,    awaiting    orders    from    General    Ayres. 
Don't  be  uneasy.  .  .  . 

Yours  affectionately, 

John  S.  Mosby. 

[From  the  Baltimore  Sun,  February  6th,  1866] 

Col.  Mosby  has  been  released  upon  parole  by  Genl. 
Grant,  he  being  included  in  the  terms  of  Genl.  Lee's 
surrender. 

Thus  it  was  nearly  a  year  after  Lee's  surrender 
that  the  war  closed  for  Mosby. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

In  Retrospect 

[In  December,  1899,  Colonel  Mosby  wrote 
the  following  letter  to  John  S.  Russell  —  his 
chief  scout  in  the  war  —  which  throws  valuable 
sidelights  on  many  of  the  episodes  connected  with 
his  command,  and  sums  up  his  deliberate  opinion  of 
many  of  the  controversial  points  connected  with  his 
partisan  life.  In  this  survey  of  the  past,  Colonel 
Mosby  stated  many  of  his  final  conclusions.] 

San  Francisco,  Dec.  16,  1899. 

Mr.  John  S.  Russell, 
Berryville,  Va. 

Dear  John : 

I  have  mailed  you  a  set  of  photographs  of  the  Berry- 
ville raid  that  made  Sheridan  retreat  fifty  miles  down 
the  Valley  to  the  place  where  he  started  from.  In 
1867  Captain  McAleer,  of  Baltimore,  visited  the 
scene,  made  sketches,  and  procured  photographs  of 
many  of  our  men.  He  then  went  to  Paris  and  had  the 
pictures   painted   by   two  distinguished   artists.1  .  .  . 

1  Beauce"  and  Philippoteaux.  Photographic  reproductions  of  these 
paintings  were  widely  circulated  in  France,  England,  and  America 
shortly  after  the  war,  and  one  is  reproduced  in  this  volume. 

36s 


366  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

Number  i  ("Mosby  Planning  an  Attack  on  the  Federal 
Cavalry")  represents  the  battalion  just  as  we  reached 
the  east  bank  of  the  Shenandoah  —  "the  daughter  of 
the  stars."  You  are  near  me,  listening  intently  to  an 
order  I  am  giving  you  to  cross  the  river  and  find  out 
what  was  in  front.  You  returned  after  dark,  when  I 
was  asleep  enjoying  a  soldier's  dream,  "and  the  senti- 
nel stars  had  set  their  watch  in  the  sky",  and  told  me 
that  a  long  train,  heavily  guarded,  was  passing  on  the 
pike.  In  a  few  minutes  all  were  mounted  and  moving 
to  the  attack. 

Number  2  represents  the  Berryville  fight  and  the 
stampede  of  the  train  guard.  I  am  with  Sam  Chap- 
man's company  that  was  kept  in  reserve  with  the 
howitzer  that  is  firing  while  Richards's  squadron 
charge  at  one  point  on  the  line  and  William  Chapman 
and  Glasscock  with  their  companies  charge  at  another. 
Stockton  Terry,  of  Lynchburg,  is  near  me  with  the 
battalion  colors.  A  body  of  the  enemy  formed  behind 
a  stone  fence  and  made  some  resistance.  Here  Lewis 
Adie,  of  Glasscock's  company,  was  killed.  I  remember 
very  well  when  Guy  Broadwater  rode  up  and  reported 
it  to  me  in  the  midst  of  the  fight.  All  I  said  was, 
"I  can't  help  it."     He  was  a  fine  boy. 

Do  you  remember  how  the  yellow- jackets  routed  us, 
and  were  near  spoiling  all  my  plans  of  that  day? 
The  howitzer  came  up  at  a  gallop  and  was  unlimbered 
on  a  knoll  that  commanded  the  pike.  The  gun  was 
put  in  a  position  right  over  a  nest  of  yellow-jackets. 
They  were  home-rulers,  like  the  Boers,  and  instantly 
a  swarm  flew  out  to  repel  the  invasion  of  their  terri- 


IN   RETROSPECT  367 

tory.  My  men  had  stood  a  volley  from  a  body  of 
infantry  on  the  pike,  but  the  sting  of  the  yellow- jackets 
was  too  much  for  their  courage.  The  horses  reared  and 
plunged,  the  men  ran  away  from  the  gun.  Whether 
the  scene  was  sublime  or  ridiculous  depends  upon  one's 
point  of  view  at  the  time.  My  horse  was  frantic, 
and  I  felt  a  good  deal  like  Hercules  did  when  he  put 
on  the  shirt  of  the  Centaur  and  couldn't  pull  it  off. 
We  were  on  the  verge  of  a  panic  —  a  few  minutes' 
delay  would  give  the  enemy  time  to  recover  from  their 
surprise.  A  shot  from  the  howitzer  was  to  be  the 
signal  for  the  squadrons  to  charge.  They  were  waiting. 
But  just  then  one  of  the  men  —  Babcock  I  think  it 
was  —  rushed  forward,  recaptured  the  howitzer,  and 
dragged  it  off.  The  yellow-jackets  returned  in  tri- 
umph to  their  hole  in  the  ground.  In  a  minute  a 
shell  burst  among  the  wagons  ;  it  knocked  off  the  head 
of  a  mule,  the  guard  stampeded,  while  the  braying  of 
the  mules  could  be  heard  above  the  roar  of  the  gun. 
The  mules  we  captured  supplied  General  Lee's  army 
with  transportation,  and  the  drove  of  fine  beeves  was 
sent  as  a  present  and  furnished  beefsteaks  for  his 
soldiers. 

You  will  observe  in  the  picture  representing  our 
return  a  figure  on  horseback  playing  a  fiddle.  It  is 
Bob  Ridley  (Eastham).  He  got  it  from  a  headquarters 
wagon.  Bob  is  playing  a  tune  to  which  he  had  danced 
—  "Malbrook  has  gone  to  the  Wars." 

Our  object  was  to  impede  Sheridan's  march. 

I  was  sorry  I  could  not  be  with  you  at  the  unveiling 
of  the  monument  to  our  men  at  Front  Royal,  and  I 


368  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

dissent  from  some  historical  statements  in  Major 
Richards's  address.  I  do  not  agree  with  him  that  our 
men  were  hung  in  compliance  with  General  Grant's 
orders  to  Sheridan.  They  were  not  hung  in  obedience 
to  the  orders  of  a  superior,  but  from  revenge.  A  man 
who  acts  from  revenge  simply  obeys  his  own  impulses. 
Major  Richards  says  the  orders  were  "a  dead  letter" 
after  I  retaliated,  which  implies  that  they  had  not 
been  before.  I  see  no  evidence  to  support  such  a  con- 
clusion. In  his  letter  in  the  Times,  Major  Richards 
says  that  Sheridan's  dispatches  about  hanging  our 
men  were  "visionary  ",  i.e.,  he  never  hung  any.  If  so, 
the  order  had  always  been  a  "dead  letter."  No  one 
ever  heard  of  his  hangings  until  his  dispatches  were 
published  a  few  years  ago ;  Sheridan  was  then  dead, 
but  his  posthumous  memoirs  say  nothing  about  hang- 
ing, although  two  pages  are  devoted  to  an  account  of 
the  killing  of  Meigs  and  Custer's  burning  dwelling 
houses  in  Rockingham  County  in  revenge.  Meigs 
was  not  killed  by  my  men ;  we  never  went  that  far 
up  the  Valley. 

Sheridan's  dispatches  in  the  War  Records  about  the 
men  he  hung  were  not  even  a  revelation  to  me,  — 
they  revealed  nothing.  They  were  simply  spectres 
of  imagination,  like  the  dagger  in  the  air  that  Macbeth 
saw.  If  Sheridan  had  communicated  Grant's  dispatch 
of  August  16th  to  any  one  to  be  executed,  it  would 
have  been  to  Blazer,  who  commanded  a  picket  corps 
that  was  specially  detailed  to  look  after  us.  In  his 
report  Blazer  speaks  of  capturing  some  of  my  men ; 
he  never  mentions  hanging  any.     Those  he  captured 


IN   RETROSPECT  369 

were  certainly  not  hung,  for  I  saw  them  when  they 
came  home  after  the  close  of  the  war. 

The  following  dispatches  record  the  rise  and  fall  of 
Blazer. 

[Sheridan  to  Augur] 

August  20,  1864. 

I  have  100  men  who  will  take  the  contract  to  clean 
out  Mosby's  gang.  I  want  100  Spencer  rifles  for  them. 
Send  them  to  me  if  they  can  be  found  in  Washington. 

P.  H.  Sheridan, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

[Indorsement] 
Approved  :  By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

C.  A.  Dana, 

Asst.  Secretary. 

[Stevenson  to  Sheridan] 
Harper's  Ferry,  November  19,  1864. 

Two  of  Captain  Blazer's  men  came  in  this  morning 
—  Privates  Harris  and  Johnson.  They  report  that 
Mosby  with  300  men  attacked  Blazer  near  Kabletown 
yesterday  about  11  o'clock.  They  say  the  entire 
command,  with  the  exception  of  themselves,  was  cap- 
tured or  killed.  I  have  ordered  Major  Congo1  on  with 
300  Twelfth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  to  Kabletown  to 
bury  dead  and  take  care  of  wounded,  if  any,  and  report 
all  facts  he  can  learn.  I  shall  immediately  furnish 
report  as  soon  as  rec'd. 


37o  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

Exit  Blazer ! 

Richards  commanded  in  the  Blazer  fight.  I  was 
not  there.  As  an  affair  of  arms  it  passed  anything 
that  had  been  done  in  the  Shenandoah  campaign  and 
recalled  the  days  when  Knighthood  was  in  flower. 
When  we  sent  Blazer  and  his  band  of  prisoners  to 
Richmond,  they  would  not  have  admitted  that  they 
ever  hung  anybody. 

Major  Richards  refers  to  Grant's  orders  to  destroy 
subsistence  for  an  army  so  as  to  make  the  country 
untenable  by  the  Confederates,  and  pathetically  de- 
scribes the  conflagration.  He  ought  to  know  that 
there  had  been  burning  of  mills  and  wheat  stacks  in 
Loudon  two  years  before  Grant  came  to  Virginia. 
Grant's  orders  were  no  more  directed  against  my  com- 
mand than  Early's.  Augusta  and  Rockingham  were 
desolated,  where  we  never  had  been.  But  I  can't 
see  the  slightest  connection  between  burning  forage 
and  provisions  and  hanging  prisoners.  One  is  per- 
mitted by  the  code  of  war ;   the  other  is  not. 

After  General  Lee's  surrender  I  received  a  communi- 
cation from  General  Hancock  asking  for  mine.  I  de- 
clined to  do  so  until  I  could  hear  whether  Joe  Johnston 
would  surrender  or  continue  the  war.  We  agreed  on 
a  five  days'  armistice.  When  it  expired  nothing  had 
been  heard  from  Johnston.  I  met  a  flag  of  truce  at 
Millwood,  and  had  proposed  an  extension  of  ten  days, 
but  received  through  Major  Russell  a  message  from 
Hancock  refusing  it  and  informing  me  that  unless  I 
surrendered  immediately  he  would  proceed  to  devastate 
the  country.     The  reply  I  sent  by  Russell  was,  "Tell 


IN    RETROSPECT  371 

General  Hancock  he  is  able  to  do  it."  Hancock  then 
had  40,000  men  at  Winchester.  The  next  day  I  dis- 
banded my  battalion  to  save  the  country  from  being 
made  a  desert.  If  any  one  doubts  this,  let  him  read 
Hancock's  report.  If  it  was  legitimate  for  Hancock  to 
lay  waste  the  country  after  I  had  suspended  hostilities, 
surely  it  was  equally  so  for  Grant  to  do  it  when  I  was 
doing  all  the  damage  in  my  power  to  his  army.  Stan- 
ton warned  Hancock  not  to  meet  me  in  person  under  a 
flag  of  truce,  for  fear  that  I  would  treacherously  kill 
him.  Hancock  replied  that  he  would  send  an  officer 
to  meet  me.  He  sent  General  Chapman.  The  atten- 
tion Grant  paid  to  us  shows  that  we  did  him  a  great 
deal  of  harm.  Keeping  my  men  in  prison  weakened  us 
as  much  as  to  hang  them. 

Major  Richards  complains  of  the  "debasing  epi- 
thets" Sheridan  applied  to  us.  I  have  read  his  reports, 
correspondence,  and  memoirs,  but  have  never  seen  the 
epithets.  In  common  with  all  northern  and  many 
southern  people,  he  called  us  guerrillas.  The  word 
"guerrilla"  is  a  diminutive  of  the  Spanish  word 
"guerra"  (war),  and  simply  means  one  engaged  in  the 
minor  operations  of  war.  Although  I  have  never 
adopted  it,  I  have  never  resented  as  an  insult  the  term 
"guerrilla"  when  applied  to  me. 

Sheridan  says  that  my  battalion  was  "the  most 
redoubtable"  partisan  body  that  he  met.  I  certainly 
take  no  exception  to  that.  He  makes  no  charge  of  any 
act  of  inhumanity  against  us.  The  highest  compli- 
ment ever  paid  to  the  efficiency  of  our  command  is  the 
statement  in  Sheridan's  "Memoirs",   that  while  his 


372  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

army  largely  outnumbered  Early's,  yet  their  line  of 
battle  strength  was  about  equal  on  account  of  the 
detachments  he  was  compelled  to  make  to  guard  the 
border  and  his  line  of  communication  from  partisan 
attacks.  Ours  was  the  only  force  behind  him.  At 
that  time  the  records  show  that  in  round  numbers 
Early  had  17,000  present  for  duty,  and  Sheridan  had 
94,000.  I  had  only  five  companies  of  cavalry  when 
Sheridan  came  in  August,  1864,  to  the  Shenandoah 
Valley.  A  sixth  was  organized  in  September.  Two 
more  companies  joined  me  in  April,  1865,  after  the 
evacuation  of  Richmond.  They  came  just  in  time  to 
surrender. 

I  don't  care  a  straw  whether  Custer  was  solely  re- 
sponsible for  the  hanging  of  our  men,  or  jointly  with 
others.  If  we  believe  the  reports  of  the  generals, 
none  of  them  ever  heard  of  the  hanging  of  our  men ; 
they  must  have  committed  suicide.  Contemporary 
evidence  is  against  Custer.  I  wonder  if  he  also  denied 
burning  dwelling  houses  around  Berryville. 

I  once  called  at  the  White  House  in  1876  to  see 
General  Grant ;  sent  him  my  card,  and  was  promptly 
admitted.  When  I  came  out  of  his  room,  one  of  the 
secretaries  told  me  that  General  Custer  had  called  the 
day  before,  but  that  General  Grant  had  refused  to  see 
him.  The  incident  is  related  in  the  "Life  of  Custer." 
A  few  weeks  afterward  Custer  was  killed  in  the  Sitting 
Bull  Massacre. 

Major  Richards  further  says  "that  there  was 
scarcely  a  family  in  all  that  section  that  did  not  have 
some  member  in  Mosby's  command."     If  that  is  true, 


IN   RETROSPECT  373 

I  must  have  commanded  a  larger  army  than  Sheridan. 
I  didn't  know  it.  He  describes  the  pathos  of  the 
scenes  that  might  have  been  if  the  "severe  and  cruel 
order"  had  been  executed  to  transfer  the  families 
from  that  region  to  Fort  McHenry,  and  says  it  would 
have  "paralyzed"  my  command.  If  so,  that  would 
have  been  a  more  humane  way  of  getting  rid  of  it 
than  killing  the  men.  Now  I  have  never  considered 
women  and  children  necessary  appendages  to  an 
army ;  on  the  contrary,  I  would  rather  class  them  with 
what  Caesar,  in  his  "Commentaries",  calls  impedi- 
menta. Homer's  heroes  were  not  paralyzed  when 
Helen  was  carried  off  to  Troy ;  it  only  aroused  their 
martial  ambition.  Sheridan  knew  that  if  he  did  any- 
thing of  the  kind  it  would  stimulate  the  activity  of  my 
men,  so  he  didn't  try  it.  As  for  our  lieutenant-colonel, 
who,  as  Major  Richards  says,  married  in  that  section, 
I  think  that  if  Sheridan  had  captured  his  wife  and 
mother-in-law  and  sent  them  to  prison,  instead  of 
going  into  mourning,  he  would  have  felt  all  the  wrath 
and  imitated  the  example  of  the  fierce  Achilles  when 
he  heard  that  Patroclus,  his  friend,  had  been  killed 
and  his  armor  had  been  captured.  "Now  perish 
Troy,"  he  said,  and  rushed  to  fight. 

Very  truly  yours, 

John  S.  Mosby. 


CHAPTER  XIX 
My  Recollections  of  General  Lee 

My  first  meeting  with  General  Robert  E.  Lee 
was  in  August,  1862,  when  I  brought  the  news 
of  Burnside's  reinforcement  of  Pope,  a  story  I 
have  told  in  the  preceding  pages.  The  next 
time  we  met  was  at  his  headquarters  in  Orange, 
about  two  months  after  Gettysburg.  He  did 
not  seem  in  the  least  depressed,  and  was  as 
buoyant  and  aggressive  as  ever.  He  took  a  deep 
interest  in  my  operations,  for  there  was  nothing 
of  the  Fabius  in  his  character.  Lee  was  the  most 
aggressive  man  I  met  in  the  war,  and  was  always 
ready  for  an  enterprise.  I  believe  that  his  in- 
terest in  me  was  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  his 
father,  "Light  Horse  Harry",  was  a  partisan 
officer  in  the  Revolutionary  War. 

After  General  Stuart  was  killed,  in  May,  1864, 
I  reported  directly  to  General  Lee.  During  the 
siege  of  Petersburg  I  visited  him  three  times  — 
twice  when  I  was  wounded.  Once,  when  I  got 
out   of   the   ambulance,    he   was    standing    near, 

374 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL   LEE    375 

talking  to  General  Longstreet.  When  he  saw 
me  hobbling  up  to  him  on  crutches,  he  came  to 
meet  me,  introduced  me  to  General  Longstreet, 
and  said,  "Colonel,  the  only  fault  I  have  ever 
had  to  find  with  you  is  that  you  are  always  getting 
wounded." 

Such  a  speech  from  General  Lee  more  than 
repaid  me  for  my  wound. 

The  last  time  I  saw  him  during  the  war  was 
about  two  months  before  the  surrender.  I  had 
been  wounded  again.  He  was  not  only  kind, 
but  affectionate,  and  asked  me  to  take  dinner 
with  him,  though  he  said  he  hadn't  much  to  eat. 
There  was  a  leg  of  mutton  on  the  table ;  he  re- 
marked that  some  of  his  staff  officers  must  have 
stolen  it. 

After  dinner,  when  we  were  alone,  he  talked 
very  freely.  He  said  that  in  the  spring  of  1862, 
Joe  Johnston  ought  not  to  have  fallen  back  from 
the  Rapidan  to  Richmond,  and  that  he  had 
written  urging  him  to  turn  against  Washington. 
He  also  said  that  when  Joe  Johnston  evacuated 
his  lines  at  Yorktown,  in  May  of  that  year,  he 
should  have  given  battle  with  his  whole  force 
on  the  isthmus  at  Williamsburg,  instead  of  mak- 
ing a  rear-guard  fight. 

When  I  bade  Lee  good-by  after  our  last  inter- 


376  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

view,  I  had  no  idea  that  it  was  my  final  parting 
with  him  as  my  commander.  I  can  never  forget 
the  sympathetic  words  with  which  he  cautioned 
me  against  unnecessary  exposure  to  danger. 

The  following  is  the  last  order  he  ever  gave  me. 
It  was  dated  March  27,  1865,  and  put  me  in  com- 
mand of  all  northern  Virginia : 

Collect  your  command  and  watch  the  country  from 
the  front  of  Gordonsville  to  Blue  Ridge,  and  also  the 
Valley.  Your  command  is  all  now  in  that  section, 
and  the  general  (Lee)  will  rely  on  you  to  watch  and 
protect  the  country.  If  any  of  your  command  is  in 
Northern  Neck,  call  it  to  you. 

W.  H.  Taylor, 
Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

Lee  was  raised  in  the  political  school  of  Wash- 
ington and  Hamilton.  In  the  Virginia  conven- 
tion of  1788,  his  father  had  voted  against  the 
imbecile  confederation  and  for  the  Constitution 
which  made  the  laws  of  the  Union  supreme  law 
of  the  land,  and  in  1798  spoke  and  voted  against 
the  famous  States-rights'  resolutions.  In  the 
year  1794  ne  commanded  the  Virginia  troops 
that  were  ordered  to  Pennsylvania  to  suppress 
the  Whiskey  Insurrection.  It  is  difficult  to  dis- 
tinguish in  law  between  Washington's  proclama- 
tion  in    1794,    calling   out   the   military   force   to 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL   LEE    377 

execute  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  Lin- 
coln's in  1861. 

As  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  the  Second  Cavalry, 
Lee  was  stationed  in  Texas  in  February,  1861, 
but  was  ordered  to  Washington,  arriving  there 
about  the  time  of  the  presidential  inauguration. 
The  commander-in-chief,  General  Scott,  a  Vir- 
ginian, was  too  old  for  active  service  —  there 
was  then  no  retirement  law  —  and  he  wanted 
Lee  near  him  as  an  adviser  and  second  in  com- 
mand. On  March  16,  Colonel  Edwin  V.  Sumner 
was  promoted  to  be  a  brigadier-general  in  place 
of  Twiggs,  who  had  been  dismissed  for  treachery 
in  surrendering  the  Union  troops  in  Texas.  A 
Virginia  lady,  who  met  Lee  about  that  time, 
told  me,  many  years  ago,  that  he  spoke  to  her 
with  great  indignation  about  General  Twiggs's 
conduct.  Lee  now  became  colonel  of  the  First 
Cavalry.  His  biographers  do  not  seem  to  have 
heard  of  this  promotion  and  have  ignored  the 
fact  that  he  accepted  a  commission  from  Presi- 
dent Lincoln.  Lee  was  with  his  family  at  Arling- 
ton and  on  confidential  relations  with  the  War 
Department  up  to  the  day  of  his  resignation, 
April  20,  1 861.  As  the  command  of  the  U.  S. 
Army  was  offered  to  him,  Scott  must  have  thought 
that  he  would   stand  by  the  Union,    and   Lee's 


378  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

purpose  to  resign  in  the  event  of  Virginia  passing 
an  ordinance  of  secession  had  not  been  disclosed. 

Lee  was  forced  by  circumstances  to  take  the 
side  for  which  he  fought  in  the  war.  On  the  sub- 
ject of  slavery  and  the  right  of  secession,  he 
agreed  with  Abraham  Lincoln.  Five  years  be- 
fore, in  writing  about  slavery,  he  had  said,  "It 
is  a  moral,  social,  and  political  evil." 

Writing  at  Fort  Mason,  Texas,  on  January  23, 
1 86 1 — after  seven  States  had  passed  ordinances 
of  secession  —  Lee  said  : 

The  framers  of  our  Constitution  would  never  have 
exhausted  so  much  labor,  wisdom,  and  forbearance 
in  its  formation,  and  surrounded  it  with  so  many 
safeguards  and  securities,  if  it  was  intended  to  be 
broken  by  every  member  of  the  confederacy  at  will. 
It  was  intended  for  "perpetual  union",  so  expressed 
in  the  preamble,  and  for  the  establishment  of  a  govern- 
ment, not  a  compact,  which  can  only  be  dissolved  by 
revolution,  or  by  the  consent  of  all  the  people  in  con- 
vention assembled.  It  is  idle  to  talk  of  secession. 
Anarchy  would  have  been  established,  and  not  a  gov- 
ernment, by  Washington,  Hamilton,  Jefferson,  Madi- 
son, and  all  the  other  patriots  of  the  Revolution. 

When  Lee  resigned  his  commission  to  join  the 
forces  of  his  native  State,  he  acted,  as  nearly  every 
soldier  acts,  from  personal  sympathy  with  the 
combatants,  and  not  on  any  legal  theory  of  right 


RECOLLECTIONS   OF  GENERAL   LEE    379 

and  wrong.  On  the  day  when  he  resigned,  he 
wrote  his  sister  that  he  could  not  draw  his  sword 
against  his  family,  his  neighbors,  and  his  friends. 

On  the  previous  day,  he  happened  to  go  into  a 
store  in  Alexandria  to  pay  a  bill.  His  heart  was 
burdened  with  a  great  sorrow,  and  he  uttered  these 
words,  which  the  merchant  wrote  down  in  his 
journal  —  they  still  stand  there  to-day:  "I  must 
say  that  I  am  one  of  those  dull  creatures  that  can- 
not see  the  good  of  secession." 

Below  this  entry  the  merchant  wrote,  "Spoken 
by  Colonel  R.  E.  Lee  when  he  paid  this  bill,  April 
19,  1861." 

A  few  days  later,  Lee  was  made  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  forces  of  the  State  of  Virginia. 
There  was  no  competition  for  the  position.  The 
late  Judge  John  Critcher  represented  Westmore- 
land, Lee's  native  county,  in  the  secession  con- 
vention, and  was  one  of  the  committee  sent  to 
notify  him  of  the  appointment.  The  judge  told 
me  that  when  Lee  returned  with  the  committee 
to  the  convention  hall,  in  the  Capitol  at  Rich- 
mond, they  had  to  wait  for  a  few  minutes  in  the 
rotunda.  Looking  at  Houdon's  statue  of  Wash- 
ington, Lee  said,  very  gravely,  "I  hope  we  have 
seen  the  last  of  secession." 

He  evidently  feared   that  the  seceding  States 


380  COLONEL  JOHN  S.  MOSBY 

would  soon  separate  from  one  another.  "The 
Life  of  Alexander  Stephens"  shows  that  the  appre- 
hension was  not  unfounded,  and  that  the  members 
of  the  Confederacy  were  held  together  only  by 
the  pressure  of  war  and  by  the  despotic  power  of 
the  central  government  at  Richmond. 

I  once  heard  General  John  C.  Breckenridge  say, 
at  a  dinner  in  Baltimore,  soon  after  he  returned 
from  his  exile  in  Canada,  that  if  the  Southern  Con- 
federacy had  been  established,  "  there  would  have 
been  such  a  spirit  of  local  self-assertion  that  every 
county  would  have  claimed  the  right  to  set  up  for 
itself." 

I  met  General  Lee  a  few  times  after  the  war, 
but  the  days  of  strife  were  never  mentioned.  I 
remember  the  last  words  he  spoke  to  me,  about 
two  months  before  his  death,  at  a  reception  that 
was  given  to  him  in  Alexandria.  When  I  bade 
him  good-by,  he  said,  "Colonel,  I  hope  we  shall 
have  no  more  wars." 

In  March,  1870,  I  was  walking  across  the  bridge 
connecting  the  Ballard  and  Exchange  hotels,  in 
Richmond,  and  to  my  surprise  I  met  General  Lee 
and  his  daughter.  The  general  was  pale  and 
haggard,  and  did  not  look  like  the  Apollo  I  had 
known  in  the  army.  After  a  while  I  went  to  his 
room ;    our  conversation  was  on  current  topics. 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  LEE    381 

I  felt  oppressed  by  the  great  memories  that  his 
presence  revived,  and  while  both  of  us  were  think- 
ing about  the  war,  neither  of  us  referred  to  it. 

After  leaving  the  room,  I  met  General  Pickett, 
and  told  him  that  I  had  just  been  with  Lee.  He 
remarked  that,  if  I  would  go  with  him,  he  would 
call  and  pay  his  respects  to  the  general,  but  he  did 
not  want  to  be  alone  with  him.  So  I  went  back 
with  Pickett ;  the  interview  was  cold  and  formal, 
and  evidently  embarrassing  to  both.  It  was 
their  only  meeting  after  the  war. 

In  a  few  minutes  I  rose  and  left  the  room,  to- 
gether with  General  Pickett.  He  then  spoke  very 
bitterly  of  General  Lee,  calling  him  "that  old 
man." 

"He  had  my  division  massacred  at  Gettysburg," 
Pickett  said. 

"Well,  it  made  you  immortal,"  I  replied. 

I  rather  suspect  that  Pickett  gave  a  wrong  rea- 
son for  his  unfriendly  feelings.  In  May,  1892,  at 
the  University  of  Virginia,  I  took  breakfast  with 
Professor  Venable,  who  had  been  on  Lee's  staff. 
He  told  me  that  some  days  before  the  surrender  at 
Appomattox,  General  Lee  ordered  Pickett  under 
arrest  —  I  suppose  for  the  Five  Forks  affair.1  I 
think  the  professor  said  that  he  carried  the  order. 

1  Battle  of  April  I,  1865. 


382  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

I  remember  very  well  his  adding  that,  on  the  re- 
treat, Pickett  passed  them,  and  that  General  Lee 
said,  with  deep  feeling,  "Is  that  man  still  with 
this  army?" 

I  once  went  to  see  the  tomb  of  Montcalm  in 
the  chapel  of  the  Ursuline  Convent  at  Quebec. 
When  I  read  the  inscription  —  "Fate  denied  him 
victory,  but  blessed  him  with  a  glorious  immor- 
tality"—  it  recalled  General  Robert  E.  Lee. 


CHAPTER  XX 
My  Recollections  of  General  Grant 

I  FIRST  met  General  Grant  in  May,  1872,  after 
Mr.  Greeley  had  been  nominated  for  the  presidency 
by  a  convention  whose  members  called  themselves 
Liberal  Republicans  —  although,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  many  of  them  had  been  the  most  radical 
element  of  the  party,  but  had  seceded  on  account 
of  personal  grievances.  My  home  was  then  at 
Warrenton,  Virginia,  where  I  was  practising  law. 
As  it  was  only  fifty  miles  from  Washington,  I  was 
frequently  there,  but  I  had  only  once  seen  General 
Grant  —  one  evening  at  the  National  Theatre, 
when  he  was  in  a  box  with  General  Sherman. 
Both  men  seemed  to  enjoy  the  play  as  much  as 
the  gods  in  the  gallery. 

In  common  with  most  Southern  soldiers,  I  had 
a  very  kindly  feeling  towards  General  Grant, 
not  only  on  account  of  his  magnanimous  conduct 
at  Appomattox,  but  also  for  his  treatment  of  me 
at  the  close  of  hostilities.  I  had  never  called  on 
him,  however.     If  I  had  done  so,  and  if  he  had 

383 


384  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

received  me  even  politely,  we  should  both  have 
been  subjected  to  severe  criticism,  so  bitter  was 
the  feeling  between  the  sections  at  the  time. 

No  doubt,  in  those  days,  most  Northerners  be- 
lieved the  imaginative  stories  of  the  war  corre- 
spondents and  supposed  that  my  battalion  fought 
under  the  black  flag.  General  Grant  was  as  much 
misunderstood  in  the  South  as  I  was  in  the  North. 
But  time  has  healed  wounds  which  were  once 
thought  to  be  irremediable ;  and  there  is  to-day 
no  memory  of  our  war  so  bitter,  probably,  as 
the  Scottish  recollection  of  Culloden.  Like  most 
Southern  men,  I  had  disapproved  the  reconstruc- 
tion measures  and  was  sore  and  very  restive  under 
military  government ;  but  since  my  prejudices 
have  faded,  I  can  now  see  that  many  things  which 
we  regarded  as  being  prompted  by  hostile  and 
vindictive  motives  were  actually  necessary,  in 
order  to  prevent  anarchy  and  to  secure  the  free- 
dom of  the  newly  emancipated  slave. 

I  had  given  little  attention  to  politics  and  had 
devoted  my  time  to  my  profession,  although  I  was 
under  no  political  disability.  As  we  had  all  been 
opposed  to  the  Republican  party  before  the  war, 
it  was  a  point  of  honor  to  keep  on  voting  that  way. 

When  Horace  Greeley  was  nominated,  I  saw  — 
or  thought   I   saw  —  that  it  was  idle  to  divide 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  GRANT    385 

longer  upon  issues  which  we  acknowledged  to  have 
been  legally,  if  not  properly,  settled ;  and  that  if 
the  Southern  people  wanted  reconciliation,  as 
they  said  they  did,  the  logical  thing  to  do  was  to 
vote  for  Grant.  I  have  not  changed  my  opinion, 
nor  yet  have  I  any  criticism  to  make  of  those  who 
differed  with  me.  We  were  all  working  for  the 
same  end.  Some  said  they  couldn't  sacrifice 
their  principles  for  Grant's  friendship ;  I  didn't 
sacrifice  mine. 

Not  long  before  the  death  of  the  late  General 
M.  C.  Butler,  United  States  Senator  from  South 
Carolina,  I  met  him  on  the  street  in  Washington. 

"We  ought  to  have  gone  with  you  for  Grant," 
he  said. 

My  views  and  opinions  of  that  period  are  set 
forth  in  the  following  interview  published  in  the 
Richmond  Enquirer,  in  January,  1873. 

Reporter:  "I  see  it  stated  generally  that  you  have 
some  influence  with  General  Grant,  —  is  this  true?" 

Colonel  Mosby :  "I  don't  know  what  amount  of 
influence  I  may  have  with  the  President,  but  General 
Grant  knows  the  fiery  ordeal  I  have  been  through 
here  in  supporting  him,  and  I  suppose  he  has  some 
appreciation  of  it." 

Reporter :  "What  is  the  policy  that  you  have  advo- 
cated for  the  Virginia  people?" 

Colonel  Mosby:   "The  issues  that  formerly  divided 


386  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

the  Virginia  people  from  the  Republican  party  were 
those  growing  out  of  the  reconstruction  measures. 
Last  year  the  Virginia  people  agreed  to  make  no  fur- 
ther opposition  to  those  measures  and  to  accept  all 
questions  growing  out  of  them  as  settled.  There  being 
no  longer  any  questions,  then,  on  principles  separating 
Virginia  people  from  General  Grant,  it  became  a  mere 
matter  of  policy  and  expediency  whether  they  would 
support  him  or  Horace  Greeley.  I  thought  it  was  the 
first  opportunity  the  Southern  people  had  had  to  be 
restored  to  their  proper  relation  and  influence  with  the 
Federal  administration.  In  other  words,  I  said  the 
Southern  statesmen  ought  to  avail  themselves  of  this 
opportunity  and  support  General  Grant  for  re-election, 
and  thereby  acquire  influence  and  control  over  his 
administration.  That  was  the  only  way  I  saw  of 
displacing  the  carpetbag  crew  that  represented  the 
Government  in  the  Southern  States.  I  think  that 
events  have  demonstrated  that  I  was  right. 

"General  Grant  has  certainly  accorded  to  me  as 
much  consideration  or  influence  as  any  one  man  could 
have  a  right  to  expect.  I  know  it  is  the  disposition  of 
General  Grant  to  do  everything  in  his  power  for  the 
relief  of  the  Southern  people,  if  Southern  politicians 
will  allow  him  to  do  it.  The  men  who  control  the 
policy  of  the  Conservative  party  combine  with  the 
extreme  Radicals  to  keep  the  Southern  people  arrayed 
against  General  Grant.  As  long  as  this  course  is 
pursued,  the  carpetbag  crew  who  profess  to  support 
the  administration  get  all  the  Federal  patronage. 
This  is  the  sustenance,  the  support  of  the  carpetbag 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF   GENERAL   GRANT    387 

party  in  the  South.  Deprived  of  that,  it  would  die 
to-morrow.  I  admit,  as  every  Southern  man  must 
admit,  the  gross  wrongs  that  have  been  perpetrated 
upon  the  Southern  people.  I  am  no  apologist  for  them, 
but  neither  party  proposes  any  atonement  or  indem- 
nity for  the  past.  I  propose  at  least  to  give  security 
for  the  future  by  an  alliance  between  the  Southern 
people  and  General  Grant's  administration."  .  .  . 

Reporter:  "Has  the  President  ever  tendered  you 
any  position  under  his  administration?" 

Colonel  Mosby :  "Shortly  after  the  presidential 
election  the  President  said  something  to  me  on  the 
subject  of  giving  me  an  office.  I  told  him  while  I 
would  as  lief  hold  an  office  under  him  as  under  any 
other  man  who  had  ever  been  President,  yet  there 
was  no  office  within  his  gift  that  I  desired  or  would 
accept.  I  told  him  that  my  motives  in  supporting 
him  had  been  assailed,  and  my  accepting  a  position 
under  his  administration  would  be  regarded  as  a  con- 
firmation of  the  truth  of  the  charge  that  I  was  governed 
by  selfish  motives.  But  my  principal  reason  for  not 
accepting  anything  from  him  was  that  I  would  have 
far  more  influence  for  good  by  taking  nothing  for 
myself."  .  .  . 

Reporter:  "Colonel,  I  have  heard  that  you  are 
now  promoting  claims  against  the  Government,  —  is 
that  a  fact?" 

Colonel  Mosby  :  "It  is  not.  I  have  filed  one  claim 
for  a  citizen  before  the  Southern  Claims  Commission. 
I  shall  turn  this  over,  however,  to  a  claim  agent.  I 
have  had  hundreds  of  claims  of  all  sorts  for  prosecu- 


388  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

tion  against  the  Government  offered  me,  but  have 
declined  them  all,  as  I  have  no  idea  of  bartering  my 
political  influence.  ...  I  do  not  think  that  any 
man  nominated  at  Lynchburg  will  stand  the  most 
remote  chance  of  success,  because  he  will  only  be  sup- 
ported by  the  negroes  of  the  State,  led  by  a  few  white 
men.  No  matter  what  my  relations  to  the  adminis- 
tration may  be,  I  wouldn't  assist  in  putting  this  set  in 
power." 

I  had  strong  personal  reasons  for  being  friendly 
with  General  Grant.  If  he  had  not  thrown  his 
shield  over  me,  I  should  have  been  outlawed 
and  driven  into  exile.  When  Lee  surrendered, 
my  battalion  was  in  northern  Virginia,  on  the 
Potomac,  a  hundred  miles  from  Appomattox. 
Secretary  of  War  Stanton  invited  all  soldiers  in 
Virginia  to  surrender  on  the  same  conditions 
which  were  offered  to  Lee's  army ;  but  I  was 
excepted.  General  Grant,  who  was  then  all- 
powerful,  interposed,  and  sent  me  an  offer  of  the 
same  parole  that  he  had  given  General  Lee. 
Such  a  service  I  could  never  forget.  When  the 
opportunity  came,  I  remembered  what  he  had 
done  for  me,  and  I  did  all  I  could  for  him. 

Early  one  morning,  a  few  days  after  the  elec- 
tion of  1872,  I  had  to  go  to  the  Treasury  Depart- 
ment   on    business,     The    Secretary,    Mr.    Bout- 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  GRANT    389 

well,  had  not  come,  and  I  was  waiting  in  an  ante- 
room. To  my  surprise,  General  Grant  walked 
in.  He  shook  hands  with  me,  and  said,  "I  heard 
you  were  here,  and  came  to  thank  you  for  my 
getting  the  vote  of  Virginia."  That  is  the  only 
time  I  ever  saw  a  President  in  any  of  the  depart- 
ments. Of  course,  I  appreciated  General  Grant's 
compliment,  although  he  gave  me  credit  for  a 
great  deal  more  than  I  deserved. 

General  Grant  had  also  done  another  thing 
which  showed  the  generosity  of  his  nature.  A 
few  weeks  before  the  surrender,  a  small  party 
of  my  men  crossed  the  Potomac  one  night  and 
got  into  a  fight,  in  which  a  detective  was  killed. 
One  of  the  men  was  captured  and  sent  to  Fort 
McHenry.  After  the  war  he  was  tried  by  a 
military  commission  and  sentenced  to  be  impris- 
oned. The  boy's  mother  went  to  see  President 
Johnson,  to  beg  a  pardon  for  her  son ;  but  John- 
son repelled  her  roughly. 

In  her  distress,  she  went  over  to  the  War  De- 
partment to  see  General  Grant.  He  listened 
patiently  to  her  sorrowful  story,  then  rose  and 
asked  her  to  go  with  him.  He  took  her  to  the 
White  House,  walked  into  the  reception  room, 
and  told  the  President  that  there  had  been  suf- 
fering enough,  and  that  he  would  not  leave  the 


390  COLONEL  JOHN   S.   MOSBY 

room  without  a  pardon  for  the  young  Southerner. 
Johnson  signed  the  necessary  paper. 

In  spite  of  the  parole  that  I  had  taken,  after 
I  had  settled  down  to  the  practice  of  law,  I  was 
several  times  arrested  by  provost-marshals  sta- 
tioned at  the  court  houses  where  I  went  on  the 
circuit.  This  was  both  annoying  and  unfair. 
My  parole  was  a  contract  with  the  government 
that  was  binding  on  both  parties.  To  arrest  me 
before  I  had  violated  it  was  a  breach  of  it. 

As  my  wife  passed  through  Washington  on 
her  way  to  Baltimore,  she  determined  to  go  to 
the  White  House,  not  to  ask  for  a  pardon,  but 
to  make  a  complaint.  She  had  not  intimated 
her  purpose  to  me.  Her  father  and  President 
Johnson  had  served  in  Congress  together,  and 
had  been  friends ;  so  she  told  Johnson  whose 
daughter  and  whose  wife  she  was.  Instead  of 
responding  kindly,  he  was  rude  to  her. 

She  left  him  and  went  to  see  General  Grant 
at  the  War  Department.  He  treated  her  as 
courteously  as  if  she  had  been  the  wife  of  a  Union 
soldier,  and  then  wrote  the  following  letter,  which 
he  gave  to  her.  He  did  not  dictate  the  letter 
to  a  clerk;  the  whole  is  in  his  small,  neat  hand- 
writing. It  gave  me  liberty  to  travel  anywhere 
unmolested  as  long  as  I  observed  my  parole. 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  GRANT    391 

Headquarters  of  the  Armies  of  the  United  States, 
Washington,  D.  C,  Feb'y  2nd,  1866. 

John  S.  Mosby,  lately  of  the  Southern  Army,  will, 
hereafter,  be  exempt  from  arrest  by  military  author- 
ities, except  for  violation  of  his  parole,  unless  directed 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  Secretary  of 
War,  or  from  these  headquarters. 

His  parole  will  authorize  him  to  travel  freely  within 
the  state  of  Virginia,  and  as  no  obstacle  has  been 
thrown  in  the  way  of  paroled  officers  and  men  from 
pursuing  their  civil  pursuits,  or  traveling  out  of  their 
States,  the  same  privilege  will  be  extended  to  J.  S. 
Mosby,  unless  otherwise  directed  by  competent 
authority. 

(Signed)  U.  S.  Grant, 
Lieutenant  General. 

When  General  Ewell  was  captured  by  the 
Federal  forces,  on  the  retreat  from  Richmond, 
he  was  sent  to  Fort  Warren.  Mrs.  Ewell  —  who 
had  married  the  general  during  the  war  —  was 
from  Nashville,  and  had  known  Johnson  when  he 
was  Governor  of  Tennessee.  She,  too,  called  on 
the  President,  presuming  on  their  old  acquaint- 
ance, to  ask  that  her  husband  be  released  on 
parole.  Ewell  was  in  a  feeble  condition  ;  he  had 
lost  a  leg  in  the  war.  Johnson  treated  her  just 
as  he  had  treated  my  wife,  and  asked  her  why  she 
had  "married  a  one-legged  man." 


392  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

Mrs.  Ewell  then  went  to  see  General  Grant, 
who  expressed  great  pleasure  at  being  able  to 
do  something  for  "my  old  friend  Ewell",  and 
ordered  that  the  poor  fellow  should  be  released 
from  prison.     He  did  hundreds  of  similar  things. 

As  I  have  said,  my  first  interview  with  Gen- 
eral Grant  was  in  May,  1872,  when  I  was  in- 
troduced to  him  by  Senator  Lewis  of  Virginia. 
He  immediately  began  telling  me  how  near  I 
came  to  capturing  the  train  on  which  he  went 
to  take  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
in  1864.  I  remarked,  "If  I  had  done  it,  things 
might  have  been  changed  —  I  might  have  been  in 
the  White  House  and  you  might  be  calling  on  me." 

"Yes,"  he  said. 

In  our  talk  I  became  convinced  that  he  was 
not  only  willing  but  anxious  to  lift  the  Southern 
people  out  of  the  rut  they  were  in,  but  he  couldn't 
help  them  without  their  cooperation.  If  they 
insisted  on  keeping  up  their  fire  on  him,  he  had 
to  return  the  fire.  I  knew  that  he  was  in  favor 
of  relieving  Southerners  of  the  disabilities  imposed 
by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  as  he  had  recom- 
mended in  his  message.  Such  a  bill  had  passed 
the  House,  but  in  the  Senate,  Sumner  had  in- 
sisted on  tacking  to  it  his  Civil  Rights  Bill,  which 
made  it  odious,  and  the  measure  was  defeated. 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  GRANT    393 

I  suggested  that  if  he  could  get  such  a  bill 
passed,  it  would  be  construed  as  an  olive  branch, 
and  would  create  such  a  reaction  in  his  favor  in 
Virginia  that  we  could  carry  the  State  for  him. 

"We  will  see  what  can  be  done,"  he  replied. 

As  I  was  under  no  disability  myself,  it  would 
have  been  hard  to  discover  a  selfish  motive  in 
what  I  urged  Grant  to  do.  A  few  days  after- 
wards, a  bill  removing  political  disabilities  was 
reported  in  the  House ;  the  rules  were  suspended, 
and  the  bill  passed.  It  was  sent  to  the  Senate ; 
there  was  a  night  session ;  Sumner  went  to  his 
committee  room  to  take  a  nap,  and  while  he  was 
asleep,  the  bill  was  called  up  and  became  a  law. 
He  was  furious  when  he  awoke  and  found  out 
what  had  been  done.  Many  Confederates  who 
had  been  excluded  from  public  position  were 
then  sent  to  Congress  or  received  appointments 
from  Washington.  Among  them  was  the  Vice- 
President  of  the  Southern  Confederacy. 

I  crossed  the  Rubicon  when  I  paid  my  first 
visit  to  the  White  House,  and  I  never  recrossed 
it.  My  son  Beverly,  who  was  about  twelve  years 
old,  was  with  me.  He  had  been  with  his  mother 
six  years  before,  when  she  called  on  Andrew 
Johnson.  That  night,  when  he  knelt  by  her  to  say 
his  prayers,  after  getting  through  the  usual  form, 


394  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

he  turned  to  her  and  said,  "Now,  mamma,  may  I 
pray  to  God  to  send  old  Johnson  to  the  devil?" 

I  told  the  story  to  Grant. 

"A  great  many  would  have  joined  in  Beverly's 
prayer,"  he  said,  laughing. 

As  many  people  in  the  South  regarded  me  as 
a  connecting  link  between  the  administration 
and  themselves,  I  had  to  pay  frequent  visits 
to  the  White  House,  either  to  ask  favors  or  to 
carry  complaints.  Such  a  duty  is  a  shirt  of  Nessus 
to  any  one  who  wears  it.  Although  I  declined 
to  take  office  from  General  Grant  and  exerted 
all  the  influence  I  had  with  him  for  the  benefit 
of  the  Virginia  people,  this  did  not  save  me  from 
the  imputation  of  sordid  motives. 

It  is  generally  believed  that  Grant  appointed 
me  consul  at  Hong  Kong.  He  did  not ;  I  was 
appointed  by  Mr.  Hayes. 

Often  as  I  went  to  the  White  House  during 
Grant's  second  term,  I  never  failed  to  see  him 
except  once,  when  he  was  in  the  hands  of  a  den- 
tist. In  those  days  hundreds  went  to  him  for 
appointments,  who  would  now  be  sent  to  the 
Civil  Service  Commission.  In  spite  of  all  this 
pressure,  he  never  seemed  to  be  in  a  hurry.  He 
was  the  best  listener  I  ever  saw,  and  one  of  the 
quickest  to  see  the  core  of  a  question. 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  GRANT    395 

I  once  called  at  the  White  House  about  seven 
o'clock  in  the  evening,  with  a  telegram  I  had 
received  from  General  Hampton.  The  door- 
keeper said  that  the  President  was  at  dinner. 
I  gave  the  man  my  card  and  told  him  I  would 
wait  in  the  hall.  He  returned  with  a  message 
from  General  Grant,  asking  me  to  come  in  and 
take  dinner  with  the  family.  I  replied  that  I 
had  already  dined.  Then  Ulysses  S.  Grant, 
Junior,  came  out  and  said,  "Father  says  that 
you  must  come  in  and  get  some  dinner." 

Of  course,  I  went  in.  At  the  table,  the  Gen- 
eral spoke  of  having  called  that  evening  on  Alex- 
ander Stephens,  who  was  lying  sick  at  his  hotel. 
It  looked  as  if  our  war  was  a  long  way  in  the  past 
when  the  President  of  the  United  States  could 
call  to  pay  his  respects  to  the  Vice-President 
of  the  Confederate  States. 

A  few  weeks  before  the  close  of  Grant's  second 
term,  I  introduced  one  of  my  men  to  him. 

11 1  hope  you  will  not  think  less  of  Captain  Glass- 
cock because  he  was  with  me  in  the  war,"  I  said. 

"I  think  all  the  more  of  him,"  the  President 
promptly  replied. 

I  once  said  to  General  Grant,  "General,  if 
you  had  been  a  Southern  man,  would  you  have 
been  in  the  Southern  army?" 


396  COLONEL  JOHN  S.   MOSBY 

"Certainly,"  he  replied. 

He  aways  spoke  in  the  friendliest  manner  of 
his  old  army  comrades  who  went  with  the  South. 
Once,  speaking  of  Stonewall  Jackson,  who  was 
with  him  at  West  Point,  he  said  to  me,  "Jackson 
was  the  most  conscientious  being  I  ever  knew." 

I  saw  Grant  on  the  day  when  he  signed  the 
Electoral  Commission  Bill  to  decide  the  Hayes- 
Tilden  dispute.  He  was  in  an  unusually  good 
humor,  and  said  that  the  man  in  whose  favor  the 
commission  decided  should  be  inaugurated.  He 
talked  a  good  deal  about  his  early  life  in  the  army 
and  gave  a  description  of  his  first  two  battles  — 
Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma. 

A  few  days  after  he  left  the  White  House,  I 
called  on  General  Grant  at  the  home  of  Mr. 
Hamilton  Fish,  where  he  was  staying.  I  did 
not  ask  him  to  recommend  me  to  the  new  adminis- 
tration, as  some  members  of  the  Cabinet  were 
not  friendly  to  him. 

President  Hayes,  however,  appointed  me  United 
States  Consul  at  Hong  Kong ;  and  it  was  there, 
in  1879,  during  Grant's  tour  of  the  world,  that  I 
last  saw  him.  I  went  in  a  boat  to  meet  him,  and, 
as  I  was  the  official  representative  of  the  United 
States,  the  other  craft  that  surrounded  the  steam- 
ship as  soon  as  it  anchored  gave  me  the  right  of 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  GRANT    397 

way.  As  I  went  up  the  gangway,  I  recognized 
him,  with  his  wife  and  eldest  son,  standing  on 
the  deck.  It  did  look  strange  that  I  should  be 
there  representing  the  government,  while  Gen- 
eral Grant  was  a  private  citizen. 

There  was  with  me  an  old  Virginian  who  had 
gone  to  Hong  Kong  before  the  war.  When  I 
introduced  him,  I  told  General  Grant  that  when 
I  arrived  I  had  found  this  fellow  countryman 
of  mine  in  about  the  same  temper  that  I  was  in 
when  the  general  was  fighting  in  the  Wilderness ; 
but  that  he  was  willing  to  surrender  to  the  man 
to  whom  General  Lee  had  surrendered.  Mrs. 
Grant  spoke  up  and  asked  liberal  terms  for  him, 
and  Grant  said  that  he  paroled  him,  and  hoped 
he  would  be  a  loyal  citizen. 

The  Governor  of  Hong  Kong  met  General 
Grant's  party  at  the  wharf,  and  they  went  to 
the  Government  House.  Next  morning  the  gen- 
eral paid  his  respects  to  me  at  the  American  Con- 
sulate. He  was  the  guest  of  the  governor  for 
about  ten  days.  On  several  days  I  breakfasted 
with  him,  and  we  had  many  free  and  informal 
talks.  Once  he  was  giving  a  description  of  his 
ride  on  donkey-back  from  Jaffa  to  Jerusalem. 

"That,"  he  said,  "was  the  roughest  road  I 
ever  traveled." 


398  COLONEL  JOHN  S.  MOSBY 

"General,"  I  replied,  "  I  think  you  have  traveled 
one  rougher  road  than  that." 

"Where?"  he  inquired. 

"From  the  Rapidan  to  Richmond,"  I  answered. 

"I  reckon  there  were  more  obstructions  on 
that  road,"  he  admitted. 

I  went  with  the  general,  Mrs.  Grant,  Colonel 
Fred  Grant,  and  the  governor,  in  a  launch,  to 
the  United  States  man-of-war  which  carried  his 
party  up  the  China  coast,  and  bade  him  my  last 
farewell.  When  we  started  ashore,  the  ship 
began  firing  a  royal  salute  of  twenty-one  guns, 
in  honor  of  the  governor,  and  the  launch  stopped. 
When  the  firing  was  over,  General  Grant  lifted 
his  hat,  and  we  responded.  I  never  saw  the  great 
soldier  again. 

Some  time  afterwards,  I  sent  the  general  a 
Malacca  cane  which  I  had  had  lacquered  for 
him.  It  bore  the  inscription,  "To  General  U.  S. 
Grant  from  John  S.  Mosby,  Hong  Kong." 

He  was  in  very  poor  health  when  he  received 
it,  but  Colonel  Fred  Grant  wrote  me  that  his 
father  was  pleased  at  my  remembrance  of  him. 

When  I  heard  that  President  Cleveland  had 
removed  me  as  consul,  in  1885,  I  wrote  to  General 
Grant  and  asked  him  to  secure  me  employment 
from  some  corporation,  by  which   I  could  make 


COLONEL   MOSBY   AT   FOURSCORE   YEARS  OF  AGE  ( 1915) 


RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  GRANT    399 

a  living.  I  did  not  then  know  how  near  he  was 
to  his  end.  My  letter  was  forwarded  to  him  at 
Mount  McGregor,  and  on  the  day  before  I  sailed 
from  Hong  Kong  a  dispatch  announced  his  death. 
I  felt  that  I  had  lost  my  best  friend. 

I  did  not  suppose  that  my  letter  would  have 
any  result,  but  on  arriving  in  San  Francisco,  I 
learned  that  he  had  dictated  a  note  to  Governor 
Stanford,  of  the  Southern  Pacific,  asking  him,  as 
a  personal  favor,  to  take  care  of  me.  I  was  made 
an  attorney  in  the  company  and  held  that  posi- 
tion for  sixteen  years. 

I  have  given  as  faithful  an  account  as  ^neas 
did  to  Dido  of  events  —  all  of  which  I  saw  and 
part  of  which  I  was.  No  one  clung  longer  to 
the  Confederacy  than  I  did,  and  I  can  say  with 
the  champion  of  another  lost  cause  that  if  Troy 
could  have  been  saved  by  this  right  hand  even  by 
the  same  it  would  have  been  saved. 


INDEX 


Abingdon,  Virginia,  n,  14,  15,  27. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  13. 

Aldie,  Virginia,  159,  160. 

Aldridge,  West  (Mosby's  com- 
pany), 317. 

Alexander,  General,  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  63,  81,  82,  83; 
quoted,  65,  72,  75,  76-77,  78,  82. 

Alexandria,  Virginia,  55,  306,  379. 

Alexandria  pike,  50. 

Alexandria  State  Journal,  quoted, 

363-      ■  - 

Amelia  County,  Virginia,  29. 

Ames,  Sergeant,  adventure  in 
Mosby's  company,  1 70-1 71, 
172-174;  deserted  from  Fifth 
New  York  Cavalry,  168. 

Amy  Warwick,  The,  seized,  96. 

Anderson,  Major  Robert,  at  Fort 
Sumter,  18. 

Appomattox,  252,  388 ;  Lee's 
surrender  at,  28,  84,  356,  381. 

Aquia  Creek  (on  Potomac),  130. 

Archer's  brigade  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  249,  250. 

Arlington,   Lee's  home,   55. 

Army  of  Potomac,  at  Frederick 
City,  224;  commanded  by 
Meade,  86,  223 ;  finest  regi- 
ment in,   286. 

Ashby's  Gap  (Blue  Ridge),  Vir- 
ginia, 212. 

Ashby's  regiment  in  battle  of 
Manassas,    57,    85. 

Ashland,  Virginia,  28,   112. 

Augur,  General  C.  C,  307,  310; 
at  Washington,  286,  290;  dis- 
patch to  Lazelle,  295  ;  dispatch 
to  Sheridan,  287,  288,  294,  350 ; 
dispatch  to  Waite,  288,  289. 

Averell,  General  W.  W.,  25. 


Ball's  Ford,  47. 

Baltimore,    Maryland,    85,    209, 

224,  227,  233,  325,  326,  390. 
Baltimore     Sun,     quoted,      6-8, 

364- 
Banks,  General  N.  P.,  59, 
Barker,  Captain,  capture  of,  174, 

179- 

Bartow's  brigade  at  Manassas, 
71,  78. 

Bealeton   Station,    Virginia,    106. 

Beattie,  Ab.,   Major,   27. 

Beattie,  Fount  (Mosby's  com- 
pany), 30,  48,  99,  320. 

Beauregard,  General  P.  G.  T.,  39, 
43,  46 ;  address  by,  97 ;  dis- 
patch to  D.  R.  Jones,  70,  73 ; 
dispatch  to  War  Department, 
62 ;  in  battle  of  Manassas, 
56-58,  60-68,  72-79,  81-85; 
quoted,  75 ;  report  on  battle, 
68 ;    strength  of  army,  84. 

Beaver  Dam  Station  (Chesapeake 
and  Ohio  R.  R.),  126,  136. 

Beckham,  Mr.    (citizen),   182. 

Beckham's  battery  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  79. 

Bee,  General  B.  E.,  at  Manassas, 
71,  78. 

Bell  and  Everett  Meeting,   16. 

Bernhardi,  General,  quoted,  208, 
229-230. 

Berryville,   Virginia,   290. 

Beverly's  Ford,  204,  205,  207. 

Blackburn's  Ford  (Bull  Run),  70, 

74- 
Blackford,   Captain  William,    11, 

99- 

Blackstone's  "Commentaries",  8. 
Black  well,  Joe,  visited  by  Mosby, 
335- 


401 


402 


INDEX 


Blazer,     Captain,     attempts     to 

capture    Mosby,    319-320. 
Blountville,    Tennessee,    22. 
Blue  Ridge  Mountains,  33,  47,  56, 

61,  156,  171,  202,  208,  212,  214, 
215,  218,  230,  240,  245,  283, 
290,  298,  299,  305,  320,  324,  328. 

Boiling,  Bartlett,  4. 

Bonham,  General,  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  63,  70,  71. 

Boutwell,  George  S.  (Secretary  of 
Treasury),  388. 

Braddock  road,  161. 

Brandy,  Virginia,  182,  203,  205 ; 
cavalry  combat  at,  208,  220. 

Breckenridge,  General,  quoted, 
380. 

Bristol,  Virginia,   II,   16,  22. 

Broadwater,  Guy  (Mosby's  com- 
pany), 298. 

Brooklyn  14th,  Mosby's  en- 
counter   with,    94. 

Brougham,  Lord,  13. 

Brown,  John,  33. 

Buchanan,  ex-President,  12. 

Buckner,  General  S.  B.,  surrender 
of,  103,  104. 

Buford's  division  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  203,  205,  207,  208, 
249. 

Bull  Run,  25,  26,  43,  48,  49,  57, 

62,  63,  64,  66,  68,  70,  72,  82,  84, 
85,  100,  220,  250  ;  battle  of, 
see  Manassas,  battle  of. 

Bull  Run  Mountain,    159. 

Bunker  Hill,  West  Virginia,  30-31. 

Burnside's  troops  at  Hampton 
Roads,  129,  130,  131,  132;  in 
battle  of  Manassas,  79 ;  re- 
enforcement  of  Pope,  374;  re- 
pulsed at  Fredericksburg,  148 ; 
sent  to  Washington,  44. 

Butler,  General  M.  C.,  quoted, 
385- 

Calhoun,  John  C,  13,  14. 
Campaign  of  i860,  12-17. 
Campbell,  Doctor  Edward,  65,  81. 


Carlisle,  West  Virginia,  37,  227, 
228,  231,  235,  240, 241, 242, 243. 

Cashtown,  Pennsylvania,  231,  235, 
236,  238,  242,  243,  244,  247, 
249,  250. 

Cashtown  Pass,   245,   251. 

Cedar    Mountain,    133. 

Cedar  Run,  105. 

Central  Railroad,  289. 

Centreville,  West  Virginia,  61,  63, 
66,  67,  68,  70,  71,  72,  74,  75, 
81,  94,  99,  105,  173,  177,  178, 
179, 180, 181. 

Chambersburg,  Pennsylvania,  24, 
25.  37,  234;  Hooker  at,  245; 
Lee  at,  219,  221,  223,  224,  225, 
226,    231,    238;     Patterson   at, 

40,  240,  241,  242,  243,  244. 
Chancellor,  Colonel,  172. 
Chancellorsville,  Virginia,  201, 251. 
Chantilly,  172,  178. 
Chapman,    General     George    H., 

299 ;     report   quoted,   299-300. 

Chapman,  Sam  (Mosby's  com- 
pany), 291, 356. 

Chapman,  Captain  William 
(Mosby's  company),  271,  290, 
291, 298, 325, 334, 336,  356,  360. 

Charleston,    South    Carolina,    92. 

Charles     Town,    West     Virginia, 

41,  42,  47,  62,  220. 
Charlottesville,  Albemarle  County, 

1,  5.  6,  305- 
Cheney,     Lieutenant    P.    C.    J., 

letter  to  Mosby,   189. 
Chesapeake,  the,  129. 
Chickahominy    River,    no,    116, 

117.  125. 
Cincinnati,  Ohio,  38. 
Civil  Rights  Bill,  392-393. 
Clarke's  Mountain,  138,  142. 
Clendenin,  Colonel,  343. 
Cleveland,    ex-President,    398. 
Cocke,     Colonel,     in     battle     of 

Manassas,  67,  69,  71,  75. 
Cold  Harbor,  Virginia,  60. 
Coleman,  Mr.  (citizen),  217. 
Coles,     Lieutenant- Colonel,    319. 


INDEX 


403 


Colt's  revolver,  use  of,  285. 
Confederacy,    depression    in,    96, 

97- 

Confederate  Conscription  Act,  98. 

Confederate  newspaper,  quoted 
regarding  hanging  of  Mosby's 
men,  300-301  ;  quoted  regard- 
ing attack  on  railroad,  331,  332  ; 
quoted  regarding  Mosby's  com- 
pany, 354-355- 

Congress,  act  of,  regarding  com- 
merce with  South,  95-96. 

Cooke,  John  Esten,  quoted,  216- 
217. 

Cooke,  Mr.  (Jackson's  biographer), 

57- 
Cooke,  General  St.  George,   116. 
Couch,    General,    in    Gettysburg 

campaign,    228,    229. 
Critcher,  Judge  John,  379. 
Cub  Run,  82,  84,  180. 
Culpeper,  Virginia,  138,  166,  183, 

202,  209. 
Culpeper  Court  House,  175,  182, 

205. 
Cumberland  River,  103. 
Cumberland  Valley,  223,  225,  235. 

Dabney,  Mr.  (Jackson's  biogra- 
pher), 57,  142 ;    quoted,  143. 

Davis,  "Grimes",  death  of,  205. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  19,  39,  60,  81, 
83,  104,  213,  224;  dispatch  to 
General  Johnston,  60 ;  message 
to  Congress,  97-98. 

Dear,  Charlie  (Mosby's  company), 

317- 

Deas,    Major,   quoted,   35-36. 

Dispatches,  Augur  to  Lazelle, 
295 ;  to  Sheridan,  287,  288,  294, 
350 ;  to  Waite,  288,  289 ;  to 
A.  A.  G.  Taylor,  328 :  Beaure- 
gard to  War  Department,  62  ; 
to  D.  R.  Jones,  70,  73 :  Davis 
to  Johnston,  60;  Edwards  to 
Neil,  297 ;  Gamble  to  Augur, 
349 ;  Gansevoort  to  Augur, 
295-296;     Halleck    to    Meade, 


225  ;  to  Sheridan,  306 :  Harri- 
son to  Kelly,  294 ;  Hooker  to 
Halleck,  207  ;  Lawrence,  A.  A. 
G.,  to  Halleck,  325 ;  Lazelle  to 
Augur,  293-294,  294-295,  296 ; 
to  De  Russy,  294 :  Lee  to  Ewell, 
241,  242;  to  Seddon,  321: 
Lincoln  to  McClellan,  59-60 ; 
Neil  to  Stanton,  298  ;  Pleasan- 
ton  to  Hooker,  207  ;  Seward  to 
Stevenson,  322 ;  Sheridan  to 
Augur,  287,  288,  289,  296,  369 ; 
to  Emory,  350 ;  to  Grant,  309  ; 
to  Halleck,  311:  Slough  to  Tay- 
lor, 327 ;  Smith,  Prescott,  to 
President  Garrett  (B.  &  O.  Ry.), 
326 ;  Stanton  to  Stevenson,  322 ; 
Stevenson  to  Averell,  293 ;  to 
Edwards,  307  ;  to  French,  325  ; 
to  Halleck,  324 ;  to  Sheridan, 
292,  324,  350,  369  ;  to  Stanton, 
296-297,  323 :  Stuart  to  Ran- 
dolph, 121 ;  Taylor,  A.  A.  G.,  to 
Augur,  288 ;  to  De  Russy,  327  ; 
to  Slough,  327 :  Winship  to 
A.  A.  G.  Taylor,  328. 

Douglas,  S.  A.,  12. 

Dover,  Loudoun  County,  Virginia, 
172,  228. 

Drake,  Doctor,  anecdote  of,  169- 
170. 

Dranesville,  fight  at,  188,  270. 

Dumfries,  raid  to,  148. 

Dunn,  Doctor  Will  (Mosby's 
company),  334. 

Early,  General,  21,  24,  46,  283, 
303.  307,  332 ;  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  69,  70,  71,  79;  in 
Gettysburg  campaign,  227,  228, 
231,  232,  241,  242,  250. 

Edmonson,  Sergeant  Tom,  22. 

Edwards,  General,  dispatch  to 
Neil,  297. 

Eighteenth  Virginia  Regiment  at 
Manassas,  79. 

Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry,  286,  287, 
328,  343- 


404 


INDEX 


Eighth  Virginia  Regiment  at 
Manassas,  79. 

Eley's  brigade  in  battle  of  Manas- 
sas, 50. 

Ellsworth,  Colonel,  55. 

Elzey's  brigade  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  79. 

Emory  and  Henry  College,  23. 

England's  attitude  toward  Con- 
federacy, 92,  93,  94,  95. 

Evans,  General,  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  63,  67,  69,  71,  73, 
75,  78. 

Ewell,  General,  40,  66,  69,  70, 
72,  74,  107 ;  capture  of,  391  ; 
in  Gettysburg  campaign,  202, 
204,  208,  210-216,  218,  219, 
221,  223,  224,  226-228,  230- 
232,  234,  235,  238-244,  249, 
250,  252  ;  quoted,  243  ;  release 
of,  392 ;  report  on  Gettysburg 
campaign,    241,    243. 

Eylau,  Prussia,  285. 

Fairfax,  Virginia,  94,  148,  177, 
286,  298,  328,  345,  349; 
Mosby's  attacks  on,  150-156, 
162-164,  170-171,  172-174; 
skirmish  at,  29. 

Fairfax  Court  House,  40,  50,  83, 

99,  172,  173- 

Fauquier  County,   Virginia,  335. 

Fifth  New  York  Cavalry,  168, 
169. 

First  Vermont  Cavalry,  160,  161, 
162. 

First  Virginia  Cavalry,  47,  182; 
organized  by  Stuart,  30,  31. 

Fisher's  Hill,  battle  at,  303. 

Fitzhugh,  Major,  136,  139;  cap- 
ture of,  140. 

Five  Forks,  381. 

Floyd,  Governor  (General),  14,  18, 
39;  at  Fort  Donelson,  18-19, 
24,  103-104;    fate  of,  18-19. 

Foote,  Commodore,  103. 

Forbes,  Major,  capture  of,  278 ; 
report   of   capture,   279-282. 


Fort  Donelson,  18,  24;    fall  of, 

103-104. 
Fort  Mason,  Texas,  378. 
Fort  McHenry,  389. 
Fort  Sumter,  surrender  of,   18. 
Fort  Warren,  Boston  Harbor,  13, 

92,  39i- 

Fortress  Monroe,  Mosby  at,  129, 

131. 

Frankland,  Walter  (Mosby's  com- 
pany), 169,  170. 

Frazar,  Major,  343 ;  report  of 
wounding     of     Mosby,     346- 

349- 
Frederick   City,    Maryland,    223, 

224,   226,   227,   233,  237,  244, 

246,  248. 
Fredericksburg,  Virginia,  59,  127, 

148,    183,  202,  211. 
Freemantle,  Colonel,  quoted,  247. 
Fremont,  Colonel,  defeated,  60. 
Front  Royal,  305,  306,  310. 
Fry's  Woods,  Virginia,  2,  3. 
Fulkerson,  Colonel  (Judge),  26. 
Furse,  Colonel,  quoted,  253. 

Gamble,  Colonel,  dispatch  to 
Augur,  349. 

Gansevoort's  dispatch  to  Augur, 
295-296. 

Gaps  of  South  Mountain,  Mary- 
land, 221,  224,  235,  240,  245. 

Garnett,  General,  39. 

Gettysburg,  85,  162,  165,  374. 

Gettysburg  campaign,  discussion 
of,  201-257  ;  Ewell's  report  on, 
241,  243;  Heth's  report  on, 
337,  250,  251 ;  Hill's  report  on, 
236,  237;  Lee's  report  on,  218, 
219,  232,  235,  236,  237,  238- 
240,  243,  244,  246,  247,  248; 
Stuart's  report  on,  200,  235- 
236. 

Gibraltar,  Virginia,  1 . 

Gibson,  Mr.  (Mosby's  company), 
136,  137- 

Gibson,  Captain,  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  205. 


INDEX 


405 


Gibson,  Major,  349,  350. 
Gilmer,  Major,  search  for  Mosby's 

company,  157-162. 
Glade  Spring  Church,  28. 
Glasscock     (Mosby's     company), 

277.29i.395- 
Glen  Welby  farm,  Mosby  visits, 

335,  343- 

Gordon,  General  George,  quoted, 
142. 

Gordon,  General  John  B.,  353. 

Gordon's  brigade  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  232. 

Gordonsville,  Virginia,  133,  138, 
305.  308,  346. 

Grafton,    Virginia,    40. 

Grant,  Colonel  Fred,  398. 

Grant,  Mrs.,  397,  398. 

Grant,  General  Ulysses  S.,  19, 
68,  306,  307,  310 ;  attack  on  Ft. 
Donelson,  103  ;  at  theatre,  383  ; 
attitude  towards  South,  392, 
393 ;  bars  Lee's  retreat  at 
Appomattox,  252 ;  capture  of 
Ft.  Donelson,  104;  conduct  at 
Appomattox,  383 ;  description 
°fi  399 ;  first  two  battles,  396 ; 
generosity  of,  389,  392  ;  gives 
Mosby  parole,  388,  390,  391  ; 
intent  to  cut  Lee's  communica- 
tions, 283  ;  intuition  of,  123  ; 
misunderstood,  384;  policy  of, 
353  ;  quoted,  303,  304,  389,  394- 
395.  396»  397.  398 !  secures 
Mosby  position,  399 ;  signs 
Electoral  Commission  Bill,  396 ; 
telegram  to  Early,  303 ;  tele- 
gram to  Sheridan,  305 ;  tour 
of  world,  396 ;  visit  to  Hong 
Kong,  396-398. 

Grant,  Ulysses  S.,  Jr.,  395. 

Gregg,  in  Gettysburg  campaign, 
207,  208. 

Greeley,  Horace,  nominated  for 
President,    383,    384. 

"Greenback  Raid  ",  327. 

Green  Village,  242. 

Greenwood,  Virginia,  237. 


Grimsley,  Captain,  in  Gettys- 
burg   campaign,    205. 

Grogan,  Charlie  (Mosby's  com- 
pany), 317,  320. 

Groveton,    Pennsylvania,    181. 

Hagerstown,   Maryland,  46,  210, 

211,  239. 
Hall,  Charlie  (Mosby's  company), 

320. 
Halleck,   General,   138,   139,  207, 

226,  227,  310 ;  dispatch  to 
Meade,  225  ;  dispatch  to  Sheri- 
dan,  306 ;    quoted,   306. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  376. 

Hampton,  General  Wade,  131, 
216,  395;  in  battle  of  Manas- 
sas, 78,  79 ;  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  207. 

Hampton  Roads,  129. 

Hancock,  General  Winfield  S., 
excludes  Mosby  from  parole, 
358  ;  notice  of  Lee's  surrender, 
358. 

Hanover,  Virginia,  135,  140. 

Hanover  County,  124. 

Harper's  Ferry,  56,  57,  59,  225, 
283,  286,  307,  310,  321-322, 
325 ;  abandonment  of,  29,  33- 
46;  base  in  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, 46 ;  situation  of,  33  ; 
value  of,  33-34,  41,  43,  45. 

Harris  Cavalry  (New  York),  cap- 
ture of  Mosby,  127  ;  history  of, 
quoted,  128. 

Harrisburg,     Pennsylvania,     212, 

227,  228,  229,  232,  233,  235, 
237,  238,  242,  243,  244. 

Harrison,    Captain,    dispatch    to 

Kelly,  294. 
Harrisonburg,  304. 
Hatton,  Ben,  episode  of,  153-156, 

162. 
Hayes,      ex-President,      appoints 

Mosby  consul  at  Hong  Kong, 

394.  396. 
Heidlersburg,   Pennsylvania,  242. 
Heintzelman,   General   S.   P.,   in 


406 


INDEX 


battle  of  Manassas,  73  ;  quoted, 
80. 

Henderson,  Colonel,  57 ;  quoted, 
58. 

Heth  (officer),  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  231,  237,  246,  247, 
249,  250,  251  ;  report  on  Gettys- 
burg campaign,   237,   250. 

Hill,  General  A.  P.,  in  Gettys- 
burg campaign,  202,  209,  210, 
213,  220-222,  231,  234-237, 
239,  243,  245-247,  249-251 ; 
report  on  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, 236,  237. 

"History  of  Civil  War  in 
America",  quoted,   134-135. 

Holmes's  brigade  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  69,  70. 

Hong  Kong,  Grant  visits,  396, 
397 ;  Mosby  consul  at,  394, 
396,  399- 

Hooker,  General  Joseph,  150; 
dispatch  to  Halleck,  207 ;  in 
Gettysburg  campaign,  202-204, 
207,  208-211,  213,  215,  218,  219, 
220-225,  231-233,  235,  239- 
241, 243-245,  248-249,  251,  252 ; 
quoted,  203. 

Horsepen  Run,  170. 

Howard's  brigade  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  74-75. 

Hunter,  General  David,  account 
of,  24-25 ;  in  battle  of  Manas- 
sas, 73. 

Hunter,  Sergeant,  in  raid  on 
Fairfax,  178,  179,  180,  181,  182, 
183. 

Hunton,  Colonel  Eppa,  at  Lees- 
burg,  40 ;  in  battle  of  Manassas, 

79- 
Hutchinson,  Curg,  anecdote  about, 

314.  315- 

Imboden  (officer),  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  213,  237,  238,  245. 

Jackson,    Mr.     (civilian),    shoots 

Colonel    Ellsworth,     55. 
Jackson,  Andrew,   12. 


Jackson,  T.  J.  (Stonewall),  33, 
66,  123,  126,  127,  202;  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  34,  36 ;  in 
battle  of  Manassas,  56-61,  71, 
72,  78,  79,  81,  84;  in  campaign 
against  Pope,  133,  138,  140, 
143 ;  incident  regarding,  144- 
145;    quoted,   34. 

James  River,  Virginia,  no,  117, 
123, 129, 130. 

Janney,  Mr.,  incident  regarding, 
165. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  2,  3,  14. 

Johnson,  President,  389,  390 ; 
visited  by  Mrs.  Ewell,  391  ; 
visited    by    Mrs.    Mosby,    390, 

393- 

Johnson,  General  J.  E.,  47,  50, 
74,  84,  94 ;  army  of,  30,  38 ; 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  33,  38-45 ; 
headquarters  at  Centreville,  99  ; 
in  battle  of  Manassas,  56-58, 
60-66,  68,  75-76,  78,  79,  85; 
Lee's  comment  on,  375  ;  praised 
by  Mr.  Davis,  104;  quoted, 
37,  61,  162  ;  report  on  battle  of 
Manassas,  78,  84 ;  retired  from 
Centreville,  105 ;  strength  of 
army,  56,  58,  84,  85 ;  urges 
reenlistment,  96-97.  ■ 

Johnson's  (Edward)  division  in 
Gettysburg  campaign,  242,  243. 

Johnston,  Colonel  (Fifth  New 
York  Cavalry),  162-180;  inci- 
dent regarding,   177,   187. 

Johnston,  General  A.  S.,  blunder 
of,  103. 

Jones,  Brigadier-General,  head- 
quarters of,  99 ;  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  66,  69,  72,  74,  94; 
in  Gettysburg  campaign,  205, 
206,207,214;  made  colonel,  99. 

Jones,  Captain  William  E.,  n, 
22,  27,  30,  32,  48-49,  106; 
quoted,  49. 

Jones,  Colonel,  102. 

Jones,  Lieutenant  Roger,  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  34. 


INDEX 


407 


Kanawha  Valley,  39. 

Kelly's  Ford,  204,  207. 

Kemper,  Dell,  battery  of,  45,  49 ; 

in  battle  of  Manassas,  82,  84. 
Kenly's  brigade,  292. 
Kentucky    lost    to    Confederacy, 

103. 
Kernstown,   battle  at,   28. 
Kershaw    (officer)    in    battle    of 

Manassas,  82. 
King,  General,  127. 
King,  Sergeant  Jim,  account  of, 

27-28. 

Lake,  Ludwell,  incident  at  house 

of,  33&-345- 

Latan6,  Captain,  combat  with 
Captain  Royall,  112. 

Lavender,  Jake  (Mosby's  com- 
pany), 335. 

Lawrence,  A.  A.  G.,  dispatch  to 
Halleck,  325. 

Lazelle,  Colonel,  298 ;  dispatch 
to  Augur,  293-294,  294-295, 
296;    to  De  Russy,  294. 

Lee,  Colonel  Fitzhugh,  94,  109, 
118,  166,  175,  182,  183,  184, 
185,  216;  in  expedition  against 
Pope,  135,  136,  139,  140. 

Lee,  General  Robert  E.,  36,  118, 
124,  127,  131,  283,  304,  307; 
army,  condition  of,  353  ;  notice 
of  surrender  of,  358  ;  organiza- 
tion of,  202  ;  surrender  of,  356, 
388 ;  authorizes  attack  on  Mc- 
Clellan,  112;  becomes  colonel 
First  Cavalry,  377  ;  comments 
on  Johnston's  movements,  375  ; 
commissioned  by  Lincoln,  377 ; 
conference  with  Mosby,  334; 
crosses  Potomac,  202 ;  dis- 
patch to  Ewell,  241,  242;  dis- 
patch to  Seddon,  321  ;  expedi- 
tion against  Pope,  135,  137, 
140,  141 ;  headquarters  of,  105, 
in;  home  of,  55 ;  in  Gettys- 
burg campaign,  201-204,  208- 
316,    218-234,    237-249,    251- 


253 ;  instructions  to  Mosby, 
289 ;  interview  with  Mosby, 
132 ;  letter  to  Davis,  185 ; 
last  order  to  Mosby,  376  ; 
made  commander-in-chief  Vir- 
ginia forces,  379 ;  mentions 
Mosby  in  report,  125  ;  Mosby's 
report  to,  321  ;  offered  com- 
mand of  U.  S.  army,  377  ;  opin- 
ion about  Harper's  Ferry,  33, 
34,  39 ;  opinion  on  secession 
and  slavery,  378 ;  president  of 
Washington  and  Lee  College, 
5;  quoted,  39,  210,  211,  214, 
219. 237-238,  239,  308,  375,  378, 
379,  380,  382  ;  report  on  Gettys- 
burg campaign,  218,  219,  232, 
235,  236,  237,  238-240,  243, 
244,  246,  247,  248 ;  resigns 
commission,  378 ;  selects  Ma- 
nassas Junction  as  concentra- 
tion point,  56 ;  stationed  in 
Texas,  377. 

Lee,  "Lighthorse  Harry",  374, 
376. 

Lee,  W.  F.  H.,  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  207. 

Leesburg,  Virginia,  40. 

Letcher,  Governor,  15,  27 ;  com- 
missions Mosby  captain,  183. 

Letters,  Cheney,  Lieutenant  P.  C. 
J.,  to  Mosby,  189  ;  Lee  to  Stuart, 
141 ;  Morgan  to  Mosby,  359 ; 
Mosby  (Colonel)  to  his  sister, 
89 ;  to  General  Sheridan,  302- 
303 ;  to  Hancock,  359-360 ; 
to  Mrs.  Mosby,  49-50,  51-53, 
53-54,  86-92,  102,  104-105, 
108-109,  1 19-120,  122,  128-129, 
143,  146,  147,  152,  263-264, 
308-309,  312,  330-33I,  361-362, 
363-364;  to  Russell,  365-373; 
to  Seddon,  355-356;  to  Mrs. 
Stuart,  254-257 ;  Peck,  T.  S., 
to  Mosby,  189-190 ;  Sheridan 
to  Grant,  304 ;  Stanton  to  ex- 
President  Buchanan,  83 ;  Tay- 
lor, W.  W.,  to  Mosby,  192. 


408 


INDEX 


Lewis,  Senator  (of  Virginia),  392. 
"Life  of    Alexander    Stephens", 

380. 
"Life  of  Jackson  ",  58. 
"Life  of  Marion  ",  4. 
Lincoln,  Abraham,  92 ;   anecdote 

of,    181;    assassination  of,  25; 

call  for   troops,    1 8 ;    Congress 

called  by,  95  ;  inaugural  quoted, 

20;    proclamation  of,   19,  376; 

dispatch  to  McClellan,  59-60 ; 

dispatch  to  Hooker,  209. 
Long     (Lee's     biographer),     ail, 

218,  219,  220. 

Longstreet,  General  James,  66, 
I36,  138,  141 ;  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  70,  71 ;  in  Gettys- 
burg campaign,  202,  204,  209, 
212,  213,  220,  221,  239,  240, 
245,  246,  247 ;  Mosby  meets, 
375;    quoted,   212,   213. 

Loudoun  County,  150,  156,  245, 
320. 

Louisa  Court  House,   140. 

Love,  Tom  (Mosby's  company), 
298,  335,  336,  339,  3451  cap- 
ture of,  343. 

Lowell,  Colonel  Charles  R.,  Jr., 
278 ;  report  of  Major  Forbes's 
capture,  279-282. 

Lynchburg,  Virginia,  298,  305, 
346 ;  paper  quoted  regarding 
Mosby's  parole,  362-363. 

Maddux,  Cab,  incident  regarding, 

316. 
Manassas,  discussion  of  battle  of, 

47-85,    95,    Hi- 
Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  305,  306, 
307,  310,  328;   attacks  on,  307, 

309,3I3-3I7- 
Manassas  Junction,  Virginia,  40, 

41,  56,  57,  59,  60,  61,  62,  83,  305. 
Marion,  Virginia,  23. 
Marr,  Captain,  death  of,  29. 
Marshall,    Colonel    Charles,    218, 

219,  220,   225,   234,   236,   238, 
248;     quoted,    233-234. 


Martha  Washington  College, 
Abingdon,  22. 

Martinsburg,  West  Virginia,  31, 
32,  220,  321,  323. 

Maryland,  34,  221,  222,  223,  232, 
245,  248,  286,  325;  invaded, 
46;   line  crossed,  4,  210,  239. 

Maryland   Heights,   34,   220. 

Mason,  Senator  James  M.,  13 ; 
capture  of,  13,  92-94. 

McCausland,  General,  24,  25. 

McClellan,  General  George  B., 
59;  at  Chickahominy,  110- 
113,  116,  117;  at  Cold  Harbor, 
60;  driven  from  Virginia,  148; 
estimate  of  ability,  117;  head- 
quarters of,  38  ;  movements  of 
army,  105,  123,  130,  135; 
Stuart's  ride  around,  125,  132, 
230. 

McDowell,  General  Irvin,  44; 
dispatch  from  Fairfax  Court 
House,  83  ;  in  battle  of  Manas- 
sas, 50,  55-57,  59,  60-64,  66- 
69,  74-76,  79,  81,  83,  84;  loca- 
tion of  army,  35,  38, 46;  quoted, 
67,  80;    strength  of  army,  55, 

84,  85. 

McGowan,  General,  70. 

McLaurine,  James,  1  ;   Robert,  1. 

McLean's  Ford  (farm),  69,  71,  74. 

Meade,  General  George  G.,  68 ; 
in  Gettysburg  campaign,  225- 
228,  241,  243,  244,  246-250; 
quoted,  226 ;  takes  command 
Army  of  Potomac,  223. 

Middleburg,  Virginia,  156,  158, 
170,  343- 

Middletown  Valley,  Maryland, 
240. 

Miles 's  brigade  in  battle  of  Manas- 
sas, 74. 

"Military  Memoirs  ",  65. 

Millwood,   West   Virginia.   220. 

Milroy  (officer)  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  202,  208,  209. 

Mitchell's  Ford,  Bull  Run,  71. 

Monongahela    River,    161. 


INDEX 


409 


Montcalm,  General,  tomb  at 
Quebec,  382. 

Monteiro,  Doctor,  334,  346,  360. 

Montgomery,  Alabama,  36. 

Monticello  (home  of  Jefferson),  2. 

Moore,  Major,  321. 

Moorefield,  25. 

Moran,  Dick  (Mosby's  company), 
182. 

Morgan,  General  C.  H.,  letter  to 
Mosby,  359. 

Mosby,  Alfred  D.,   1. 

Mosby,  Colonel  John  S.,  activi- 
ties, 1863-1864,  258-259;  ad- 
venture with  John  Underwood, 
163-164;  anecdote  of  son 
Beverly,  393-394 ;  anecdote 
regarding  name,  166-167;  ap- 
pointed attorney  of  Southern 
Pacific  Railroad,  399 ;  ap- 
pointed consul  at  Hong  Kong, 
394.  396 ;  attacks  on  Fairfax 
outposts,  150-156,  170-184;  at- 
tacks on  railroad,  308,  309,  313- 
3J7i  325  I  begins  partisan  war- 
fare, 148-149;  called  "bush- 
whacker ",  285 ;  captured  and 
wounded  at  Lake's  house,  336- 
343 ;  captured  by  Harris's 
New  York  Cavalry,  127 ;  cap- 
ture of  Major  Forbes,  278,  279- 
282 ;  capture  of  Sheridan's 
paymasters,  317,  320,  321  ;  cap- 
ture of  Sheridan's  supplies,  292  ; 
capture  of  General  Stoughton, 
1 75-1 8 1  ;  captures  two  cavalry- 
men, 217;  carries  information 
to  Lee,  131-133  ;  commissioned 
colonel,  356 ;  commissioned  cap- 
tain by  Governor  Letcher,  183; 
conversation  with  a  German 
lieutenant,  318;  conversation 
with  Grant,  395-396 ;  con- 
versation with  General  Pickett, 
381 ;  death  reported,  346,  349, 
350;  description  of,  149  note; 
destroys  supply  train,  308,  313- 
318,  320 ;  dinner  with  Lee,  105, 


375  ;  discards  use  of  sabre,  152, 
284;  discovers  destination  of 
McClellan's  army,  129-130; 
discussion  of  battle  of  Manas- 
sas, 47-85,  98 ;  discussion  of 
Gettysburg  campaign,  201-257 ; 
discussion  with  Grant,  392- 
393 ;  efforts  to  start  campaign 
against  Pope,  123-126;  en- 
counter with  Major  Gilmer's 
company,  157-162;  escape  from 
Lake's  house,  344-346 ;  ex- 
changed, 131 ;  farewell  address 
to  his  command,  360-361 ;  feel- 
ing towards  Grant,  383-385, 
388 ;  first  meeting  with  Grant, 
383,  392 ;  first  meeting  with 
Lee,  374;  goes  to  Richmond, 
355 ;  hanging  of  Mosby's  men, 
300-302 ;  last  meeting  with 
Grant,  396-398 ;  last  meeting 
with  Lee  as  commander,  376; 
last  order  from  Lee,  376;  let- 
ters from  Lieutenant  Cheney, 
189;  Morgan,  C.  H.,359;  T.  S. 
Peck,  189-190;  W.  W.  Taylor, 
192 :  letters  to  his  sister,  89 ; 
to  General  Hancock,  359-360; 
to  Mrs.  Mosby,  49-50,  51-54, 
86-92,  102,  104-105,  108-109, 
109-110,  119-120,  122,  128- 
129,  143,  146,  147,  152,  263- 
264,  308-309,  312,  330-331, 
361-362,  363-364;  to  John  S. 
Russell,  365-373 ;  to  Seddon, 
355-356 ;  to  General  Sheridan, 
302-303 ;  Lynchburg  paper 
quoted  regarding  his  parole, 
362  ;  made  adjutant,  102  ;  meet- 
ing with  Lee  after  war,  380-381 ; 
meeting  with  Stuart,  100-101 ; 
newspaper  comment  on,  114- 
115  ;  omitted  from  parole,  358; 
parole  given  by  Grant,  338,  390, 
391 ;  put  in  command  of 
Northern  Virginia,  356 ;  quoted 
re  Barbara  Frietchie  incident, 
114;  re  Stonewall  Jackson  inci- 


4io 


INDEX 


dent,  144-145 :  recommended 
by  Stuart,  121  ;  recollections 
of  General  Grant,  383-399 ; 
recollections  of  General  Lee, 
374-382  ;  rejoins  army,  135  ; 
removed  as  consul,  398  ;  report 
of  a  raid,  187-188;  to  Secre- 
tary Seddon,  308 ;  to  General 
Stuart,  192-195,  197-199,  259- 
263,  264-270 ;  to  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Taylor,  271-278:  re- 
ports of  capture  and  wounding, 
quoted,  346-348,  35<>,  351-352  ; 
scouting  for  Stuart,  106-108, 
109, 110-112,  113-114, 118-119; 
sent  to  Old  Capital  Prison,  127  ; 
Sheridan  harassed  by,  283, 
284,    289,    290-292,    312,    313, 

319,  320,  323,  324,  332-333; 
use  of  Colt's  revolvers,  152,  285- 
286  ;  wounded  at  Fairfax,  298  ; 
wounded  at  Lake's  house,  338- 

346,  353- 
Mosby,  Mrs.  Alfred  D.   (Colonel 

Mosby's  mother),  extracts  from 

diary,  354,  357~358. 
Mosby,    Mrs.    John    S.    (Colonel 

Mosby's  wife),  secures  Mosby's 

parole,  390-391. 
Mosby,  Victoria,   2. 
Mosby,  William  H.,  360. 
Mountjoy     (Mosby's    company), 

320,  327. 

Mount  McGregor,  399. 
Mount  Zion,  battle  at,  278. 
Muddy  Branch,  286. 
MurreU's  Shop  (post  office),  2. 

Napoleon  at  Austerlitz,  74 ;  at 
Marengo,  215;   at  Rivoli,  208. 

Nashville,  Tennessee,  391. 

Nassau,  Bahama,  92. 

Neil's  dispatch  to  Stanton,  298. 

Nelson,  Aleck,  5. 

Nelson,  Joe  (Mosby's  company), 
174,  178. 

Nelson  County,  Virginia,  1,  2. 

New  York  City,  50. 


New    York  Herald,   quoted,  351- 

352. 
New  York  Zouaves  (Ellsworth's), 

55.  80,  84. 

Ninth  Virginia  Cavalry,  112. 
Norfolk  Navy  Yard  seized,  21. 

Occoquan  River,  Virginia,  62. 
O'Connor,  Lieutenant,   185,   187; 

dispatches    quoted,    186. 
Ogg,  Tom,  anecdote  of,  328-330. 
Ohio  River,  38. 
Old  Capital  Prison  (Washington), 

127. 
Old  Church,  Hanover,  112. 
Omens  of  war,  11-12. 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad, 

137,  305  ;   attacks  on  Manassas 

Gap  section,  307,  309,  313-317- 
Orange  County,  Virginia,  138,  374. 

Pamunkey  River,   no,   in,   113, 

114,   117,   123. 
Paris,    Comte    de,    quoted,    119, 

134-135- 

Patrick,  Captain,  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  47. 

Patterson,  General  Robert,  40, 
41,  43,  44,  47;  crosses  Mary- 
land line,  42 ;  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  56-57,  59,  61,  62; 
location  of  army,  31,  32,  38,  40, 
44,  46,  47,  62 ;  quoted,  44 ; 
retired  from  Harper's  Ferry, 
44;    strength  of  army,  39,  55, 

56,  58. 

Patton,  John  S.,  quoted,  7-8. 

Pawnee,  The,  55. 

Peck,  T.  S.,  letter  to  Mosby,  189- 

190. 
Pelham,    Major    John,    183. 
Pender's   division   in   Gettysburg 

campaign,  249,  250. 
Pennsylvania,  201,  210,  211,  221, 

225,  232,  239. 
"Peter    Parley"   schoolbooks,    4. 
Peters,  Professor  William  E.,  23 ; 

captured,  25 ;    refusal  to  burn 

Chambersburg,  24-25. 


INDEX 


4U 


Petersburg,    Virginia,    105,    307, 

332, 334.  374- 

Peterville,  1. 

Pettigrew's  brigade  in  Gettysburg 
campaign,  249. 

Philadelphia,    Pennsylvania,   235. 

Pickett,  General  George  E.,  meet- 
ing with  Lee,  381  ;   quoted,  381. 

Piedmont  region,  Virginia,  283. 

Pierpont,  Governor,  38. 

Pillow,  General  G.  J.,  escape  from 
Fort  Donelson,  103-104. 

Pipe  Creek,  227,  250. 

Pleasanton,  General  Alfred,  at 
Gettysburg,  204-206,  208,  209, 
222 ;    dispatch  to  Hooker,  207. 

Point  Lookout,  337. 

Point  of  Rocks,  Maryland,  36. 

Pope,  General  John,  123,  138,  139, 
143  ;  attacked  by  Jackson,  133  ; 
campaign  against,  125-126; 
driven  from  Virginia,  148  ;  loca- 
tion of  forces,  137-138  ;  organi- 
zation of  army,  123  ;  proclama- 
tion of,  124;  reenforced  by 
Burnside,  129,  132;  saved  from 
Stuart  by  "comedy  of  errors", 
140-142. 

Porter  (officer  at  Bull  Run), 
quoted,  81. 

Potomac  River,  23,  33,  34,  35,  36, 
40,  41,  42,  43,  46,  55,  56,  57, 
59,  60,  85,  86,  95,  105,  129, 
150,  201,  202,  209,  210,  211, 
213, 214,  215, 220, 221,  222,  224, 
225,  231,  232,  239,  240,  248, 
284,  286,  324,  325,  388,  389. 

Powhatan  County,  Virginia,  1. 

Prentiss,  Lieutenant,  capture  of, 
174;     escape,    177. 

Pryor,  Roger  A.,  reply  to  Yancey, 
14. 

Putnam,  Israel,  4. 

Raccoon  Ford,  140. 

Rapidan  River,  105,  126,  135,  136, 

137.  138,  139,  141,  H2,  203,  207, 

375- 


Rappahannock  River,  105,  106, 
138,  142,  148,  149,  182,  201,  202, 
203,  204,  209,  305. 

Rectortown,    Virginia,    309,    335, 

343- 
Reid,  Captain,  death  of,  271. 
Reports :  Lowell,  Colonel  Charles 

R.,    Jr.,    279-282 ;     Mosby    to 

Stuart,        259-263,       264-270 ; 

Mosby    to    Lieutenant- Colonel 

Taylor,  271-278. 
Revolutionary    War,    374. 
Reynolds,    General    John    F.,    in 

Gettysburg      campaign,       227, 

228,  250. 
Richards,   Captain  Adolphus  E., 

286,  291,  320,  327,  334,  336,  349. 
Richards,  Major,  373. 
Richardson,  General,  in  battle  of 

Manassas,    74,    75. 
Richmond,    Virginia,    15,   27,    33, 

38,  42,  43,  59,  60,  96,  103,  105, 

112,     Il6,     Il8,     123,     124,     125, 
129,  I33,  I35,  I38,  I70,  283,  284, 

328,   335,   349,   355,   375,   379, 

380,  391. 
Richmond  Enquirer,  quoted,  385- 

388. 
Richmond  Examiner,  quoted,  93, 

301-302. 
Rio,  96. 

Rives,  Tim,  14,  15. 
Robertson    (brigade   commander) 

in   Gettysburg   campaign,   207, 

214. 
Robertson,  Judge  William  J.,  8. 
Rodes's    division    in    Gettysburg 

campaign,  241,  242,  243. 
Romney,  West  Virginia,  41. 
Royall,    Captain,     112. 
Ruggles,     Major,     capture     and 

death  of,  321. 
Russell,  John  S.  (Mosby's  scout), 

290,  291 ;    letter  from  Mosby, 

365-369. 

Sabres,  use  of,  30,  284. 
Salem,  Virginia,  309,  335. 


412 


INDEX 


San  Francisco,  California,  399. 

San  Jacinto,  The,  92. 

Schenck,  General  R.  C,  44,  209 ; 
account  of,  45. 

Scott,  General  Winfield,  41,  43, 
59.  62,  377;    quoted,  44. 

Secession  Ordinance,  55. 

Seneca,  Virginia,  85,  223,  286. 

Seven  Days'  Battle,  123. 

Seventh  Virginia  Cavalry  in 
Gettysburg    campaign,    206. 

Seward,  William  H.,  Secretary, 
92,  93  ;  dispatch  to  Stevenson, 
322. 

Shenandoah  River,  33,  61,  290, 
292,  299,  319,  320. 

Shenandoah  Valley,  Virginia,  13, 
24,  29,  30,  34.  35,  40,  43,  47,  56, 
57,  59,  60,  84,  123,  166,  202, 
208,  213,  283,  286,  324,  326, 
332. 

Shepardstown,  West  Virginia,  214, 
220. 

Sheridan,  General  Philip  H.,  283, 
386,  287,  289,  290,  310,  333; 
begins  retreat,  305 ;  campaign 
against,  283-311;  capture  of 
supply  train  of,  313-318,  319; 
defeats  Early,  303  ;  dispatch  to 
Augur,  287,  288,  289,  296,  369 ; 
dispatch  to  Grant,  309;  dis- 
patch to  Halleck,  311 ;  dis- 
patch to  Emory,  350 ;  harassed 
by  Mosby,  283,  284,  289,  290- 
292,  3r2,  313,  319,  320,  323, 
324,  327,  332-333;  expedition 
against  Mosby's  men,  298-299, 
349 ;  letter  to  Grant,  304 ; 
line  of  supply  in  danger,  307 ; 
quoted,  304,  310;  telegram, 
333-334;  winter  quarters  of, 
332. 

Sherman,  General  William  I.,  at 
theatre,  383. 

Shields,  General  James,  in  battle 
of  Manassas,  60. 

Sixteenth  New  York  Cavalry  at 
Rectortown,  343. 


Skinner,  Mrs.,  337,  338,  339,  340, 
342. 

Slater,  George  (Mosby's  com- 
pany),   181,  344,  345. 

Slidell,  John,  13 ;    capture  of,  92, 

93, 94- 

Smith,  Boyd  (Mosby's  company), 

334- 

Smith,  General  Edmund  Kirby, 
in  battle  of  Manassas,  79. 

Smith,  Prescott,  dispatch  to  Presi- 
dent Garrett,  326. 

"Snicker's  Gap  ",  Blue  Ridge,  290, 
299. 

Snodgrass   Springs,    Virginia,   32. 

South  Carolina,  16;  bombard- 
ment   by,    18. 

South  Mountain,  221,  231,  244, 
248. 

Southside   Railroad,    307. 

Southwick,  Miss  Abby,  5-6,  note. 

Sperry,  J.  A.,  quoted,  16-17,  note. 

Stahel,  General,  report  on  Miskel 
Farm  affair,  190-191 ;  report 
on  Mosby's  raid,  196;  telegram 
to    Heintzelman,    197. 

Stanford,  Governor,  399. 

Stanton,  Secretary  Edwin  McM., 
388  ;  dispatch  to  Stevenson,  322 ; 
letter  to  ex- President  Buchanan, 

83- 
States'  Rights  Resolutions,  376. 
States'  Rights  theory,  21. 
Stevens,  Colonel,  quoted,  74. 
Stevenson,  General,  dispatches :  to 

Averell,  293  ;  to  Edwards,  307  ; 

to    French,    325 ;     to    Halleck, 

324 ;    to    Sheridan,     292,    324, 

35°,  369 :   t0  Stanton,  296,  297, 

323- 
Stone  Bridge  (Bull  Run),  62,  63, 

69,  71,  73,  81,  82. 
Stoughton,  General,  171,  176,  178, 

181;   capture  of,  174-181,  184; 

exchange  of,  187;  headquarters 

of,  150;    quoted,  180. 
Strassburg,     Virginia,     305. 
Strother,  Colonel,  25. 


INDEX 


413 


Stuart,  General  J.  E.  B.,  11,  85, 
125,  135.  139.  183 ;  account  of, 
31  ;  commands  First  Virginia 
Cavalry,  30 ;  dispatch  to  Secre- 
tary of  War,  Randolph,  121 ; 
escape  from  capture,  137;  ex- 
pedition against  McClellan, 
106-119;  expedition  against 
Pope,  135-143 ;  general  order, 
quoted,  184 ;  in  battle  of  Manas- 
sas, 47-48,  49.  50,  57.  59,  79,  80, 
84 ;  in  Gettysburg  campaign, 
202, 204,  207-219, 212-216, 218- 
223,  226,  228-230,  232,  237-240, 
245,  246,  252,  253  ;  killed,  374 ; 
location  of  headquarters,  183, 
205 ;  made  brigadier-general, 
99 ;  Mosby's  report  to,  192- 
I95.  I97-I99 ;  quoted,  106,  143 ; 
raid  to  Dumfries,  148 ;  report 
on  Gettysburg  campaign,  200, 
235-236  ;  ride  around  McClel- 
lan, 125,  229,  230;  strength  of 
army,  85 ;  wounded,  344. 

Stuart,  Mrs.  J.  E.  B.,  Mosby's 
letter  to,  254-257. 

Sudley,  Virginia,  25,  49,  62,  63, 
67.69,  73.  74.  75.  80,81,  181. 

Sumner,  Charles,  392,  393. 

Sumner,    Colonel  Edwin   V.,  31, 

377- 
Surratt,  Mrs.,  25. 
Susquehanna  River,  211,  213,  215, 

218,  219,   224,   227,   228,   230, 
231,  234,  235,  238,  240. 

Swan,  Major,  account  of,  48-49. 

Taggart,   Major,    165. 

Taylor,  A.  A.  G.,  dispatch  to 
Augur,  288 ;  dispatch  to  De 
Russy,  327 ;  dispatch  to  Slough, 
327- 

Taylor,  Colonel  Walter  W.,  218, 

219,  220,  236,  237,  238;   letter 
to  Mosby,  192. 

Tennessee,  103. 

Thirteenth  New  York  Cavalry  at 
Rectortown,  343. 


Thirty-seventh  Virginia  Infantry, 
28. 

Thomas,  Colonel  George  H.,  42. 

Toombs,  General  Robert,  142 ; 
account  of,  141. 

Torbert,  General,  345. 

Totopotomy  (creek),  no. 

Trent,  The,  92. 

Turner,  Lieutenant,  261. 

Twiggs,  General  David  E.,  con- 
duct of,  377. 

Tyler's  division  in  battle  of 
Manassas,  73. 

Underwood,  John,  adventure  with 

Mosby,  162-164. 
Union  Mills  (Bull  Run),  62,  72. 
United  States  Armory  (Harper's 

Ferry)    seized,    2 1 . 
University  of  Virginia,  5,  II,  24, 

38 1  ;  episode  in  Mosby's  life  at, 

6-10. 

Venable,  Professor,  381. 

Verdiersville,  135,  139. 

Vienna,  Virginia,  44. 

Virginia,  201,  210,  211,  212,  213, 
214,  215,  225,  232,  238,  240, 
245,  248 ;    secession  of,  19,  20, 

31,  55- 

Virginia  Convention,  19,  20,  376. 
Virginia  Military  Institute,  38. 
Von     Massow,     Baron,     incident 
regarding,  270-271. 

War  Department,  45 ;  quoted, 
41-42. 

"War  Diary"  (Weld),  quoted,  217. 

Warren,  General,  quoted,   116. 

Warrenton,  Virginia,  360,  383. 

Warrenton   Pike,   79,    173. 

Washington,  D.C.,  16,  34,  35, 
41,  43,  44,  46,  59,  67,  85,  107, 
123,  130,  131,  139,  148,  150, 
174,  202,  209,  210,  215,  218, 
223,  224,  232,  235,  284,  286, 
289,  305,  324,  326,  327,  328, 


4*4 


INDEX 


375,  377, 383,  390, 393  ;  Mosby's 
attacks  on  outposts  of,  156. 

Washington,  George,  19,  161 ; 
proclamation  of  1794,  376. 

Washington  and   Lee  College,   5. 

Washington  Star,  94. 

"Wearing  of  the  Gray ",  quoted, 
216-217. 

Weld,  General,  217. 

Wells,  Major,  capture  of,   165. 

Westmoreland,  379. 

Westover,  Virginia,  118. 

West  Point,  11,  31,  175,  182. 

Wheat,  Betsy,  3. 

Whiskey  Insurrection,  19,  376. 

White,  James,  5. 

Whiting,  Major,  37. 

Wilkes,  Captain  Charles,  92. 

Williams,  Frank  (Mosby's  com- 
pany), 176. 

Williamsburg,  Virginia,  375. 


Williamsport,  Maryland,  36,  220. 
Wiltshire,    Doctor  Jim,   312. 
Winchester,  Virginia,  29,  30,  41, 

44,  56,  57,  60,  61,  62,  208,  307, 

332 ;    battle  of,   298,   303. 
Wise,  General,  39. 
Withers,    Colonel,    in    battle    of 

Manassas,  79. 
Wolfe,  General,  4. 
Woodstock,  Virginia,  309. 
Wyndham,    Colonel    Percy,    151, 

171,  173,  174,   177,  187. 
Wytheville,  Virginia,  28,  29. 

Yancey,  William  L.,  debate  with 
Rives,  1 5  ;  disruption  of  Demo- 
cratic party  by,  14-15. 

York,  Pennsylvania,  227,  228, 
232,  235,  241. 

York  River  Road,  116. 

Yorktown,  109,  375. 


